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The thesis provides a new interpretation of Britain’s policy towards 
German rearmament through an analysis of the views of government ministers, 
Foreign Office officials and military planners. It analyses the role of five key 
influences.
British antipathy to the Germans was of seminal importance. Suspicion of 
the Germans among Labour ministers produced a backlash against a policy of 
German rearmament from September 1950. The Foreign Office feared a new 
German-Soviet, Rapallo-style pact and sought to prevent this by integrating the 
Federal Republic into the West. Once political and military integration were 
conjoined in the EDC-contract negotiations they became supportive of the EDC 
as a means of containing the German threat.
The American role was crucial in persuading the British to accept German 
rearmament within the EDC. However, Washington consistently came into conflict 
with London over Germany’s financial contribution to defence, the extent of 
German rearmament and British attempts to moderate German policy in order 
to conciliate the Soviets. The Anglo-Soviet relationship constitutes a third crucial 
factor. Initially, fear of Soviet reactions inhibited the British from supporting 
extensive German rearmament. The apparently less provocative nature of EDC 
was one reason for British acceptance of it. In 1951, 1953 and 1955 elements 
within the British government sought to promote detente through concessions to 
the Soviets on German rearmament.
Though the British military put the German rearmament issue on to the 
government’s agenda in spring 1950, subsequently the strategic rationale became 
less important than the diplomatic. From 1952 a German defence contribution 
was seen as a means of compensating for NATO deficiencies rather than as part 
of a wider force expansion. German rearmament involved substantial financial 
costs for Britain but a series of favourable financial agreements with the Federal 
Republic enabled policy-makers to discount this factor.
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PREFACE
I have greatly enjoyed researching and writing this thesis. It originated from 
a desire to examine how Britain viewed the transformation of Germany, or at least 
the western half of it, from a bitter enemy to a partner in the western alliance 
system. The study of British foreign policy in the first post-war decade has tended 
to concentrate on the problems experienced in adapting to the decline of Britain’s 
global influence, Britain’s attitudes towards European integration and on the 
souring of Anglo-Soviet relations. Less has been written on the effect which three 
generations of hostility between Germany and Britain had on Britain’s view of the 
post-1945 balance, or imbalance, of power on the European continent. Naturally 
an interest in this subject leads one to consider British attitudes to the arming of 
the nascent Federal Republic.
Much important research has of course been done on this subject, 
particularly by Saki Dockrill, John Young and Klaus Larres. However, their work 
centres around two particular facets of the German rearmament issue, namely 
Britain’s attitude towards the European Army and the role of Churchill’s 
diplomacy in this controversy. The development of the Labour government’s 
policy between 1949 and 1951 has been somewhat neglected, as has the 
reconsideration of policy which occurred in 1954-5. In addition the disagreements 
within the western alliance over issues such as German arms production, the 
German financial contribution, the role of German rearmament in Allied military 
strategy and the decoupling of the EDC from the establishment of contractual 
relations need further examination. My over-riding aim has been to discover the 
nature of the internal debate within the British government on the subject of 
German rearmament. As a result of my analysis I discovered that the uncertain 
future of Germany played as large a role as the seemingly unremitting hostility of 
the Soviet Union in the development of Britain’s Cold War policy.
This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of a 
number of people and institutions. I owe a huge debt to my supervisor, Dr John 
Kent, for his help and encouragement, without which this project could never have 
been finished within the three year deadline. The International History 
department at LSE provided a stimulating environment for my work and I would 
particularly like to thank Pat Christopher for her assistance in steering me through
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a series of administrative obstacles. I received invaluable advice on the draft 
manuscript from Dr Kate Morris, Christine Murray, Ian Speller and Bryan White. 
Professor John Young assisted in the publication of the first chapter, provided me 
with a draft manuscript of his book, Churchill’s Last Campaign, and scrutinised 
the final draft for which I am very grateful. Professor Geoffrey Warner gave me 
access to the Kenneth Younger papers which I quote with the kind permission 
Lady Younger. I would also like to thank Mrs Elizabeth A1 Qadhi for granting me 
access to her father’s papers.
The staff at the Public Records Office at Kew supplied me with an endless 
stream of papers from the government archives on which most of this thesis is 
based. The resources of the British Library of Political and Economic Science 
proved immensely useful and I would like to thank the staff there for their 
assistance. I have receive help from the staff at a number of other libraries and 
institutions and I acknowledge my debt to those working at the British Library; the 
Imperial War Museum; the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; the 
Department of Modem Manuscripts at the Bodleian Library and the Nuffield 
College Library, Oxford; the House of Lords Record Office; the Liddell Hart 
Centre at King’s College, London; the University of London Library; the archives 
centre at the University of Birmingham; the National Army Museum; and the 
National Register of Archives and Historical Manuscripts Commission at Quality 
House.
I am immensely grateful to the British Academy who have funded my work 
for the past three years and have been helpful and efficient in all my dealings with 
them.
The greatest debt of all I owe to my mother, Mrs Sheila Mawby, who 
unflaggingly typed chapter after chapter, draft after draft, while retaining an 
unshakable conviction that one day at some hour we would eventually get to the 
end. And, astonishingly enough, we did.
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INTRODUCTION
The complexities of British foreign policy in the first half of the 1950s have 
perhaps not yet been fully appreciated. During 1950 Bevin’s attempts to create a 
viable Western Union based on a transatlantic partnership reached fruition with 
the agreement to create an integrated NATO structure and the appointment of 
an American Supreme Commander for Allied forces in Europe. However, a series 
of new problems emerged during the course or the year. In rapid succession the 
French proposed greater European economic integration in the form of the 
Schuman Plan and a new European defence structure embodied in the Pleven 
Plan. After a period of relative calm following the end of the Berlin Blockade the 
outbreak of the Korean War appeared to signal an escalation in the Cold War. 
The Soviets sought to exploit western fears through renewed offers of four power 
negotiations. Meanwhile, the Americans became ever more vehement in their 
insistence upon a greater defence effort from the European powers. Finally, the 
new Chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, sought to utilise his domestic 
weakness to international advantage by warning that without concessions from the 
Allies on the subject of a security guarantee and the establishment of an armed 
Federal police force, his position would be endangered. All of these issues fed into 
the debate within the British government on the subject of a German defence 
contribution and in various forms fears about Germany’s future, American 
pressure, the Soviet Cold War challenge and the debate over European defence 
were to create endless difficulties for British policy-makers over the next five 
years. Perhaps because of these intricacies there is no full, accurate, narrative 
account of the evolution of British policy towards German rearmament in this 
period. This thesis is intended to provide such a narrative and to analyse the 
factors which influenced British foreign policy-makers. In doing so it will 
demonstrate that the British had a singular perspective on the Cold War in the 
early 1950s and evaluate how influential the British view was in the international 
debate over the arming of Germany.
The general view of British policy between 1949 and 1951 has been that 
it was marked by the slow acceptance of the idea of German rearmament by the
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Labour government. ^  In fact the reverse is true. In the spring of 1950 the British 
government developed a plan for a German defence contribution based on the 
notion that this was essential to western defence in the long term but that such 
a policy must proceed cautiously. After June 1950 a reaction set in which 
accelerated with the forced acceptance by the British of the principle of German 
rearmament at the New York Foreign Ministers conference in September. In the 
winter of 1950-1 the majority of the Cabinet, most Foreign Office officials and 
even some military analysts were seeking a delay or even the abandonment of the 
policy of German rearmament. Chapter one of this thesis deals with the early 
British plans for a German defence contribution and chapter two outlines the 
backlash. Chapter three chronicles a series of Anglo-American disputes over 
German arms production and the Federal Republic’s financial contribution to 
defence. It argues that the European Defence Community (EDC) became an 
essential component of the government’s policy for the integration of Germany 
into the western system which was the central goal of British foreign policy. 
However, there were dissenters from this line and the procrastination of the 
French on this issue provided them with their opportunity. Chapter four analyses 
Churchill’s failed attempt to revise policy and suggests that the defeat o f his 
initiative, combined with the emergence of a new military rationale for German 
rearmament merely reinforced the status quo. The Conservative government did 
eventually lose faith in EDC but only during the last months of its life. To suggest 
they had been trying to strangle it since its infancy^ is a distortion. Chapter five 
suggests that the real abandonment of EDC did not consist of the formulation of 
plans for German rearmament within NATO, which many military analysts 
believed were profoundly flawed but which have nevertheless been used as 
evidence of British coolness towards the European Army, but of a plan to 
postpone German rearmament in order to establish a contractual relationship with 
the Federal Republic which did not emerge until the summer of 1954. The
1. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991), chs. 1-4; D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (Oswald Wolff, London, 1965), 
p. 102-8; David Clay Large, Germans to the Front (University of North Carolina Press, Stanford 
Hill, 1996), p. 41-4.
2. For the extreme version of this view see Klaus Larres, ’British Attitudes to German 
Rearmament and Reunification in the 1950s’, Contemporary Record, 5, 1991, p.292-3. Dockrill 
also argues that Eden and the Conservatives were tepid towards EDC. See Saki Dockrill, The 
Evolution of British Policy Towards a European Army*, Strategic Studies, 12, 1989, p.38-62.
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primacy of the new political relationship is the theme of chapter six which 
demonstrates the increasing indifference of the Foreign Office to a German 
defence contribution and their willingness to negotiate over this issue with the 
Soviet Union.
For the sake of convenience the main foreign policy decision-makers are 
often discussed as members of one of three groups: Whitehall officials, of whom 
the most important were the members of the Foreign Office, the military, 
represented mainly by the Chiefs of Staff, and government ministers. Of these 
three groups it was the permanent officials at the Foreign Office who had the 
greatest influence. The Foreign Office was both the point at which information on 
foreign affairs was collected and analysed and a centre for decision-making. Those 
departments responsible for Germany received telegrams from Bonn covering 
events in the Federal Republic but their staff also read reports from the other 
embassies whose work impinged on German affairs, including Washington, 
Moscow and Paris. At the centre of the decision-making process was an official 
with the remit to supervise German affairs. His work included deciding which 
issues needed to be addressed by his supervisors, the writing of advisory 
memoranda to the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Foreign Secretary on 
these matters and the taking of decisions when he believed further consultation 
was unnecessary. For the 1949-51 period this official had the rank of Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the semi-autonomous German sectiqn of the Foreign Office, 
but subsequently German affairs were reintegrated into the parent organisation 
and a superintending Deputy Under-Secretary took responsibility. As Permanent 
Under-Secretary for the German section between 1949 and 1950, Ivone 
Kirkpatrick exercised enormous influence, while Frank Roberts, as Deputy Under­
secretary superintending German affairs, played a crucial role in guiding British 
policy from 1951 to 1954. The former initially opposed German rearmament, 
while the latter favoured it, and the change in personnel at least partially explains 
the British government’s more positive attitude towards a German defence 
contribution after 1951. Donald Gainer, the Permanent Under-Secretary for the 
German section between 1950 and 1951, and Geoffrey Harrison, the 
superintending Under-Secretary after 1954, were less influential. The key official 
abroad was the British High Commissioner to Germany. Of the three occupants
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of this post it was Kirkpatrick who, as High Commissioner for three years from 
1950, had a commanding role. However his predecessor, General Brian 
Robertson, who helped persuade Bevin of the need for a Federal gendarmerie, 
and his successor, Frederick Hoyer-Millar, who stressed the need for an end to 
the occupation after 1953, were also important figures. Other officials abroad, 
notably the ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1950, David Kelly, and the. 
ambassador to France in 1954, Gladwyn Jebb, were influential on occasions. The 
head of the Foreign Office, the Permanent Under-Secretary, often acted as a 
conduit for the views of his officials rather than as an active policy-maker. 
However, the two officials who held this post in our period, William Strang and 
Kirkpatrick, both had strong views on German policy and played an active role 
in its development.
The Cabinet was some distance removed from the process of active foreign 
policy-making. They received periodic reports from the Foreign Secretary in the 
form of memoranda drafted by the responsible Under-Secretary but with a few 
exceptions, notably Hugh Dalton and Harold Macmillan, they were inevitably 
distracted by the affairs of their own departments and were less well briefed than 
the Foreign Secretary. Outside interventions were generally the result of either 
party pressure or individual initiative. While the second Attlee government 
suffered disruption from both sources, during Churchill’s second administration 
Eden only had to deal with personal challenges. The increasing divisions within 
the Labour Party during the 1950s began to exert a disruptive influence as Bevin’s 
grip on foreign affairs weakened due to ill health in 1950. The Labour left, which 
came under Anuerin Bevan’s leadership, persistently argued the case for 
negotiations with the Soviets to achieve German unification and they gained 
additional support from the strong Germanophobic elements in the party when 
urging the postponement of the German defence contribution. The emergence of 
this powerful coalition provided the background to Attlee’s increasing scepticism 
about arming the Germans in the winter of 1950-1. There were numerous forums 
in which this dissent could be expressed including the National Executive 
Committee (NEC), meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the annual 
party conference. The controversy reached its climax at the 1954 Scarborough 
conference when the leadership’s motion endorsing the rearmament of Germany
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passed by a narrow majority following a bitter party row. In the Conservative 
Party the dissenters were a smaller faction, with greater loyalty to the party 
leadership and less opportunity to express their discontent. During Churchill’s 
second premiership German rearmament was increasingly tied to the EDC issue 
and, though there was a range of opinion about the idea of a European Army in 
the Conservative Party, when it came to votes on Britain’s association there were 
few willing to abstain. This may have been at least partly a reaction to Labour 
disunity.
Even without the constraints of party pressure there were a number of 
prominent Cabinet ministers willing to oppose the development of government 
policy on this issue. Hugh Dalton, who had been one of Labour’s leading 
spokesmen on foreign affairs in the 1930s and was still a prominent NEC member, 
provided leadership for a group of ministers determined to prevent Bevin’s 
agreement to the principle of German rearmament in 1950 being put into practise 
in 1951. In the 1951-5 Conservative government the most prominent opponent of 
Eden’s foreign policy was Churchill himself. The Prime Minister was bitterly 
critical of the form which EDC had taken and was infuriated when French 
hesitancy about ratifying the treaty appeared to be blocking the path to detente. 
Macmillan too regarded the EDC as a misconceived continental project which 
ought to be abandoned but he was unable to muster the support Dalton had 
gained within the Labour government and was defeated by the silencing authority 
of Eden. Significantly, one Cabinet minister who never joined the dissenters was 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Both Gaitskell and Butler accepted German 
rearmament and seemed to regard the trade implications as advantageous, even 
if the consequences for the balance of payments were not. The Treasury 
arguments against a German defence contribution based on the increase in the 
defence budget which would result from Britain’s assumption of occupation costs 
in Germany were never put to the Cabinet by either Chancellor. It was left to 
Eden to give the Foreign Office view of the economic consequences of German 
rearmament.
The British Chiefs of Staff had access to foreign policy-making through 
regular consultations with the Foreign Office, the Defence Committee and the
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presence of the Minister of Defence at Cabinet meetings. However, their 
influence was circumscribed during the Churchill administration by the increasing 
infrequency of Defence Committee meetings and the weakness of Alexander as
•3
a departmental head. Their most notable success came in early 1950 when they 
persuaded Bevin to accept their conception of an armed Federal gendarmerie for 
West Germany. After the outbreak of the Korean War they lost the initiative and 
never regained it. Nevertheless, the views of two key figures, John Slessor and 
John Harding, had some impact even after June 1950. Slessor, the Chief of the 
Air Staff between 1950 and 1952, believed it was essential to harness German 
military potential to the western cause and argued strongly that fears of a new 
German threat were anachronistic because the threat of atomic retaliation was 
bound to inhibit any future German government from pursuing an adventurist 
foreign policy. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1952, proved a 
vigorous advocate of a substantial German defence contribution at a time when 
its strategic rationale was becoming increasingly unclear.
The role of domestic factors, with the exception of party politics, has been 
largely discounted in this study. It has generally been recognised that public 
opinion has had a very marginal influence on British foreign policy.^ Kenneth 
Younger, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office between 1950 and 1951, 
could recall no example of a foreign policy decision being taken under the 
influence of domestic pressures.^ Though the Beaverbrook press launched a 
campaign against the idea of German rearmament, there is little evidence to 
suggest it had a great impact on policy-making. Indeed, if one examines the 
Foreign Office files it is clear that they took a much greater interest in the state 
of German than British public opinion. The formal reason for this was that, 
whereas the High Commissioner in Germany sent a stream of reports to the 
leading figures in the Foreign Office analysing the state of German opinion, 
reporting and shaping British public opinion was left to the separate German 
Information department, under the long serving but obscure functionary, Roland
3. Anthony Seldon, Churchill’s Indian Summer (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981), p.298-9.
4. David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968), 
ch.4.
5. James Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy? (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 
1976), p.11-12.
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Chaput de Saintonge. Despite constant reorganisation the German Information 
department remained outside the policy-making structure. However, the central 
reason for Foreign Office disinterest was their awareness that the British had at 
least tacitly accepted the need for a western alliance to counter communist 
influence and showed no sign of changing this view but the Germans had yet to 
be persuaded of the West’s Cold War case and had traditionally been drawn 
towards and eastern alliance. Countering this latter tendency was central to 
Foreign Office strategy and was accepted as such by Bevin, Morrison and Eden. 
Even the opponents of German rearmament tended to concentrate on opposition 
to it in Germany rather than attempting to harness British public opinion in an 
extra-Parliamentary campaign. Thus the February 1951 Attlee conditions called 
for the consent of the German people to be demonstrated and the Labour Party 
returned to this theme in May 1952, when they demanded new elections in the 
Federal Republic to endorse Adenauer’s policy.**
In examining British policy towards German rearmament this study will 
concentrate on five key factors:
1.British antipathy towards the Germans. The British had endured two recent wars 
against the Germans and the quondam Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, held them responsible for the last five European 
conflicts. In order to understand British attitudes towards German rearmament 
it is essential to be cognisant of the emotive nature of the issue.
2.The relationship with the United States. The Americans had been drawn into 
European affairs by Hitler’s declaration of war upon them in December 1941 and 
since that time it had been a goal of British policy-makers to maintain the Atlantic 
alliance and avoid a repetition of the post-1918 era when American engagement 
with the Old World seemed restricted to the exercise of dollar diplomacy. In April 
1949 the Americans signed the North Atlantic Treaty and this was followed in 
December 1950 by the commitment of American reinforcements to Europe and 
the appointment of an American Supreme Commander for NATO. American 
involvement inevitably implied American leadership and the role of Anglo-
6. Kenneth Harris, Attlee (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.498.
7. In November 1939 Vansittart wrote his version of the origins of the Second World War and 
called it ‘The Origins of Germany’s Fifth War’. See Norman Rose, Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat 
(William Heinemann, London, 1978), p.239.
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American relations must be considered from this perspective in any analysis of 
British policy towards German rearmament.
3.The relationship with the Soviet Union. After the ending of the Berlin Blockade 
in 1949 Anglo-Soviet relations can best be described as antagonistic but stable. 
Despite the overt hostility between London and Moscow, the Soviets could still 
offer British policy-makers inducements, in the form of a relaxation of tension 
which would allow both countries an opportunity to confront their domestic 
problems, and potent threats, ranging from intimidatory probes into the western 
sphere of influence to the launching of all out war, in an effort to influence British 
policy. Thus the influence of Soviet diplomacy must also be considered.
4.The military situation. The threat posed by the still vast military forces deployed 
by the Soviets dominated British military thinking at the end of the 1940s. Since 
August 1945 the British and the Americans had completed a vast demobilisation 
programme which had produced a huge disparity between the armed forces of the 
West and those of the Soviet Union. The rearming of the western zones of 
Germany offered the opportunity to narrow this gap at a time when the West’s 
technological advantage was apparently eroding.
5.The economics of German rearmament. British forces had been in occupation 
of Germany since 1945 and though this had initially involved huge costs, by the 
time of the founding of the Federal Republic in September 1949, the Germans 
were making a substantial contribution to the British defence budget by paying for 
the stationing of allied troops on their territory. The rearming of Germany implied 
that the funds previously allocated to the occupying powers would go towards the 
raising of German forces instead. The new costs on the Exchequer had to be 
considered against the possible benefits which British exporters might gain from 
the strains on the German economy resulting from a large scale rearmament 
programme.
Of these five factors, the background to the Anglo-American and Anglo- 
Soviet relationships are well known, while the military and economic aspects relate 
specifically to the conditions prevailing in the 1949-55 period and will be examined 
in subsequent chapters. However, the role of Anglo-German antagonism is rarely 
discussed as a factor in the development of the Cold War and it is necessary, 
therefore, to place this in historical context.
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Though it is often assumed that prior to the 20th century Britain had 
developed close relations with Germany based on racial, linguistic and cultural 
affinities, in fact the historical record is ambiguous. In geopolitical terms Germany 
lies at the heart of Europe, while Britain is on the periphery, and this fact has 
been reflected in the very different histories of the two countries. Since the start 
of the Early Modem period Germany has been at the centre of European politics, 
first as a battleground for the great powers, then as a hotbed in which the modem 
phenomena of nationalism, militarism and totalitarianism developed at an 
accelerated pace. By contrast, the British did not suffer the depredations which 
accompany the march of foreign armies and were distracted from playing a larger 
role in Europe by the process of acquiring a global empire. On the occasions 
when the British did interfere it was not always to the benefit of the German 
states. In 1704, for example, Marlborough conducted a brutal campaign of terror 
in Bavaria as part of Britain’s policy of opposing the ambitions of Louis XIV and 
his German ally, the Elector of Bavaria. Indeed Britain’s policy towards the 
German states seems largely to have been conducted on the basis of the latter’s 
utility in opposing French policy. Thus, when Prussia allied itself to France during 
the Silesian Wars of the 1740s she found herself in conflict with Britain, but when 
Prussia fought France, as during the Seven Years War, she gained British support.
Anglo-German relations were further complicated by the close dynastic ties 
between the two countries. In the 18th century the Hanoverian kings had a dual 
role as German electors and British monarchs. These dynastic influences survived 
into the 19th century when Queen Victoria and her German spouse, Prince 
Albert, became ardent advocates of close Anglo-German relations. However, the 
disruptive influence of the rise of Prussia prompted many British statesmen to 
question whether it was wise to encourage German nationalism, even if it did 
provide a continental counterweight to Britain’s traditional foes, France and 
Russia. Palmerston was prepared to align himself with despotic Russia in order 
to prevent the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. This venture ended in 
humiliating failure and demonstrated that neither pro-Germans nor anti-Germans 
within Britain had much hope of influencing events on the continent of Europe 
in the mid-19th century.
In 1914 the British did intervene in Europe to oppose German designs and
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it is possible to trace the origins of this decision to the autocratic Bismarck era. 
The first German Chancellor’s influence on Anglo-German relations was a baleful 
one. Queen Victoria was shocked by his brutal treatment of the pro-British party 
at court, led by her son-in-law, the Crown Prince Frederick. Liberals were 
dismayed by Prussia’s comprehensive victory in the war against France, and then 
further alienated by Bismarck’s contempt for Gladstone. Even some Conservative 
politicians, such as Derby, who later defected to the Liberals, and Salisbury,
Q
became concerned at the vigour with which a united Germany conducted itself. 
These worries intensified with the adoption by Bismarck’s successors of 
Weltpolitik and, most significant of all, the emergence of a German naval 
challenge. The erratic course of German foreign policy in the 1890s not only 
strained relations between William II and his uncle, the Prince of Wales, but, 
more significantly, soured Sir Edward Grey’s view of Germany.^ The outburst of 
violent anti-British feeling during the Boer War cemented the new antagonism.
One crucial development during the years of escalating tension leading up 
to World War I was the virtual takeover of the British Foreign Office by the 
Germanophobes, the effects of which could still be felt half a century later. ^  
The key figure in this group was Francis Bertie. As an Assistant Under-Secretary 
he used his influence, which extended as far as the court, to advance the careers 
of like-minded officials, including Charles Hardinge, Arthur Nicolson, Louis Mallet 
and Eyre Crowe. Crowe was regarded as a mentor by the most famous of this 
line, Sir Robert Vansittart, although Crowe himself was not particularly impressed 
by his successor’s abilities. Vansittart’s own influence continued to be felt in the 
post-1945 era when his close ally in opposing appeasement, Sir Orme Sargent, was 
head of the Foreign Office. Though it may be argued that these officials were a 
good deal more reasonable than some of the more violent Germanophobes 
outside the Civil Service, they nevertheless showed a consistent hostility to the 
Germans. Their existence proved a formidable obstacle within the government to
8. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism (The Ashfield Press, London, 1980), 
especially ch. 11.
9. C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power British Foreign Policy, 1902-16, voLl 
(Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1972), p. 18.
10. Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1969), ch.3; Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (Fontana edition, 
London, 1986), p.61-2.
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a policy of conciliation, though one which could be overcome, as it was in the
inter-war years. Furthermore, by any objective standard, their view of the German
people was bleak, and the outbreak of war in 1939 seemed to justify their beliefs.
In 1940 Vansittart wrote to Halifax that "eighty per cent of the German race are
the political and moral scum of the earth". After the Soviet Union’s entry into
the war, Sargent, contemplating the refugee problem which might result from the
removal of German-populated territory from the Reich, suggested it might be best
if those uprooted "disappear into Siberia, instead of forming themselves into a
12compact and indigestible mass in Germany". The descendant of this line of 
Permanent Under-Secretaries in our period was Sir William Strang. At the 
outbreak of the war he stated his view, which was the antithesis of the appeasers’ 
foreign policy perspective, that it was "less dangerous in the immediate future for 
western Europe that Russia should displace Germany in Eastern Europe than that 
Germany should maintain herself. J
The influence of this group reached its peak in the pre-1914 period, when 
they had a sympathetic Foreign Secretary in Grey. Many Liberal politicians argued 
against the drift towards a commitment to France and in favour of a neutrality 
pact with Germany. In the summer of 1914 Morley, representing the Gladstonian 
tradition within the party, resigned from the Cabinet with two of his colleagues in 
protest against the drift towards war. After August 1914 tales of German atrocities 
in Belgium gave impetus to a tide of anti-German emotion. More surprising was 
the speed with which these feelings ebbed in the aftermath of the war. Curzon, 
the Foreign Secretary, was sympathetic to Germany’s post-war plight, while 
Keynes’s book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, proved to many that 
Versailles was unjust. The popularity of Wilsonian ideals and the League of 
Nations demonstrated the wider public’s disillusionment with the war. As Martin 
Gilbert has demonstrated, appeasement of Germany was not simply the policy of 
Neville Chamberlain, but of the post-1918 generation. ^
11. Rose, op. cit., p.242.
12. Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War (Jonathan Cape, London, 1982), p.38; Neil 
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The most interesting aspect of appeasement for those considering its
influence on the post-1945 period, is its connection with the Bolshevik threat. This
was most apparent in the aftermath of the October Revolution. In the spring of
1919 the new Bolshevik government was at war with Poland, Bavaria experienced
a Communist coup and a Soviet regime was established in Hungary. Churchill, the
leader of the alarmist party in London, advocated the use of German troops
against the Bolsheviks. When he publicly aired this idea in April 1919, it was given
a rousing reception.^ The first part of his formula, ‘Kill the Bolshie; Kiss the
Hun’^ ,  was abandoned long before the second part. With Stalin's destruction
of the Left Opposition in the 1920s, the Soviets recanted from their ideal of world
revolution and to a large extent withdrew from active European diplomacy. In
contrast, the threat of German recidivism remained a potent one which British
statesmen sought to counter by conciliating the government in Berlin. Lloyd
George explained the need to adopt a policy of judicious magnanimity in his
Fontainebleau Memorandum, which warned that the punitive peace favoured by
the French would leave Germany weak and vulnerable to a left wing take- 
17over. Surprisingly, this belief in the possibility of a communist revival was to 
reemerge in 1945 and would again be used to justify a policy of opposition to 
French revancheism. However, even more significant was to be the influence of 
the Rapallo pact which was signed in the last year of Lloyd George’s premiership. 
He had succeeded in assembling the European powers at Genoa in an effort to 
achieve reconciliation but found his efforts undermined by the signing of a 
bilateral Soviet-German agreement at Rapallo in the middle of the conference. 
Rapallo was to become a by-word for German duplicity.
The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933 finally galvanised the 
opponents of appeasement. However, they were few in number, divided among 
themselves and their antipathy to the Germans generally predated the Nazi era. 
Macmillan, Duff Cooper, Dalton, Bevin and Boothby were all prominent in 
publicising the German threat in the 1930s and, with the exception of Boothby,
15. Lowe and Dockrill, op. cit., vol.2, p.324-5.
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1 o
their dislike of the Germans predated the 1930s. All five went on to express
grave concerns about the policy of German rearmament in the 1950s. Those
politicians whose reputation survived their association with appeasement, notably
Morrison and Butler, later proved sanguine about the proposed recreation of
German armed forces. The two figures who do not fit this schema are Churchill
and Eden. Churchill did not have fixed views about Germany and his opinions on
Britain’s relations with that country fluctuated wildly, depending upon current
circumstances.^ This phenomena can be observed in the spring of 1953 when
he tried to reverse Britain’s policy on German rearmament, before switching back
to supporting it before the end of the year. Eden had a somewhat chequered
record as an anti-appeaser and his opposition to Chamberlain centred on Italian
policy. He would later reluctantly accept the Foreign Office thesis that
German rearmament was a regrettable necessity.
The anti-German views of Dalton and Bevin became increasingly influential
in the Labour Party, until by 1945 they were predominant. Between the wars the
party developed close links with the German Social Democrats and Ramsey
MacDonald was one of the most fervent advocates of friendship with the Weimar
71Republic, arguing that it represented the lfbetter Germany". However, the left
found the tactics of the Nazis repugnant and the Trade Unions in particular were
active in opposition to appeasement. By 1937 Dalton had persuaded the
parliamentary party to drop its opposition to the Service estimates which had
77hindered efforts to portray the party as strong opponents of the Nazis. During 
the war it was Labour ministers who were most active in arguing for a punitive
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peace. In 1942 anti-German Labour MPs formed the Tight for Freedom’ group
to argue that the blame for Germany’s crimes was not restricted to the Nazis, but
extended to the population as a w hole.^ Within the government, Attlee argued
that the eradication of Germany’s war potential must have priority over the
restoration of order and stability on the grounds "that everything that brings home
to the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is worthwhile
in the end".^  Bevin favoured dismemberment and was insistent that the
25Germans should not retain control over the industrialised Ruhr. After the war
anti-German feeling was not restricted to senior Labour ministers. Indeed
opposition to German rearmament in the 1950s was even more pronounced
among the next generation of Labour leaders. Harold Wilson, James Callaghan,
Michael Stewart, Tony Benn, Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Barbara
Castle all opposed the idea of German rearmament during the early 1950s.
The Labour Party and the Foreign Office were the two bastions of anti-German
sentiment after the war, though their calculations about the best means of
preventing the reemergence of the German menace eventually led them to
different conclusions about the wisdom of German rearmament.
Distrust of Russia was one of a number of factors which influenced Neville
97Chamberlain in his determination to settle European problems peacefully. 
The outbreak of war with Germany and the unforseen alliance with the Soviet 
Union which came about two years later represented a complete defeat for 
Chamberlain and his supporters. The likelihood of this new alignment outlasting 
the war was an issue which the Churchill government preferred to ignore, but it 
inevitably became a matter of controversy once victory was assured. Churchill 
continued to demonstrate a somewhat eccentric attitude to the future of Germany.
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His main enthusiasm was for the detachment of Prussia and the creation of a 
separate south German ‘Danubian’ federation, but he also proposed that a 
proportion of German men should be separated from their womenfolk in an effort
90
to restrict population growth. Generally, however, Churchill was willing to 
defer to the Allies on the subject of Germany’s future. At the 1944 Quebec 
conference he agreed to the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralisation of Germany, 
and at Yalta it was left to Eden to argue the case against Soviet demands for the
on
dismemberment of the country. It was only when both the Americans and the 
Soviets lost their enthusiasm for dismemberment that the idea was
on
abandoned.
Below the ministerial level an important debate did take place among 
civilian and military planners about the future of Germany. In 1943 there was 
some discussion about the prospect of using the threat of aerial bombardment as 
an alternative to policing Germany with ground troops. This idea was to be 
revived by Sir John Slessor during the debates over German rearmament in the
01
1950s but was rejected at this time by the Chiefs of Staff. In the summer of 
1944 the Post Hostilities Planning Staff raised an even more controversial subject 
when they suggested that if the Soviets proved hostile to Britain after the war "in 
the last resort this might even entail coming to some arrangement with our ex­
enemies". Gladwyn Jebb, the Foreign Office representative on the committee, 
reported to his colleagues that the Chiefs were obsessed with the idea of drawing 
as much as possible of Germany into the western sphere of influence after the 
war. He suggested this view derived "from some kind of suicidal mania." The 
Foreign Office were resentful of what they saw as military interference in their 
sphere of competence and perturbed that the Chiefs’ advocacy of a post-war 
alliance with Germany might be relayed to the Soviets. On 25 August a PHP 
paper was submitted which, as part of a discussion of the possible tripartite 
division of Germany, suggested that the British and American zones could be
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integrated into a future western alliance. The presupposition was "We must above 
all prevent Germany combining with the Soviet Union against us". This prompted 
Jebb to withdraw from the committee and Eden to intervene personally. In 
September 1944 he warned the Chiefs that discussion of German membership of 
a western bloc must "be avoided like the plague... we shall quickly destroy any 
hope of preserving the Anglo-Soviet alliance and soon find ourselves advocating 
the relaxations of the disarmament and other measures which we regard as 
essential guarantees against future German aggression".
A number of Foreign Office officials regarded the communisation of 
Germany as a real danger. Geoffrey Harrison, who a decade later became Under­
secretary responsible for Germany, believed that the Germans, with their "innate 
reverence for ruthless power", might be attracted to Stalinism, and this view was 
supported by Frank Roberts. Though these opinions have been criticised as 
crude and unrealistic,^ it should be stressed that generally Foreign Office 
concerns centred on the threat of the Germans trying to undermine the wartime 
alliance through an accommodation with Moscow, rather than the possibility of 
a communist take-over in Berlin. They were surely correct in suggesting that the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had proved precisely the point that the two countries 
could reach a rapprochement based on power-political, rather than ideological, 
considerations. John Troutbeck and Orme Sargent were worried about a return 
to Bismarckian diplomacy rather than a German swing towards communism. Thus, 
Troutbeck was convinced that what was required in the post-war era was to 
destroy, not communism, but "to stamp out the whole tradition on which the 
German nation has been built." J In his famous memorandum ‘Stocktaking 
After VE-Day’ written in July 1945, Sargent warned that a revived Germany might 
"put herself up to the highest bidder so as to play off each of the three Great 
Powers one against the other".^
Between 1945 and 1947 the Soviet threat came to dominate Foreign Office
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thinking, but the possibility that a revived Germany could play a destabilising role
in the emerging Cold War was never entirely forgotten. It re-emerged forcibly
once Germany began to recover from the catastrophic post-war collapse and
Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union stabilised. In this period the Foreign
Office saw itself in a competition for influence in Germany and developed the
view that the best means of countering Moscow’s strategy was to isolate and build
up the western zones.^  The huge costs involved in maintaining the British zone
were also influential in persuading Bevin of the need to raise German industry
levels and ultimately to accept a merger with the American zone. The expense of
feeding the large population of the British zone, now swollen by an influx of
refugees, was a terrible burden. The British had to supply 70% of the food for
their zone at a cost of £80 million despite severe shortages in Britain. At the
1947 Moscow conference, Bevin encouraged the Americans to raise production
levels in the bizone, while fending off Soviet demands for reparations. The new
American Secretary of State, George Marshall, came away from the conference
disillusioned with the prospect of a deal with Stalin and it is generally agreed that
this was the period in which the chances of a deal on unification evaporated,
although the formal division of the country was not assured until the introduction
■20
of currency reforms a year later.
During the evolution of the West German state there remained a latent 
concern about what policy the Germans would adopt once they regained their 
independence. In many respects developments in central Europe seemed to offer 
Moscow the prospect of future successes even after an economic recovery had 
begun. There were millions of refugees in the western zones of Germany who 
hankered after the return of the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line and only 
the Soviets had the necessary influence to return these lands. Furthermore, the 
division of the country was felt as a loss by practically all Germans and the Soviets 
continued to retain the option of offering new, attractive terms for reunification 
in an effort to win over the Germans and disrupt western plans. Bevin’s brief for
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the 1947 Moscow conference stated: "If a German government in Berlin fairly 
reproduced the outlook of the country it would be neither wholly eastward looking 
nor wholly westward looking. The question would then turn on whether the 
western democracies or the Soviet Union would exercise the stronger pull. On the 
whole the balance of advantage seems to lie with the Russians".^
Fearing that the Germans would once more assume a position of influence 
in world affairs, Labour ministers had hoped for a deal with Moscow on 
unification, even when relations with the Soviets were clearly deteriorating, and 
continued to seek restrictions on Germany’s future freedom of action. Bevin was 
convinced that the Allies should retain control over Germany’s industrial heartland 
in the Ruhr valley, and during 1946 pursued plans for international control and 
the socialisation of industry despite the scepticism of his officials.^* In January 
1947 Bevin told the intensely Germanophobic British ambassador to Paris, Duff 
Cooper, that he agreed with him that the Germans still posed a potent th re a t.^  
At the end of the year he reiterated this view during a conversation with the 
French Foreign Minister, Bidault.^ Attlee too was concerned about what would 
occur once Germany had built up its strength; a policy he described as "using 
Satan to defeat Sin". He warned the Dominions Prime Ministers in May 1946 that, 
"A Germany under Russian influence might in time develop into a Russia under 
German influence".^ Though the enthusiasm of Labour ministers for industrial 
controls and decentralisation generally went beyond what was desired by the 
Foreign Office, some more independently minded officials were sympathetic to 
their concerns. In December 1946 Nigel Ronald proposed cooperating with 
Moscow to achieve the "long-term containment of Germany" and Gladwyn Jebb
40. Anne Deighton, ‘The Frozen Front: The Labour Government, the Division of Germany and 
the Origins of the Cold War’, International Affairs, 63, 1987, p.458.
41. Rothwell, op. cit., p.313-4; Bullock (1983), op. cit., p.266-7; Morgan, op. cit., p.254-6.
42. Bullock (1983), op. cit., p.358. In November 1947 Bevin advised in a minute that "we have to 
have regard to a German recovery. Like Duff Cooper I am concerned about that". See Rothwell, 
op. cit., p.288.
43. Rothwell, op. dt., p.337. Note also that in June 1947 Bevin told a staff meeting that "Germany 
in time might well regain her previous position as the chief threat to the peace of the world." See 
Lewis, op. dt., p.331.
44. Geoffrey Warner, ‘Britain and Europe in 1948: The View from the Cabinet’ in Joseph Becker 
and Franz Knipping (eds.), Power in Europe? (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986), p.42; 
Rothwell, op. dt., p.321. The idea that Germany might prove the senior partner in a hostile 
alliance with the Soviet Union had been suggested to Attlee by Dalton three years earlier. See 
Burridge, op. dt., p.91.
23
feared that, if such cooperation did not occur, Germany "might well, in default of 
such agreement, become once again a menace owing to both sides competing for 
her favours".^
The creation of the bizone and the introduction of the Marshall Plan gave 
the Americans increasing influence over German affairs and brought them into 
conflict with the British who, having taken measures to ameliorate conditions in 
north-west Germany during the previous two years, now favoured a more cautious 
policy which reflected their fear of the consequences of a resurgent Germany. 
Bevin initially opposed the inclusion of the bizone in the European Recovery 
Program m e^, but this disagreement was far less serious than the dispute which 
occurred over socialisation in the Ruhr. Bevin was determined that the Ruhr 
industries should not be returned to the German industrialists who, he believed, 
had abused their responsibilities in the past. With British encouragement the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had developed plans for nationalisation. 
However, American policy was that the Ruhr coal mines should be run on the 
basis of private enterprise, and in September 1947 the British finally 
acquiesced.^ A year later Bevin again came into conflict with the Americans 
when they proposed to halve the number of industrial plants on the reparations 
list. He remained an enthusiastic advocate of dismantling and he warned 
Washington that unless it was carried out thoroughly, Germany would remain a 
potential danger to the peace of Europe. After months of argument a compromise 
agreement, which favoured the American rather more than the British view, was 
agreed in March 1949.^
At the same time as these arguments were proceeding, the constitution of 
a new West German state was being formulated. In June 1948 a conference of the 
western powers in London had recommended the formation of a provisional 
government and during the following winter progress was made towards this
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objective, despite the Berlin Blockade. The Basic Law or constitution of the new
state, as devised by the regional governments or Lander, was presented to the
Military Governors in March 1949 and approved two months later. In August
elections were held which were won by the Christian Democrats and Konrad
49Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic. However, his 
freedom of action was restricted by the Occupation Statute which, among other 
things, strictly forbade the creation of German armed forces and gave the Allied 
High Commission complete control over the demilitarisation process.^®
Central to this thesis will be an examination of the tortuous process by which the 
western powers finally gave up these rights and forged a plan for the creation of 
German armed forces. It will be argued that British policy towards German 
rearmament was governed by a set of assumptions which were derived as much 
from pre-1939 as Cold War experiences. They were:-
1. The Soviet Union was hostile to Britain and the West and its aim was to 
destroy the capitalist system. However, the Soviets did not want war and saw the 
destruction of the West as a very long term goal. In the short term they were 
willing to accept the status quo and consolidate their gains. The Soviets would 
pursue limited tactical goals in order to avoid conflict with the West.
2. Britain’s relationship with Germany was much less stable than with the Soviet 
Union. While it seemed clear that the Soviets would adopt a hostile but restrained 
policy unless provoked, it was less easy to predict Germany’s future course. They 
were the unstable element in international relations. As a race, they were 
emotionally unstable and committed to the relentless pursuit of political 
advantage. The combination of these two characteristics meant that they often 
fervently pursued self-defeating and damaging policies.
3. There was a real danger of the Germans seeking a Soviet alliance once they 
regained freedom of action. After 1918 the Germans, believing they were being 
treated as parasites, had allied themselves with that other outcast state, the Soviet 
Union. The tendency of the Germans to ally themselves with the Russians was 
something of a historical tradition, which was only confirmed by the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact.
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4. A Soviet-German alliance would be a disaster for the West. The acquisition by 
Moscow of German military and industrial potential would probably result in a 
decisive Soviet victory in the Cold War.
5. The best means of preventing a Soviet-German alliance was to create 
permanent institutional, economic and political ties with West Germany. 
Continued occupation would only encourage Germany’s tendency to drift into an 
eastern alliance, while giving her complete freedom of action was far too 
dangerous. Though there was no ideal German policy, the tying of the Federal 
Republic to western organisations was the best available.
These nostrums were never incorporated into a single document but I hope 
to show that they were widely believed and formed the basis of British policy 
towards German rearmament. They were undoubtedly influential in other areas 
of policy, but the detailed discussion of such important issues as the treatment of 
war criminals, industrial controls, the allied reserved powers, the Saar and Berlin 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, though many of these beliefs were 
shared by policy-makers in the United States and France, and even by Adenauer, 
the focus of this study is the British debate. The efforts of the nascent German 
Defence Ministry or Blank Office to eradicate many of the malign traditions of 
the German army, and subordinate its interests to those of a new civil society is 
another subject of importance which cannot be addressed here. It was of very 
little interest to British policy-makers in the early 1950s. They believed that history 
had shown that the Germans were almost incorrigible in their bellicosity and that 
Britain’s task was to restrain these impulses to as great an extent as possible. The 
rearmament of Germany in a controlled manner was an essential part of this 
process, but one which was believed to entail substantial risks.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE GENDARMERIE SCHEME
When Ernest Bevin, the ailing British Foreign Secretary, arrived in New 
York in September 1950 for a meeting with his French and American colleagues, 
he brought with him a scheme for the arming of a German Federal gendarmerie 
which had been the product of almost a years debate between British military and 
diplomatic planners. Far from being a hastily devised expedient cobbled together 
in reaction to the Korean War, the British plan was actually similar to an earlier 
proposal put forward before the eruption of full scale war in the Far East. Though 
the rationale behind the British scheme had somewhat altered during the summer, 
Bevin’s proposal for the creation of an armed West German police force or 
gendarmerie presented at the New York conference was similar to that put 
forward by the British in the High Commission for Germany months earlier. The 
period between the first discussions of German rearmament at the end of 1949 
and the New York meeting was the time when British policy was least subject to 
international pressures. In the absence of any rival scheme for German 
rearmament, and with the Soviets unaware that the British were preparing to 
provide the Federal Republic with an armed police force, the Attlee government 
was able to make long-term plans for Germany’s future defence contribution, free 
from either the threats or inducements which the superpowers would utilise after 
September 1950. Furthermore, the British did not seriously consider the economic 
consequences of German rearmament at this stage. These initial British plans 
were, therefore, of particular interest as they constituted the British government’s 
ideal solution to the German rearmament problem, with the proviso that, as 
British policy-makers were constantly reiterating, any policy for Germany 
contained inherent dangers.
The essence of the first British plan was the creation of an armed police 
force similar to the paramilitary Volkspolizei which the Soviets had created in 
their zone. Though this constituted a programme on which diplomatic and military 
planners were able to agree in May 1950, there was an inherent tension between 
the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. The former regarded the rearmament 
of Germany as a long-term proposition which could only occur as part of the 
wider process of integrating the Federal Republic into the West, while the latter
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saw it as a security problem requiring an immediate militaiy solution. These 
different perspectives produced a series of disagreements which began towards the 
end of 1949, abated in spring 1950 and reached a climax in December 1950.
Another view among British policy-makers was that Germany should never 
be rearmed. At the end of 1949 this was still the majority opinion among Foreign 
Office officials and Labour ministers. Influential figures such as the Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, and the ex-Chancellor, 
Hugh Dalton, were to continue to oppose the implementation of any proposal for 
German rearmament long after the government had officially accepted its 
inevitability. Strang’s passionate opposition to any scheme for the creation of 
German armed forces was all the more surprising because he was known for his 
equanimity. In contrast to his flamboyant predecessors, he was generally regarded 
as colourless, bureaucratic and quiescent. However, having witnessed at first hand 
the consequences of Britain’s appeasement of Germany in the 1930s, he was 
unwilling to place his faith in German good will again. *
In February 1949 a Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee was 
established to discuss long term planning, with Strang as Chairman. They 
produced a paper on Germany’s future in November. Despite the recent creation 
of the Federal Republic, the committee still regarded the unification of Germany 
as the long term aim of British policy. Among the disadvantages of maintaining 
the current division was that "while there is no Four-Power control, it is easier for 
the Germans to blackmail the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in turn and 
so to recover their strength as a nation and a dominant influence in Europe." The 
means of achieving unification was through the creation of "a strong and 
democratic German Federal Republic", which, it was optimistically believed, would 
force Moscow to accept free all-German elections. Though confidence in this 
programme faded over the following years, the British government continued to 
regard the unification of Germany as their ultimate goal and to retain reservations 
about perpetuating the division of the country. Strang’s Committee were at this
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stage still convinced, however, that the Federal Republic must remain disarmed 
and that even if reunification occurred, rearmament would have to be prohibited 
for a specified period. Though they made a crucial concession in accepting that 
a united Germany could have an armed gendarmerie, the Committee considered 
that "In view of the possibility of a German nationalist revival, inflamed by a 
desire to see German unity restored, the occupation and the essential controls to 
prevent German rearmament should continue." The difficulty for Strang and his 
colleagues was that this policy was somewhat inconsistent with another of their 
stated aims: the raising of the prestige of the Federal Republic and its integration 
into the West prior to unification.
Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the British 
military had the problem of devising a plan for the defence of western Europe 
with the utterly inadequate forces available to the alliance. In the month the treaty 
was signed, the signatories had only 12 ill-equipped divisions assigned to the 
defence of western Europe. By mid-1950 there were still only 14 divisions 
available. These units were unprepared for war and deployed for maximum 
administrative rather than military efficiency. Lord Ismay, the first NATO 
Secretary General, stated of British forces in Germany at this time, "It is difficult 
to imagine dispositions that could be more unsuitable for operations in the event 
of aggression." Before the results of the first Medium Term Defence Plan 
(MTDP) became available, British military planners worked on the assumption 
that roughly 35 ready divisions would be required to provide an adequate defence 
for western Europe.^ In April 1950 the Allies were shocked to discover that the 
first draft of the Medium Term Defence Plan called for the creation of a force of 
90 ready and reserve divisions and 12,000 aircraft by 1954.^ As the British High 
Commissioner in Germany, General Robertson, stated in June 1950, the repeated 
assertions that western Europe was indefensible without a West German
2. FO 371/76386, w6201, PUSC(62)Final, November 1949.
3. William Park, Defending the West (Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1988), p.23-4; Lord Ismay, 
NATO : The First Five Years 1949-54 (Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p.29-30.
4. Slim, the CIGS, hoped that the promise of British reinforcements might contribute to a force 
of 35 divisions, Slessor’s estimate was 40 divisions, while Montgomery was demanding 18 divisions 
for D-Day, with an additional 16 at D+3 days. See DEFE 4/26, COS(49)168th mtg., minute 1, 
14 November 1949; AIR 75/61, Slessor memo on Atlantic Foreign and Strategic Polity, 10 July 
1949; Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Field Marshall (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1986), p.763.
5. CAB 134/37, AOC(50)3, 28 June 1950.
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contribution were, "a statement of the mathematically obvious."**
The significance of Robertson’s remark is further illustrated by an analysis 
of Britain’s own vulnerable position in the NATO alliance. Though after June 
1950 the Americans conditionally accepted the need for an American Supreme 
Commander and an increased U.S. military contribution to European defence, and 
the French promised a major rearmament programme involving an increase of 20 
divisions, it is important to realise that the British military first proposed German 
rearmament in the very different, pre-Korean War environment. Responsibility for 
taking the lead in western defence had devolved on Britain due to American
H
refusals to participate in European defence planning. The American 
government had declined membership of the Western European, Northern 
European and South-Eastern Europe/Western Mediterranean Regional Planning
o
Groups within NATO. Furthermore, American strategy continued to be based 
on the evacuation of continental Europe. Following the outbreak of war in 
Europe, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to send reinforcements to 
Morocco from where, it was hoped, a bridgehead could be established in southern 
Spain. The British Chiefs were critical of the American concept for a number of 
reasons, but principally because such a strategy would be disastrous for French 
morale. The Joint Planning Staff visited Washington in late September 1949 to 
press British objections but were unable to secure any substantial change in 
American strategy.^ On 19 October 1950 the Chief Staff Officer, Sir William 
Elliot, recalled: "Almost to a day a year ago I was with Lord Tedder in 
Washington discussing round the table with the American Chiefs of Staff what 
they might be prepared to do for the land battle in Europe. The initial 
answer...was that they would do virtually nothing...Thus a year ago American 
strategy was content to liberate Europe. Today it insists on defending 
Europe".^
On 13 February 1950 the First Sea Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape,
6. FO 371/85022, C4350/20/18, Robertson to Bevin, 22 June 1950.
7. DEFE 5/20, COS(50)93,16 March 1950, states that as the US will not provide troops for Rhine 
defence Britain must assume the responsibility: "If we fail to do so, Western Union will fail."
8. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (Aldwych Press, London, 1989), p. 162-3.
9. DEFE 4/24, COS(49)131st mtg., minute 8,8 September 1949; DEFE 4/25, COS(49)154th mtg., 
minute 5, 19 October 1949; DEFE 6/11, JP(49)136 (Final), 1 March 1950.
10. Sir William Elliot Papers 2/1, Some Reflections on the Present Deadlock over the Question 
of German Rearmament, 19 October 1950.
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presented a paper which stressed the deficiencies in western defence and the 
Chiefs endorsed its conclusion that the forces available "were at present quite 
inadequate".^ France was the only one of the European allies with the 
manpower resources to close the gap in western defences but she was politically 
unstable and the morale of the French military establishment was low. In March 
the Joint Planning Staff recommended that Britain should promise to contribute 
an additional two divisions to the continent at the outbreak of war, while 
reiterating that France was the key to solving Europe’s defence problems. They 
claimed that a promise of British reinforcements was essential to boost French 
morale and provide them with an incentive to make a greater contribution to 
western defence. ^  Field Marshal Montgomery, as Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, had argued this case persistently, but it was his successor, Sir 
William Slim, who in changed circumstances proved more persuasive. A modified 
version of the proposal was adopted by the Chiefs and accepted by Attlee at a 
Defence Committee meeting on 23 March. The change had little effect in 
France however. In July Bevin complained: "at the present moment the military 
effectiveness of France and the Benelux Powers is still very small. France is still 
sick, perhaps more sick than at the time of the signature of the Brussels 
Treaty.’’14
It was in these circumstances that the British Chiefs became accustomed 
to making strategic plans without the resources to implement them. In May 1948 
they instructed the British Military Governor in Germany, Sir Brian Robertson, 
to fight on the Rhine in the event of a Soviet attack. In October 1949 they 
reaffirmed their commitment to Rhine defence as the basis of Allied strategy. 
They accepted this concept despite the fact that it "was not a policy which we 
would advocate on strategic grounds alone as it was in some respects militarily 
unsound." There was particular concern that the Soviets might make a limited 
attack, delaying their main assault on the Rhine until Allied reinforcements were
11. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)26th mtg., minute 1, 13 February 1950.
12. DEFE 6/12, JP(50)22, 10 March 1950.
13. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)39th mtg., minutes 1 and 2,13 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)93,16 
March 1950; CAB 131/9, D0(50)20, 20 March 1950; CAB 131/8,DO(50)5th mtg., minute 1, 23 
March 1950.
14. FO 371/85050, C4807/27/18, Barclay to Gainer and others, 20 July 1950.
15. DEFE 4/13, COS(48)64th mtg., minute 1,10 May 1948 and COS(48)73rd mtg., minute 1, 28 
May 1948; DEFE 4/25 COS(49)158th mtg., minute 8, 26th October 1949.
31
drawn into position and could be destroyed. Nevertheless, a declaratory policy of 
Rhine defence was seen as essential to reassure the French. ^
The problem of implementing this policy remained. At the end of 1949 the 
probability of a Soviet attack in the immediate future was almost discounted; but 
the possibility of ever building up a successful defence system in Europe which 
could meet the long term threat appeared remote. The British military had been 
forced to accept a strategy of Rhine defence which they regarded as unsound, 
while making continued and largely unavailing efforts to persuade the French to 
improve their armed forces and the Americans to abandon their plan to give 
priority to North Africa in the event of war.
It was the future Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, who took the lead 
in addressing the problems of western defence. Unlike his colleagues, Slim and 
Fraser, who gained their reputation as war time commanders, Slessor’s standing 
is based on his influence as a strategic thinker. He was an iconoclast who proved 
a formidable advocate for the RAF during inter-service disputes. By the late 1940s 
his two principal concerns were the promotion of strategic bombing and the 
countering of the Soviet military threat. This led him to develop an unusual 
perspective on the German rearmament issue. In 1943 he had been "convinced 
that Germany is and will be the danger, and the one way to ensure that we never 
have a World War III is to ensure that Germany is never again in a position of 
military strength." However, even at this stage, he regarded the revival of a 
German air force, rather than armoured divisions as the essence of the German 
menace. By 1949 he had accepted the need for a German defence contribution 
which would in the long term allow NATO to push its defence line east of the 
Rhine. He acknowledged that because of French susceptibilities it was an 
inappropriate time to raise the issue, but warned that the Germans would never 
become firmly allied to the West unless they could be given an adequate defence. 
He wrote: "GERMANY has turned to Russia several times in comparatively 
recent history. And if we continue to talk about the RHINE line the time will 
come when the GERMANS, believing the Allies intend anyway to abandon them 
to their fate if war comes, will reinsure with RUSSIA And that will be a day of 
mortal peril for the West."
16. DEFE 4/25, COS(49)154th mtg., minute 4, 19 October 1949.
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This was to be the theme of British discussions of German rearmament 
over the next six years, but Slessor brought a singular perspective to the dilemma. 
He argued that it was French ignorance of the true strategic situation which 
prevented Britain from beginning the process of German rearmament. He 
believed that the point "which Allied policy in GERMANY has overlooked is that 
as long as we occupy GERMANY and in this Air and Atomic age even if we 
cease to do so. we have the practical means of preventing potential becoming 
actual, if we, the Western democracies, are prepared to face up to realities." The 
idea which the French and others had failed to grasp was that the threat of aerial 
bombardment could be used to control Germany in the same way as the British 
had policed colonial areas between the wars. Slessor placed the failure of 
Britain’s European policy in the 1930s on the absence of "the Will to Act" and 
called for greater resolution in the future. The solution to the German 
rearmament problem, according to Slessor, "involves a really drastic revision of 
many of the historic cannons of military doctrine...it is the threat and if necessary 
the use of the bomb (and, if appropriate, the atomic bomb) as the form of force 
to be employed to prevent the expansion of the GERMAN peace economy to a 
war footing." Thus Slessor’s confidence that German rearmament could proceed 
was based on his belief that the western democracies could employ the threat of 
bombing against the Germans to prevent them re-emerging as an independent 
threat, rather than on any faith that the Germans had changed. The only 
remaining obstacle was to persuade the Allies of the soundness of this view.-^ 
The current Chiefs, while not embracing the whole of Slessor’s thesis, were 
equally convinced that a German contribution was essential to provide an effective 
defence for western Europe. When presented with the Strang Committee’s report 
on Germany in November 1949, they suggested that the West should take the 
initiative in proposing talks on unification because the division of the country was 
"a permanent source of friction." They dissented from the Foreign Office view that 
a united Germany should remain disarmed and argued instead that, "The size of 
the German army should be related to that of the French army". Taking up the 
suggestion that a united Germany should have an armed gendarmerie they applied
17. AIR 75/61, Slessor to Pakenham, 28 May 1949, Slessor memo on Atlantic Foreign and 
Strategic Policy, 10 July 1949. See also Sir John Slessor, Strategy for the West (Cassels, London, 
1954), ch.6.
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it to the Federal Republic and stated: "the creation of a German armed 
gendarmerie...was urgent and should be set in hand as soon as possible." In reply 
the Strang Committee accepted the latter suggestion but stressed that it could not 
be the basis for the creation of an army in the Federal Republic. They believed 
such action would be opposed by the Soviets and that "it seems too early to 
decide to entrust an army to the German Federal Government, at least until we
10
have seen how the new state develops". This discussion revealed that a policy 
of arming the gendarmerie in West Germany provided an area of possible 
compromise between the Foreign Office and the military, but also the potential 
for conflict over the urgency with which German rearmament should be pursued.
The parlous condition of western defences led to similar discussions in the 
USA, the Netherlands and West Germany. In America the Senate was unwilling 
to consider the Truman’s request for a large scale Mutual Assistance Program 
without guarantees that the Europeans would use the funds to create an effective 
defence. Taft complained that "although the amount was not large enough to do 
any good it was sufficient to start an arms race".^  Many Senators believed that 
the only method by which an effective defence could be created was to arm the 
Germans. Vandenberg declared: "Western Germany is the final key to our peace
9fi
hopes in Western Europe and to our final victory in case of war". The
American military was also increasingly convinced of the need for some form of
German contribution. During November 1949 Generals Bradley and Clay both
71hinted at the need for a measure of German rearmament.
While the American Congress was concerned about the wasting of 
resources on inadequate defence arrangements, the continental Europeans were 
alarmed at the threat to their territory resulting from NATO’s military impotence. 
By the end of 1949 the Dutch States-General were moving towards support for 
West German rearmament. Their Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, became one of
18. DEFE 4/26, COS(49)166th mtg., minute 1,9 November 1949; DEFE 4/30, COS(50)52nd mtg., 
minute 4, 29 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)109, 3 April 1950; DEFE 6/11, JP(49)156, 17 
March 1950; DEFE 11/26, Makins to Barclay, 9 November 1949; FO 371/76386, w6137, FO to 
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20. Ibid., p. 156.
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22the leading advocates of German rearmament during the course of 1950. The 
position of the new West German state was even more exposed than that of the 
Netherlands. Following his victory in the country’s first national election, 
Adenauer began to agitate for a new Alliance strategy encompassing the defence 
of German territory east of the Rhine. This inevitably raised the possibility of a 
German contribution and he discussed this matter with the Allied High 
Commissioners on 8 December 1949.
All of this was very unwelcome to the Foreign Office. Though they were 
not averse to the idea of an armed gendarmerie for the Federal Republic, they 
did not trust the Germans sufficiently to accept that they should possess regular 
armed forces. On 15 December 1949, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of the German section and future British High Commissioner in 
Germany, produced a memorandum which contained many of the themes of 
Foreign Office opposition to early German rearmament. Like Strang, Kirkpatrick 
had reluctantly participated in the appeasement of Germany in the 1930s and was 
determined to prevent that country from regaining a position of influence. 
However, the two men had very different personalities. Kirkpatrick was highly 
opinionated and his antipathy to the Germans was part of a more general 
xenophobia. He once told an emissary from the United States government "that
Oyf
foreigners were either redundant or insanitary". In his December 
memorandum he explained his opposition to early rearmament on the grounds 
that the French would not accept it, it was provocative to the Soviets, the 
resources were not available and it might lead to an end to the occupation 
followed by American withdrawal from Europe. Finally, Kirkpatrick argued that 
the Germans were untrustworthy. Even if they did not ally with the Soviets, 
"experience teaches us that an armed German soon develops a truculence and 
arrogance which makes him impossible to deal with." This idea of German
22. FO 371/85050, C4582/22/18, Ministry of Defence minute, 13 July 1950 (Annex D, FO Record 
of US and Western European views on German rearmament); FO 371/85087, C57/57/18, Nichols 
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24. FRUS, 1955-7, vol.5, memo of a conversation, 1 September 1955, p.573.
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German Rearmament, 15 December 1949).
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duplicity, already hinted at in the Strang Committee’s paper on Germany, was a 
constant motif during Foreign Office discussions of this subject.
Despite the stated opposition of the Foreign Office to a German military
contribution, the Chiefs raised the subject again in their paper on the Japanese
Peace Treaty completed on 23 December 1949. This argued that the Allies could
not be less generous to the Germans than to the Japanese and that therefore a
future treaty with Germany ought to allow "a German army within the North
Atlantic Treaty, whilst the other North Atlantic Treaty Powers would be
9 6responsible for the navy and air force." Gilchrist, of the Foreign Office’s
German section, complained that this paper, combined with various statements by
Stikker, Clay, Bradley and Robert Schuman, was causing progress towards
27German rearmament to be made prematurely. At the end of December the 
Foreign Office contacted British diplomatic missions around the world to urge that 
discussion of a German military contribution "should be firmly discouraged". They 
stated: "the attractiveness of German armed support for Western Europe against 
an attack by the Russians themselves are superficial and outweighed by the risks 
which, unlike the hypothetical contingency of Soviet aggression would be real, 
immediate and inescapable." The risks included the threat of preventive war by 
the Soviets, the sowing of discord in France, German dominance of Western 
Union and even the possibility of a military coup in the new Federal 
Republic.^
The Chiefs* determination to present the case for early German 
rearmament only increased when Slessor replaced Tedder as Chief of the Air 
Staff. At a meeting on 29 March 1950 they discussed two Joint Planning Staff 
(JPS) papers, drawn up in consultation with the Foreign Office, which emphasised 
the diplomatic obstacles to a policy of German rearmament. The papers again 
stressed the duplicitous nature of the Germans, stating: "we believe that the 
Germans were no more than superficially interested in western democracy for 
itself and their real concern is the restoration of a united Germany." They 
suggested that the build up of other western defence resources and the political
26. DEFE 5/18, COS(49)453, 23 December 1949.
27. FO 371/85048, C27/27/18, Gilchrist minute, 1 January 1950.
28. FO 371/85087, C57/57/18, Telegram to HM representatives around the world, 22 December
1949.
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integration of the Federal Republic into western Europe were essential 
prerequisites to German militarisation. Slessor complained that these papers "dealt 
too much with political factors and did not bring out clearly enough the military 
case for the eventual creation of a German army". Though the paper dealing with 
specific Foreign Office questions was approved in amended form, the main paper 
covering the military aspects of German policy was rejected. The Chiefs urged that 
the rewrite should consider the possibility of using German rearmament as "a way 
of meeting part of the serious deficit between the forces required and the forces
JQ
available for the defence of Western Europe."*' This instruction was to provide 
the basis for the later proposal to form a German army of twenty divisions. In the 
interim Slessor wrote directly to Strang to suggest that the insistence of his 
committee that Germany must remain disarmed should be modified. He suggested 
Germany should be allowed to make a defence contribution while making it 
"perfectly clear that if she ever attacks the West again... she is bound to get in the 
first month what she got over 5 years last time, and then some with the atomic
Of)
weapon as the opening gambit."
During the first months of 1950, though discussion of German rearmament 
in Europe and America was less prevalent, in Germany the Allies continued to 
come under pressure from Adenauer on the issue of a security guarantee for the 
Federal Republic. On 28 April he proposed the creation of a gendarmerie
-30of 25,000 men to enforce Federal policies and as a police force for Bonn. 
This plan produced a brief truce in the dispute between the civilian and military 
branches of the British government. Kirkpatrick had hoped that the issue of a 
Federal gendarmerie could be postponed but, accepting the military’s assessment
“3 - 3
that it was a matter of urgency, he agreed not to oppose Adenauer’s request.
At a meeting on 2 May the Chiefs and the Foreign Office representative, 
Gilchrist, agreed that Adenauer’s proposal "was a step in the right direction."^ 
However, on 11 May the High Commissioners rejected Adenauer’s request,
29. DEFE 4/30, COS(50)52nd mtg., minute 4,29 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)109, 3 April 
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35offering instead a force of 5,000 men, carrying only small arms.
It is apparent that during the spring of 1950, with France still prostrate and 
America unwilling to become fully committed to European defence, the arguments 
of the Chiefs were becoming increasingly persuasive and that a consensus was 
emerging in favour of the creation of an armed gendarmerie. On reading the 
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’s paper, Attlee argued in favour of the 
close integration of German forces into those of the West. He suggested: "German 
armed forces would be integrated with other Western Union Forces in such a way 
that while adding substantially to their strength the German contingent would not 
be as effective as an independent Force". In future discussions of the EDC these 
arguments would become common place but at the time they were a novel
'if:
contribution to the debate. In Cabinet on 8 May the view was expressed that
"before long it would be necessary to consider how Germany could best contribute
towards the defence of Western Europe - though this raised grave questions which
37would require most careful consideration." ' There were, however, strong anti- 
German prejudices in the Cabinet. In an unscripted outburst to the House of 
Commons on 28 March, Bevin had expressed the view that the Hitler revolution 
had been an expression of the German character and had been "latent there right
• 3 0
from Bismarkian days.100 Nevertheless, Bevin was forced to consider the Chiefs’ 
case that western Europe could not be defended without a West German 
contribution. The Chiefs presented their proposals in paragraphs 24 and 25 of 
their paper on Defence Policy and Global Strategy which was produced in its final 
form just a few days after Adenauer’s request for a 25,000 man gendarmerie. This 
paper acknowledged French concerns about German rearmament and noted the 
possibility that a strong Germany might play off West against East, but declared 
that, "in the long run the defence of western Germany against a Russian invasion 
can only be secured with the assistance of German armed forces". The danger of 
a split in Western Union and of the Soviets opting for a preventive war meant
35. FO 371/85324, C3337/3333/18, Recommendations of the High Commissioners, 11 May 1950.
36. CAB 21/1896, Elliot minute, 9 June 1950.
37. CAB 128/17, CM(50)29th mtg., minute 3, 8 May 1950.
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that full German rearmament could not begin yet, but certain steps should be 
taken. The main proposal was for "the formation of an armed gendarmerie similar 
to the Bereitschaft in the East zone." This particular phrase indicated the 
ambitious nature of the military’s plans, for the Bereitschaften was a miniature 
East German army rather than a police force. That the Chiefs saw the proposed 
gendarmerie as the basis of a future West German defence contribution is 
confirmed by their statement that "The ultimate aim would be the formation of
-3Q
a German contingent within the forces of Western Europe."
The problem was that, though Kirkpatrick had now accepted the military 
arguments for a gendarmerie, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs still differed over 
the tasks it would be expected to perform within the Federal Republic. The 
Foreign Office brief on Germany for the May London conference of Foreign 
Ministers agreed, in line with the new policy, that the British government should 
not oppose a German request for a gendarmerie. However, they suggested that 
its main functions would be to give the Federal government the means to enforce 
its authority, thus relieving the occupying forces of this responsibility; to enhance 
the Federal government’s prestige whilst lifting West German morale which was 
being damaged by the expansion of the East German police; and to make a small 
contribution to defence should war break out.^®
The Foreign Office draft provided the basis for official British policy 
towards the gendarmerie whilst the Chiefs of Staff paper provided an additional 
covert rationale. The tension between these two visions of the future role of the 
German gendarmerie was not resolved until after the outbreak of the Korean 
War. When the Defence Committee discussed the Global Strategy Paper on 25 
May they approved the section on Germany. This decision was in effect a victory 
for the military as it meant that the government was not merely committed to the 
principle of German rearmament, but was also prepared to take the first steps 
towards achieving it through the medium of a heavily armed Federal gendarmerie.
39. The paper on Global Strategy and Defence Policy will not be released until 2000 but the 
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Though it may appear anomalous that Bevin sided with the Chiefs on this issue 
two additional considerations help explain his decision. The first is that Bevin took 
this step somewhat tentatively and ensured it was not communicated to the Allies. 
He stressed that "it would be wholly premature to discuss any such far reaching 
measure with our Allies at the present tim e."^ The second key factor was that 
Bevin was particularly susceptible to the advice of his military advisers and had
A/")
intervened on their behalf more than once in the past.
The problem for British foreign policy was that it was practically impossible 
to make the creation of a heavily armed German police force appear as anything 
other than a first step towards a German army. British representatives in
4
Washington immediately questioned this new foreign policy departure. The Chiefs 
of Staff had sought to persuade the Americans of the need for a gendarmerie 
through the representations of the British Joint Services Mission (BJSM) in 
W ashington.^ On receiving the minutes of the May Defence Committee 
meeting, the BJSM asked for confirmation that the new policy was not to be 
discussed with the Americans and that the government was now seeking to 
establish a police force of 25,000 men in line with Adenauer’s request, rather than 
the 5,000 men agreed by the High Commissioners. This was confirmed but was 
then subject to further queries by the British Embassy in Washington. Oliver 
Franks, the British Ambassador, noted that the paper on Global Strategy, "set 
Federal police proposal in a context entirely different from that subsequently 
outlined in the joint submission to Foreign Ministers... of 11 M ay."^ When 
Tedder, representing the BJSM, went on to discuss the Global Strategy Paper with 
the Americans, the reference to arming the German gendarmerie in the same 
manner as East German para-military forces, who were being equipped with tanks 
and artillery, was removed. The Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Kenneth 
Younger, informed the Ministry of Defence of Bevin’s view that using the
41. FO 371/85325, C4587/3333/18, Mallet minute, 7 July 1950; DEFE 11/26, Elliot to Shinwell, 
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to FO, 8 June 1950.
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gendarmerie as a first step towards rearming the Germans was "a subject which
should not be pursued with the Americans at the present moment and that no
further exchange of views should take place regarding the studies now being
carried out by the Chiefs of Staff on this problem".^
Despite these efforts at concealment, the Americans were aware that the
German federal gendarmerie could form the basis of German armed forces and
their Joint Chiefs had already considered pursuing this method of German
rearm am ent.^  The American High Commissioner, John McCloy, and the State
Department disapproved of this scheme and became alarmed at the British
government’s vigorous espousal of Adenauer’s gendarmerie proposals. In June the
visit of Adenauer’s security adviser, Schwerin, to London raised suspicions among
American officials that the British were conspiring with the West German
authorities to expedite the process of German rearmament. On 13 June McCloy
reported that it was "becoming increasingly evident that the UK is utilizing
pressure for the creation of a German police force as a first step towards the
remilitarization of Germany".^ On 6 July the American Ambassador spoke to
Attlee about Schwerin’s visit and urged the divorcing of the issues of German
rearmament and a Federal police force. He insisted "it would be premature to
discuss the remilitarisation of Germany and that any step in that direction might
48serve to induce the Soviet (sic) to march in the west."
The French too were concerned at the new British attitude. Their Embassy 
warned: "it seemed to them impossible to disguise the fact that a Federal 
gendarmerie, once created, would in fact form the nucleus of German armed 
forces". They proposed that the Federal government make use of the local Land 
forces in emergencies. A Foreign Office minute stated that, "Since one of our 
objectives in supporting the creation of a Federal gendarmerie is, in fact, to lay 
the foundations for an eventual armed force of some kind for employment within
45. FO 371/85050, C4719/27/18, Gilchrist to Barnes, 13 July 1950 and C4582/22/18, Younger to 
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Gendarmerie for the Western Zones, 7 July 1950.
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the Western European defence system, the French proposals here defeat our 
purpose." Ivo Mallet, the Under-Secretary superintending the German Political 
Department, suggested: "Ministers will have to decide whether to attempt to 
overcome French opposition by openly stating that we regard the proposed force 
as the first step towards a Federal gendarmerie, which in turn will be a first step 
towards a measure of German rearmament; or whether we content ourselves for 
the present with meeting Adenauer’s request as far as can be done".^
American and French opposition to any form of German rearmament was 
also evident from their obstruction of the Federal gendarmerie scheme in the 
High Commission. The plan for a force of 5,000 men sanctioned by the High 
Commissioners on 11 May was insufficient to achieve the purposes agreed at the 
Defence Committee meeting of 25 May and the British representatives therefore 
set about trying to achieve agreement on stronger measures through the 
establishment of a working party to examine alternative proposals for a Federal 
police force. Robertson believed a gendarmerie was essential both for the defence 
of western Europe and the maintenance of internal security. It was required to 
prevent a recurrence of an incident in March 1950 when British troops were 
forced to intervene following attacks on a British dismantling team at the 
Salzgitter steel p lan t.^  Robertson was a figure on whom Bevin had come to 
rely and it is probable that his views, along with those of the Chiefs, overcame 
Bevin’s innate suspicion of the Germans during the summer of 1950.^*
Though the outbreak of war in Korea on 24 June had a profound effect on 
the Truman administration’s attitude to German rearmament and therefore 
indirectly led to British acceptance of full scale German rearmament in response 
to American pressure, its immediate effect on British policy has been exaggerated, 
while its long term effects have been misunderstood. In June 1950 the Joint 
Planning Staff at the insistence of the Chiefs of Staff were already making plans 
for a German contribution to western defence. The Foreign Office had agreed to 
support Adenauer’s request for a 25,000 man Federal police force though, as their
49. FO 371/85324, C4094/3333/18, Ashe minute, 22 June 1950 and Mallet minute, 27 June 1950.
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brief for the London conference had shown, they believed its role should be the
maintenance of internal order. Their scepticism about the rearmament of West
Germany through a gendarmerie was only confirmed by events in Korea. Outside
the government, Churchill had written to Attlee on 5 May suggesting a
52contribution of five divisions from the Federal Republic. Attlee, as we have 
seen, was already contemplating a German contribution to an integrated NATO 
force. In this context Churchill’s subsequent call, during a speech to the Council 
of Europe, for the creation of a European army containing German units appears 
less dramatic, though he did now privately speak of 10 rather than 5 German 
divisions.^ Admittedly, the Korean conflict persuaded many people who had 
not been party to these arguments of the need for a German contribution to a 
large programme of western rearmament. The Under-Secretary of State at the Air 
Ministry, Aidan Crawley, after consulting with the Secretary of State for War, 
John Strachey, wrote that unless "it is decided now that German forces must be 
included in Western defence by the time we aim at making these defences 
adequate all our money will be wasted".^ Similarly, Kenneth Younger wrote: 
"it is surely essential to face the fact that without the Germans, realistic western 
defence by 1954 or probably 1957 is out of the question".^
Initially Bevin remained committed to a policy of German rearmament. 
This is evident from a note by Roderick Barclay, Bevin’s Private Secretary, written 
after the Korean War in response to a minute from Mallet stating the Chiefs of 
Staffs view that, "Even if and when France can be rearmed the question of the 
association of Federal Germany will have to be effected." Barclay responded that 
this was Bevin’s opinion also and "that once some progress has been made with 
the rearming of France I do not think he would necessarily exclude the taking of 
the necessary steps to incorporate the Germans in the general defensive system... 
it is only on account of French and American susceptibilities that the Secretary 
of State has felt we must be so very cautious."^ By the end of the year the
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positions would be reversed as the Americans pressed the issue of German
rearmament while Bevin and the Foreign Office sought to delay it, but during this
period it was evident that neither the French nor the Americans were willing to
accept British proposals for a police force of 25,000 men. On 1 July 1950
Kirkpatrick, the new British High Commissioner, who was evidently reluctant to
press the matter, was warning "that in the face of French opposition and
57American hesitation the whole project may become irretrievably stuck.' 
Speaking to Mallet on the phone later that month Kirkpatrick warned "the
CO
Americans are with the French on this."
By 4 July Mallet was advocating the separation of the gendarmerie and 
rearmament issues. He suggested that in order to overcome the opposition of the 
other High Commissioners to the gendarmerie plan it was "necessary to make it 
clear to the US and French Governments that we regard the question of the 
German police as one wholly distinct from that of the rearmament of 
Germ any".^ This idea was implicit in a new plan put forward by Kirkpatrick 
which became the basis of British policy at the New York conferences in 
September 1950. In the interim the High Commission agreed to the creation of 
a Land based mobile police force of 10,000 m en .^  After the rejection of the 
initial British concept, the Foreign Office continued to support the idea of a 
Federal gendarmerie but with a new rationale, based on the Korean experience. 
The Chiefs of Staff pressed ahead with their demands for early German 
rearmament which events in Korea appeared to have made more urgent and the 
scale of which they calculated on the basis of NATO’s strategic requirements.
Foreign Office policy was largely the work of Kirkpatrick. He had accepted 
the gendarmerie plan only with reluctance and failed to press for it vigorously 
after replacing Robertson as High Commissioner. His primary goal was the 
integration of the Federal Republic into the western system. In November 1948 
he had written that West Germany should ultimately join Western Union, thus 
"making them so dependent, economically, politically and militarily on the Western
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World that they cannot afford to break away and join the E ast."^ However, in 
mid-1950 he was still convinced that military integration would be premature and 
this view was confirmed by his first experiences as High Commissioner. He took 
up his post only weeks before the Korean conflict began and was shocked by the 
anguished reaction of the German public to events in the Far East. The 
experience left him with a jaundiced view of the Germans which was to influence 
his opinions in the years to come. In particular he identified a strain of instability 
and unpredictability in the German character which he believed the West would 
have to counter by a policy of judicious concessions mixed with a determined 
effort to develop permanent ties between the Federal Republic and the West. 
Kirkpatrick was concerned about the state of civilian morale in the Federal 
Republic and about the panic induced by the Korean War. The West Germans 
feared that the East German regime might follow a similar course to the North 
Koreans. On 15 July Kirkpatrick warned: "Failing any evidence of our resolve 
there will be an increasing tendency to compound with the Russians while there 
is time." He was hopeful that the West could "hold the position", but only if there
fk)was some evidence that they were tackling the defence problem. At the start 
of August Kirkpatrick outlined a five point plan for restoring confidence among 
the population without resorting to rearmament. He insisted that there was no 
support for this idea among the German people and that the West would have to 
continue to bear the main burden of defence. As an alternative to rearmament 
he proposed that the Federal government be allowed an effective gendarmerie, 
that alterations be made in the role of the Germans working for the occupying 
forces as auxiliaries and that improvements be made in the German frontier 
police. In addition, he suggested that studies should be made of the potential 
refugee problem in Germany which would result from a Soviet attack and of the 
possibility of West Germany making an industrial contribution to western 
rearmament.
On 18 August, two weeks after the Kirkpatrick note was received, the
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Chiefs presented their paper on German rearmament. It was based on a second 
redraft of the Joint Planning Staff paper first presented on 29 March. At that 
meeting the Chiefs had called for greater emphasis on the military arguments in 
favour of German rearmament; but the redraft was rejected on 2 May in favour 
of a more comprehensive survey.^ Thus the origins of the August proposals 
can be found in the Chiefs’ pre-Korean War convictions that large scale German 
rearmament had to be considered. Their plan was entirely different from 
Kirkpatrick’s. Their proposal to immediately start building up a 20 division 
German army with an additional 10 reserve divisions was the most ambitious form 
of German rearmament proposed during 1950. The extreme nature of the plan 
reflected the increased importance of western Europe in British strategy and the 
vast deficit between the forces required and those available for European defence, 
as revealed by NATO planning. The Chiefs knew that the deterrent value of the 
American atomic bomb was waning and feared that Britain’s position would 
become untenable should the Soviets take advantage of western conventional 
weaknesses and overrun the continent. They believed that Britain would be highly 
vulnerable once the Rhine defences were breached. Historically the Low 
Countries had been an area of vital military interest to Britain and the Chiefs 
recognised their continued relevance to British defence policy. They noted: "It had 
become of vital importance for the survival of the United Kingdom that the 
enemy should be held no further west than the line of the Rhine. Even with the 
advent of improved weapons we could not afford to forego the early warning of 
an air attack that could be obtained by Allied possession of the Low 
Countries."^ In 1949 the Chiefs had rejected the possibility of holding a 
bridgehead west of the Rhine and so the defence line had to be drawn on the 
Rhine or further east. The new importance of European defence was evident from 
the decision to allot two reserve divisions to western Europe and the revision of 
the three pillar defence policy to incorporate the defence of the continent into the 
first pillar of British strategy, the defence of the home b ase .^
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The inadequacy of the forces available to implement a strategy of Rhine 
defence was obvious from the widespread lack of confidence in the Western 
Union’s Short Term Plan, while the scale of rearmament required for an effective 
system of Rhine defence was revealed by the negotiations over NATO’s Medium 
Term Defence Plan. Montgomery, as Commander in Chief of the forces of 
Western Union, noted that the Short Term Plan, which was based on Rhine 
defence, "was quite inoperable because the forces available were totally 
inadequate."^ Yet the task of building up an effective defence was formidable, 
especially when economic costs were considered. Initial estimates of the forces 
required to implement the Medium Term Defence Plan were so daunting that 
they had to be scaled down to reduce the gap between requirements and the
/T O
forces likely to be available. The eventual targets, which did not take account
of a possible German contribution, required Britain to provide 7 divisions and 520
fighters by D + 90 days. As Sir George Creasey, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff,
noted, the UK "could not hope" to meet this figure, "without an upheaval in our
national economy". The French, whose defence establishment was in a state of
chaos and who were involved in a war in Indochina were expected to provide 24V£
divisions.^ During the summer the NATO planners considered a less drastic
programme of rearmament which would include the raising of 3 German divisions
and an additional American contribution of 3 divisions. Even in these
circumstances, however, the British Chiefs were dubious about their ability to
70meet their allotted contribution of 6 British divisions by D+20 days.
It appeared that the only means of filling the gap between the estimated
requirements of western defence and those likely to be actually available was to
proceed with a more substantial measure of German rearmament. The Chiefs of
Staff had already noted on 8 March "the importance of enlisting German
71manpower to redress the balance between east and west." x The problem with
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the plan that they advocated in August 1950, however, was that they allowed their
proposals to be based entirely on the extent of the likely deficit between defence
requirements and capabilities. The type of scheme this would produce was already
evident in the rejected Joint Planning Staff paper of 21 April, which estimated
that the deficit would be around 30 divisions and stated that West Germany had
7?the manpower to fill this gap. The revised paper of August 1950 merely 
elaborated on this analysis. Its main conclusion was stated in the covering note 
which read: "In view of the present defenceless position of Western Europe in 
face of the impending threat and present mounting tension, and since the only 
way in which this position can be remedied is to use the military resources of 
Western Germany we recommend that HM Government should take the initiative 
in effecting the necessary political and economic measures which will enable the 
rearmament of Western Germany to start since without this measure there is no 
possibility of defending Western Europe." Though deference was paid to Foreign 
Office arguments about the need to give priority to rearming other west European 
countries, the economic obstacles to rearmament and the importance of not 
bargaining with the Germans, these factors are not evident from the actual 
recommendations of the report, which involved a programme more ambitious than 
that put forward by the Americans at the September meetings in New York or by
n 'l
Adenauer’s advisers in the Himmerod Memorandum of October.
The JPS recommended, and the Chiefs of Staff approved, that measures 
be taken immediately to begin the process of creating German armed forces 
consisting of 20 balanced ground divisions and 10 reserve divisions, an air defence 
force of 1,000 fighters and a tactical air component of 1,100 aircraft. The size of 
this force was a reflection of the deficiencies in western defences. Though a more 
complex procedure is adopted to reach the figure of 30 divisions, essentially the 
calculation is the same as that made in the rejected JPS report of 21 April. The 
30 divisions were the minimum required to fill the expected gap between NATO 
targets and Allied capabilities. Basing the plan on the NATO requirement for 56 
divisions at M + 30 days to defend the Rhine, the JPS estimated that 60 divisions
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would be required for a defence inside West German territory. Moving the 
defence line further east was essential to fill Mthe military vacuum between the 
Rhine and the Elbe", and gave the Chiefs the opportunity to change the emphasis 
on Rhine defence which they had always believed was unsound. A pparently in 
response to Foreign Office concerns, at this point the military planners introduced 
the idea that German forces should constitute no more than a third of the total 
Allied force. On the basis that 60 divisions would be required for a defence west 
of the Rhine, the West Germans would be expected to provide 20 divisions by 
M + 30 days. The problem with this calculation was that the size of the G erm an 
contribution was calculated as a ratio of the troops NATO ought to deploy to 
fulfil military requirements. As the paper admitted, however, the most optimistic 
assessment of the non-German forces likely to be available in 1954 was 27 
divisions. If this figure were used then the German contribution would have to be 
reduced to 13 or 14 divisions. Rather than employing the two to one ratio to limit 
G erm an rearm am ent, it was actually used to urge the adoption of drastic new 
measures for west European rearmament including "a major degree of industrial 
mobilisation", increases in American financial aid and even the utilisation of 
obsolete equipment to provide arms for the extra forces. In calculating the 
G erm an air contribution the planners estimated that 4,400 planes were required, 
and the fraction to be provided by the Germans was one quarter, instead of the 
one third used for ground forces. The resulting figure of 1,100 was only a small 
proportion of the expected deficiency of 3,000 aircraft. Again, however, if the 
proposals were implemented and the projected size of the Allied tactical air force 
proved correct, the West Germans would supply closer to a half than a quarter 
of the NATO air fo rces.^
In contrast to the ambitious plans of the Army and Air Force, the Navy 
were distinctly unenthusiastic about a German defence contribution. O f the three 
services they remained the most concerned about the revival of Germ any’s war- 
making capacity. Thus they insisted that the Federal Republic must be prohibited
7 c
from possession of, "All major war vessels, including submarines. "/J  W hen the 
Navy’s Director of Plans was forced to clarify the Admiralty’s proposals for the
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planned German Navy during the EDC discussions of the following year, he
reiterated the view that the Germans should not be allowed destroyers of
submarines but restricted to the possession of coastal escorts and
minesweepers.^ Unlike their colleagues in the other services, Admiralty
planners consistently refused to contemplate a major German contribution in their
field and reacted with alarm whenever the Germans expressed any interest in
77expanding their planned naval contribution.
The Chiefs presented their proposals at a time when a backlash against the 
idea of either covert or open German rearmament was occurring in the Foreign 
Office. Mallet told the Chiefs that their report gave "insufficient weight to the 
formidable political difficulties involved in the policy proposed." Both the French 
and the Americans were opposed to German rearmament, while the German
7 0
economy would be unable to support the scale of defence effort envisaged.
This was not merely a reaction to the American refusal to countenance the
gendarmerie scheme, but also the product of a new assessment of the German
situation following developments in Korea. It was felt that an armed gendarmerie
of the type proposed by Kirkpatrick would have a crucial rule in combating the
threat from the East German para-military force and ought not to be regarded
merely as the basis for a larger scheme of rearmament. It was now evident that
the East German Bereitschaften, or Volkspolizei, was being turned "into a highly
trained regular German army of 150,000 men which is to include a number of
armoured divisions." In West Germany, negotiations for a Land based mobile
police were subject to .endless delays, and at the end of August Adenauer made
a new request for a gendarmerie of 150,000 men to counter the East German 
79forces. Like the German Chancellor, Bevin believed that the threat of a 
Korean style attack against the Federal Republic was genuine. Under his direction 
a paper incorporating Kirkpatrick’s proposals was prepared for the Cabinet. It
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senvisaged the creation of a 100,000 strong gendarmerie and the expansion of and 
improvements in the German customs police and auxiliary forces. This policy, 
"would give us at an early date nearly 200,000 trained Germans an access[ion] of 
strength which would be sufficient to deter the Russians from using the Eastern 
German army against the western zones." On 1 September the Defence 
Committee endorsed this policy and three days later Bevin informed the Cabinet 
that he proposed to advocate the creation of a West German gendarmerie of up
on
to 100,000 men at the New York Foreign Ministers meeting.
The Chiefs’ plans had been by-passed. On 13 August a Foreign Office brief 
for Bevin outlined their formal objections to the Chiefs’ ideas. Though the 20 
division proposal is described as a useful "first estimate", the paper is criticised for 
paying "insufficient attention a) to the difficulties we are likely to have with our 
allies, particularly in regard to the fear of Soviet reactions...b) to the ability of the 
German economy to support such a load... and c) to the dangers of rearming
Ol
Germany."0-1 By the end of the month the Minister of Defence, Emanuel
Shinwell, had accepted that the proposals of his military advisors were impractical
R ?and agreed to accept the Foreign Office line.
More interesting than this debate are the comments of Ivo Mallet on the 
new gendarmerie plan. On 15 March 1950, responding to a request from 
Robertson that the Foreign Office take some action to reassure the West German 
population, Mallet had clearly envisaged the formation of a gendarmerie as a 
possible starting point for German rearmament. His minute stated: "If ultimately 
an integration of German manpower and resources into western defence becomes 
possible we may have some hope of defending western Europe and ourselves... As 
this is at present impossible can we make a start with this most urgent problem 
by beginning to create a gendarmerie?"^ By September he was complaining 
that, to the Chiefs of Staff, "the federal gendarmerie has always been nothing 
more than a first step towards a German armed force." The idea of ‘making a 
start’ on rearmament with the gendarmerie now appeared ridiculous to Mallet. He
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explained that,"Just as there is a job for the frontier police and the auxiliaries so 
there is a job for the gendarmerie." Their role was to deal with disturbances and 
sabotage which would otherwise distract the attention of the Allied forces. In a 
key section, revealing the change in thinking brought about by the Korean War, 
he stated that the need for a gendarmerie, "has become urgent since Korea 
opened our eyes to the danger that the Russians will use the Bereitschaften to 
stage a civil war in Germany for the avowed purpose of reuniting the country and 
freeing it from foreign occupation. It is doubtful whether the Allied forces, as at 
present constituted... would be able to hold Western Germany by the end of next
04
year if the Bereitschaften continued to develop as they are doing."
These comments by one of the senior Foreign Office officials dealing with 
German policy illustrate the changes in British thinking about a gendarmerie as 
well as undermining the current historical consensus about its role in British 
policy. Christian Greiner has stated that prior to the Korean War the western 
occupying powers "adhered strictly to their demilitarisation policy", while Saki 
Dockrill has argued that it was only after June 1950 that the British began to
oc
contemplate using a Federal gendarmerie as the basis for a future army. 
These accounts have strong intuitive appeal. After all, prior to the Korean War, 
the British were thinking in terms of a 25,000 man gendarmerie, while Bevin was 
railing against the Germans in the Commons; after June 1950 the Foreign 
Secretary moderated his language and a scheme emerged for a 100,000 man force. 
However, though we do not have a complete record of the May Defence 
Committee meeting, it is quite clear that Bevin gave at least tentative approval to 
the Chiefs’ plans at this time, while at the Defence Committee meeting of 
September he explicitly ruled out German rearmament "before Western Europe
or
was stronger". The strongest evidence that on the first occasions the 
gendarmerie was regarded as a step towards full German rearmament is contained 
in the minutes of Foreign Office officials such as Barclay and Mallet which suggest 
that Bevin had now agreed to take the first steps towards German rearmament,
84. FO 371/85327, C6004/3333/18, Mallet minute, 12 September 1950.
85. Christian Greiner, ‘The Defence of Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1947-50’ 
in Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security; European and Atlantic Defence, 1947-53 (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1985), p. 159; Saki Dockrill, Britain and the Problem of a West 
German Military Contribution to NATO, Ph.D.(Arts), London, 1988, ch.2.
86. CAB 131/8, DO(50)17th mtg., minute 2, 1 September 1950.
52
and the reactions of British officials abroad who clearly discerned the change in 
policy initiated at the May Defence Committee meeting.
It may appear anomalous that the British, who for four, years after 1950 
were to argue with the Americans for a more cautious approach to the 
rearmament of Germany and a more conciliatory line towards the Soviets, were 
the first to propose arming the Germans. However, when placed in their proper 
context the British arguments in favour of an armed gendarmerie do not appear 
so peculiar. Though the British military envisaged the gendarmerie as the basis for 
a major defence contribution from West Germany, their arguments were never 
wholly accepted. Initially the Foreign Office resisted the Chiefs* conception 
vigorously and they only reluctantly succumbed when Bevin was persuaded that 
the long term military situation was hopeless without a German defence 
contribution. The Korean War transformed the debate in a rather unexpected 
way. With the West about to engage in a massive programme of rearmament and 
with industry unable to meet the demands of the newly buoyant defence sector, 
the prospect of finding any arms to supply to the Germans appeared distant. 
Instead a new rationale for German rearmament emerged which was hinted at in 
Kirkpatrick’s post-Korean War gendarmerie proposals. This argument was based 
on the notion, which was already embedded in Foreign Office thinking, that the 
Germans were unreliable and prone to extreme reactions. When combined with 
the realisation that the occupation could not be permanent it produced a 
conviction that West Germany must be rearmed in such a way that the country 
would find itself bound by political and military ties to the West before the end 
of Allied controls became inevitable. The door to an eastern alliance must be 
firmly shut. However, this analysis did not triumph immediately and in the next 
chapter the main theme will be the continuation of the post-Korean War reaction 
during which the anti-German prejudices of the government, the belief that 
German rearmament must be subordinate to NATO rearmament and the fear 
engendered by the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea produced a backlash 
against the whole idea of arming the Germans.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LABOUR BACKLASH
It was in the winter of 1950-1 that those factors militating against the 
acceptance of German rearmament, namely a visceral antipathy to the Germans 
resulting from two world wars and a fear of Soviet reactions, had the greatest 
influence on the development of British policy. This was also the period in which 
the government first began to consider the financial costs which would result from 
Germany making its contribution to defence directly through the training and 
equipping of its own armed forces, rather than indirectly through the payment of 
occupation costs to Britain, the United States and France. However, there were 
countervailing pressures which were to be more influential in the long run. The 
most significant of these was American pressure to accept German rearmament. 
The Truman administration gained a nominal success in September by persuading 
Bevin to accept the idea of German rearmament in principle but they were to be 
frustrated by a combination of French intransigence and British insistence that 
agreeing to the principle did not imply agreement to the immediate execution of 
the policy. The Labour government’s scrupulous adherence to this principle was 
facilitated by the American decision of December 1950 to end the linkage 
between German rearmament and American reinforcements to Europe. However, 
the Franco-American agreement to support a German contribution to a European 
army in the summer of 1951 left the British isolated. This development and the 
realisation that some kind of arrangement for a German defence contribution 
would be needed before the occupation ended, ensured that the British revolt 
against the demands of American foreign policy petered out with the defeat of the 
Labour government in the October general election.
An analysis of British policy between September 1950 and October 1951 
reveals that the deep divisions which developed earlier in 1950 on the subject of 
a German defence contribution persisted. The military chiefs and their political 
masters had very different priorities. The military’s principal aim was the 
successful completion of negotiations to provide additional forces to close the gap 
between the force levels required to provide an effective defence for western 
Europe and the forces available. They hoped that the Germans would contribute 
to this process as soon as possible, though there were doubts about when this
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would be feasible. The Foreign Office, which had been pursuing a policy of 
seeking to tie western Germany into the western alliance since 1946, were 
primarily concerned with the completion of this process through the replacement 
of the Occupation Statute with a contract between the Federal Republic and the 
wartime allies. The majority of ministers and of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
regarded the possibility of achieving a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union as a 
more attractive goal than pressing ahead with German rearmament. Indeed, it was 
hoped that the latter could be sacrificed to achieve the former. Despite the 
collapse of the preliminary discussions with the Soviets in June 1951, it was still 
hoped that German rearmament could be postponed. Even had the international 
circumstances been propitious the British government were not prepared to 
accept the immediate creation of German armed forces in this period.
The position of the Labour government with regard to German 
rearmament and the prospect of four power talks was influenced by the enervated 
condition of the second Attlee administration. Within the country at large, the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and the Cabinet itself there was much anti-German 
and anti-American prejudice but it was the lack of foreign policy leadership which 
allowed these tendencies to flourish. At the February 1950 election Labour’s 
majority was cut to five and for the next eighteen months the party continued to 
govern under the constant threat of a general election. ^  This made the Cabinet 
vulnerable to the pressure of backbench and public opinion, but more important 
in this respect were the deficiencies of Labour’s national leadership. The Big Five 
were in decline and the bipolar world of Gaitskellite and Bevanite politics had yet 
to emerge. By September 1950, when the decision to support German 
rearmament in principle was taken, Bevin and Cripps were fatally ill, Dalton, 
though still with some influence, was at the backwater of Town and Country 
Planning, and Attlee appeared to be more diffident than ever. The key figure
1. The actual Labour majority was often even smaller due to the poor health of a number of 
Labour MPs. Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951 (Oxford University Press, 1984) 
p.462.
2. Cripps resigned in October 1950 and died two years later. Bevin died in April 1951, a month 
after leaving the Foreign Office. Dalton’s portfolio was changed from Town and Country Planning 
to Local Government and Planning in February 1951. Attlee was in hospital during the Cabinet 
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was the party strategist and electoral planner, Herbert Morrison. When he 
replaced Bevin as Foreign Secretary in March 1951 he seemed the only possible 
successor to Attlee. Yet it was from this moment that Morrison’s career went into 
decline. He was regarded both by his contemporaries and by his future 
biographers as a poor Foreign Secretary. The consequence of Bevin’s frailty and 
then Morrison’s weakness was that German policy became the subject of 
numerous indecisive squabbles between ministers. In this atmosphere Attlee, 
responding to the concerns of the Parliamentary Labour Party and hopeful of 
some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, guided the government 
towards a policy of delaying German rearmament. Though it is possible that even 
if Bevin had still been the vigorous, autocratic figure of the 1940s he would have 
pursued a similar policy, he would never have allowed his decision to become the 
subject of a prolonged governmental dispute of this kind.
The Chiefs of Staff, who were in the process of reassessing the Soviet 
threat during early 1951, were eagre to begin the process of German rearmament 
as rapidly as possible. As we shall see there was a certain inconsistency about their 
views as to the effect this would have on Soviet policy, but despite this it is clear 
that during this period the British military were making a serious attempt to assist 
in the construction of an effective conventional defence for western Europe. 
Indeed, in December 1950 the Chiefs had their most series clash yet with the 
Foreign Office over the issue of German rearmament. They sought to downplay 
suggestions from the diplomatic corps that it might provoke a dangerous Soviet 
reaction. The strategy developed by Eisenhower at NATO headquarters called for 
a defence east of the Rhine and if this was to be successfully implemented then 
a German contribution seemed essential. During 1951 the Chiefs remained among 
the most radical and persistent advocates of measures designed to achieve a 
substantial German contribution to defence at an early date, but there was
3. Dalton recorded: "HM doesn’t work at Foreign Affairs and doesn’t know about them." Acheson 
claimed Morrison "knew nothing of foreign affairs and had no feeling for situations beyond the 
sound of Bow Bells". Dirk Stikker, the Dutch Foreign Minister, complained in June 1951 that 
"inspirational" British leadership in foreign affairs "disappeared from the Labour Government with 
the departure of Cripps and the death of Bevin." See the Hugh Dalton Diaries, part 1 vol.42, 4 
June 1951; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (W.W. Norton, New York, 1969), p.505; Louis 
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increasing concern about how soon the alliance would have the resources available 
to rearm the Germans. The Chiefs were generally more pessimistic than the other 
allies about the length of time required to develop effective German armed forces 
and were sceptical about the likelihood of the continental powers meeting their 
obligations to NATO. German rearmament was an obvious solution to the 
problem of closing at least part of the projected gap between the force 
requirement prescribed by NATO and the actual contribution which the 
continental powers were likely to make.
Foreign Office officials were, in general, less convinced than the military 
of the need to achieve early German rearmament, but were also highly suspicious 
of the attempts of the politicians to bargain with the Soviets over Germany’s 
future. Though there was a great deal of hostility to Germany in the Foreign 
Office, by 1951 this did not match the pessimism with which the Soviet Union was 
regarded. The Russians were seen as implacable enemies. A global settlement was 
believed to be wholly unrealistic and any partial settlement was likely to be 
exploited by Moscow. The diplomats were particularly anxious that the 
achievements of German policy since 1948 should not be prejudiced. The failure 
of the London conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, followed by the 
Soviet withdrawal from the Allied Control Commission in March 1948 and the 
imposition of the Berlin Blockade allowed Bevin to proceed with the policy, 
formulated by the British in 1946, of tying the western zones of Germany into the 
West.^ A process of gradual liberalisation began with currency reform, 
proceeded with the abolition of the Military Government and continued with the 
reform of the Occupation Statute. Though even in 1951 the ultimate fate of West 
Germany remained unclear, the Foreign Office were unwilling to sacrifice the 
substantial achievements of the previous three years to embark on a risky new 
policy based on the possibility of achieving an agreement with the quarrelsome
4. There is general agreement that 1948 was a watershed for British and western policy in 
Germany. See Saki Dockrill, ’Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p.6; Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance: A  
History of West Germany vol. 1 (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford 1993), p. 191; Alan Bullock, Ernest 
Bevin : Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Heinemann, London, 1983), p.513-6; Geoffrey Warner, 
‘Britain and Europe in 1948: The View from the Cabinet’ in Becker and Knipping (eds.), Power 
in Europe? (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986), p.40.
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Soviets.^ Though the Foreign Office accepted that German rearmament would 
be a part of the process of restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic, they 
were concerned about its timing, and believed the military were acting 
prematurely. During 1951 they became reconciled to the idea that the moment 
when the Germans ought to begin making a contribution to western defence was 
approaching. This was only accepted as the corollary to the framing of a contract, 
however, and the general, though not unanimous view, was that the contractual 
negotiations should have priority.
By the time of the September New York Foreign Ministers meeting the 
Foreign Office had won a clear victory on the issue of German rearmament, but 
their triumph appeared hollow when the Americans presented their ’one package’ 
proposal. The British government had initially believed that American obstruction 
of their gendarmerie schemes was indicative of a general opposition to German 
rearmament in the Truman administration. Thus, on 6 July Gilchrist noted that 
the Americans were unconvinced of the need for a gendarmerie and that 
"considered as a first step towards German rearmament its establishment would 
be opposed by United States public opinion. The State Department do not feel 
that democracy is well enough established in Germany to take any risks yet by 
embarking on something which looks like rearmament." On 14 July the British 
Embassy in Washington explained that the State Department "would like to see 
clearer signs of political development in Western Germany... before committing 
themselves to even such a moderate concession to German rearmament as a small 
Federal police force."**
During the week prior to the New York meeting the British became aware 
of Washington’s desire to see German units incorporated into European 
defence. They remained unaware, however, that Acheson would advocate 
German rearmament so vigorously, with the aid of a range of inducements linked 
to rearmament in one package. In fact even before the Korean War the American
5. CAB 129/43, CP(50)294 annex A, 2 December 1950; CAB 129/44, CP(51)33 annex A, 26 
January 1951.
6. FO 371/85325, C27/3333/18, Gilchrist minute, 6 July 1950 and C4689/3333/18, Penson to Allen, 
14 July 1950.
7. FO 371/85327, C5757/3333/18, Washington to FO, 9 September 1950; FO 371/85053, 
C5756/27/18, Franks to FO, 9 September 1950; FO 371/85052, C5049/27/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 
24 August 1950; DEFE 4/34, COS(50)144th mtg., minute 2, 8 September 1950.
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military had been determined to make American commitments "conditional upon 
the other NATO countries doing their full share and of satisfying the United 
States that they are doing their full share".^ The eventual package agreement 
was the result of rushed negotiations between the Pentagon, who wanted to make 
an American commitment to an integrated force dependent upon German 
rearmament, and the State Department, who opposed the linking of these issues, 
following Truman’s demand on 28 August that they develop an agreed policy.^ 
When Bevin met the American charge, Holmes, he was informed "that United 
States thinking was much in line with the Secretary of State’s" on the subject of 
a gendarmerie. There was no hint that the American proposals for the creation 
of a unified defence force would be linked to German rearmament, though 
Holmes made clear that Washington did favour both of these proposals.^ The 
true nature of the American scheme was not clarified until the Foreign Ministers 
meeting on 12 September when Acheson, having reluctantly accepted the 
military’s formula, promised American reinforcements for Europe and agreement 
to an integrated NATO staff on condition that a policy of German rearmament 
was approved. He later made it clear that the US administration had considered 
how to defend Europe as far east as possible and had "concluded that without 
some German participation the simple arithmetic would not work out".^
The American initiative in New York brought the issue of German 
rearmament into the realm of Cabinet decision making for the first time. The 
decision in May 1950 to support covert German rearmament had been taken in 
the Defence Committee and there had been little discussion when Bevin had 
informed the Cabinet on 4 September of the position to be taken at New York. 
Despite Shinwell’s recollection that "none of us liked it", there were evidently
8. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950, vol.3, memo from Service Chiefs to 
Johnson, 13 July, p. 133-4; Records of the JCS, 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of the UP A, 
Washington), pt.2, reel 1, JCS2124/9, 20 July 1950.
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8 September, p.273-7. See also Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (Aldwych 
Press, London, 1989), p.185-95; Acheson, op.cit., p.437-40; R. McGeehan, The German 
Rearmament Question (University of Illinois Press, London, 1971), p.25-30; Geoffrey Warner, 
‘The United States and Rearmament of West Germany’ International Affairs, 61,1985, p.280-81.
10. Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly, Documents on British Polity Overseas (HMSO), series 2, vol. 
3, record of a meeting on 4 September 1950, including annex, p.4-8.
11. FRUS 1950, vol.3, memorandum of a conversation between Acheson and Schuman, 12 
September 1950, p.285-7 and memorandum of a private conference of the three Foreign Ministers 
and High Commissioners, p.293-300; Bullock (1983), op.cit., p.804-8; McGeehan, op.cit., p.34-5.
59
1?considerable differences over the issue. Dalton, who subsequently campaigned
against it, was in a state of depression which prevented him opposing it during
September 1950.^ Bevin and Attlee, who favoured agreement in principle
while delaying in practice, were at first unable to persuade the majority of the
Cabinet. At their meeting on 14 September the Cabinet refused to endorse the
Foreign Secretary’s proposals. The revolt was an ephemeral affair and the next
day, following further telegrams from Bevin, they agreed to accept German
rearmament in principle. ^  Once agreement was reached, however, Shinwell
became a vigorous proponent of the American scheme. The contrast between
Foreign Office caution and military urgency soon became evident. At a meeting
of Foreign and Defence Ministers in New York on 22 September, Shinwell
emphasised that 1951 would be "the critical year", that it would be "fatal" not to
accept the American offer and that planning the form of a German contribution
would have to begin immediately.^ In contrast Bevin’s deputy, Kenneth
Younger, complained that, "The Americans are rushing things too fast for the
French and the Germans and possibly, even, too fast for British opinion. We are
trying to stall them, but they have the bit between their teeth and I fear there will
be no holding them for a month or two at m ost".^
It was the suggested change in American foreign and defence policy which
persuaded Bevin and eventually the rest of the Cabinet to accept the American
17concept of German rearmament. The main points of the American offer were 
the promise to increase American forces in Europe to a peace time strength of 
4 infantry and lV i armoured divisions, to reinforce these in the event of war and
1 o
to appoint an American Supreme Commander for N A T O /0 The British hope 
was that agreement in principle would allow the substantive part of the American
12. Emanuel Shinwell, I’ve Lived Through It All (Victor Gollancz, London 1973), p.204.
13. Dalton collapsed on 18 September. See Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1/38 (1950), 8 and 18 
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19proposals to be implemented before German rearmament began. The
American scheme certainly appeared to offer scope for extended negotiations.
The plan presented to NATO’s Defence Committee was for the incorporation of
West German balanced ground divisions into an integrated NATO force. The
number of divisions would never exceed one fifth of the total and the Supreme
20Commander would control their operational activities.
The problem for the British government was that the French would not
accept the American plan, and without French acceptance of the principle of
German rearmament the Americans would not proceed with the remainder of
their package. The result was a three month crisis in NATO which only ended
with the adoption of the Spofford Plan by the North Atlantic Council in 
21December. The primary concern of the Attlee administration during this 
period was to maintain the Atlantic Alliance, which appeared under serious threat, 
while seeking to avoid unduly provoking the Soviets. Acceptance of the principle 
of German rearmament, while leaving its detailed application as a matter for 
future discussion was seen as the only way forward and the French were bitterly 
criticised for obstructing this path. On 20 October Attlee told a meeting at 10 
Downing Street: "It was not acceptable that the present situation should continue. 
The French should be pressed by every form of argument to come to some 
positive and helpful conclusion." The Pleven Plan for the creation of an integrated 
European Army, introduced to the French National Assembly on 24 October, did 
not, from the British perspective, meet either, of these criteria. At the NATO 
Defence Committee meeting which began on 28 October, Shinwell told Marshall 
that the Plan "did not seem to us to hold out any real or substantial hope for the 
defence of Western Europe. On the contrary it seemed to be a political 
manoeuvre which was designed to give the French ‘a way out* of their difficulties." 
Privately Shinwell was even more outspoken, describing the Plan as, "disgusting
19. FO 371/85053, C5865/27/18, FO telegram to New York, 15 September 1950; CAB 128/18, 
CM(50)59th mtg., minute 1, 15 September 1950.
20. FRUS 1950, vol.3, State-Defence Memo for North Atlantic Council, 6 October 1950, p.362-3.
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22and nauseous...military folly and political madness." At the meeting the
French defence minister, Jules Moch, was intransigent. He insisted that integration
should be at battalion level as the creation of German divisions "would
23unavoidably lead to camouflaged Ger general staff and Ger army." The 
European Army idea posed a double threat to the British government by both 
delaying, perhaps indefinitely, the American commitment to European defence 
promised by Acheson in September and by promoting a European based defence 
system rivalling the Atlantic Alliance.
Frustration with the French became intense. Attlee complained that the 
failure of the NATO meeting was "entirely due to French intransigence and lack 
of resolution. Valuable time was being lost; chances of substantial American 
reinforcements in Europe were being thrown away; and there was little prospect 
of being able to build up adequate strength against the real dangers of aggression 
in Europe in 1951."^ Evelyn Shuckburgh, the head of the Foreign Office’s 
Western Organisations department, was relatively unconcerned about the dangers 
of German rearmament but regarded the French plan as potentially fatal to the 
cause of Western security. He described the Pleven Plan as "a conscious move 
away from the Atlantic conception of defence...and towards a European federal 
solution which is impossible for us and which we consider futile...it overlooks the 
present Soviet threat and concentrates on the remoter danger of a rearmed 
Germany in Europe relieved of the Russian menace and abandoned by the 
USA".^ In order to forestall the French, Bevin developed a plan for an 
Atlantic Federal Force based, like the European Army, on the idea of creating an 
integrated multi-national army in western Europe, but to include British, 
American and Canadian forces. As with the Pleven Plan the participants would 
have to sacrifice a degree of military sovereignty but this would strengthen rather 
than weaken the Atlantic system. Bevin’s plan was designed to build on the 
achievements of NATO, while by contrast the French design with "its emphasis 
on the European idea, its determination to exclude Germany from NATO and its
22. PREM 8/1429, pt.l, note of an Informal Meeting at 10 Downing Street on 20 October 1950, 
BJSM in Washington to Ministry of Defence, 28 October 1950; Walter S. Poole The History of 
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24. CAB 131/18, DO(50)21st mtg., minute 4, 8 November 1950.
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62
covert hostility to US participation in European affairs...strikes at the very root of
the Atlantic ideal and threatens to undermine the whole treaty." The British
military, who were in any case less hostile to the European Army concept,
regarded Bevin’s plan as wholly unrealistic. They argued it had "no sound military
basis" and that it was unlikely to be acceptable to the Americans who were still
maintaining the link between the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the
German rearmament issue. The American offer to appoint a Supreme
Commander was regarded by the Chiefs as "a vital advantage which we must seize
now or may lose forever". Bevin’s plan was rejected by the Defence Committee
on 27 November on the grounds that it seemed likely to delay still further the
fulfilment of the American offer.^
The debate over the French proposals was conducted at the same time as
a separate discussion about whether the British government should seek to delay,
perhaps indefinitely, the implementation of German rearmament, despite having
accepted the idea in principle. Though the New York conferences of September
1950 witnessed the first open agreement to German rearmament by the British
government, paradoxically they also marked the start of a period of reaction
against the idea, facilitated by French delaying tactics and brought to a climax by
the intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea. The more open nature of
the commitment lead to a much wider debate on the issue than had occurred in
May. This provided an opportunity for opponents of German rearmament,
including the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir William
Strang, to intervene to stop or delay the scheme. On 15 September Strang wrote
to Younger that a rearmed Germany would "possess a power of manoeuvre, with
or without the Soviet Union which will be profoundly disturbing and disruptive.
I have a conviction, possibly a foolish one which is not amenable to reason that
77it is still a mistake to put arms into German hands for purposes of war". 1 In 
November Mallet proposed a bizarre scheme to rearm Germany on a Land basis, 
thus recreating the Bavarian and Prussian armies of the 19th century. This gained
26. PREM 8/1429, pt.l, FO paper on ‘German Contribution to the Defence of Western Europe’, 
24 November 1950, Elliot brief for Attlee, 25 November 1950; DEFE 4/37, COS(50)177th mtg., 
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the support of another Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir Pierson Dixon. He wrote: "In 
spite of all objections to it, it does seem to me that by basing ourselves on the 
federal principle we should be less likely to risk the creation of a German monster 
which we as well as the French would have reason to distrust... By the time we 
have created an effective police force & army & when the economic controls 
which rearmament are likely to involve have been reimposed the Fourth Reich 
will be in being tho’ still divided".^
By contrast events in New York were welcomed by the Chiefs of Staff and 
prompted them to return to the ideas set out in their 20 division plan. This 
became apparent when the matter of safeguards against a resurgence of German 
military power was discussed. Initially the military seemed unwilling to consider 
any measures which might sacrifice military effectiveness for political expediency. 
When the Ministry of Defence was consulted on this issue, the Chief Staff Officer, 
Sir William Elliot, suggested "that on the assumption that we denied an Air Force 
to Germany the best safeguard was the Allied power to pulverise the German war 
industry in the Ruhr with the atom bomb. The role that strategic 
bombardment could play in restraining Germany became a theme in military 
discussions of German rearmament. Slessor and his deputy, Sanders, suggested 
French fears could be removed if "we should undertake to maintain powerful air 
striking forces, including a strong French element under French control ready for
on
immediate action against Germany". Nor were the Chiefs prepared to 
sacrifice the 2 to 1 ratio of Allied to German troops in favour of the American
- 5 1
suggestion of 4 to 1 or Kirkpatrick’s advocacy of 4 to 1 or perhaps 3 to 1. 
The Joint Planning Staff argued that restricting German forces to a third of the 
total Allied strength should ensure that "the demands of Allied security would be 
more than satisfied." Sanders and Creasey, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, 
argued that the 2 to 1 ratio was based on the needs of the Medium Term Defence 
Plan which the Americans had taken insufficiently into account in their
28. FO 371/85057, C7268/27/18, Mallet minute, 6 November and C7269/27/18, Dixon minute, 13 
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schem e.^  Eventually it was accepted that the ratio of Allied to German troops 
should remain subject to further negotiations. The principal concession made by 
the Chiefs was over the level of integration at which German troops would be 
incorporated into Allied forces. In order to ease French concerns, they were 
willing to accept a brigade group as the basic unit.
\
The main disagreement between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs in the
aftermath of New York was not, however, over the safeguards which ought to
accompany German rearmament, but over its timing. Where the Chiefs were
determined to expedite the measures necessary to achieve a German military
contribution as soon as possible, the diplomats were anxious to delay it until the
West could build up its defences without German assistance. The initial dispute
concerned the Marshall Points which had been agreed by the American, British
and French Defence Ministers at New York. These constituted a series of interim
measures which could be implemented in the absence of agreement on German
rearmament, and included the establishment of an armed Land-based police
fo rc e d  Bevin was unable to persuade the French and Americans of the
35benefits of a Federal force under the control of the government in Bonn.
Despite the fact that the police force envisaged in the Marshall Points was to be
organised on a regional basis, the Chiefs apparently still regarded it as a starting
point for military rearmament. This was a return to the ideas of the May Defence
Committee agreement. On this occasion the Foreign Office, led by Bevin, resisted.
The Foreign Secretary warned Shinwell that using the mobile police as a means
to achieve covert German rearmament would "lead to a political crisis of the first
3magnitude in Germany."
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The second and more important confrontation came in the aftermath of 
the Chinese intervention in Korea. On 25 November a massive Chinese counter­
attack was launched in Korea, precipitating a chaotic American retreat. For the 
three weeks after the Chinese intervention, strategic planning in Britain and 
America took place against the background of a massive American evacuation of 
northern Korea. The atmosphere of crisis was further exacerbated by concern 
over the Communist victories of Cao Bang and Langson in Indochina the previous 
month. This increase in Cold War tension had a profound effect on British 
attitudes towards German rearmament. On 12 December Bevin informed the 
Cabinet that "it can legitimately be said that the conditions in which we are called 
upon to accept the present plans for German participation are different from 
those in which we committed ourselves, in September last, to the principles of a
' l ' j
German contribution."
Events in the Far East affected Foreign Office thinking about German 
rearmament in two ways. Firstly, they increased concern about possible Soviet 
reactions to an announcement that German rearmament was to commence. Just 
as the Chinese had warned MacArthur not to advance to the Yalu, the Soviets 
had issued clear warnings about German rearmament. Fear of Soviet reaction 
had been an important factor in Foreign Office thinking for some time. On 1 
September Bevin told the Defence Committee: "There was serious danger in 
endeavouring to support any measure of German rearmament which apart from 
its effect on public opinion in Western European countries, might provoke serious 
reactions from Russia, from Eastern Germany, from the Russian satellites, or from
- 5 0
all of these." The American package plan increased these concerns. Gainer, 
Kirkpatrick’s replacement as Permanent Under-Secretary for the German section, 
feared the deal offered by the Americans "will give us a negligible accession of 
strength over the critical period of preparation... at the cost of alerting the
'IQ
Russians by the fullest possibility as to our intentions." The escalation of the 
Korean War in November and the Soviet request of 3 November for a four power
37. CAB 129/43, CP(50)311, 12 December 1950.
38. CAB 131/8, DO(50)17th mtg., minute 3, 1 September 1950. See also FO 371/85052, 
C554/27/18, Bevin to Harvey, 5 September 1950 and FRUS 1950, vol.3, US Ambassador to Soviet 
Union (Kirk) to Acheson, 8 August 1950, p. 129 and Bevin to Acheson, 4 September 1950, p.264.
39. FO 371/85055, C6052/27/18, Gainer to Younger, 18 September 1950.
66
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) to discuss German demilitarisation made this 
tendency in Foreign Office thought still more pronounced. Strang stressed the fact 
that the Soviets had declared they would "not reconcile themselves to measures 
directed towards the restoration, in Western Germany of a German regular army." 
The Foreign Office took the threat seriously. Gainer argued that, in light of the 
Chinese intervention in Korea, the threat from Russia "has greatly increased and 
I think we must regard the Soviet statements... and the Soviet request for a CFM 
meeting on German rearmament in the light of serious warnings, to be 
disregarded at our peril."^
Bevin was preoccupied during late November and early December with the 
second problem that the escalation of the war in Korea posed: the possibility that 
the American military effort might have to be switched from Europe to Asia. This 
was a corollary of the first; the incentive for a Soviet attack would increase if the 
Truman administration appeared to be distracted by events in the Far East. Both 
dangers were discussed when Attlee and Bevin met Pleven, the French Prime 
Minister, and Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister, on 2 December. Bevin 
stressed that "it was essential to avoid getting too heavily committed in the East" 
and that Acheson’s proposals were "too good to miss". However, Schuman warned 
that the Soviets might follow the same policy in Germany as they had in Korea 
if the West proceeded with German rearmament. Attlee concluded by arguing 
that a German defence contribution was a strategic necessity but that it would 
take time to implement and in the interim other Allied forces must be 
strengthened. Evidently French objections made some impact because at a 
meeting the next day to brief Attlee on his trip to Washington, Bevin said that "as 
a result of his conversations with the French Prime Minister and the French 
Foreign Minister, he desired more time to consider the attitude which the United 
Kingdom should adopt towards the problem of the German contribution to 
Western defence. He undertook to send his considered views to the Prime 
Minister in Washington."^ Three days later he sent a telegram to Attlee urging 
the Prime Minister to suggest to Truman a delay in the implementation of
40. FO 371/85058, C7955/27/18, Strang minute, 5 December 1950 and C8028/27/18, Gainer minute,
6 December 1950.
41. Bullen and Pelly, op.cit., record of a meeting on 2 December 1950, p.310-16; CAB 130/65, 
GEN 347/2, 4 December 1950.
67
German rearmament. Bevin explained that he was "very much concerned" about 
the fact that the Allied decision to rearm Germany would soon become known 
and about "the effect which this is likely to have on the general situation at the 
present time, having regard to the position of extreme weakness in which the 
Western Powers now find themselves and the grave doubts which we must feel as 
to whether any American reinforcement of Europe is possible in the near future." 
He insisted that circumstances were "entirely different from those which obtained 
when we first agreed with the Americans that it was safe to embark on German 
rearmament". The Americans had promised substantial reinforcements during 
1951 but now "we cannot even be sure until the consequences of present Korean 
developments are made clear, that we are not going to be faced with a situation 
in the Far East in which a large proportion of Allied military resources would be 
tied up for a long time to come." Bevin then went on to relay Foreign Office fears 
about Soviet reactions to German rearmament. He recommended that Attlee 
discuss these problems frankly with Truman to see whether he would accept a 
delay in German rearm am ent.^
This telegram had precipitated a confrontation between Bevin and the 
Chiefs of Staffs and coincided with an increase in Cabinet divisions on the issue. 
The defence establishment continued to regard the resolution of the German 
rearmament controversy as a priority. In November 1950 Shinwell was still 
"impressed with the urgency of this matter and the necessity for a quick settlement 
of the problem to meet a possible Russian move in 1951 or 1952", while the 
Chiefs had written to the BJSM stressing the necessity of overcoming French 
obstruction of the American proposals. They suggested that there would be 
sufficient safeguards against a German military revival even without a European 
army, including the fact that "with key industries concentrated on the Ruhr she is 
particularly vulnerable to atomic bomb attack".^ When Bevin had proposed his 
Atlantic Confederacy scheme as a counter to the European Army concept 
embodied in the Pleven Plan, Shinwell had explained that his "main concern was 
to ensure that an increase of strength on the ground was achieved by 1951" and 
warned that Bevin’s scheme might cause further delays in achieving th is .^  The
42. FO 800/456, Def 50/21, FO to Washington, 6 December 1950.
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Chiefs were horrified when they discovered that Bevin intended to send a
telegram to Attlee voicing his concerns about German rearmament. Slessor
warned that Bevin’s prevarication might jeopardise the sending of American
reinforcements, while Elliot believed it would "have a deplorable effect in France."
On 4 December they agreed to make urgent representations to prevent the
telegram being sent. The following day Bevin and the British ambassador to the
Soviet Union, Sir David Kelly, met the Chiefs and explained their view that, with
the possibility of the Americans being distracted by events in the Far East, "we
could clearly not afford to gamble on the result of any decision which might
provoke the Russians into action." Kelly emphasised that there would be "a
dangerous time" between the announcement of German rearmament and the
appearance of German forces. However, the Chiefs continued to warn of the
disastrous effect the proposed telegram would have on the Americans and it was
agreed that it should be re-drafted. Considering this re-draft the following day,
they remained dissatisfied. Nevertheless, they agreed not to disassociate
themselves from it provided a statement of their views was included.^
Attlee decided not to raise Bevin’s fears about German rearmament with
Truman, but a split was developing in the Cabinet on this issue. Bevin and
Shinwell had clashed on a number of occasions during the last few months and
now Morrison insisted on Bevin communicating his support for the Chiefs’
position to A ttlee .^  Following his return, the Prime Minister was confronted
by a recovered Hugh Dalton who expressed his reservations about German
rearmament and claimed that Bevin "shared my apprehensions".^ Kenneth
Younger, who gradually took over Bevin’s responsibilities during the next few
weeks, was highly critical of the Americans. In early January he complained they
had "been pressing for immediate German rearmament, regardless of the risk of
provoking the Russians at the moment of Europe’s greatest weakness, you could
scarcely get a more complete picture of dangerous stupidity on the part of a 
48leading power". This was the first phase of a bitter Labour Party dispute
45. DEFE 4/38, COS(50)193rd mtg., minute 3,4 December 1950, COS(50)194th mtg., minute 1,
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which lasted into the mid-1950s. Labour’s ambivalence about German rearmament 
prevented the government giving full endorsement to a policy which they had 
accepted in principle at New York.
The failure of the Atlantic Federal Force idea and Attlee’s refusal to 
backtrack on Britain’s commitment to German rearmament during his meetings 
with Truman left acceptance of the deal engineered by the American 
representative on the North Atlantic Council, Charles Spofford, as the only viable 
alternative. The Spofford Plan sanctioned both negotiations for the creation of 
German armed forces and separate discussions to examine the feasibility of the 
Pleven Plan. As this compromise was to precipitate the vital negotiations of 1951 
it is worth noting that the British government was unenthusiastic about it from the 
outset. This was partly because it implied acceptance of the European Army. 
Bevin informed the British representative on the NATO Defence Committee that 
he had "grave misgivings" about the Spofford Plan because he objected to "taking 
any risk whatever that the French might succeed in creating the European 
Defence Force...it would be a weakening of the Atlantic Community as a whole 
and might well result, in the long run, in the emergence of a neutral third force 
in E urope."^  There was also a feeling that the plan would involve the western 
powers in a process of bargaining with the Germans over the ‘price* of their 
defence contribution. The British representative on the North Atlantic Council, 
Hoyer-Millar, "expressed concern that dual approach to Germans under US 
proposals (by HICOMS on basis US plan and in Paris on basis European Army) 
concurrently might cause German temporize on first until terms of second visible." 
He did not begin to give support to Spofford’s plan until 28 November, a week 
after Spofford presented his proposals and the day after Bevin’s Atlantic Federal 
Force scheme was rejected by the Defence Com mittee.^ The Foreign 
Secretary still insisted that his acceptance "did not commit the governments as to 
the precise timing of the approach to the Federal Government" and that there 
must be flexibility over how the issue was to be raised with the West German
49. PREM 8/1429, pt.l, Elliot brief for Defence Committee meeting of 25 November 1950. See 
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government. During December Bevin continued to make it plain that he had
"always felt very strongly that it would be fatal to go to the Germans cap in hand
with a request for their contribution, thereby putting them in a position where
they can bargain with us and...that if we put the Spofford Plan formally to them
at the present moment we should court a rebuff which may weaken our position
not only in Germany but also vis-a-vis the Russians".^
By December 1950 Bevin was contemplating the prospect of some form of
rapprochement with the Soviets through a conference of Foreign Ministers.
Moscow’s warnings that they would not be reconciled to German rearmament
were balanced by the offer of new talks on Germany. In October, during a
meeting at Prague with their Eastern European allies, they called for the creation
of an all-German Constitutional Council consisting of representatives from the
East and West German governments and they subsequently requested a Council
of Foreign Ministers (CFM) to discuss this proposal and ensure a return to the
Potsdam formula for Germany. The British Foreign Office were sceptical about
Soviet motives and it was decided that the Prague proposals, or indeed any
52discussion of German problems in isolation, was unacceptable. However, the
C-5
Cabinet were more enthusiastic about the prospect of talks. Partly this was 
because of a desire to reassure British public opinion. On 5 December they 
agreed that, "Although the chances of reaching a satisfactory settlement with the 
Soviet government were slight, public opinion in this country would not stand firm 
unless it were felt that all reasonable steps had been taken to settle the many 
outstanding points of disagreement with Russia." Ministers subsequently tried to 
alter the text of a Foreign Office note to make it appear more conciliatory to the 
Soviets.^ Though Bevin rebuffed these attempts at redrafting, there is some 
evidence that he believed a CFM could have a successful outcome. His initial 
reaction to the Prague proposals was that "the Russians were apprehensive about 
the consequences of rearming Germany." He was unsure whether they wanted a
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CFM "for the purpose of obstructing the plans of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Powers or whether they were prepared to face a realistic settlement of outstanding 
issues." In December the American charge in Britain reported that Bevin felt "that 
if we push our defense preparations resolutely there may be some chance of a 
CFM producing at least a lessening of the tension between East and W est."^
With the acceptance of the Spofford Plan at the Brussels North Atlantic
Council in December 1950 it appeared that the American advocates of early
German rearmament had succeeded in their goal. The Plan stated that the
Germans could participate in the French scheme for a European Defence Force,
if militarily acceptable arrangements could be devised, but that "the generation of
combat worthy German units should not await solutions to these problems...the
formation of small units should be started in the immediate future and these
gradually built up to units of the required size."^ As in September 1950 it
seemed that American support for German rearmament had persuaded the
British government to acquiesce in a decision which would expedite the formation
of German military forces. The parallel turned out to be too exact, however,
because the prospect of early German rearmament proved illusory again. The
Foreign Office were quite satisfied that they had made no irrevocable
commitment to early German rearmament. In the brief provided by Pierson Dixon
for the Brussels meeting he made clear that one of the British objectives was to
ensure that German rearmament was not rushed. He stated: "political evolution
must develop first and rearmament come later". After the meeting he
acknowledged that this was "partly because we wanted to avoid producing any
57unnecessarily sharp Soviet reaction". Dixon was content that at Brussels it had 
been agreed that the Occupation Statute should be revised in tandem with 
German rearmament. In the years that followed the Foreign Office continued to 
give priority to the ending of the occupation.
The rearmament of Germany on a substantial scale had important financial 
implications. Though these were perceived by British policy-makers at an early
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stage, little was done to address the problems which might arise. Furthermore, 
even when in the winter of 1951-2 the financial debate became central to 
discussions of German rearmament, it had little impact on British policy. The 
opponents of German rearmament never really utilised the financial argument 
against the creation of German armed forces. Their objections were based on 
military and diplomatic factors. In 1950 the Federal Republic was paying for the 
costs of British forces in Germany and it seemed inevitable that when the 
Germans had to create their own army they would terminate these payments. At 
a meeting of British officials on 22 September 1950 it was noted that the Federal 
Republic’s budget was already "delicately balanced" and that, even without having 
to pay for German armed forces, the cost of the increased number of Allied 
divisions and the police force would be "extremely difficult" for the Germans to 
meet. A fortnight later Stevens, the Under-Secretary responsible for the German 
financial department who had chaired the meeting, raised this issue with Bevin. 
He warned that the creation of German armed forces when added to the cost of 
occupation could "impose an intolerable fiscal burden" on the Federal Republic 
and suggested there was a "need for reducing occupation costs to the lowest per 
capita figure in order to leave the largest possible room for direct German 
contribution to her own defence". Bevin wrote to Attlee to inform him that the 
British Exchequer would lose an estimated DM 1,376 million or £120 million if the 
Germans could no longer meet the occupation costs. He warned that once the 
cost of German armed forces began to mount "we shall be likely to pass the 
taxable capacity of the country" and concluded that retrenchment in the British 
occupation budget was "of capital importance".
Despite this flurry of autumnal activity the issue of the German financial 
contribution was allowed to lapse in the months that followed. General Sir Sidney 
Kirkman was despatched to Germany to advise on how cuts in the British 
occupation budget could be made but despite this the total cost of the occupation 
continued to rise as allied reinforcements began to arrive. A British working party 
suggested that occupation costs would increase from DM4.1 milliard to at least 
DM7.1 milliard in 1951-2. The High Commission meanwhile engaged in an
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acrimonious dispute, with the British and French arguing in favour of charging the
Germans approximately DM7 milliard and the Americans trying to reduce this
figure to DM6 milliard. The compromise figure eventually agreed was DM6.6
somilliard, with the British share set at DM2.08 milliard.
As well as increasing occupation costs in Germany the expansion of NATO 
armed forces created a further economic obstacle to German rearmament because 
western defence industries would be incapable of supplying sufficient equipment 
for the German armed forces. This was particularly true of the proposed German 
air force, and it was Slessor who in early 1951 began to question the feasibility of 
the planned German contribution. He had been one of the first to advocate 
arming the Federal Republic but it was typical of him that he should now seek to 
question those strategic orthodoxies which he had been so influential in 
propagating. By March 1951 he was privately chastising the Americans for forcing 
the British government to accept the creation of German armed forces when 
"there appeared to be little chance of the Germans getting any equipment before 
1954". This demonstrated some effrontery when one considers that Slessor had in 
the summer of 1950 approved a plan for the creation of 20 German divisions. 
Nevertheless, at this stage Slessor opined: "we have said so much that to go back 
on our policy would presumably cause a lot of trouble in Germany and give the 
Russians the impression that we have surrendered to their threats...we are now 
in a position of having made a lot of public fuss about German rearmament - and 
incurred the consequential risks and disadvantages - while being in fact quite 
incapable of implementing it" .^
Despite Slessor’s reservations, the strategic demands of the situation on the 
European continent led the Chiefs to plan for a major German contribution. They 
believed that a defence system based on the line of the Rhine was strategically 
flawed. In their brief for a Commonwealth conference in December 1950 they 
restated their view that a more forward strategy was "essential in order that the 
considerable potential of Western Germany is denied to the enemy and secured
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for the Allies; to give depth and continuity to the ground and air defence of the
territories of all NATO nations in Europe and Western Germany; to honour the
pledge of all tripartite forces to protect Germany, and to retain the goodwill of
the Western Germans."^ In order to implement this forward strategy it was
apparent that greater military efforts would be required of the Allies. Despite the
fact that current strategy was based on the defence of the Rhine and not on a
more ambitious forward strategy, a gap had emerged between the force
requirements prescribed by the Medium Term Defence Plan and the forces
promised by western governments. The Americans estimated that the shortfall in
western Europe, excluding the northern and southern flanks, would be 1 and a
third divisions on D-Day, rising to 9 and two thirds by D+30. The NATO
Standing Group's request that the Allies forward plans for filling this gap by 1
February 1951 met with little response. The British Chiefs were wary of
committing precious resources to the European continent unless their efforts were
to be matched by the Allies. In October 1950 Slim contemplated allocating a
division earmarked for the strategic reserve to the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) but made this conditional on American reinforcements. By February
1951 while he was willing, in principle, to send the 6th Armoured Division, he
insisted that this would be "subject to satisfactory similar action by the United
63States and French governments."
It was in these circumstances that the Chiefs sought to achieve the 
maximum German contribution in the shortest possible time. The Petersberg talks 
between the representatives of the Allied High Commission and Adenauer’s 
military experts seemed to offer the best prospect of achieving this. The 
discussions were a result of the Spofford Plan which called for the formation of 
German units "in the immediate future". The Chiefs, therefore, instructed the JPS 
to prepare a statement on the size of the military contribution the Germans could 
be expected to make by the autumn of 1952. The JPS accepted the Spofford Plan 
safeguards which stated that the Germans should not contribute any more than
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one fifth of the land based forces allocated to NATO but, as in the summer of 
1950, they based their calculations on the figures prescribed by NATO planners 
rather than the total contribution offered by the members of the Alliance. On the 
basis that 34 and two thirds divisions were required in 1952 they argued that the 
Germans ought to be allowed to contribute the equivalent of 7 divisions. As the 
Petersberg negotiations were proceeding on the basis that the initial German units 
would be formed at a level lower than that of the division, this figure translated 
into 21 brigade groups.^ No account was taken of the difficulties of equipping 
such a force.
The sense of urgency felt by military planners did not seem to be shared 
by those negotiating at Petersberg. As during the negotiations over a German 
gendarmerie in the summer of 1950, the discussions in Germany were being 
conducted by Foreign Office officials who were not entirely persuaded by the 
military’s case. Ward, the Deputy High Commissioner who was Britain’s 
representative on the Petersberg committee, believed that a withdrawal from West 
Germany was still a possibility because the pledge to defend it "would not depend 
solely on having troops in Western Germany; the true defence would remain, as 
today, in western air strength and the atomic bomb."^ Still more damaging to 
the Chiefs’ cause was the attitude of the Americans. Eisenhower was not anxious 
for an immediate solution. He had been 'Very sympathetic" to French concerns 
during late 1950 and in January 1951 told the American Cabinet that he was 
worried the Germans were becoming "cocky about their importance in the 
picture."^ The State Department shared the concerns of Bevin and Eisenhower 
that the public debate over the need for German rearmament would place the 
"Germans in a bargaining position where they can attempt to fix maximum and 
even unreasonable conditions." Rearmament, they argued, should follow the
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f nintegration of West Germany into the western democratic system.
If the Americans were unwilling to force the issue at Petersberg, then the 
British government were certainly not prepared to take the initiative in 
precipitating a solution. The Parliamentary Labour Party had reacted with hostility 
to Bevin’s public acceptance of German rearmament at New York. Crossman 
reminded Parliament of Bevin’s previous assertions that a decision in favour of 
German rearmament would be "frightful". Frederick Elwyn Jones summed up the 
general feeling on the Labour benches when he warned that "a Germany armed 
will add to the political dynamite that is already sufficiently powerful to blow up 
the world."^ Within the government a group of ministers including John 
Strachey, the Secretary of State for War, Kenneth Younger, the Foreign Office 
Minister of State, and Attlee himself hoped that the threat of German 
rearmament could be used as a bargaining counter which could be traded to 
achieve concessions from the Russians. The Foreign Office, which believed that 
a settlement of differences with Russia as a result of a conference of Foreign 
Ministers was highly unlikely, opposed this idea but, with Bevin seriously ill, lacked 
an effective spokesman to put their case.
On 11 January 1951 Mallet raised the crucial questions regarding the 
proposed conference of Foreign Ministers: "What are to be our terms to agreeing 
to discuss the demilitarisation of Germany? That is to say what other items do we 
want put on the agenda? Secondly are we prepared to accept the demilitarisation 
of Germany in return for a settlement of any of these problems on our lines, and 
if so, which?"^ The Foreign Office proposed to put a disarmament treaty as 
the first item on the agenda and warned that any settlement of the German 
problem outside the context of a broader agreement on disarmament would be 
dangerous. It would make it more difficult to retain the support of public opinion 
for western rearmament, weaken American interest in Europe, cause severe 
military problems and, worst of all, there would be a "grave risk that, with the 
west lulled into a false feeling of relief, the whole of Germany would fall into the 
hands of the Communists." It was admitted, however, that the possibility could not 
be excluded that the Soviets "would force war upon us rather than see the
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manpower and industrial resources of Western Germany harnessed into the 
military effort of the Atlantic P o w e r s . " ^
This analysis prompted Strachey to complain to Attlee, "an early general 
war must be final catastrophe for this country... Yet the Cabinet is being urged to 
decide tomorrow (Thursday 1 February) on a course which its advocates frankly 
state, involves the serious risk of just such an early war." He insisted: "a settlement 
of even the German problem alone appears to me to be an immense gain, both 
to the cause of the West and the cause of peace." He reminded Attlee, "You told 
me the other day that you considered that our proposals for German rearmament 
might well be used as a bargaining weapon with the Russians to bring them to 
reason on Germany and in particular force them to abandon their own
7 1
rearmament of the East German military police." At the Cabinet meeting on 
1 February it was agreed that the issue of German rearmament could be "a very 
powerful factor" at a CFM. It was accepted that such a meeting should have a 
wider agenda than just German problems but the general view was that the 
Foreign Office were "unnecessarily pessimistic" about the prospect of a four-power 
meeting producing a reduction in tension. The Foreign Office brief was rejected
77
in favour of retaining a "flexible" position. After the meeting Gaitskell 
recorded the strength of opposition to German rearmament in his diary. After 
suggesting that much of the opposition to German rearmament stemmed from a 
dislike of American policies, he noted, "H[arold] W[ilson] is clearly ganging up 
with the Minister of Labour... The others on Bevan’s side are very genuine, Jim 
Griffiths for pacifism; Chuter Ede because he is anti-American and Dalton 
because he hates the Germans." He was concerned that anti-American sentiment 
"leads to accepting...an agreement with Russia which...might be extraordinarily 
dangerous."
On 6 February Strachey sent another memorandum to Attlee in which he 
analysed the military situation in terms very similar to Slessor. He argued that the
70. FO 371/93320, C1015/84, FO brief for the Four Power Talks in Paris, 28 December 1950; CAB 
129/44, CP(51)33, 26 January 1951.
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within the government and their desire to do a deal with the Soviets over Germany.
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West was avoiding discussions with the Soviet Union "not so much because of any
practical gain in the military security of the West which German rearmament can
quickly give use (sic), as because the American reaction to an abandonment or
even postponement of German rearmament is so much feared...for some years
there will not be enough arms to equip all the troops which will be available to
the NATO armies without the Germans. During this time each German formation
equipped will mean, other things being equal, one less British, French or
American formation equipped. There would be no net gain in security." Strachey
went on to warn that, "expecting the Russians to sit passively by while we carry
out a full German rearmament...is asking a good deal". His advice was that the
government should ,rbase our policy on a real instead of a simulated attempt to
come to an acceptable, limited agreement with Russia, in which we secure
substantial advantages from her (such as, for example, the disarmament of
Eastern Germany and/or an Austrian treaty) in return for a postponement of
German rearmament...to use the threat of German rearmament as a bargaining
weapon upon Russia".^ These persuasive arguments evidently had some effect
on Attlee. When the issue was debated again on 8 February he stated very
specifically, "we were anxious to use German rearmament as a bargaining counter
75in the discussions at the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers." This 
prompted Pakenham, the principal advocate of early German rearmament within 
the government, to complain about ministers "trying to prevent German
7zr
rearmament by hook or by crook".
Within the Cabinet there was a strong feeling that they should now make 
public their desire to delay the creation of West German armed forces. During the 
8 February meeting they discussed a Foreign Office paper reassuring them that 
"the opening of exploratory conversations with the German authorities do not 
constitute any final decision on the part of the Allied Governments." The issue 
was now whether they "should take any initiative to delay the moment at which
74. John Strachey papers 1951, Box 14, Strachey memo to Attlee, 6 February 1951.
75. CAB 128/19, CM(51)12th mtg., minute 4, 8 February. Dalton reminded Attlee in July 1951 
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a positive move forward might occur." Younger, deputising for Bevin, argued that
the lack of enthusiasm for German rearmament in the Federal Republic and the
absence of any urgency on Eisenhower’s part meant that there was no likelihood
of an early decision in any case. Attlee, however, suggested that it was necessary
to rearm the other western European countries before West Germany and that
the negotiations on a German defence contribution ought to be "spun out." Dalton
complained that the Americans had "bulldozed" the government into accepting the
principle of German rearmament and declared that "there were some principles
that were accepted but never applied...Any forces raised in W[est] Germany would
consist of Nazis, SS & refugees... they would think of nothing but reconquering
their old homes beyond the 0[der]-N[eisse] line." The Cabinet also noted that a
delay would be popular with public opinion and would thus be of "great political
advantage" as well as being less provocative to the Soviet Union. Though others
argued that German rearmament was necessary to counter Soviet moves in East
Germany and that it was inevitable in any case, the anti-rearmers again had the 
77upper hand. The result of these deliberations was the adoption of a very 
negative attitude by the British government to the Petersberg negotiations. 
Already on 7 February Ernest Davies, the junior minister at the Foreign Office, 
was insisting in answer to Parliamentary questions that no irrevocable decision 
regarding German rearmament had yet been taken, somewhat to the surprise of 
Eden who detected a distinct ambiguity in the government’s attitude to the
70
Petersberg discussions.'0 On 9 February, the day after the crucial Cabinet 
discussion of the matter, Kirkpatrick told the other High Commissioners that he 
believed the talks with the German military representatives had reached "complete 
deadlock" and suggested referring the matter back to NATO. The Americans 
wished to continue however, and Bevin instructed Kirkpatrick to allow further 
discussions of the military problem but to ensure that "they should not outrun the 
political discussions...there is no advantage to be gained in bringing them to a 
head until agreement has been reached on the political discussions." He believed 
that "the process of transferring authority to the Federal government should 
continue whatever form the association of the Federal Republic in Western
77. CAB 129/44, CP(51)43,7 Februaiy 1951; CAB 128/19, CM(51)12th mtg., minute 4,8 February 
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defence may take ."^  On 12 February Attlee finally gave a public clarification 
of the government’s strategy of delay. He told the Commons that "the time and 
method" of German rearmament "will require a great deal of working out". The 
final resolution of the issue would be conditional on the rearmament of NATO, 
the preliminary strengthening of Allied forces, agreement on measures to prevent 
the re-emergence of the German military threat and a deal with the West
on
Germans on the level of their contribution. Attlee could not reveal the full 
extent of the government’s change of attitude without seriously alarming the 
Allies. The so-called Attlee conditions were a means of publicly flagging the 
Cabinet’s increasing disenchantment with German rearmament in order to 
reassure Labour backbenchers.
The extent of the Cabinet’s misgivings about German rearmament and 
their desire to have serious negotiations with the Soviets on the matter alarmed 
the Foreign Office. Prior to the four power preliminary conference which began 
in Paris on 5 March they began to marshal the arguments against a deal with the 
Soviets on Germany. Gainer, Dixon and Shuckburgh all wrote papers setting out 
the case against any agreement to a neutral, disarmed Germany. The core of their 
argument was "that a neutralised (unitary) Germany must fall prey to Russia." 
Shuckburgh concluded that "the freedom of Europe depends on holding Germany 
in the Western camp, that we must regard this as a vital objective and take no 
risks with it; and that far from agreeing to loosen our hold on Western Germany 
for the sake of a partial and temporary detente with Russia, we should keep our 
eye on the ultimate objective of freeing the whole of Germany from Russian 
bondage." This provocative language was regarded by Kenneth Younger as far too 
uncompromising. He complained that the officials in the Foreign Office were 
ignoring the "real danger of the Russians acting before Western defence has 
become effective", and that there was a tendency "to underestimate the long-term 
danger of maintaining the present division of Germany and proceeding with 
German rearmament...As Western Germany gets militarily stronger...her influence 
upon Western policy - and indeed her power of blackmail - will also increase." He 
added: "British official policy until recently was opposed to German rearmament
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on its merits, and they (the public) will not understand if we now take the line 
that German rearmament is so essential to us that it can be given up only in 
return for larger scale Soviet disarmament." He disliked Shuckburgh’s paper and 
favoured a memo by Strang, which argued that "By deciding to admit Western 
Germany to participate in the defence of Western Europe...the Western Powers 
have taken a step which is less easily defensible than, for example, the decision 
to provide Western Germany with its own governmental institutions." A brief was 
prepared for the Secretary of State’s use at a future CFM, which tried to reconcile 
the divergent points of view. It concluded that a united, demilitarised Germany 
"would still involve grave risks and should only be adopted by the Western Powers 
provided they could secure from the Soviet government further concessions which 
would constitute a substantial alleviation of the underlying causes of tension." The 
"minimum alleviation" constituted an Austrian Treaty, the proper settling of the 
Balkan peace treaties and an armaments agreement based on East-West
01
parity.
The Soviet suggestion of a Council of Foreign Ministers and the American 
agreement to the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of an 
integrated NATO force combined during the first two months of 1951 to produce 
a definite shift in British foreign policy away from the idea of rearming Germany 
in the immediate future, if at all. It must be stressed, however, that the Attlee 
government had been inclined towards this position since the matter was first 
discussed by the full Cabinet in September 1950. As the Cabinet papers state, 
policy towards Germany had to take account of "the consideration, expressed at 
almost every discussion of this topic and by the Secretary of State and other 
Foreign Ministers... that caution must be exercised in the timing of the actual
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rearmament and Four Power Talks, 22 February 1951, C1015/288, Younger to Strang, 7 March 
1951 and Dixon minute, 9 March 1951, C1015/289, Gainer to Strang, 19 February 1951; FO 
371/93331, C1015/329, draft for Secretary of State on German Questions at a conference of 
Foreign Ministers, 16 March 1951; FO 371/93377, C10110/99, Strang memo, 5 March 1951. It is 
indicative of Foreign Office scepticism about the idea of negotiating an agreement with the Soviets 
that Strang, who was the most ardent opponent of German rearmament, did not hold out any 
hope of a deal with the Soviets at a conference of Foreign Ministers. See FO 371/93318, 
C1015/52, minutes of a meeting in Strang’s room, 17 January 1951; FO 371/93319,01015/74, 
minute from Strang on Four Power Talks, 20 January 1951; FO 371/93331, C1015/328, Dixon and 
Strang minutes, 15 March 1951.
82
82raising of German forces."
One of the main causes of ministerial tentativeness about German
rearmament was the fear of Soviet reactions and their concern was only
exacerbated by the inconsistent views of the Chiefs of Staff about the role that
West German rearmament would play in provoking a Soviet attack. On one
occasion they described the threat of provocation as "the weakest of all
arguments" against a German defence contribution, and claimed that it "would
have little effect on Russia’s decisions as to whether or not she would go to
w ar."^  Generally, however, they accepted the view that the rearming of West
Germany would increase the likelihood of Soviet attack, but insisted that this was
a risk which must be taken. Thus, when Kelly warned that the Soviets might
"launch a war" before German rearmament could be made effective, Slim replied
that they had accepted this policy as "the lesser of two evils, and the Chiefs of
84Staff still firmly maintained that this was the course to follow."0^ Nevertheless,
the essential point of Kelly’s analysis was confirmed by a Joint Intelligence
Committee report of 21 February which stated "the main danger of war was about
the end of 1952." This conclusion was reached on the assumption that at this time
German rearmament would begin to take effect and start eroding Soviet
conventional superiority which would have increased during the previous eighteen
months. Thus the period of maximum danger would occur just before the German
85defence contribution became effective.
Though the report was endorsed by the Chiefs, its prediction that German 
rearmament would be influential in a Soviet decision to attack western Europe 
was a powerful argument for those who wished to delay it, most notably John 
Strachey. Another of Strachey’s beliefs, that the current discussion of German 
rearmament was otiose because there was no equipment available to achieve it, 
was shared by Slessor and his staff. Thus, when the Joint Planning Staff circulated 
the revised figure of 20 brigade groups and 114 squadrons as the German 
contribution for 1952, MacFadyen of the Air Staff complained that the target for 
the air force was "entirely unrealistic; in any circumstances the idea of building up
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an air force from scratch at the speed envisaged was to put it mildly optimistic, 
in present conditions of shortage of aircraft and training facilities...the idea was 
manifestly absurd." Ten days later, on 22 March, in studying the figures prepared 
by the NATO Standing Group for the German contributions, the Chiefs agreed 
that it would be best not to give the Germans a specific timetable and that they 
ought to maintain "a realistic outlook." At a subsequent meeting Slessor was even 
more emphatic, declaring: "the time factor envisaged made no sense at all, 
particularly in relation to providing the necessary equipment., we should not lead 
the Germans up the garden path by telling them we wanted things which, though 
acceptable in principle, were unrealistic in practise in the time envisaged."^ 
Thus, in early 1951 there were doubts in the military as well as the Cabinet over 
the feasibility of German rearmament.
The more active nature of British opposition to early German rearmament 
caused some alarm among other western governments. The Italian ambassador 
told Ernest Davies that he had noticed "a slight change in our approach to 
German rearmament and wondered whether this was due to a fear of provoking 
Russia." Davies replied that "the political atmosphere had to be right before
07
Germany could rearm."0 Within the American administration it was noted that 
the British were exhibiting "a tendency to hold off on the matter of German 
rearmament until the outcome of a possible Four-Power meeting is known." They 
were "disturbed" by the Attlee conditions which seemed to imply "that the Brussels 
decision to proceed with German rearmament was one taken in principle only,
0 0
and not seriously to be implemented as soon as possible."00 Adenauer too was 
critical of the new British line. To Kirkpatrick the Chancellor merely noted "that 
the British attitude had changed since Brussels and that in this matter the British
00
government were aligned with the French."07 To the American Joseph Alsop, 
however, he "bluntly blamed the British as well as the French for the 
postponement of the German defense contribution." They seemed "to think a
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Russian attack on their countries could be bought off at the cost of 
Germany...Both France and England were susceptible to Russian 
blandishments."^ Oliver Franks gave an astonishingly honest explanation of the 
background to this change in policy to Dean Acheson. Following a trip back to 
London he told the American Secretary of State in April 1951 that "the 
government had been under unceasing fire and had had to cope with crises about 
once a week, which they had barely pulled through; everyone was tired; the 
Foreign Office had been practically leaderless, with the Prime Minister, Mr Bevin 
(who was fatally ill), Mr Younger (the Minister of State), Mr Strang (the 
Permanent Under-Secretary) all contributing a little with Dixon and Makins (the 
Deputy Under-Secretaries) contributing most of the leadership." In the confusion 
"he found the Foreign Office adhering to rather partial and wholly inadequate 
conclusions, such as the idea that a revitalized Germany offered no solution but 
great danger...continually the visceral feeling became articulate. The rearming of 
the Germans was a very painful subject and there was a general desire to escape 
from this problem in ways which those who followed it knew were 
inadequate."^
Franks suggested it was now Morrison's job to develop a coherent policy
on Germany and the other crucial foreign policy issues. Morrison was one of the
first Labour ministers to advocate consideration of German rearmament and the
92only one of the Big Five to consistently support it. The problem was that 
Morrison was distracted by other matters during his first weeks as Foreign 
Secretary. In his role as deputy Prime Minister he dealt with the crisis over 
Bevan’s resignation while Attlee was in hospital. The Festival of Britain, a long 
term Morrison project, was another distraction. Finally, Morrison learnt in April
n -i
that his wife was fatally ill. In terms of foreign policy, his main concern was 
the Abadan crisis. He seemed to have no fixed policy for dealing with Anglo- 
Soviet relations or European problems and as a result he badly mishandled the 
preliminary four power meeting in Paris at the Palais Rose. The negotiations were
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92. Morrison raised the idea of utilising German manpower to supplement Western defence as 
early as December 1948. See FO 371/76527, C120/5/18, Morrison to Bevin, December 1948.
93. Donoughue and Jones, op.cit., ch.36.
85
intended to set the agenda for a future conference of Foreign Ministers but their 
main consequence was to strain Anglo-American relations as the American 
delegation realised that the British were determined to delay any action on the 
defence front until a meeting of Foreign Ministers could be held. The British 
delegation was led by Ernest Davies, the junior Foreign Office minister, rather 
than a professional diplomat like the American representative, Philip Jessup .^  
The latter soon developed a poor opinion of Davies, describing him as inept and 
lacking in the experience necessary for negotiating with the Soviets.^ Like so 
many members of the government Davies had bitter memories of German policy 
during the 1930s and was "fearful of the re-emergence of a German military 
machine". He "considered that German rearmament could not be permitted until 
the atmosphere in Germany was ripe for it". Initially at least he seemed to believe 
in the possibility of striking a deal with the Soviets.^ The real problem, 
however, was that Davies was too faithful in representing the concerns of the 
Cabinet and Morrison failed to control him.
After the first few meetings there was a disagreement over the wording of 
an item on German demilitarisation, with Davies much more willing to accept the 
Soviet phraseology than the Americans. He was apparently surprised that, "The 
State Department are evidently very anxious to avoid giving the Russians any 
excuse for arguing that the participation of Germany is still an open question." 
The Americans were thoroughly confused by Davies’s attitude and unable to
0 7
understand Morrison’s policy. Though the Foreign Secretary tried to placate 
the Americans he did nothing to restrain Davies, whose constant themes in 
tripartite discussions were the need to reassure western public opinion and grant
go
concessions to the Soviets. This led to a major clash when on 18 April Davies 
sent a note to the American and French representatives containing a subtle threat. 
He stated: "While we on our side are equally determined that the defence
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programme of the Atlantic Powers shall remain unaffected, we feel obliged to 
take account of the fact that the British people will require to be convinced that 
no agreement can be reached with the Soviet government." This prompted Jessup 
to complain that British policy "amounted to capitulation". One member of the 
American delegation wrote to Washington that "The British attitude here can 
leave one with only the following conclusions: that they regard the Brussels 
decision on Germany as an agreement in principle only not to be carried forward 
seriously before a CFM; and that they will not put their hearts into their own
QQrearmament... until they have had a CFM discussion." In Washington Franks
provided his own gloss on the situation, explaining that his government’s
conciliatory attitude to Moscow was motivated by "memories of the Anglo-French
negotiating failures that had led to the disastrous 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact."^®
The Foreign Office soon became aware of American displeasure and,
"apprehensive of a split with the Americans and French", decided to adopt a
101tougher attitude towards the Soviets. A By April the idea of striking a deal
10 2with Moscow over Germany was in abeyance. ^ Cabinet discussion of the
talks resumed in June and the general view was that either they should continue
or a Council of Foreign Ministers ought to be held without an agenda. At least
one Cabinet minister expressed "astonishment" on learning that the discussions
103had been terminated on 21 June without any agreement on a CFM.
The end of the Four Power preliminary conference, combined with the 
issuing of a report on the Petersberg discussions on 6 June and the holding of the 
French elections on 17 June, marked the beginnings of the next phase in the
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German rearmament controversy. In Britain a new three way debate began 
between the military, civilian and political branches of the government which again 
resulted in a victory for the advocates of delay.
The principal concern of the military was to get the decision to begin 
German rearmament taken. On 20 July Creasey stated: "What was required was 
some drastic action to start things moving, otherwise this delay would be 
protracted endlessly. In reaching any decision how German rearmament was to 
be put into effect, our primary consideration must be that a German military 
contribution to Western European defence was an urgent military necessity." 
Though equipment shortages were inevitable, "there was no need to delay the 
formation of German units on this account." The target date set by the Chiefs for 
a decision was the October North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome, which was 
also the American deadline. They warned that "By that time nearly a year would 
have elapsed since agreement in principle had been reached on the necessity for 
this contribution: if still no progress was made, there might be disastrous 
repercussions to European defence." Shuckburgh had warned the Chiefs that the 
Cabinet were still uncommitted and that "There was a school of thought that the 
present moment was most inopportune". However, he stressed that there was now 
little difference between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff v ie w .^
The limited entente between the military and the diplomatic branches of 
the government was given substance by a joint paper submitted by Shinwell and 
Morrison to the Defence Committee on 24 July. While the Petersberg discussions 
were continuing, Morrison had been content to reaffirm Bevin’s instruction to 
Kirkpatrick to seek agreement on the political aspects of the planned contract 
with West Germany "even without a decision regarding the German contribution 
to d e f e n c e " . I n  the joint paper presented in July, however, Morrison and 
Shinwell argued that any further delay over a decision on German rearmament 
would be dangerous. There were two main arguments; one military and one 
political. On the political front, "the whole future of Western Germany is involved 
and on our handling of this matter may turn the question whether she can be 
retained in the Western camp or not. Any attempt to ‘sterilise* West Germany by
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keeping her disarmed and neutral would inevitably result in her being lost to the 
West." Militarily, "the defence of Europe demands a strategy based on the Elbe 
not on the Rhine, and the Western Powers clearly cannot defend Western 
Germany without German cooperation and the assistance of German manpower." 
In addition the paper noted that the Americans were becoming impatient for a 
decision, that the Four Power talks, which "had inhibited a forward policy in this 
matter", were now finished and that German expectations had been raised by the 
issuing of the Bonn report on the Petersberg negotiations. Though Shinwell was 
still doubtful about the practicality of a European Army, the paper advocated 
accepting the idea as the only means by which French acquiescence to a German 
defence contribution could be secured.
Prior to the Defence Committee meeting, however, the forces opposed to
German rearmament were already mobilising. Dalton wrote to Attlee on 10 July
that the Germans had "a vested interest in a war of revenge" and reminded him
"there is a substantial element on the National Executive and in our party who are
against West Germany’s rearmament at the present time." Attlee replied: "I am
very much of your view" and Dalton was invited to the Defence Committee
107meeting of 26 July. At the meeting Morrison argued that it was 
"exceedingly dangerous to permit a vacuum in Western Germany and it was 
impossible to keep the Germans in a permanent state of submission and 
inequality", and that the climate was now favourable for an agreement on German 
rearmament. Attlee, however, returning to the conditions he had set in February, 
said "It would be very difficult to accept any system of priority which put the 
allocation of equipment to the Germans above the allocation of equipment to the 
members of NATO". The main confrontation at the meeting was between 
Pakenham, who had recently been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and 
Dalton. The former argued: "If no beginning were made now and if decisions were 
indefinitely delayed there would never be any German forces and it was more 
than doubtful if Western Europe could in fact be defended without them." Dalton 
responded that a German army would only work for a war of revenge and that 
"we should delay until the latest possible moment and, at any rate, for the next
106. CAB 131/11, DO(51)89,24 July 1951; CAB 131/10, DO(51)20th mtg., minute 2,26 July 1951.
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year or two, to give effect to the principle of German rearmament." It was
108impossible to reconcile these views and the issue passed to the full Cabinet.
One of the key arguments remained whether German rearmament would 
be provocative to the Soviets. The military assessment was that the date when 
German rearmament became effective would be an important factor in Soviet 
calculations of whether to launch a preventive war. The Chiefs of Staff had argued 
that with 1952 as the period of maximum danger it was essential to proceed with 
German rearmament as rapidly as possible. Yet if the autumn of 1952 was the key 
moment because at this point German rearmament would become effective, surely 
there was an argument for postponing it until western strength was built up to a 
level sufficient to deter the Soviets. This case was put once again by Strachey. He 
told the Defence Committee: "The military advice which had been given to him 
had always emphasized that German rearmament would be a provocation to the 
Soviet Union... he thought that it was essential that we should not take any 
practical action with regard to the Germans which might provoke the Soviet 
Union into a preventive war during the next two years, when we should be far 
from ready." In a letter to Attlee of 27 July Strachey drew attention to a statement 
by Slim that "The Russians were probably still more afraid of the German bayonet 
than of the American atomic bomb." He argued in favour of delaying a decision 
until 1953 because "within two to three years both ourselves and the west as a 
whole will have greatly improved our relative strength as compared with Russia, 
and will be in a position to offer a much more effective deterrent should German 
rearmament then provoke a Soviet attack." By suggesting that the period 
of maximum danger would occur when German rearmament became effective, the 
Chiefs had presented the opponents of early German rearmament with a powerful 
argument, even though they themselves were insistent that the threat of war in 
1952 made an early decision more urgent.
Morrison took a sanguine view of the situation and at the full Cabinet 
meeting of 30 July, which saw a continuation of the Defence Committee debate,
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he argued that the integration of German units into a European Army, "would
probably overcome French reluctance to proceed with German rearmament and
would be less provocative to the Russians." By this stage the arguments for and
against a decision on German rearmament had been well rehearsed and what
mattered was the balance of forces in the Cabinet and the attitude of the Prime
Minister. Dalton had the support of Alexander, Griffiths, McNeil and Strachey
and claimed that Robens, who did not speak, also agreed with him. Morrison,
Jowitt and the Chiefs were of the opposite opinion, while Shinwell, perhaps
because of his reservations about the European Army solution, did not forcibly
argue the case for the paper which he had co-authored. In these circumstances
Attlee, who Dalton recorded as being "much our way", avoided taking any decision
and thereby rejected the argument of the Morrison-Shinwell paper which was that
immediate action was required. According to the Cabinet records Attlee declared
that they needed more information on the European Army "before any decision
was taken on German rearmament." In Dalton’s account the Prime Minister
declared he wanted "this whole thing to be played very slow."^®
The issuing of the Interim Report on the European Army by the Paris
conference and a new American initiative to get a final decision on a German
defence contribution forced the Cabinet to compromise over the policy of
postponement formulated by Attlee at the Cabinet meeting of 30 July. The Paris
conference had been in session since January but neither the British nor the
Dutch were participating and the Americans were initially unwilling to give the
idea their full support. In these circumstances the conference became a forum for
Franco-German disputes over the size of German units and the role of a German
military staff. ^  The initiative in reinvigorating the Paris talks was taken by
two American diplomats: the American High Commissioner in West Germany,
McCloy, and the Ambassador to France, David Bruce. With the assistance of Jean
Monnet they succeeded in persuading Eisenhower to give his full support to the
112European Army concept. In a speech to the English Speaking Union on
110. PREM 8/1429, pt.2, Dalton to Attlee, 31 July 1951; Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.l, vol.41, entry 
for August 1951; CAB 128/20, CM(51)56th mtg., minute 6, 30 July 1951.
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p.215-24; McGeehan, op.cit., p. 127-31.
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3 July Eisenhower publicly announced his conversion. A month later he explained
to Marshall: "Some spectacular accomplishment is vitally necessary to us if we are
to get this whole security program moving with the kind of rapidity that will
113generate confidence both here and in the North American Continent.
At the same time as the leading American representatives in Europe were 
campaigning in favour of a European Army, the Truman administration was 
developing plans to mark the first anniversary of their initial attempt to obtain an 
agreement on German rearmament with a second, more carefully planned, 
campaign of persuasion. On 28 June Acheson declared that the "time for 
attempting to remove deadlock now at hand". Initially he proposed immediate 
German membership of NATO, which was the favoured option of the American 
military, but McCloy and Bruce persuaded him that the European Army option 
was a practical alternative. Despite some further opposition from the American 
Chiefs, on 30 July Truman approved a memorandum from Acheson and Defence 
Secretary Lovett setting out a schedule which involved obtaining agreement on a 
European Defence Force, a specific plan for raising German units and a further 
restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic by the time of the expected 
North Atlantic Council meeting in late October.
The British response to this proposed schedule was that it was "a very 
tight one". However, some Foreign Office officials were themselves beginning to 
accept that it was necessary to make progress both on the contract and the 
German rearmament issue. Like his American counter-part, the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, was concerned about the domestic political 
situation in West Germany. The execution of five Nazi war criminals and the 
enactment of Law 27 enforcing decartelisation had caused popular protests against 
the continuing occupation regime. The radical right wing SRP polled 11% in 
elections in Lower Saxony and in opinion polls 60% of those questioned declared 
themselves to be neutral in the Cold W a r .^  In December 1950 Kirkpatrick
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had suggested that on the issue of German rearmament and the contract 'Sve have
a long row to hoe." During the months that followed he was converted to the
cause of German rearmament just as Slessor was turning away from the idea.
While Slessor was concerned with the strategic feasibility of the policy, Kirkpatrick
was worried about the political implications of not proceeding with a German
defence contribution. In August 1951 he wrote to Morrison, "I do not believe that
the Allies can with safety defer for much longer a decision in regard to German
participation in Western defence... if by the end of the year it becomes clear that
the Allies are unwilling to reach any decision there is likely to be a damaging
collapse of public confidence in the West.1' ^  Kirkpatrick’ s telegram sparked
off a fierce debate in the Foreign Office. Though a number of officials supported
the High Commissioner, there was no consensus in favour of immediate German
rearmament, despite Shuckburgh’s reassurances to the Chiefs of Staff. Strang
stated that, "political equality is more important then a defence contribution; and
we might well go slow on the latter, the more so as it is not clear how it is to be
paid for." He personally believed that the attempt to integrate the Federal
Republic into the western system would fail. He wrote of his view, "that whatever
course we follow, the extremists in Germany (as in Italy) will sooner or later
bedevil German policy and in the end gain control, that the attempt... to bring
Germany into the western community will probably fail, Germany being
unassimilable; that the Germans... will in the long run make such intolerable
nuisances of themselves, that we may find ourselves... coming to think that it might
be better to keep the Germans down in a common policy with Russia than to
build up against Russia in a common policy with the Germans." Younger
confessed to sharing Strang’s doubts about the Germans and Gainer, though much
less extreme than these two, suggested "the defence horse has been setting the
117pace and it is important to give the political horse a touch of the spur. A 
There was now a clear division in the Foreign Office between those like 
Kirkpatrick and Shuckburgh who accepted that the process of German
116. FO 371/93373, C10110/5, Kirkpatrick to the FO, 22 December 1950: FO 371/93389, 
C10110/299, Kirkpatrick to Morrison, 13 August 1951.
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rearmament should begin and those such as Strang and Gainer who favoured 
continued delay.
The paper eventually submitted to the Cabinet under Attlee’s name
followed Kirkpatrick’s line of argument that "we cannot escape from the necessity
of pressing on towards a political solution with its corollary of a defence
contribution",**** but the Cabinet continued to raise objections. To Dalton
and his allies the unstable political situation in Germany was an argument against
giving arms to the Germans. As many as 80% of West Germans favoured a policy
of regaining the territories east of the Oder-Neisse and Jacob Kaiser, a prominent
member of Adenauer’s Cabinet, had declared "we must have once more a
German Breslau, a German Marienberg, a German Stettin."* *^ Younger noted
that, though Morrison seemed to regard the issue of German rearmament as
urgent, "That is not the general Cabinet view, but the Cabinet is so muddled and
170indecisive on this subject as to be quite ineffective". On 4 September
Morrison again pressed the Cabinet on the need to support the European Army
idea provided it could be made militarily effective. Dalton denounced the
Germans as "warmongers" and pointed to Kaiser’s speech as evidence of this.
Even though two opponents of German rearmament, Griffiths and McNeil, were
absent, Dalton gained support from Robens and Chuter Ede, and he noticed the
presence of Strang sitting behind Morrison who "nods vehemently when I develop
an anti-German case". Though the Cabinet still insisted that further details of the
European Army would have to be provided "before final approval could be given
to the raising and incorporation of German units", they did modify their policy of
delay somewhat by accepting in principle that the European Army could be the
171vehicle for German rearmament.
Morrison made the maximum use of this concession at the Washington 
Foreign Ministers meeting of September 1951, but it was clear that Britain was 
now the dissenting voice as Franco-American unity on the European Army 
scheme was achieved. When the Foreign Ministers drafted a note to the High
118. CAB 129/47, CP(51)240, 30 August 1951.
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Commissioners they agreed that German units must be incorporated into an
international defence force but the British would not accept the assumption that
this would necessarily be the European Defence Force. Morrison also stressed
"that the provision of arms to members of the North Atlantic Treaty should
122receive priority over requirements for German military forces." A few days
later at the Ottawa North Atlantic Council meeting, Morrison stated: "UK desired
to give whole-hearted support to EDF which was bold and visionary idea that
would require, however, considerable thought and work before it became a 
12^rea l i t y . "Fu r the rmore ,  at the Washington meeting the issue of who would
pay for the German defence contribution arose and there were indications that
both the British and the French would oppose any agreement imposing additional
costs on their budgets. Morrison warned: "we must guard against allowing the
Germans to manoeuvre us into a position from which they could refuse to fulfil
their part in Western defence unless we bear some of the occupation
c o s t s . " T h e  issue would become increasingly important during the next few
months and will be further examined in the next chapter. Though Morrison could
claim "to have re-established three power unity on the question of German 
125defence1, there were obvious differences in the American, French and 
British approaches to this problem and it was the British who were, temporarily 
at least, isolated.
On 19 September, while Morrison was in Ottawa, Attlee informed a 
depleted Cabinet that he planned to call an election. In the weeks leading up to 
polling day the Foreign Office had to deal with the new set of contractual 
negotiations with the Federal Republic, while the Chiefs of Staff examined the 
revised SHAPE estimates for European defence, but the issues raised by these 
developments were to be dealt with by the new Conservative government. It 
seems clear that had the Labour government remained in office the German 
rearmament issue would have been a continuing source of controversy. Though
122. PREM 8/1432, Record of a meeting between Morrison, Acheson and Schuman, 12 September 
1951 (including annex A).
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the Attlee administration was beginning to yield to American pressure to accept 
the European Army, they were unlikely to have been as compliant as the 
Conservative Cabinet was to prove.
Rolf Steininger has stated: "In the spring of 1951 the Western allies, 
especially the Americans and the British, could hardly imagine not including a 
German defence contribution in their plans." In fact the Americans had as 
much difficulty in persuading the British as the French to accept the 
implementation of the policy of German rearmament. The Labour government’s 
opposition to early German rearmament began to take effect in the aftermath of 
the Korean War. The decision to accept rearmament was only taken because the 
inducements offered by the Americans were so attractive. Once these were 
secured at Brussels in December 1950 the British proved quite as troublesome as 
the French on the issue. The Chiefs of Staff continued to insist that a German 
defence contribution was urgently required, but they had lost the initiative in the 
summer of 1950 and by 1951 divisions between them were emerging. The 
contradictory accounts of the role German rearmament might play in a Soviet 
decision to launch a preventive war only alarmed their political superiors. Though 
Attlee did not get the opportunity to strike a bargain with the Soviets over 
German rearmament, following the failure of the Paris preliminary conference he 
was able to lead a divided Cabinet away from any advance on the agreement to 
German rearmament in principle made the previous September. In following this 
course he was reflecting opinion within his party which was opposed to arming the 
Germans and was powerfully represented in the Cabinet by Dalton and his allies. 
The Foreign Office was also divided and though a number of important figures, 
most notably Kirkpatrick, came to believe in the summer of 1951 that the 
appropriate moment to begin German rearmament had arrived, there was still 
strong anti-German prejudice within the department. Morrison, who favoured 
German rearmament, was initially unable to overturn the Cabinet’s policy of delay 
which had been formulated in the first two months of the year but did manage to 
secure limited support for the European Army with the assistance of Kirkpatrick’s 
arguments and American pressure.
126. Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of 
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CHAPTER 3
THE EDC OPTION 
Though there was a strong element of continuity in British foreign policy 
in the decade after 1945, the return of a Conservative administration at the 1951 
election did produce a significant change in the attitude of the British government 
towards the European Defence Community and German rearmament. The 
reasons for the change were manifold. Firstly, Eden had greater authority in 
Cabinet than Morrison. Though both men argued for a positive British attitude 
towards the EDC, Eden was able to secure Cabinet approval for his policy where 
his predecessor had failed. Only Harold Macmillan appears to have expressed 
fears that a rearmed Germany might come to dominate Europe, and his 
opposition was partly based on his desire for Britain to participate in the 
European debate over integration.* In Parliament too Eden was generally able 
to impose his views on his party. Though there remained substantial opposition 
to German rearmament in the Commons, the majority of the dissenters sat on the 
Labour backbenches from where the Attlee government’s German policy had 
been assailed. The Conservatives generally supported the idea of a German 
defence contribution. Butler had summed up their mood a few months before the 
election when he demanded to know from Morrison, "why this vital question of 
German re-armament has been so consistently delayed...progress in this matter 
must be made pari passu at the same time as progress in our own re-armament
'y
and progress in the political sphere in Germany."'6 The Conservative delegation 
to the Council of Europe had played its own part in the reintegration of Germany 
into the western community when, following Churchill’s demand "Where are the 
Germans?", they played a seminal role in the admittance of the Federal Republic
'l
to the Council. After the 1951 election, though a few maverick Conservative 
MPs such as Viscount Hinchingbrooke and Bob Boothby spoke out against the 
policy of German rearmament, the government could rely on the support of the 
vast bulk of their own backbenchers and a number of Labour MPs who strongly
1. Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945-55 (Macmillan, London, 1969), p.466-71; Alistair 
Home, Macmillan 1894-56, vol.l, (Macmillan, London, 1988), p.350-1.
2. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.478, cols. 496-7.
3. Macmillan, op.cit., p.177-84; Horne, op.cit., p.316-7; Earl Kilmuir, Political Adventure 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964), p. 179.
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supported the policy of raising a German army as part of the West’s overall 
defence effort.
Opposition to German rearmament in the Foreign Office was also 
weakening. The officials of the German department had been contemplating the 
possibility of a German defence contribution since early 1950 but had regarded 
it as a long term measure; the last step in Germany’s reintegration into the 
western community. Now that this process was reaching completion, and with the 
international situation much calmer than it had been in 1950, they were willing to 
accept the idea of German rearmament within the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Defence Community. They were also aware that with 
the US becoming ever more insistent on this course there were serious diplomatic 
dangers associated with any attempt to deviate from such a policy. Finally, it was 
evident that the actual raising of German divisions would continue to be delayed 
by the need to complete the vastly complex negotiations on the German contract 
and then to secure ratification in the EDC countries. From a financial point of 
view the new government could not afford to see the process of German 
rearmament begin before the end of 1952 but the period of negotiation and 
ratification was certain to be lengthy enough to provide the requisite delay.
As these shifts in parliamentary and diplomatic thinking were occurring, the 
British military were reaching the final stage of an almost unique period in the 
history of British peace-time defence planning, during which they planned to make 
the maximum possible contribution to establishing an effective conventional 
defence on the continent of Europe. During the course of 1952 the reduction in 
the planned defence programme and the formulation of the revised Global 
Strategy Paper would undermine this policy. In the winter of 1951-2, however, the 
Chiefs of Staff continued to regard German rearmament as an essential 
component of their strategy of continental defence. They hoped that the West 
Germans would provide a substantial manpower contribution and help fill the 
expected equipment gap. Their advocacy of extensive German arms production 
brought them into conflict with Eden, but, with the assistance of American 
pressure, they won their case.
Eden’s opposition to the production of heavy military equipment reflected 
continuing British doubts about German trustworthiness. Eden himself had only
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accepted the idea of German rearmament with reluctance. He had told the 
Commons in March 1950: "I can never altogether escape the feeling that in the 
minds of many Germans there is a desire, or at any rate a tendency, to believe 
that the Germans have some special mission with regard to the rest of 
Europe...which in fact means the domination of their neighbours".^ His 
subsequent efforts to promote EDC reflected a genuine belief that it was the best 
solution to the German rearmament problem. As early as November 1950 he 
expressed his support for a "European Army which Russia would fear less than 
an Atlantic army." Shortly after his reappointment as Foreign Secretary he told 
the Labour backbencher, Richard Crossman, that it would be "really dangerous" 
to allow the Germans into NATO. He added: "That’s why the European Army is 
so very important. If the Germans are thoroughly mixed up with the French, the 
Russians won’t be so provoked."^ However, there were an array of difficulties to 
be overcome before the European Army solution could be implemented, and it 
was during the course of the exasperating negotiations on these matters that some 
residual doubts became evident. During the controversies over the production of 
civil aircraft and guided missiles as well as over heavy military equipment, British 
policy-makers initially advocated a ban on German production, though on each 
occasion they were forced by diplomatic considerations to modify their position. 
On the subject of the German financial contribution it was the British who were 
the most insistent on a binding agreement covering Allied occupation costs for the 
1952-3 financial year. At times of particular tension in the negotiations Foreign 
Office officials, such as Kirkpatrick and Jebb, even went as far as to suggest that 
the whole policy should be abandoned. However, the disastrous consequences of 
failure were constantly in the minds of the diplomats and ensured that the British 
government pressed on to the conclusion of the negotiations.
The most intractable of the difficulties confronting the government was the 
negotiation of an agreement with the West Germans to cover occupation costs
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after German rearmament had begun. The High Commissioners had agreed a 
figure of DM6.6 milliard for occupation costs in 1951-2. The British were to 
receive DM2.08 milliard, which was described in a Treasury report of 10 July 1951 
as "a substantial contribution to our defence effort from the German economy". 
The report noted: "if that contribution were diminished or disappeared, we would 
therefore have to increase our Defence Budget substantially or else reduce the 
size or effectiveness of the forces to which it is at present related". However, it 
estimated that the German contribution to occupation costs was "of comparable 
magnitude" to the defence costs of other European countries and came to the 
somewhat complacent conclusion that the German subsidy would not be 
endangered in "the near future" because the creation of German armed forces 
remained "a distant prospect". As Geoffrey Humphrey-Davies, one of the 
Treasury’s Under-Secretaries, noted when faced with the fact that the United 
Kingdom defence budget would have to increase by £130 million or 10% if Britain 
lost the contribution from Germany "our financial advantage lies in putting off the 
evil day as long as we reasonably can".**
The October election was held at a time when Britain’s economic position 
was steadily worsening. The sterling area had a deficit of £1,600 million with the
H
rest of the world' which would only increase if Britain assumed responsibility for 
occupation costs in Germany. At the meeting on 4 September at which the 
Cabinet gave its heavily (qualified support to the European Army scheme, they 
also agreed that in no circumstances would they accept the extra burden of
o
occupation costs. Negotiations for the establishment of contractual relations 
between the occupying powers and the Germans began on 24 September and 
lasted eight months. One of the subsidiary conventions in the planned contract 
was intended to cover the financing of foreign forces in West Germany. The lack 
of preparation in confronting the problem of the occupation costs now became 
evident. Whereas the Treasury insisted that Britain would under no circumstances 
accept any additional costs and hoped to postpone the issue, the Foreign Office
6. DEFE 7/872, pt.l, Treasury report, 10 July 1951; T 225/394, Humphrey-Davies minute, 25 July 
1951.
7. Anthony Seldon, Churchill’s Indian Summer, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981), p. 170.
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were convinced that the problem had to be confronted and that a solution would
inevitably involve extra costs for the British Exchequer.^ The Treasury opposed
discussion with the Germans on the size of their financial contribution. Sir Leslie
Rowan, the Treasury’s Second Secretary, told Kirkpatrick on 9 October, "that our
economic position was so serious that it was quite impossible for us to shoulder
any further burdens.... He appreciated the German constitutional difficulties but
this made it essential that we should not enter into any agreement until we were
assured that the Bundestag was prepared to endorse it. This might place heavy
burdens on the German exchequer but....the German economy was able to bear
the burden entailed by the support of our troops."^ A month later Humphrey-
Davies suggested that though it was "very difficult to tell the Germans that they
cannot have the 12 Divisions recommended by SHAPE", the British government
should seek "some phasing back of the rate of the build up of the German
resources". ^  Frank Roberts, the new Foreign Office Under-Secretary
responsible for German affairs, admitted that with regard to "the financial
implications of the German defence contribution we are in a state of the utmost
confusion amongst ourselves and will be in no position to begin any discussions
12with the Germans for some time to come."1 He was anxious to get an idea of 
where Britain stood on the financial question as soon as possible. For the 
Foreign Office, the contract, the financial convention, the EDC and the German 
defence contribution were all bound together. One of the first briefs that Eden 
received on his return stressed that early negotiations on a German financial 
contribution were "absolutely essential". Any delay would "prejudice the 
contractual arrangement and the whole process of bringing Germany into Western 
partnership."^
The Treasury case for a delay or a phasing in of German rearmament was 
never considered by the Cabinet. When Sir James Crombie, the Third Secretary 
to the Treasury, noted that the creation of an indigenous German arms industry
9. T 225/395, Compton minute, 5 October 1951.
10. FO 1008/59, minutes of a meeting at the Foreign Office, 9 October 1951; FO 371/93408, 
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12. FO 371/93405, C10110/577, Roberts to Dixon, 8 November 1951.
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was "not altogether welcome" because it would "increase our already formidable 
difficulties in getting our own expenditure met", Butler revealed his own feelings 
on the issue. He commented: "in deciding this question more weight should be 
given to political and military than to financial and economic considerations...! 
should like to see German industry partly occupied in this way, rather than in 
competing in our markets".^ Thus, when Eden outlined the current difficulties 
over the German financial contribution to the Cabinet on 15 November, Butler 
did not present the case for delay. Eden warned that the raising of a 12 division 
German army was bound to give rise to a gap between the amount the Germans 
were willing to spend on defence and the combined costs of the occupation and 
their own military build up. The gap could be reduced either by additional 
American aid, by a smaller West German contribution, or by reducing the size of 
the British occupation forces. These solutions were all flawed, either on the 
grounds of practicality or desirability. The immediate issue for the Cabinet to 
decide was whether to proceed with negotiations. The Germans would inevitably 
argue "that they should pay for their forces and we for ours". However, entering 
negotiations was, Eden suggested, the best way in which to utilise American 
influence to secure the maximum possible German financial contribution. The 
Cabinet were remarkably sanguine when confronted with this sombre analysis. The 
Mutual Aid Committee had estimated that the likely size of the financial gap, on 
even the most optimistic assumptions, would be approximately DM8 milliard or 
£700 million up to 1954. Ministers responded by asserting that these were only 
"rough estimates" and would probably prove "excessive". A sub-committee 
including Butler, Salisbury and Cherwell was established and reported on 17 
November that the best policy would be to begin negotiations on the subject of 
the German financial contribution to defence "at an early date". They noted that 
a slow down in the German build up might help postpone the problem but added 
that "open advocacy of such a course would be politically most undesirable". The 
Cabinet accepted the case for the immediate opening of negotiations with 
equanimity, but instructed Eden to make it clear to the other participants that
15. T 225/131, Humphrey-Davies memo, 12 November 1951, Crombie minute, 12 November 1951, 
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"they were not prepared to accept any additional financial burden". No 
realistic solution to the problem was mooted, either by the committee or the full 
Cabinet.
The optimism of the new government appeared to be misplaced. British,
American and French officials met during the autumn to discuss these problems.
They recommended a German financial contribution to defence of DM13 milliard
for the 1952-3 financial year, of which DM 7.4 milliard would be spent on the
support of the Allied forces. Using NATO estimates they suggested that between
1 April 1952 and 30 June 1953 the cost of German rearmament within the EDC
would be DM 15.8 milliard. They concluded: "even if the three governments are
able to convince the German Federal Government that a total contribution of the
order of magnitude set out... above should be made... the total of the contribution
to the European Defence Community and the cost of the support of other Allied
forces in Germany will exceed the total German contribution. Whether the gap
will occur by June 1953 is still uncertain, but there can be absolutely no doubt that
17such a gap will occur during 1953-4." Despite some difficulties with the 
French, by the end of November the three governments had reached agreement 
that they should seek a contribution of DM 13 milliard from the West German 
government for the financial year 1952-3.^ Kirkpatrick was, however, 
unconvinced that the Germans would accept this figure. He warned that when 
Adenauer discovered "that we are resolved to require that Germany should not 
only pay the whole bill for our forces but that her total contribution to defence 
should be in the region of 12^2 milliards we are likely to have an explosion." 
Though the German reaction was considerably more composed than Kirkpatrick 
expected, the German finance minister, Schaeffer, nevertheless declared that "it 
would be physically impossible for him to produce a sum of DM 13 milliards for 
defence next year without creating an inflation of such magnitude as would shake 
the Federal Republic to its very foundation."^
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17. FO 371/93886, CF(W)111 118/53, Report of the Tripartite Group, 17 November 1951.
18. FO 371/93884, CF(W)111 118/6, Roberts to Eden, 25 November 1951, CF(W)111 118/7, 
Roberts to Eden, 27 November 1951.
19. FO 371/93418, C10110/810, annex B to the Brief for the Paris talks on Germany, 16 November 
1951; FO 371/93886, CF(w)lll 118/65, Kirkpatrick to FO, 21 December 1951.
104
Though German rearmament appeared to pose a threat to Britain’s
financial position, policy-makers were aware of its potential long term advantages.
As part of the contractual negotiations which had begun in September it was
necessary to consider whether Germany should be allowed an arms industry which
could be utilised for the purposes of western rearmament. Roberts noted: "There
is a basic contradiction between the NATO desire to limit German arms
production severely and the western need... to obtain a balanced combat-worthy
German defence contribution at an early date. A further important consideration
is that a Germany with an unduly restricted armaments industry would be likely
to become an increasingly serious economic competitor to the United Kingdom
70with her heavy rearmament burden."^
The choice that British policy-makers had to make was whether to
implement in full the Brussels compromise agreement of December 1950 which
included the prohibition of a German arms industry as one of its safeguards or to
take a more liberal attitude in order to facilitate the completion of NATO’s huge
rearmament programme. Distrust of the Germans cautioned against the latter but
the size of the latest NATO force goals argued against the former. The Spofford
Plan agreed at Brussels specified a moratorium on the production of "heavy
military equipment, military aircraft or naval vessels other than minor defensive
craft" in West Germany. Following the Washington meeting of Foreign Ministers
in September 1951 a steering committee was established to clarify these
prohibitions. Subsequently a dispute developed in which the British found
themselves allied with the French in opposing the recreation of a large scale
German arms industry. The Americans advocated that only heavy calibre artillery
and super-heavy tanks ought to be banned, while the French argued that the
Germans should not be allowed to produce any tracked armoured fighting vehicles
nor any guns with a calibre greater than 60mm. The British favoured a limit of
50mm on gun barrels and 80mm on howitzers and a ban on all tanks and
armoured cars heavier than 6 tons. The eventual tentative compromise suggested
by the committee was for a ban on armour plate more than 50mm thick and guns
71with a calibre greater than 60mm. The American case was strengthened by
20. FO 371/93411, C10110/687, FO brief for Eden, 29 October 1951.
21. DEFE 5/34, COS(51)644, 6 November 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, US Delegation at the 
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Eisenhower’s latest estimates of NATO force requirements. SHAPE figures,
calculated during the summer of 1951, called for an Allied force of 97 divisions
22at D+30, an increase of nearly 20 divisions on previous NATO estimates. At
the Ottawa North Atlantic Council meeting in September 1951 a three man
advisory group called the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) was established
to draft a plan for future force levels which would take economic factors into
account. The so-called ‘Three Wise Men’ were designated as Averell Harriman,
Sir Edwin Plowden and Jean Monnet. In December 1951 they submitted an
interim assessment of force requirements. Though the projected number of
divisions required by 1954 was only 86 2/3, estimates of the likely equipment gap
were as large as $22 billion, if the four year programme of US aid was excluded.
Rearming the Germans, should they be barred from producing their own military
23equipment, would add $6 billion to this figure.
The British Chiefs were concerned about how an enlarged NATO force 
and a German contingent could be equipped simultaneously. Under the influence 
of Slessor, they had argued that Germany should be allowed to establish effective 
armed forces on the basis that they could never commit another act of aggression 
against the West because of their vulnerability to strategic bombing. These 
arguments were now applied to the dispute over a German arms industry. On 
being consulted about the current controversy, Brownjohn, the Vice-Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, stressed "the importance of obtaining German help" and 
opposed allowing the EDC to regulate German arms production on the grounds 
that this would effectively give France a v e to .^  At their meeting of 12 
November, the Chiefs went so far as to argue that no restrictions at all were 
necessary on the production of heavy military equipment in Germany. Sanders, 
the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, explained that "the plain fact was that the only 
necessary restriction was that manufacture take place in the Ruhr as this area was 
highly vulnerable to a modem air force. Thus we could always exercise adequate
22. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of University Publications 
of America), pt.2, reel 6, JCS 2073/201 Enclosure B, 12 September 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, US 
Delegation at Rome to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), 27 November 1951, p.730-1.
23. FRUS 1951, vol.3, Ambassador in France (Bruce) to Acheson, 6 December 1951, p.370 and 
Summary of the TCC Report, 17 December 1951, p.389; Walter S. Poole, Histoiy of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: The JCS and National Policy 1950-1952 (Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1980), 
p.274.
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control."^
The Chiefs’ confidence that Germany could not, in any circumstances, 
again become a menace to the West was not shared by Eden. On 13 November 
he complained to Churchill that Acheson was now advocating "that the Germans 
should be able to [make a] maximum contribution to arming the forces they 
contribute to the European Army". While noting the Chiefs’ view that Britain 
could safely accept the new American proposal, he pointed out that Schuman was 
likely to vigorously oppose the American demands. His intention was to "urge Mr 
Acheson to accept as the Allied starting point in negotiations with the Germans 
the compromise already proposed by the tripartite official conference. This is the 
solution I should prefer." Eden was aware of the economic as well as the military 
implications of the decision. If Germany made a substantial contribution to NATO 
arms production "the proportion of her defence budget which could otherwise 
contribute to the build up of the German defence contribution and to the 
maintenance in Germany of Allied troops will be considerably reduced. On the 
other hand potential German commercial competition in the export field would 
also be reduced."
As noted earlier Butler believed that German rearmament would be 
beneficial to the British economy in the long run because it would hinder German 
attempts to compete in British markets. His predecessor, Gaitskell, had expressed 
a similar view, supported by the arguments in a Board of Trade brief that there 
might be advantages in having a section of the German economy turned over to 
military production. At the end of December Roberts outlined the dual reasoning 
behind the switch in policy towards acceptance of a German industrial 
contribution towards rearmament. They had changed policy "partly because it 
provides the only basis on which we could hope to reach agreement with the 
Germans but also for the reasons in the Board of Trade brief."^ In fact there 
was some continuity in Foreign Office thinking on this matter. Though initially 
siding with the French on the limits to be imposed on German arms production, 
they had no intention of allowing this dispute to jeopardise the negotiations. In
25. DEFE 4/49, COS(51)183rd mtg., minute 7, 12 November 1951.
26. FO 800/792, Eden to the Prime Minister, 13 November 1951.
27. FO 371/93886, CF(w)lll 118/76, Roberts minute, 27 November 1951 and Crawford minute, 
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order to accommodate Adenauer they had, for example, been willing to accept 
that restrictions on German arms production should not be embodied in the 
contract, where they would appear discriminatory, but contained instead in a
90
unilateral declaration of intent by the West German government. It was the
economic and diplomatic arguments in favour of lifting prohibitions on the
production of heavy military equipment, combined with American pressure, which
were more influential in altering Foreign Office policy than the arguments of the
Chiefs. By the end of December tentative tripartite agreement had been reached
on the lifting of restrictions on most heavy military equipment with the exception
29of propellants and gun barrels of a calibre greater than 105mm.
During his first months back in office Eden also had to confront the 
possibility of the collapse of the EDC negotiations in the face of Benelux 
hesitations. Though his policy on this issue became the subject of recriminations, 
it is clear that he was anxious to give full support to the European Army concept. 
The Labour government, though willing to express general support for some form 
of European defence organisation, was not prepared to endorse EDC specifically 
as the vehicle for German rearmament. By contrast, Eden was eager to associate 
Britain with the EDC. The day after the infamous Rome press conference of 28 
November, at which he merely restated the established policy that Britain would 
not join the EDC as a full member, Eden expressed his regrets about the negative 
reaction to Acheson. He then asked the American Secretary of State whether it 
would be advisable for Britain to offer some form of institutional association but
-in
Acheson rejected the idea. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office believed that 
some form of military cooperation would be possible. They feared that the failure 
of the EDC conference in Paris would mean that "the provision of the German
28. DEFE 5/34, COS(51)644, 6 November 1951.
29. DEFE 5/37, COS(52)108,12 February 1952; FO 371/93886, CF(w)lll 118/76, Roberts minute, 
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military contribution to Western European defence would be further delayed, and 
the whole programme for establishing a new relationship with Germany and her 
closer association with the West would be hung up." The alternative of a German 
army was open to "a variety of objections" which had been the subject of intensive 
discussion for the previous two years. Furthermore, if the European Army project
- 5 1
ended in failure Britain would be held responsible.
This enthusiastic endorsement of a European Army by the Foreign Office 
would have been unthinkable a year earlier and it is important to realise that 
strategic factors were not the most important in changing the opinions of the 
diplomatic corps. The American conversion to the EDC idea and the linking of 
it with the contractual negotiations were of seminal importance. As we shall see 
Foreign Office officials would constantly return to the theme that the EDC was 
the only solution to the German rearmament problem in light of the linkage 
between the European Army and the contract. Furthermore, there was much less 
fear of the likely Soviet reaction than there had been twelve months previously. 
During a meeting of the Foreign Office’s Russia Committee in November Roberts 
pointed out "that there was now less Russian fear of Germany as such, they were 
afraid of Atlantic rearmament as a whole". A few months later Dixon declared "he 
had been struck by the surprising mildness of Soviet reaction to the latest EDC 
discussions". The role of these officials is of crucial importance for an 
understanding of the switch to a policy of support for the European Army. 
Kirkpatrick’s conversion to this point of view was a result of his long standing 
fears about the domestic situation in the Federal Republic. Another important 
event was Gainer’s replacement as Under-Secretary superintending the German 
department by Frank Roberts. Roberts was industrious, perceptive and a 
dedicated opponent of the Soviets. As Minister at the Moscow Embassy between 
1945 and 1947 he had co-operated with George Kennan in alerting western 
governments to the bellicosity of Soviet policy. Though like Strang and 
Kirkpatrick, Roberts had witnessed the appeasement policy of the 1930s at first 
hand, after the war he was far less concerned about the re-emergence of the
31. DEFE 5/35, COS(51)733, 8 December 1951.
32. FO 371/94845, NS 1053/46, minutes of a Russia Committee meeting, 13 November 1951; FO 
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33German threat than about the new danger from the Soviet Union. In this 
sense Roberts was an atypical, though very effective, Foreign Office official.
When the Foreign Office consulted the military about the possibility of co­
operation with the EDC they found them surprisingly enthusiastic about the idea 
of some form of integration between British and EDC forces. In November the 
Joint Planning Staff had listed among the advantages of British participation in 
EDC the fact that "Anglo-French solidarity would be strengthened and any 
German tendency to dominate the forces... would be counterbalanced". Though 
the Chiefs considered that the advantages of full membership were outweighed 
by the disadvantages, the various arguments in favour of some form of British 
association were influential when the matter of military cooperation was discussed 
the following month.*^ On 7 December Sanders, representing the views of 
Slessor, stressed "the importance of achieving a settlement" of the EDC 
negotiations. A British contribution to the European force "might regain in 
Europe the initiative and leadership which at present had passed to the United 
States... The feasibility of integrating British personnel into a European Defence
-3C
Force might not be so difficult as at present envisaged." J Thus, though the 
Chiefs could not accept the idea of full membership, they were willing to offer 
close cooperation with the European Army under the overall command of 
SHAPE. During the first few months of 1952 detailed planning began on the 
means by which the British armed forces could assist a nascent European Defence 
Force and by April an extensive plan of cooperation had been ag reed .^
The only dissenting voice among the general consensus in favour of utilising 
the EDC as a means to secure German rearmament was that of the Prime 
Minister. Churchill had an ambivalent attitude towards Germany and particularly 
the Prussian element of the German nation. He both feared the Germans as a 
military threat to the West and admired them for their success in blocking Russian
33. John Zametica, ‘Three Letters to Bevin: Frank Roberts at the Moscow Embassy, 1945-1946’ 
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expansion westwards. By the end of 1951 he was seeking to utilise them in 
the latter role. He suggested to the Cabinet in a memorandum of 29 November: 
"There can be no effective defence of Western Europe without the Germans. As 
things developed my idea has always been as follows. There is the NATO army. 
Inside the NATO army there is the European Army, and inside the European
no
Army there is the German Army.'00 Churchill had been one of the first to 
propose the creation of a European Army in his speech to the Council of Europe 
in August 1950, but his conception of such a force was radically different from the 
design of the EDC. His ideas seemed guaranteed to destroy any prospect of 
French acceptance of the European Army. Surprisingly, however, Eden countered 
Churchiirs arguments by warning about the effects his plan would have on the 
Soviets, rather than on the possibly disastrous repercussions it might have on 
Britain’s European policy. He warned that the Soviets "were likely to regard the 
creation of a German national army as more provocative than any of the steps so
-JQ
far taken in building up the defence of Western Europe."*^ That the Foreign 
Secretary was not using this argument simply as a debating point is confirmed by 
his opposition to American plans for German membership of NATO. He warned 
of "the serious difficulties in which this step might involve us with the Russians. 
The latter would regard the Federal Republic’s direct membership of NATO as 
an even more provocative step than their participation in the European defence 
community."^ Concern for Soviet reactions was an area of continuity in the 
German policies of the Labour and Conservative governments. The difference was 
that Eden was more willing to press ahead with German rearmament through the 
European Defence Community as a means of overcoming Soviet fears.
Having aired his views, Churchill was willing to acquiesce to Foreign Office 
policy on the EDC. On a visit to Paris in December he promised that British 
forces would "be linked with those of the European Defence Community for 
training, supply and operations by land, sea and air." In their discussions with the 
French government Churchill and Eden promised to associate Britain "as closely
37. Gordon A. Craig, ‘Churchill and Germany’ in Blake and Louis (eds.), Churchill (Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p.37.
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as possible" with the EDC. ^  During their visit to Washington in January 1952, 
Acheson noticed that the Prime Minister had been persuaded by his Foreign 
Secretary to give public support to the EDC idea, despite Churchill’s private pleas 
on behalf of the platoon commanders of the European Army who he believed 
would find it impossible to control their polyglot forces.^
The Foreign Office remained committed to the EDC as part of the overall 
solution to the German problem. They held strictly to the view that everything 
possible must be done to ensure that all aspects of relations with Germany were 
covered by the contract, the EDC and the various additional conventions. 
However, the first priority remained the contract. This was regarded as essential 
in order to prevent the Germans from embracing neutrality or, in the worst 
possible scenario, aligning with the Soviet Union. The head of the German 
political department, Dennis Allen, minuted on 17 December 1951 that "in 
practise we shall have to proceed with our new political relationship with 
Germany even without a defence contribution."^
The importance attached to both elements of the overall policy of 
reintegration was evident from the Foreign Office response to the reaction against 
EDC in Europe during early 1952. On 8 February the Bundestag, whose members 
were furious at French policy towards the Saar, voted for a resolution demanding 
strict equality for West Germany within the EDC, membership of NATO and a 
policy to re-establish the rights of the German inhabitants of the S a a r.^  In 
France the Communists and Gaullists, who were opposed to the EDC, were now 
joined by dissidents from the ranks of the Socialists, the Radicals and the MRP 
as feeling against the European Army intensified. The National Assembly attached 
a long list of preliminary conditions to their acceptance of EDC and even the
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resulting tendentious motion passed by only 327 votes to 287 on 19 February.^ 
There was some sympathy for French concerns in Britain. Bob Boothby told the 
House of Commons on 5 February: "it will be very difficult to persuade the 
French people- or the German people- or, indeed, the British people- to accept 
even the possibility of the creation of another Wehrmacht which could have as its 
only objective... the recapture of the lost Eastern Provinces."^
From Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb, one of the Foreign Office’s most 
distinguished diplomats, dispatched a report on French disenchantment with the 
EDC to Strang in London. Jebb was a friend of Hugh Dalton and seems to have 
shared the ex-Chancellor’s suspicions about German motives. He reported: "nearly 
all assert that the only real incentive that the Germans, for their part, have for 
rearming... is in order to achieve the reunification of Germany." The French 
feared that the Americans were intent on a war with the Soviet Union which 
would be disastrous for them. Even if France was able to avoid occupation or 
atomic bombardment "it is evident that the elimination of Russia as a power 
would result in the domination of Europe by Germany." Though initially 
describing his memorandum as "reportage", he concluded: "these doubts may be 
criticised as being unconstructive and even to some extent groundless; but I 
suggest that they cannot be altogether dismissed as invalid... are the dangers 
inherent in the... policy of encouraging the reunification of Germany by all 
possible means... as illusory as some would seek to suggest?"
The comments of Roberts and Strang on this analysis reveal the priorities 
of the Foreign Office at this time. They demonstrate that the diplomats saw a 
German defence contribution as an important part of the reintegration of the 
Federal Republic into the West, that the EDC was regarded as an effective means 
of controlling German rearmament, that they believed the international situation 
was now propitious and that they were convinced that there was in any case no 
viable alternative. Roberts described the idea that German rearmament was going 
"too fast" as "rather ridiculous... The real danger is quite a different one ie. that 
even a small German army will absorb so much of Germany’s available financial 
resources that there will be little or nothing left to pay for Allied troops stationed
45. Jean Stoetzel, ‘The Evolution of French Opinion’ in Daniel Lemer and Raymond Aron (eds.), 
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in Germany and that the UK will then have to consider withdrawing its own 
divisions there." He added: "we cannot hope to sit permanently upon Germany, 
which is now reviving fast and fortunately in rather better political circumstances 
than we had any right to expect. From the military point of view we cannot defend 
Germany and Western Europe behind her, without a German contribution... We 
must therefore press a reluctant Germany to make her defence contribution to the 
EDC ensuring that we control Germany within the NATO framework. Otherwise 
a neutral Germany would before long fall prey to the Soviet Union and Sir G. 
Jebb’s French friends would really have something to worry about." The role of 
the EDC in controlling German rearmament was an important factor in Strang’s 
thinking. Previously he had opposed German rearmament but he now wrote to 
Jebb: "We cannot contemplate a neutralised, demilitarised Germany; and the only 
alternative to the present plan for a European Defence Community is in fact the 
creation of a completely independent German national army. In that event the 
risk of our being involved in ‘a war for East Prussia* (or alternatively of finding 
ourselves confronted with a new Rapallo policy!) would in our judgement be 
greater than it is under the present plan which at least offers the prospect of 
getting the West German forces closely tied up with the other forces of Western 
Europe and brought under full NATO control."^
This positive attitude to the EDC led the government to adopt a policy of 
concessions to accommodate French concerns. When Eden outlined the military’s 
plans for cooperation to Schuman on 2 February, the French Foreign Minister 
showed "great interest" and was evidently pleased with the idea of close
40
cooperation between the RAF and the putative European air force. On 5 
February Eden gave further encouragement to the EDC states by promising "we 
on this island are resolved to maintain armed forces on the continent of Europe 
for as long as is necessary."^ Following the French National Assembly’s call for 
British membership of EDC, the Cabinet agreed to a public declaration of their 
intention to oppose the secession of any member state from the EDC in the
47. FO 371/97898, C1083/2, Jebb to Strang, 12 February 1952, Roberts minute, 29 February 1952 
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future.^® This satisfied Schuman temporarily, though he cautioned that his 
government might require yet more concessions at a later d a te .^
The principal difficulties with the implementation of the government’s 
German policy were associated not with the tortuous negotiations over the EDC 
but with the even more byzantine complications of the High Commissioner’s 
discussions on the establishment of contractual relations. At Adenauer’s request 
the occupying powers had agreed in January that the size of the German financial 
contribution to defence, which had initially been set at DM13 milliard, should be 
re-assessed by the Temporary Council Committee who were responsible for 
prescribing the military targets for all the Alliance members. When the three 
Foreign Ministers presented Adenauer with the TCC’s proposed figure of DM 
11.25 milliard at London in February, the Chancellor refused to accept even this 
reduced figure without further expert analysis. The London meeting was 
called to take advantage of the presence of the leading foreign statesmen at 
George V i’s funeral, and provided an opportunity for the Americans to press for 
reductions in the size of the occupation costs. They had already been cut from 
the tripartite group figure of DM 7.4 milliard to DM 6.8 milliard. On 17 February 
Acheson suggested a further 10% reduction, to which Eden responded that "so far 
as the British forces were concerned, it might prove very difficult to effect further 
economies in expenditure." The three foreign ministers agreed that DM 6.8 
milliard should be a maximum figure for defence expenditure in Germany in 1952- 
3 and that the High Commissioners should consider how this figure could be 
pared dow n.^ When the High Commissioners totalled together their budgets 
for the 1952-3 year they actually produced a figure of DM7.5 milliard, but this 
included a number of items of civil expenditure and Kirkpatrick argued that no 
reductions could be made in this figure without jeopardising the DM6.8 milliard 
which constituted the actual cost of the military occupation. At the end of March
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he agreed to put forward a French compromise proposal for a ceiling on civil and
defence costs of DM600 million a month, which included a sum of DM206 million
for the British zone. The British government rejected this proposal and
Kirkpatrick now began a trivial quarrel with his American counterpart, McCloy,
over the expense of maid service in the British zone. However, within a few days
the government in London accepted a ceiling of DM215 million a month, with a
tacitly agreed limit of DM600 million a month on occupation costs as a whole.
Though this agreement was only intended to run for four months in fact it was to
be constantly extended with very little variation until 1955.^
The three occupying powers were also in dispute at the London conference
over the items whose production would be prohibited in Germany unless special
authorisation approving their manufacture was given by a unanimous vote of the
EDC powers. Though the list was intended to restrict the manufacture of
armaments in Germany, civil aircraft were also included. The Chiefs had accepted
the revival of a German arms industry on the basis that "since such industry would
be concentrated in the Ruhr and without an aircraft industry to produce defensive
fighters from Germany’s internal resources [it] would be an open target to Allied
bombers." The Air Ministry argued that a retention of the ban on civil aircraft
manufacture "should be regarded as the last ditch in our defences against future
German aggression and we should not concur in the lifting of the ban unless this
step is essential to securing a German contribution to Western D efence."^
Eden embraced the idea of continued prohibitions on the manufacture of civil
aircraft in West Germany with enthusiasm. He told the Cabinet it was "desirable
that we should insist on its maintenance as a military safeguard." As usual Eden
was aware of the economic implications and he added: "We might be able to sell
57civil aircraft to the Germans from our own production."* '^
As had been the case with heavy military equipment, however, the Foreign 
Secretary was forced to bow to American pressure on this issue. When Acheson
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discussed a ban on the production of civil aircraft on 14 February, he noted that 
"Eden was very tenacious on this matter, spoke of the British recollection of the 
bombing during the war, and I am sure that we will have trouble on this 
point."^ Two days later Eden was in a more conciliatory mood. He told 
Acheson that in Britain "memories of the blitz were still lively", but now seemed 
willing to accept a public declaration from Adenauer promising not to 
manufacture aircraft rather than a binding treaty guarantee prohibiting i t .^  By 
19 February he had accepted this solution and was aligning himself with the 
Americans in pressing the French to adopt a more flexible attitude over the 
banning of propellants and large gun barrels.^
The North Atlantic Council meeting of February 1952, which followed the 
London Foreign Ministers conference, confirmed the need for a German defence 
contribution and saw some progress made towards achieving it. The British brief 
stressed that the "overriding consideration" from a strategic perspective must be 
"the efficiency of the NATO forces and the early inclusion of Germans amongst 
them". The scale of German rearmament had been a much less controversial issue 
at the Paris EDC conference than the level of integration. During the course of 
1951 a figure of 12 divisions or ‘groupements’ had been agreed and accepted by 
NATO’s Standing Group. At Lisbon this figure was confirmed. It was remarkable 
that it continued to act as the target for the Federal Republic’s defence 
contribution from 1951 onwards, despite the fact that the planned contributions 
of the other North Atlantic countries, including Britain, shrank drastically from the 
peak set at Lisbon. The Lisbon force goals, based on Eisenhower’s estimates, 
called for the creation of 50 divisions by the end of 1952 and 96 divisions by the 
end of 1954 to be ready by M+30.*^ The deal outlined at London, whereby 
Adenauer would provide a reassurance that his government had no intention of
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manufacturing civil aircraft, was confirmed. In addition the French dropped their 
demand for a moratorium on the production of gun barrels larger than 105mm 
and accepted a formula which precluded the manufacture of propellants in 
"strategically exposed areas".
The smaller NATO powers now began to question whether sufficient funds 
would be available to finance both the German contribution and the occupation 
costs. The British delegation sought to reassure them that the current negotiations 
on a German financial contribution covered only the first year when "the Germans 
will have great difficulty spending as much as DM 3.5 milliards" on their own 
rearm am ent.^ The question of how German forces were to be paid for once 
the process gained momentum and costs increased was not addressed. Despite this 
progress was made on the issue of the first year’s contribution. Adenauer accepted 
the report of the TCC in principle and offered the figure of DM 850 million a 
month with the proviso that the Federal Republic should be given financial 
assistance if the economic forecasts of the TCC should prove optimistic. Roberts 
noted that this amounted to an acceptance of the Allied demands but "in the most 
unacceptable form possible." The French too were unenthusiastic, but Acheson 
stressed: "This was a great victory for the Allies and it must not be thrown away 
because of the difficulty over presentation."^ In fact it was to be the division 
of the DM 850 million sum, rather than the conditional nature of the offer, which 
was to be a source of continuing difficulty for the Allies and this issue was not 
addressed at Lisbon.
In the aftermath of Lisbon it became clear to the British government that 
they could not afford German rearmament to begin before the autumn of 1952. 
Prior to the start of German rearmament they could be confident that the 
Germans would continue to contribute at least DM600 million a month to Allied 
occupation costs under the deal agreed by the Allied High Commission. After 
German rearmament began, though they were determined to push down the share
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of the German financial contribution of DM 10.2 milliard allocated to the build 
up of German forces as much as possible in order to ensure that a more 
substantial portion was spent on the upkeep of Allied troops in West Germany, 
it was clear the Allies would not receive as much as the current figure of DM7.2 
milliard a year. Stewart Crawford, the head of the Mutual Aid Committee, 
explained in March that the financial gap between German payments and the 
combined costs of the Allied budget and the German military build-up "is bound 
to arise before very long and the only question is when that will happen. Our 
hope has been that it would not happen for at least a year. I think that provided 
ratification does not take place before the autumn, the gap is unlikely to arise 
before March 1953." The Foreign Office argued that West Germany would only 
require DM 3.4 milliard in the first year, while the Germans demanded DM7 
milliard with an additional DM 1.85 milliard to subsidise German industry. Strang 
concluded gloomily, "the decision to rearm Germany is going to mean before the 
next year from now is out, either an increased demand on the British taxpayer or 
a reduction in the British defence programme, and the effect in the first year will 
be much less than in the second year, when there will be little or nothing from 
German funds for the upkeep of British forces in Germany. These are 
consequences we have not yet really faced."^ Much depended on the 
judgement of the EDC conference in Paris which was to arbitrate on the 
competing Allied and German estimates of the financial costs of German 
rearmament during the first year. R.S. Symons, an Assistant Secretary in the 
Treasury, calculated that if occupation costs were kept down to the agreed figure 
of DM6.8 milliard and the German build up cost no more than DM3.3 milliard 
in the first year, which was the latest estimate of the American, British and French 
experts, then the budget could just about be balanced. However, the German 
estimate of DM8.9 milliard for the first year of rearmament completely destroyed 
this calculation. Symons recommended that Britain retain the option of 
withdrawing forces from Germany if occupation costs could not be met, and 
advised the government to press NATO to consider "the military and strategic 
implications of any threatened reduction in forces as above, so that the alternative
65. FO 371/100026, CF(w)llll/95, Crawford brief, 10 March 1952 and Strang minute, 11 March 
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of a slowing up of German rearmament may be properly examined". This latter
suggestion was not taken up, but the Treasury continued to stress that if the costs
of British forces in Germany could not be met by the Federal Republic, Britain
would have to keep the option of force withdrawals o p e n .^  Eden warned the
Cabinet that if the Paris conference supported the German case Britain would be
67presented "with a serious problem of political and military priorities."0
In the months that followed, the negotiations for the signing of the EDC 
treaty continued to be characterised by hesitation and delay. On 14 March the 
EDC powers requested that a formal treaty be negotiated with Britain and that 
reciprocal guarantees be exchanged under the mutual defence provisions of the 
Brussels treaty. The British response to this request demonstrated once again 
Eden’s commitment to EDC as the vehicle for German rearmament. He told the 
Cabinet that his discussions in Paris "have left me with the clear impression that 
the EDC is not likely to go ahead unless we respond to this latest proposal. I 
believe that without running too great a risk we can give the desired undertaking 
provided that it is limited to the period during which the United Kingdom is a 
party to the North Atlantic Treaty." Though Schuman had only requested a 
declaration, Eden was prepared to offer a formal treaty stating that if any of the 
EDC parties were attacked, the United Kingdom would, under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, afford "all the military and other aid and assistance in its 
power." Britain would thus extend its guarantees on the continent to West 
Germany and Italy.00 Alexander, the Minister of Defence, insisted on consulting 
the Chiefs before accepting Eden’s proposals, but they were as enthusiastic about 
the EDC as the Foreign Secretary. They "agreed that it was essential that we 
should do everything possible- short of actually joining the organisation- both to 
strengthen and encourage the EDC." They also approved the idea of talks with 
the French on military cooperation. Having worked on the subject since 
November 1951 they were able to produce an extensive list of proposals for
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69assisting the nascent European defence force when it came into existence.
It was still the contractual negotiations which, from a British perspective,
seemed to pose almost insuperable problems for policy-makers. The Foreign
Office remained unconvinced by optimistic American forecasts of when the
contract could be signed and Kirkpatrick, who as High Commissioner was
responsible for the detailed negotiations, almost despaired of ever completing it.
On 19 March he told Roberts that the negotiations were still dragging on and that
"I see no prospects of bringing them to an end in any measurable distance of 
70time." Acheson, however, was determined to make progress in order to
facilitate the passage of the Mutual Security Agency appropriations through
Congress before its current session ended. On 11 April he sent out instructions to
his ambassadors in western Europe urging them to encourage the EDC countries
71and Britain to complete negotiations by 9 May. Kirkpatrick regarded this
schedule as impossible. He and his colleagues on the High Commission had set
20 May as a provisional date for the signing of the contract but he believed that
"Even that was cutting things rather fine." Eden suggested to Acheson that the
earliest possible date for signature would be between 15 and 20 May while
stressing that "we must allow ourselves time to get the very important financial
provisions fully agreed." He was adamant that Britain could not accept McCloy’s
suggestion that some form of written assurance on the German financial
contribution could serve as a substitute for an agreed convention within the 
72contract.
The schedule was further jeopardised by the emergence of a new 
disagreement concerning the prohibitions on the German arms industry. The 
pattern of this dispute was very similar to that established during the arguments 
over heavy military equipment and civil aircraft, with the British initially favouring 
restrictions on the Germans but eventually conceding victory to the more liberal 
American approach. The list of weapons whose manufacture in Germany would
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be prohibited included guided weapons, but in April the Germans requested 
permission to produce highly sophisticated short range guided missiles for use 
against aircraft. They argued that these weapons were essential for protection 
against fast Soviet planes. The Chiefs, who had based their arguments in favour 
of a liberal attitude towards the production of heavy military equipment in West 
Germany on the vulnerability of German industry to air attack, at first opposed 
the new German initiative. They argued: "It was inevitable that if the Germans 
were allowed to produce short range guided missiles they would in fact acquire 
the knowledge and potential to produce long range guided missiles." However, 
they were determined that a dispute at this late stage in the negotiations should 
not be allowed to prejudice a final settlement and subsequently accepted that due 
to American pressure there was "no alternative" but to permit the Germans to
7-3
manufacture guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence.
The Americans were attracted to the German proposals because the
Wasserfall-Rheintocher-Enziron missile which the Germans had been developing
in 1945 was more advanced than anything the Allies had produced since, and
would constitute a new weapon in the armoury of the West. To politicians in
Britain, however, this was an alarming development. Despite the ambivalence of
the Chiefs of Staff, Eden remained opposed to the German request. He stated
that there were "serious political objections to allowing the Germans to
manufacture weapons which would differ from V2s only in size as this would be
the thin end of the wedge." The Defence Committee was concerned that the
development of this valuable technology in West Germany would increase the
danger of it falling into Soviet hands.^ Once again, however, Eden was unable
to sustain his opposition. By 13 May, with the date for the signing of the contract
approaching, Eden promised to make one last effort to persuade Adenauer to put
short-range guided missiles on the prohibited list but warned that he would
75probably have to accept their removal. The French proved more tenacious 
in opposing German demands and it was not until 24 May that agreement was 
finally reached on the exclusion of short range anti-aircraft guided missiles from
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76the general prohibition on guided missiles.
The final resolution of Germany’s financial contribution to defence was
subject to the same frantic last minute negotiations. The British found that the
claim to a DM 6.8 milliard share of the total German financial contribution of
DM 10.2 milliard for the Allies was being squeezed from two directions at once;
from the EDC powers who believed that the DM 3.4 milliard which had been
allocated to the Germans for the purposes of rearmament was insufficient, and
by the other occupying powers who regarded the DM 6.8 milliard figure for
occupation costs as provisional and subject to downward revision. The EDC
powers estimated that the cost of German rearmament would be DM 4.2 milliard
for nine months and DM 8.1 milliard for twelve months. On the assumption that
heavy equipment could be provided by the Americans, these figures could be
reduced to DM 2.4 milliard and DM 4.2 milliard respectively. Even if the
minimum EDC figures were adopted, however, the Allied share of the German
contribution would have to be reduced from DM 6.8 milliard to DM 6.0 milliard
in order to fit within the overall total of DM 10.2 milliard. The likelihood of the
Germans accepting this was negligible. They were now including the costs of
purchasing heavy equipment and subsidising the new arms industries in their
figures and had arrived at a total cost of DM 6.3 milliard for the first nine months
77of rearmament, rising to DM 15.6 milliard for a twelve month period. On 1 
May the High Commissioners had a depressing meeting with Adenauer. The latter 
was concerned at the loss of his majority in the Bundesrat and the hardening of 
opposition to the contract in the Bundestag. In addition, the Finance Ministry had 
been alarmed by the size of the occupation costs for the months of March and 
April. The Allies had spent DM1.4 milliard in March and DM 850 million in 
April. Kirkpatrick recorded: "Dr Schaeffer’s till is empty, there is panic in the 
Ministry of Finance and the Germans have been led to re-examine the financial 
implications of the contract." Adenauer had pointed out "that the Germans cannot 
bear all the burdens we have imposed on them... and in addition make extensive 
concessions involving loss of revenue." Exasperated by these developments,
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Kirkpatrick proposed making further concessions to the Germans. If this was not 
acceptable in London he suggested that "we should reflect whether the present 
exchange of notes with the Russians should not be used to launch Four-Power 
talks which would probably have the effect of bringing our present negotiations 
to an end and so avoid the damage which would be caused by manifest failure to
70
reach agreement with the Federal Government."
Eden did not propose to accept such a radical reversal of policy as this, but
informed the Cabinet of the bleak situation in a paper of 3 May. From his analysis
it was plain that the British government would require American assistance in
pressing for the largest possible Allied share of the German financial contribution.
He argued that Britain would be unable to receive its full occupation costs in
Germany beyond mid-1953. Indeed, she might cease to receive full costs even
earlier unless circumstances became more favourable. To prevent any additional
strain on the British economy there were four alternatives: the redeployment of
forces, economies in the budget, a smaller German defence contribution or
additional US aid. However the first of these would have disastrous repercussions
on western defence arrangements, the second was impractical, the third would
never be acceptable to the Allies and the fourth could not be relied upon. In the
short term Eden advocated putting pressure on the Americans to support British
demands that a larger share of the German financial contribution for 1952-3
79should go to the Allies. He had no solution to the long term problem. When 
Franks raised this matter with Acheson, the American Secretary of State admitted 
that German claims were probably excessive, but declared that the problem was 
one of "manageable proportions". He also reminded Franks that the occupying 
powers had agreed to make further cuts in their DM 6.8 milliard claim in 
February.^
The Treasury continued to believe that if Britain’s financial position in 
Germany could not be guaranteed then re-deployment must be considered, but 
during the two last frantic weeks of negotiation, which preceded the final
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agreement on a contractual settlement, economic considerations took second place
o - l
to diplomatic ones. The squeeze put on the British by the Germans and the 
other occupying powers forced Eden into a series of concessions which resulted 
in a substantial reduction in the portion of the German defence contribution 
allocated to the Allies. However, the expectation of further long delays before the 
contract was ratified and the emergence of a formula which gave the Allies a 
larger share of the budget in the first six months after ratification, led Eden to 
predict confidently that Britain would have its occupation costs met in full until 
the end of June 1953. On 2 May Kirkpatrick reported to London that the High 
Commissioners were considering the idea of accepting a sum of DM 570 million 
a month to cover occupation costs for a period of less than twelve months, with 
the allocation for the final months left as the subject for later negotiations. He 
explained: "If the ratification of the contract were delayed till 1st October it might 
then be possible to get our full costs covered till 30th June 1953 and the further 
division contemplated would not take place." On 7 May the Cabinet were 
informed of German demands for a reduction in the Allied share to DM 4.5 
milliard for the full twelve month period. They agreed to establish a committee 
to examine the latitude for retrenchment in the British occupation budget, while 
in the interim Kirkpatrick was instructed to argue against any further reduction 
in the DM 6.8 milliard allocated to the occupying powers. Eden did, however, give 
Kirkpatrick license to explore a settlement based on a six or nine month rather 
than a twelve month time period. On 9 May Eden told the American 
ambassador that Britain "could not possibly agree to accept arbitrary cuts in the 
figure of DM6.8 milliards", while in Washington Franks pleaded with Acheson to
O ' !
support the British position.
Though the French and Americans were not willing to accept German 
claims for a majority share of the financial contribution, they were prepared to 
consider cuts of up to 15% in the Allied claim. On 14 May Eden was forced to 
return to the Cabinet to seek their approval for a cut of up to 10% in the Allied
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share. They accepted this measure even though Eden informed them that "while 
there might be scope for further economies, it did not follow that if we abated our 
demand on the Germans by 10 per cent we should be able to achieve a reduction 
of that am ount."^ British hopes of meeting their costs in Germany up to mid- 
1953 now depended on devising a formula to cover a period of less than twelve 
months and on a delay in ratification. Initially Eden had favoured a flat monthly 
rate which would fully cover Allied costs in the first six months but on 15 May he 
instructed Kirkpatrick to accept reductions of up to 10% in the Allied claim and 
to negotiate for a settlement covering nine months. He was opposed to the latest 
idea to emerge from the High Commission for a sliding scale of payments which 
would give the Allies a larger portion of the German contribution in the first 
months and a smaller amount in subsequent months. The acceptance of a smaller 
Allied sum for the period between six and nine months would, he believed, 
prejudice the Allied case for a larger share in any subsequent negotiations. The 
Americans favoured the idea of a variable rate and only accepted the flat rate 
formula with reluctance. On 17 May the High Commissioners presented their 
agreed proposal for a nine month deal giving the Germans DM339 million a 
month. Once again, however, the Germans were unwilling to accept the Allied
oc
calculation of the amount they required for the purposes of rearmament.
The failure to reach agreement on the basis of a flat rate led to a further 
retreat by Eden and his acceptance of the American sponsored sliding scale. As 
the deadline for agreement drew near he authorised Kirkpatrick to accept a 
reduced allocation for the Allies in the final three months of the nine month 
period but insisted that "it is essential that the Allies should be allowed to carry 
forward any balance from the first two quarters into the third quarter." A  plethora 
of formulas were discussed in the final few days until agreement was finally 
reached on a figure of DM 551 million for the first six months and DM 319 
million for the three months afterwards. It was not until 24 June that the High 
Commission finally struck a deal on the division of this sum which gave the British 
DM198 million a month for 6 months and DM115 million a month for the next
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th re e .^  The extent to which this deal would cut into the British budget 
depended upon the date on which it would come into force. The later that 
ratification occurred, the longer would be the period during which the allies would 
receive contributions at the current higher rate of DM600 million a month. 
Kirkpatrick estimated that if the whole nine month deal was implemented (which 
implied ratification by 30 September) there would have to be a 16.7% cut in the 
British occupation budget; if it only ran for eight months (implying ratification by 
31 October) the cut would be only 13%. Eden told the Cabinet that the deal 
meant that "Allied requirements will, therefore, be more than covered in the six 
months, and it will be possible to carry a surplus forward which would enable 
Allied costs to be met to the beginning of the third month of the third quarter." 
He added that if, as seemed likely, the EDC and the contract were not ratified 
before 1 November 1952, "our full Deutschemark requirements for the local costs 
of the United Kingdom forces will be met from the German contribution until 30
07
June 1953. If the date is later, we should gain financially."0 ' One disadvantage 
which Eden did not mention was that the Allies had conceded the principle that 
six months from the moment when EDC was ratified the Allied share of the 
German contribution would drop to DM 319 million. It was expected that after 
nine months the size of the German contribution to the Allied budget would be 
reduced still further. Though Treasury views on the necessity of refusing to accept 
any extra costs had been ignored, the government was saved from severe financial 
embarrassment by the long delay in the contractual negotiations.
The history of the negotiations between October 1951 and May 1952 had 
been marked by a series of apparently unending British concessions. They had 
accepted a reduction in the German contribution to occupation costs from DM 
7.4 milliard a year as recommended by the Tripartite Group to an average figure 
of DM 474 million a month. The Germans were to be allowed to manufacture 
heavy military equipment and short range guided missiles, despite initial 
opposition from the British government to these concessions. On the matter of 
civil aircraft the British had yielded the principle, even though in practise the
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Germans were unwilling and probably unable to develop an aircraft industry. The 
government was more enthusiastic about the EDC but nevertheless it had to be 
goaded into offering a promise to retain troops on the continent for as long as 
necessary and into extending a guarantee to the Community in order to prevent 
the collapse of the treaty negotiations. The offer of military cooperation was, 
however, a genuine one based on enthusiasm for the idea of close association 
between the British and EDC armed forces.
Thus there was a remarkable change in the British government’s attitude 
towards the issues surrounding German rearmament in the winter of 1951-2. The 
previous summer the Labour government had opposed the implementation of 
German rearmament and expressed ambivalence about the EDC. In the 
succeeding winter the new administration worked assiduously in support of the 
EDC and the signing of a contract. With the signing of the Bonn Conventions on 
26 May 1952 and of the EDC treaty in Paris the next day they appeared to have 
succeeded. The main changes were in the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. The 
return of Eden as Foreign Secretary was particularly important because his 
authority on the subject of foreign affairs went almost unchallenged within the 
Conservative administration.**** Macmillan testified ruefully to Eden’s dominance 
and his verdict is confirmed by the Cabinet records which reveal that Eden’s views
on
were accepted with alacrity on almost every occasion. This was m marked 
contrast to Morrison’s lack of stature as Foreign Secretary. Eden’s weakness was 
in long-term policy making; his great strength was negotiation. He thus took up 
Foreign Office ideas on the need to integrate Germany militarily, economically 
and politically into the West and brought them to fruition.
Eden’s advisers in the Foreign Office now fully accepted the need for 
German rearmament as part of the final integration of Germany into the West 
which was the cynosure of British foreign policy at this time. There was actually 
still not a great deal of enthusiasm for a German defence contribution in itself but 
it was seen as the only viable policy in the circumstances. As Foreign Office 
officials constantly reiterated the alternatives were worse. This pessimism was 
based on suspicion of both the Soviets and the Germans. Kirkpatrick declared that
88. David Carlton, Anthony Eden : A Biography (Allen Lane, London, 1981), p.294.
89. Macmillan, op.cit., p.465.
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in Germany "any policy is attended by risks." Thus in going ahead with the EDC
and the contract the West was making permanent the division in Berlin which was
"obviously dangerous to peace." However, making concessions to the Soviets would
"run a serious risk of seeing the whole of Germany sovietised and of losing
all."^  An alliance of Germany with the communist powers was regarded in the
Foreign Office as the greatest danger of all. Thus Roberts echoed Kirkpatrick by
declaring "there is no ideal German policy. Our aim must be to choose that which
91offers fewest risks and, above all, to prevent a Russo-German alignment."
Allen wrote to an opponent of German rearmament, "we have grave doubts about
whether the demilitarisation of Germany... could in fact be permanently
maintained and enforced without grave risk to peace... if a solution on these lines
appealed to the Russians it would be because they saw in it possibilities of
Communist trouble-making and subversion... If it appealed to the Germans, it
would be because they saw in it the hope of playing off East against West to their 
9?advantage."
The continued suspicion of Germany combined with an examination of the 
economic consequences of German rearmament meant that the nature of the 
German settlement was a much more difficult issue for policy makers during this 
period than the more well known controversies surrounding the creation of the 
EDC. Eden generally favoured quite strict controls over the German armaments 
industry, especially those sectors of it, such as missile production, which revived 
memories of the wartime threat to Britain. However, on every occasion that he 
came into conflict with the Americans on these issues he was forced to yield. 
Acheson recalled with satisfaction that, during the contractual negotiations, Eden 
"could be counted on to end up on the side of the angels, which I tended to 
identify with my own. If it sometimes took a little while to get there, he was well
90
worth waiting for."^  On the matter of Germany’s financial contribution there 
was a steady erosion of Britain’s position, but Eden could see no alternative policy 
which would safeguard British financial interests. The final settlement was actually 
quite satisfactory from the short term point of view but this was largely due to the
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actual delay in negotiating the contract and the potential delay in ratification. The 
long term problem had still not been resolved. The EDC caused fewer difficulties 
as the military pressed ahead with their plans for cooperation with European 
armed forces and Eden proposed a series of measures designed to placate 
European opinion. British policy during this period was thus characterised by a 
desire to see Germany finally integrated into the West, to prevent undue 
provocation to the Soviets, to encourage the EDC powers to complete their work 
on a treaty and to prevent the possibility of Britain having to pay any part of the 
occupation costs before the end of the 1952-3 financial year.
These would continue to be the themes of British policy, though the 
context was now provided by continuous French hesitations at the prospect of 
entering into a partnership with a rearmed, economically renascent, West 
Germany. The British government believed there would be some delay in 
ratification, which was regarded as useful from the financial perspective, but no- 
one expected that it would be two and a half years before the German 
rearmament dilemma was finally resolved. As the French procrastinated, British 
policy-makers were forced to confront the implications of the failure of a policy 
for which they had never had great enthusiasm but which appeared to be the only 
possible solution in the prevailing circumstances. Before May 1952 British policy 
was characterised by the acceptance, one by one, of policies which had previously 
been regarded as unthinkable. In the spring of 1950 the Attlee government 
decided on a cautious policy of rearming Germany through the medium of a 
Federal gendarmerie but from the outbreak of the Korean War the British lost 
the initiative. They were forced to accept first the principle of a German army (as 
distinct from an armed German police force), then the creation of a European 
Army to contain German armed forces, and finally liberal provisions for German 
arms manufacture as part of the contract. Though the Labour government put up 
some resistance to these policies, during the first six months of the Churchill 
administration the pace of negotiations accelerated and there was little time to 
consider any alternative to the course set by the Americans. The focus of attention 
was on getting a solution which would be accepted and which would work.
Though the British government was now able to re-examine the long term 
implications of their German policy in a way which had not been possible since
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the Americans pressed their ‘one package* deal at the New York conference of 
September 1950, their freedom to act on these conclusions was strictly limited by 
Eden*s determination to press ahead with the EDC. Between May 1952 and April 
1953 Eden was scrupulous in his efforts to promote ratification. Though the EDC- 
contract solution was not regarded as the ideal German policy, none of the 
alternatives available was regarded as a sufficient improvement to risk its failure. 
It required the impulsiveness of Churchill to break the logic of this calculation. 
British support for the European Army was evident both from their attitude to the 
so-called battle of the notes, which began with the issuing of new Soviet proposals 
for German reunification on 10 March, and from the decision to ratify those 
sections of the EDC-contract treaty complex which concerned Britain as quickly 
as possible.
When the Soviets delivered the first of the four notes to the western 
powers which they issued during 1952, Eden considered that they might genuinely 
desire a European settlement and could possibly be persuaded to make 
concessions on Germany. Though containing the usual Soviet demands for 
unification and neutralisation, the note dropped their previous advocacy of 
demilitarisation and suggested that Germany could be allowed armed forces. Eden 
recognised the propagandist motives behind the note but was not entirely cynical 
in his attitude. He believed that "it might reflect a sincere desire on their part to 
make further efforts towards the achievement of a united Germany." He suggested 
to Franks in Washington that the note indicated "that the Soviet government 
might now be prepared to pay a bigger price in order to prevent the integration 
of the Federal Republic in the western world. While we could not regard the price 
now offered... as in any way satisfactory, we could reasonably regard this 
development as encouraging."^ Neither the Chiefs of Staff nor the Foreign 
Office shared Eden’s hopes for some sort of deal with the Soviets on Germany. 
Slessor judged that the note was "pure propaganda", while the Foreign Office 
described it as "primarily a tactical move designed to interfere with present 
Western defence plans."^ Indeed, Eden’s senior officials would have been
94. FO 371/97877, C1074/1, FO to Washington, 12 March 1952; CAB 128/24, CC(52)29th mtg., 
12 March 1952.
95. DEFE 4/52, COS(52)38th mtg., minute 7, 11 March 1952; FO 371/97879, C1074/52, draft 
memo from the FO for a meeting with the French and American Ambassadors.
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disappointed if the Soviet note had actually marked a change in policy. Strang 
warned that "the result of a free all-German election would probably be to 
establish a Schumacher Govt in power... Such a Govt would probably reverse 
Adenauer’s policy of integration with the West and go for a policy of neutrality 
and manoeuvring between East and West." Eden responded: "Is this really so? 
Are there not other conditions we could add?" He then elaborated: "My marginal 
comment simply refers to the possibility that the Soviets really want to pursue this 
new policy. If they could realise it would it not have important advantages for 
them ."^  Thus, Eden was clearly more optimistic than his advisers that the 
Soviet note represented an opportunity for a deal with the Soviets on Germany.
Eden’s views were not shared by the Americans either, and between March 
and September 1952 the western allies co-ordinated their responses to the Soviet 
notes in order to gain the maximum propaganda advantage and so facilitate the 
ratification of the EDC treaty in the European parliaments. The drafting of the 
replies to the first two Soviet notes was relatively uncontroversial, but the basis of 
future disagreements became evident at a meeting of Foreign Office officials held 
on 15 April at which Britain’s response to the second of the Soviet notes was 
considered. Roberts, Strang, Allen and the other participants agreed that the 
government should "proceed with our present policy of trying to secure the 
signature and subsequent ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty and the German 
Contract. We must so handle the Soviet Note as to encourage Germany not only 
to sign, but also to ratify these agreements." They opposed any four power 
meeting before the EDC and the contract were signed, but believed such a 
meeting "will probably be a necessary prelude to ratification in Germany and
0 7
France. We also have to consider our own public opinion".
Despite the fact that the Foreign Office had absolutely no intention of 
using the EDC as a bargaining counter at a four power meeting but rather saw 
talks with the Russians as a means of securing EDC ratification, the apparently 
more accommodating attitude of the British government led to a clash with the 
Americans over tactics. The dispute arose immediately after the signing of the 
EDC, which was the time at which the Foreign Office officials had envisaged a
96. FO 371/97879, C1074/52, Strang minute, 15 March 1952, with marginal note from Eden and 
additional Eden minute, 16 March 1952.
97. FO 371/97881, C1074/85, Roberts minute of meeting of FO officials, 15 April 1952.
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meeting with the Soviets at their April meeting. To Acheson’s astonishment Eden 
supported a French draft reply to the third Soviet note which envisaged talks with 
the Russians on the subject of free elections in Germany. Acheson told Oliver 
Franks an early meeting with the Soviets would jeopardise ratification in the 
United States and Germany, and that "he was baffled by fact that, after thorough 
discussion with Eden and Schuman in Paris, he had no word from Eden regarding
go
the change in position or the reasons for it.
During the subsequent tripartite discussions the British continued to 
support the more conciliatory French position, while stressing "that the difference 
in substance between us and the Americans did not seem so very great. We were 
both prepared to contemplate a meeting but the American draft so hedged this 
round with difficulties and questions that the general appearance of the Note was 
entirely negative."^ This was the key point for British policy-makers. They 
believed that a positive response to the Soviets was essential to facilitate the 
process of ratification. Roberts declared: "There is undoubtedly a strong although 
confused feeling throughout Germany against ratification until a last attempt has 
been made to achieve German unity at a four-Power meeting....it is essential, not 
only for the Western Powers, but also for the Federal Government, to have a 
four-Power meeting on Germany this summer, or at all events to be in a position 
to show very clearly to a sceptical public that the Russians alone are responsible 
for any failure to hold such a meeting." Franks told Acheson that the reply "must 
be viewed in broader terms of European op in io n " .^
The drafting of the reply to the latest note was one of the few major issues 
to be the subject of substantive discussions during Acheson’s trip to Europe at the 
end of June. Eden’s brief, while advising him to accept the American position in 
the last resort, stressed that Adenauer, who remained opposed to any meeting, 
was not representing the general feeling of his own public. Even if he had been, 
"German opinion....is not the only factor to be taken into account. There is also 
French, British and European opinion generally. We should have great difficulty
98. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Acheson to the Embassy in the UK, 10 June 1952, p.263-4, Acheson to 
the Embassy in the UK, 12 June 1952, p.267-8: Leffler, op. tit., p.461.
99. Ibid., Editorial Note, p.270; FO 371/97885, C1074/198, Roberts to Strang, 16 June 1952.
100. FRUS 1952-1954, vol.7, Acheson to Embassy in France, 19 June 1952, p.272; FO 371/97757, 
C1017/386, Roberts to Strang, 21 June 1952.
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holding the position until October or later without making some new initiative." 
The eventual compromise agreed by the three Foreign Ministers on 27 June 
proposed a meeting to discuss the composition and terms of reference for an 
electoral commission, with the proviso that all four governments must first accept 
the principle of free elections as defined by the western powers. The reply was 
sent on 10 July and was met with six weeks of silence by the Soviets. ^
Though the episode caused some bitterness in the American 
administration, this disagreement was not nearly so serious as the dispute which 
had occurred during the Palais Rose conference in the spring of 1951. On both 
occasions the British and French had adopted a more conciliatory attitude to the 
Soviets on the subject of talks on Germany than the Americans. However, the 
earlier disagreement reflected a genuine divergence of view on long term policy. 
The Labour government had hoped that by offering concessions on German 
rearmament at a four power meeting some kind of general settlement might be 
achieved, while the Americans did not want a meeting at all. In the summer of 
1952 both the Americans and the British had the same object: the ratification of 
the EDC treaties. London believed that a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviets 
would encourage ratification, while Washington thought a four power meeting 
would undermine Adenauer’s attempts to get a favourable vote in the Bundestag. 
The change in the British attitude reflected the much more positive attitude 
towards German rearmament which had developed after the return of the 
Conservatives in October 1951.
The British strengthened their reputation as supporters of the EDC by 
being the first of the European powers to ratify the relevant aspects of the EDC- 
contract treaty complex on 1 August. The ease with which the Churchill 
government accomplished this, compared with the almost insuperable difficulties 
successive French governments encountered was as much the result of the British 
political system’s tendency to invest the incumbent government with overwhelming 
power as it was of differences in French and British perceptions of EDC. Though
101. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Acheson to Department of State, 28 June 1952, p.275-7, draft reply, 27 
June 1952, p.279-80; FO 371/97886, C1074/225, brief for Secretary of State’s talks with Schuman 
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the French National Assembly had a different, more pressing set of concerns 
regarding EDC this ought not to obscure the fact that many British MPs had 
severe reservations about German rearmament as well. On the Conservative side 
Boothby argued that without British participation the EDC would merely be a 
vehicle for German domination of the continent. He had written to Eden as early 
as November 1951 to inform him of advice he had received that the German 
generals were "waiting in the wings" and that their objective was "the restoration 
of the lost European provinces". He warned that without American and British 
participation, the European Army "must sooner or later be directed by a revived 
German General Staff". ^  Another Conservative back-bencher, Sir Herbert 
Williams, continued to express the view in private that the Germans remained 
"potentially dangerous as in the past". Conservative criticism of the EDC in the 
two day debate which began on 31 July was muted but John Peyton, the MP for 
Yeovil who had been a prisoner of war in Germany from 1940 to 1945, warned 
that Adenauer, like Stresemann before him, could be overthrown and his place 
taken by less responsible men. Speaking of the German character he declared, 
"their race consciousness is near to the surface and can rise so easily to something 
which is bordering on mania". The Churchill government was, however, able to 
take advantage of the loyalty of its back benchers in order to secure 
ratification.-^
Moreover, the Labour leadership were unable to rally the opponents of 
EDC because they were divided amongst themselves. In May the National 
Executive Committee adopted a motion demanding that a series of conditions be 
met before Germany should be allowed to rearm, including the holding of free 
elections. Attlee refused to regard the NEC decision as binding and the eventual 
Opposition motion merely criticised the decision to proceed with ratification as 
"inopportune" while the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union was 
continuing. ^  Though the idea of exploring the possibility of a settlement with
102. Avon Papers, AP 20/50/53, Handwritten copy of a note from Boothby to Eden, 15 December 
1951, enclosed in Moir to Eden, 5 July 1966.
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104. The Parliamentary Debates, vol.504, col.1752; Kenneth Harris, Attlee (Weidenfeld and 
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Russia in preference to the rearmament of Germany was attractive to at least one 
Conservative MP, in general those Tory MPs most concerned about the German 
defence contribution were anxious that stricter controls should be imposed. 
They were sceptical about the prospect of talks with the Soviets and the abstainers 
from the Conservative side were swamped by the large number of Labour MPs 
who believed the government was merely proceeding with the policy of western 
rearmament endorsed by Attlee and Bevin when Labour was in office. Crossman, 
who presented the most cogent arguments against a German defence contribution, 
declared that the Labour government had been forced to accept German 
rearmament in principle by American pressure. Bevin he insisted, "was 
passionately opposed to German rearmament." This speech aroused the ire of the 
Labour right. Christopher Mayhew, who had worked under Bevin at the Foreign 
Office, declared: "it is absurd to suggest that if Mr. Bevin were here now to decide 
this issue he would not decide wholeheartedly to go ahead with contractual 
a rrangem en ts ."^  With this internecine conflict being conducted on the 
Labour benches, the government could be confident of victory despite the 
existence of reservations among their own MPs.
While the Foreign Office sought to encourage EDC ratification in order to 
complete the integration of Germany into the western system, the Chiefs of Staff 
were engaged in a major review of Britain’s strategic priorities. On 17 June they 
produced a new Global Strategy Paper entitled Defence Policy and Global 
Strategy which argued for greater reliance on long-range strategic bombing, both 
as a deterrent and as a war-winning weapon. This shift in policy would take 
advantage of American atomic superiority and provide a less costly alternative to 
the build-up of large conventional forces on the continent of Europe. A 
comparison of the Global Strategy Paper with the plans of the American Joint 
Chiefs of Staff demonstrates the different force requirements of the two different 
strategies. The British paper suggested that conventional forces would act as a 
complementary deterrent which could demonstrate "to the Russians that the Allies 
are able to make their advance across Europe both slow and difficult - a state of
105. The maverick Conservative was Viscount Hinchingbrooke who described NATO as a "palsied 
organisation" and warned that the Soviets would meet force with force, "as is the habit of some 
of the baser animals." See The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.505, cols.1911-12.
106. Ibid, vol.504, cols. 1764-6 and 1786.
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affairs which we are now approaching." Presumably the Chiefs regarded the force
goals set for the end of 1952 as sufficient. This would entail the creation of a force
of 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft to be ready by M+30. They were themselves no
longer prepared to fulfil their force requirements for 1954 as specified in the
Lisbon force goals. The Global Strategy Paper envisaged a reduction of three and
one third divisions in the British forces earmarked as reinforcements for the
central front and a cut of nearly 1,000 in the number of British aircraft to be
107made available to N A TO / When the Chiefs presented their analysis to their
American counterparts, without revealing the planned cut in Britain’s NATO
contribution, they found that, though the Joint Chiefs were prepared to accept the
long term need for economies in defence expenditure, they regarded the risk of
inswar in 1954 as too great for the strategy to be implemented immediately. °  
Furthermore, the American Chiefs believed the British were overestimating the 
effectiveness of atomic weapons. Bradley detected "considerable wishful thinking" 
on this subject. In fact, the American military were planning an increase 
in the force goals set at Lisbon. On 20 May they presented their proposals for the 
American submission to the NATO Annual Review. They envisaged the creation 
of an M +30 force of 118 divisions with an additional 12 brigades in 1954, which 
should increase to 123 divisions and 10 brigades by the following year.^® 
Though Acheson insisted these figures were unrealistic and had them reduced 
during the course of the year, the proposals of the American Chiefs provided a 
good estimate of the force levels which it was believed would be necessary to 
make a war-winning conventional strategy effective, and against which the British 
Chiefs were rebelling.
The American military had always been vigorous in their espousal of 
German rearmament. Under their plans of May 1952, the Germans would provide
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6 divisions by the end of 1953 and 12 by the end of 1954. Though this was a
somewhat optimistic estimate of the likely delay in rearming the Germans,
ostensibly the British Chiefs’ position was the same as their American
counterparts. The Global Strategy Paper stated: "We are in full agreement with
the present allied policy and plans for integrating German armed forces with those
of the Allies and these should be vigorously pursued. Indeed for the present we
can see no satisfactory alternative to doing so." The rearmament of Germany
would be a part of the limited build-up of conventional strength which was
"essential to prevent the characteristic Russian tactics of confronting the West with
local faits accompli, to discourage the Western Communists, and to restore
confidence along the frontiers of the Free World by a demonstration on the spot
of Western strength." Looking at the long term prospects for western
defence, however, the Chiefs returned to a subject which they had stressed in the
period prior to the Korean War, when they had not envisaged making a major
effort to defend the continent using conventional forces. This subject was German
reunification. In November 1949 the Chiefs had advocated reunification in order
to achieve a reduction in tension in central Europe. The new Germany would be
friendly to the West and would be allowed armed forces to protect itself, but
NATO forces would be withdrawn west of the Rhine. This policy would remove
"a permanent source of friction" between the West and the Soviet Union and,
with the Soviets withdrawing from East Germany, would rectify the "unsound" 
112position of Berlin. ^ The Global Strategy Paper took up this argument again. 
It stated that "a unified Germany could only be established independent of the 
defence orbit either of Russia or the West. In the long term we consider that 
there might be a definite military advantage in such a position. The present 
division of Germany and the precarious position of Berlin are bound to be sources 
of friction and possible causes of war." The Chiefs argued, as they had in 
November 1949, that it would be better for the West if the initiative for 
reunification came from their side, as whoever made the first move would gain 
German good will. The Joint Planning Staff recommended that the Foreign Office 
should make a study of the reunification of Germany in light of the Chiefs*
111. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952.
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analysis. However, these revolutionary proposals were not transmitted to the
1 1 o
A m ericans/
The Chiefs did not directly link the subject of German reunification with 
their new strategic concept but it is difficult to believe that their renewed interest 
in the subject was not connected to the reduced emphasis they now placed on the 
role of conventional forces. In November 1949, though notionally committed to 
the defence of the Rhine, the Chiefs did not believe a defence of the European 
continent was possible, and a policy of disengagement in central Europe resulting 
in the creation of an armed but neutral Germany was therefore attractive. During 
the course of 1950 the importance of a German contribution to western defence 
increased as the Chiefs became enamoured of the idea of conducting a 
conventional defence of the continent. With the creation in June 1952 of a new 
strategic concept based on the notion of conducting a fighting withdrawal in 
western Europe in conjunction with a massive air attack on the Soviet Union, 
German reunification could be put back on the agenda. Though the Chiefs 
continued to advocate a German contribution to western defence it was clear that 
they no longer regarded this as essential in the long term.
The effects of a German defence contribution also had to be considered 
when the costs of implementing the Global Strategy Paper were assessed. The 
total cost of the three year programme was initially estimated at £5,483 million, 
but the Cabinet agreed that the Ministry of Defence should find means of 
economising and by September this figure had been reduced to £5,286 million. It 
was emphasised by the Chiefs of Staff that during the three year period there 
would be a number of new demands on defence expenditure amounting to £420 
million. The principle increase in expenditure would result from the gradual 
assumption by the Ministry of Defence of the whole of the occupation budget for 
the forces in Germany, which would entail charges of £245 million. Initially 
the Ministry of Defence had set a figure of £112 million for annual occupation 
costs and the lower three year total was only achieved by planning a policy of 
retrenchment in the occupation budget including savings from the purchase of 
equipment and stores in the United Kingdom, reductions in labour costs and
113. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952; DEFE 6/21, JP(52)75(Final), 17 July 1952.
114. CAB 128/25, CC(52) 72nd mtg., minute 5,23 July 1952; CAB 131/12, D(52)41,29 September 
1952.
139
economies resulting from a less ambitious programme for the 2nd Tactical Air
l ie
Force stationed in Germany/
It was the date at which rearmament was to begin, combined with the
amount which the Americans and Germans would be willing to contribute for the
support of British forces after this date, which were the crucial factors in assessing
the costs of German rearmament to Britain. The Ministry of Defence assumed
that the start of the German defence build-up would be delayed for at least a
year, and that this would produce a saving of £10 million. However, it was the
Treasury which produced the very optimistic analysis which was to be the basis for
future planning. They estimated that once the surplus from the previous year was
taken into account, expenditure in Germany in the nine months of the financial
year remaining after July 1953 would be only £60 million. The Germans would
contribute £30 million, leaving the Treasury with only £30 million to pay. Once the
programme of economies was implemented, they calculated that annual costs
could be reduced to £70 million in all subsequent years and that either the
Americans or the Germans would pay half of this amount. On this basis the
Treasury were willing to provide £30 million in 1953-4 and £35 million for the two
following years. It was by these ingenious, if unrealistic, calculations that the
Treasury reduced the cost of the occupation over three years from £245 million
to £100 m ill io n .^  The assumptions used in effecting this notional reduction
were highly questionable, but this was all the additional expenditure Butler would
allow. He had initially argued in favour of maintaining the current level of defence
expenditure which was £1,462 million, but eventually proposed a higher ceiling of
£1,550 million against the Ministry of Defence claim for £1,645 million. The bitter
opposition of the Chiefs persuaded Ministers to reject the Treasury figure. On 7
November 1952 the Cabinet agreed to a figure of £1,610 million, on condition that
117a radical review of defence expenditure be undertaken. As will be seen in
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the next chapter, Butler’s economy drive was to have important consequences for 
the British military’s attitude towards German rearmament.
The British government’s inability to agree a figure for defence expenditure 
for 1953-4 was to a large extent responsible for the delay in completing the first
110
of the NATO Annual Reviews. The postponement of this exercise, the 
perfunctory nature of the exchange of notes with the Soviets and the meandering 
progress of the Interim Committee of the EDC made the second half of 1952 the 
quietest period in international diplomacy since the Cold War began. Without any 
overt Soviet challenge to the status quo and with the Truman administration on 
its last legs these were arid months for the cause of western unity. This state of 
inertia was reflected in the agonisingly slow progress of EDC ratification.
On 17 June 1952 Eden told the Cabinet that he hoped the EDC treaty
would be ratified by the end of the year. At the same time he issued a prescient
warning. If the German Supreme Court, whose task was to assess whether
proposed legislation conflicted with the constitution, or Basic Law, decided that
the EDC and the contract did require changes to the Basic Law, then Adenauer
would be required to obtain a two thirds majority in the German parliament,
which he could not command. A week earlier, the Federal President, Heuss, had
requested that the Court give a ruling on the constitutionality of the treaties. The
Court was already considering an earlier complaint by the SPD on the same
subject and its deliberations were prolonged. By November the indications were
that the ruling would go against Adenauer. The following month he postponed the
third reading of the legislation in the Bundestag and persuaded Heuss to withdraw
his request for a ruling from the Court. Meanwhile in France the Pinay
119government refused to submit the treaties to the National Assembly.
On 6 November Kirkpatrick wrote to Roberts to warn of the possibility of 
an adverse judgement by the German Supreme Court on the constitutionality of
in 1953-4 which had initially been set by the Ministiy of Defence was £1759 million. The 
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German costs to £30 million.
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the EDC and to suggest that the Foreign Office ought to begin considering what
policy to adopt should the EDC fail. He was very pessimistic about the prospects
of gaining a new agreement with the Germans before the Federal elections in a
years time and predicted that the collapse of the EDC, should it occur, would
result in "a complete shake-up and turn-round in German politics." The Foreign
Office had always regarded the establishment of contractual relations as the first
priority and they continued to do so. Allen and Roberts believed that it would be
impossible to delay this until the next Federal election. They explained: "we are
no longer capable of running Germany on a full Occupation basis for much
longer. It is therefore going to be necessary to find some means of bringing into
force without too much delay, a new political relationship with the Germans, with
or without a defence contribution." Roberts was still convinced that a Four Power
meeting, as the British had advocated during the battle of the notes, would be
useful in persuading the waverers to support the E D C .^
Kirkpatrick believed that German membership of NATO was the only
feasible alternative to EDC but he argued that there should be no immediate
concessions to the Germans if EDC failed. Instead the promise to end the
191occupation should be used as a bargaining counter in negotiations. A The 
main work on alternatives to EDC was done by the Foreign Office’s Western 
Organisations department. On 2 December Lord Hood, the head of the 
department, sent the latest draft of the Foreign Office’s contingency plan to the 
Chiefs of Staff. The crux of the problem was that a German defence contribution 
"must be based upon the principles of equality of treatment for Germany but also 
provide safeguards without which German rearmament will not be acceptable to 
public opinion, in particular to the French." The proposed solution was German 
membership of a reconstituted NATO, which would include elements of the EDC 
structure. Thus the continental powers would be required not to keep any armed 
forces outside the NATO structure without the authority of the North Atlantic 
Council or some other international body, and arms production in Germany would 
be restricted by its designation as a strategically exposed area. In order to bind 
German forces tightly into the Atlantic framework there would be an ‘Atlantic
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Force’ constituting the armies of the continental powers and American and British 
forces on the European mainland, which would be more closely integrated than 
was currently the case. The main doubt for the Western Department planners was 
the feasibility of the project, and they warned that the British and Americans 
might have to make far-reaching concessions to achieve a solution along these 
lines. However, they also saw many benefits in the proposals, including the chance 
to reform NATO and the fact that "in NATO the United Kingdom is in a better 
position to influence the development of German policy than in the EDC." This 
last point was a controversial one as many of those who were concerned about the 
prospect of German rearmament had only been persuaded to accept it on the 
basis that the EDC provided the best means of controlling the process. A week 
before Hood’s paper was sent to the Chiefs they had their own discussion of the 
possible alternatives to EDC with the Foreign Office representatives, Frank 
Roberts and Pierson Dixon. The Chiefs "emphasized that our first consideration 
must be to do everything possible to encourage the ratification of the EDC Treaty 
by both Germany and France". When Roberts suggested that "Probably Germany 
could be better controlled as a member of NATO than as a member of the EDC', 
the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Guy Grantham, dissented. He "feared that, 
once Germany had been admitted as a member of NATO, it would quickly be 
found that she was the only nation which could provide additional forces to fill the 
inevitable gap in Western defence, she might therefore be allowed to expand her 
forces for this purpose until she became more powerful than France."A
When Eden presented the case for German membership of NATO as a 
provisional alternative to EDC to the Cabinet on 10 December, he stressed that 
in the immediate future Britain would give full support to the EDC and "actively 
discourage any suggestion that alternative plans might be considered." Beyond 
giving encouragement, however, there were few positive steps which Britain could 
take to facilitate ratification. The most effective concession would be to offer a 
permanent commitment of forces to the continent, but this would be "the first step 
on a slippery slope, to which there might be no end....Any commitment of ground 
or air forces to the EDC would result in a loss of flexibility in our plans for
122. DEFE 4/57, COS(52)160th mtg., minute 1, 24 November 1952; DEFE 5/43, COS(52)658, 4 
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defence, both militarily and economically." Thus the solution which Eden adopted 
two years later was rejected at this stage. He was willing, however, to offer the 
continental powers institutional links through the EDC Council of Ministers, the 
EDC Assembly and the Board of Commissioners. When the alternatives to EDC 
were considered, Eden was emphatic that a NATO solution was the only option 
and that there was "no half-way house between the EDC arrangements....and full 
German membership of NATO." He then outlined the past objections to the 
proposal including German untrustworthiness, the fear of Soviet reactions, the 
Germans’ claim to territory east of the Oder-Neisse line and finally, French 
opposition. It is indicative of the changed attitudes of the government that the first 
two factors were now regarded as less important than previously. The issue of the 
Oder-Neisse line was still seen as a serious problem, and indeed three months 
later there was a brief scare that Adenauer was seeking to revive the issue of 
irredentism, but it was hoped that this problem and that of French obstruction 
could be overcome by imposing safeguards such as public guarantees of current 
frontiers, an increase in SACEUR’s powers and restrictions on German arms 
production. Eden was still committed to the May 1952 treaties and to the policy 
of German rearmament. However, the Foreign Office were now prepared to 
consider alternative policies should EDC fail. They even discussed the possibility 
of using the Brussels Treaty as a framework for German rearmament, an idea for
n iwhich Eden was to claim credit two years later.
When Eden met Auriol on 16 December, the French President greeted him 
with a full exposition of French grievances against Germany, as was his habit when 
meeting foreign statesmen. Eden told him that he "shared his mistrust of the 
German character but the only solution....was to hold on to the Western part .of 
Germany and bring it into our system." His purpose was to persuade Auriol to try 
and hasten EDC ratification. He went on, 'The Russians had already begun 
rearming the Germans in the East and the only safe way to prevent the whole of
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Germany from moving over to the East was by the policy of the Atlantic Pact and
the EDC....Surely if Britain and France stood together combined, they were more
than strong enough to refuse to be drawn into German irredentist policies."-^
It was the changes to both the French and American governments in
January 1953, combined with Adenauer’s victory over the Supreme Court in
Germany, rather than any initiative on behalf of the British, which gave EDC
renewed impetus. Acheson had made little effort to promote EDC during his last
months in office and it soon became clear that the new Republican administration
125would be much more tenacious in its efforts to promote ratification. As
noted previously, Eisenhower was converted to the cause of a European Army in
the summer of 1951 while serving as NATO Supreme Commander and
subsequently became one of its most passionate advocates. In his first State of the
Union address he called for a "more closely integrated economic and political
system in Europe" and argued that EDC was the most effective spur to this
process. Walter Lippman provided a graphic picture of the commitment of
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State to the European Army when he declared: "Foster
Dulles’s real feeling about EDC is that of a man who sat down on a flypaper and
can’t think of what to do next."^^ In France the new Prime Minister, Rene
Mayer, was also a supporter of EDC and at last took the decision to begin the
process of ratification. However, the changes in the French government were not
all satisfactory to advocates of the EDC. Mayer’s Foreign Minister, Bidault, was
a captious successor to the accommodating Schuman. The new coalition was
dependent on the Gaullist RPF for support, and at their insistence, Mayer agreed
to re-open negotiations on a number of controversial aspects of the EDC 
127treaty.
As well as these international pressures Eden had to deal with internal 
opposition to his policy from a junior and the most senior member of the Cabinet. 
On 4 December 1952, while Eden was briefing Commonwealth Prime Ministers
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at a special Cabinet meeting, Churchill interrupted to declare that "he would not 
be unduly disturbed if the present plans for a European Defence Community were 
not carried into effect....he doubted whether the soldier in the line would fight 
with the same ardour for an international institution as he would for his home and 
his country." A month later on a visit to the United States prior to the 
inauguration, the Prime Minister told Eisenhower that he still regarded EDC as 
a "sludgy amalgam" which would be much less effective than separate national 
armies. Evidently Churchill was in one of his most cantankerous moods during the 
visit and Eisenhower concluded that he ought to resign.
Eden was, however, able to re-assert official policy during Dulles’s trip to 
Europe. On 1 February Dulles met with the main American ambassadors to 
western Europe in order to express his determination to make EDC a success. 
Holmes, the American charge in London, told him "that British opinion 
particularly that of Eden, had changed much in the last eighteen months....they no 
longer oppose and, in fact, are prepared to actively support EDC." Though he 
stated that the Prime Minister was unenthusiastic about the project, he added that 
"Churchill stood alone among the British in this position, and that the Prime 
Minister would complain but in the last analysis would not actively oppose." Dulles 
met Eden on 5 February and was impressed with the measures for military and 
institutional association outlined by Eden and Alexander. He told Eisenhower that 
in his meetings with British officials they "developed unity of purpose re EDC 
which the government now clearly accepts as indispensable." Churchill followed 
up the success of this meeting with a letter on 9 February stating "you can rely 
upon us to continue to give every support and encouragement to this great 
undertak ing".^
Though Dulles may have been convinced of this, the French were not. 
Mayer was now demanding that a number of protocols should be added to the
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EDC treaty in order to provide the French with a greater degree of independence 
from the supra-national EDC authorities. In addition he wanted the British to 
provide tangible evidence of their support for the European Army by giving a 
commitment to retain troops on the continent. In return for this Britain would be 
allowed a voice in each of the three main EDC institutions: the Council of 
Ministers, the EDC Assembly and the Board of Commissioners. Eden was 
somewhat shocked to discover that the concessions he had been considering 
offering to the French were now being offered to him by the Mayer government 
as an inducement to commit troops to the continent. He told the Cabinet: "It is 
absurd that they should expect us to pay a price for what is really a concession on 
our part." Regardless of who was doing the conceding, Eden was not prepared to 
offer a guarantee of British force levels on the continent. Though the French had 
offered to include an escape clause in any agreement, which would allow Britain 
to withdraw troops during an overseas crisis, Eden rejected this on the grounds 
that it would be impossible to invoke the clause without incurring the opprobrium 
of Britain’s European allies. Thus another aspect of the eventual settlement was 
rejected at this stage. All Eden was prepared to offer was an agreement on 
military and political association with EDC and the promise of talks with the 
Americans to discuss the possibility of extending the North Atlantic Treaty to 
make it coterminus with the EDC treaty. He rejected the idea of consultations 
with the continental powers on British troop levels as an "additional vague and
1 - in
unnecessary commitment". u
During the subsequent negotiations with the French, Eden received strong 
support from the Americans, who were inclined to blame Paris for the continuing
111
delays. A However, at least one member of the British government objected 
to any further concessions to the French at all. Despite his lowly position as 
Housing Minister, Macmillan prepared his own paper for the Cabinet on the 
subject of the EDC, which he regarded as a vehicle for German dominance of the 
continent. Among those who were still concerned about the German threat there
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was a vast array of views on how best to contain it. Thus whereas Grantham saw 
German membership of NATO as a more dangerous policy than EDC, Macmillan 
believed the exact reverse. Discussing the prospect of a six power federal Europe, 
he asked: "Will not Germany ultimately control this State, and may we not have 
created the very situation in Europe to prevent which, in eveiy century, since the 
Elizabethan age, we have fought long and bitter wars?" Unlike Sir John Slessor, 
who also regarded German dominance as a threat to the future of EDC, 
Macmillan did not regard British involvement in the Community as an effective 
palliative. Any further concessions would only be followed by demands for yet 
more. He believed EDC should be allowed to fail. Once it did, "then will be the 
opportunity for us should we wish to seize it." Eden brushed aside Macmillan’s 
challenge, declaring loftily that "there was no occasion at present for the United 
Kingdom Government to reconsider their present policy of working for early 
ratification of the Treaty as the quickest method of obtaining a German 
contribution towards the defence of Western Europe." Despite claiming that he 
had made no further concessions, Eden proposed to instruct Britain’s observer at 
the EDC Interim Commission to inform the French "that apart from consultation 
in the NATO we shall be willing to consult with the EDC about our level of 
forces."-^
While Mayer succeeded in persuading the other EDC powers to accept a 
number of additional protocols to the treaty as ‘interpretative texts’ at the Rome 
conference of 24-25 February, it was clear that the French position was weakening 
just as Adenauer’s was becoming stronger. Thus proposals for an increase in the 
size of the German frontier police and for discussions with NATO on the future 
deployment of German forces were greeted with enthusiasm by the Anglo-Saxon 
powers. Churchill commented on this second proposal: "I like it all. Two if not 
three years have been lost through French obstruction.*^ Domestically, 
Adenauer’s position was bolstered by the Bundestag’s ratification of the EDC and 
the contract on 19 March. Ratification by the upper house or Bundesrat posed a
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new set of problems, but on 15 May this obstacle too was surmounted. The efforts
Adenauer made to secure ratification ensured him a cordial reception when he
made his first trip to the United States in April. ^
Though Adenauer’s increasing national and international authority had its
advantages, there was concern in Britain that the Federal Republic’s position was
becoming too strong, in particular with regard to the negotiations on the German
financial contribution to western defence. The current financial arrangements for
the payment of occupation costs were proving advantageous to the British. In
April 1952 the Allied High Commission had agreed that Britain should receive
DM214 million a month from the total German contribution of DM600 million
and this arrangement was renewed in November. Due to reductions in the
occupation budget and the seasonal nature of capital construction projects, it was
agreed that the British could reduce their bid for early 1953 to DM203.5 million
a month. However, this figure was still DM90.5 million more than the services
expected to spend and the main interest of the British government was to obtain
an agreement to allow the unspent contributions to be put into suspense accounts
and used in later months. At the end of March 1953 Schaeffer accepted the
idea of the so-called carry-over and promised to continue paying DM600 million
a month up to the end of the occupation. The latest agreement on the division of
this figure gave the British between DM202 million and DM209 million a month
depending upon whether the Germans or the Allies financed NATO infrastructure 
137costs.
Though these arrangements secured Britain’s financial position during the 
occupation period, it was clear that it would be endangered during the contractual 
period. Once the EDC came into force the German contribution would take two 
forms. They were to contribute a sum to the EDC to pay for the costs of their 
own rearmament whilst also continuing to pay a proportion of the costs of Allied 
forces in Germany. By early 1953 it was evident that the arrangement worked out 
in May 1952 for the 1952-3 period was redundant and that a new agreement
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covering the 1953-4 year would be required. In March Eden warned the Cabinet
that the Germans were in a much stronger position in these negotiations than they
had been the previous year. However, he hoped that an agreement would be
reached by the time of the North Atlantic Council meeting in April. The outcome
would be crucial to Britain’s future economic situation. The Cabinet were warned
that if Germany would not meet British costs in the first half of 1954, this "would
hit our economy at its most vulnerable point, its balance of payments, and so
138oblige us to reconsider our defence programme." Eden hoped to gain 
American support for a major German contribution to Allied costs after the 
implementation of the contract. The Treasury supported these tactics, though they 
were disappointed that the Foreign Office would not consider using the threat of 
troop withdrawals to strengthen the Allied case. Their aim was to gain an 
extension of the May 1952 agreement which would effectively secure the British
I  - IQ
financial position.1 In April 1953 the Foreign Office submitted a slightly 
reduced bid of DM475 million a month for six months and DM300 million for the 
next three. However, the Germans presented proposals for a sliding scale which 
would give the Allies a smaller overall share of the total German contribution and 
reduce the Allied share to DM175 million within seven months of ratification. 
Eden was again forced to compromise. At the Paris North Atlantic Council 
meeting the post-ratification defence contribution of the Federal Republic was set 
at DM950 million a month. The American, British and French forces would 
receive DM400 million for the first six months, DM300 million for the following 
two months and, assuming ratification occurred by 1 October, DM200 million in 
the ninth month. ^
It was Washington’s support for the EDC which played the crucial role in 
persuading the British to accept the European Army and in maintaining their 
support for it. Within the British government there were those, like Macmillan
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and Jebb, who saw EDC as a vehicle for German domination of the Continent 
and those, like Eden and Strang, who were persuaded to acquiesce in German 
rearmament because the integration of German armed forces into a supra­
national organisation appeared to lessen these dangers, but these disagreements 
were insignificant compared with the danger of destroying the international 
consensus in favour of EDC which had been so painstakingly constructed during 
the course of 1951. Both during the EDC-contract negotiations in the winter of
1951-2 and the subsequent ratification controversies, Eden guided the Cabinet 
towards a policy of concessions. Whereas in the autumn of 1950 Bevin had 
regarded the European Army as a threat to Atlantic unity, from the return of the 
Conservatives in October 1951, its achievement was seen as essential to the 
success of the western cause. The Treasury arguments for a delay in German 
rearmament or for the consideration of troop withdrawals from West Germany 
were rejected on the grounds that they would have adverse diplomatic 
consequences. Similarly, the suggestion in the Global Strategy Paper that there 
was a military case for a unified Germany outside the western alliance was never 
seriously considered. Subsequently Dickson replaced Slessor as Chief of the Air 
Staff and Harding succeeded Slim as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the 
agenda of the military reverted to arguing the case for German rearmament but 
with a new rationale. The idea of reunification as a long term solution to the 
German problem was not attractive to the Foreign Office. They were prepared 
to examine alternatives to the EDC in case it should fail, but these contingency 
plans were still based on the notion of integrating German armed forces into the 
western defence system. The schemes which they had considered in the winter of
1952-3 were to prove useful when EDC finally did collapse, but it is noticeable 
that many of the ideas which were adopted in 1954 were rejected as impractical 
or inexpedient in this earlier period.
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CHAPTER 4 
GERMAN REARMAMENT RECONSIDERED 
There was plentiful justification for a re-examination of both the diplomatic 
and military cases for a German contribution to western defence during the course 
of 1953. On the political front, Stalin’s death, followed by the subsequent 
relaxation in Soviet policy, combined with perpetual French quibbling over the 
form of EDC, raised questions both about the necessity and the feasibility of 
current western policy. In terms of military strategy, the overhaul of British and 
later American policy in favour of smaller conventional forces designed to 
maintain an effective deterrent to the Soviet Union over the long haul called at 
least for a re-think of the nature of the German contribution. However, while 
Churchill provided a singular critique of the diplomatic case for the Federal 
Republic’s incorporation into the western defence system, no attempt was made 
to re-assess that country’s future military role in the light of new strategic 
developments. This chapter will describe the course of Churchill’s efforts to secure 
a change in policy and the effects of his failure, while examining the reasons why 
no similar debate took place on the subject of the strategic role of German armed 
forces. It will show that, despite all the attention which has been devoted to it, 
Churchill’s initiative left the situation fundamentally unchanged and that by the 
time of the Bermuda conference Britain’s foreign policy priority had reverted, 
under the guidance of Salisbury and Eden, to the ratification of the EDC treaty.
Until the death of Stalin Churchill had taken relatively little interest in the 
development of his administration’s German policy and instead devoted much of 
his limited energy to criticising Eden’s plans to withdraw from Egypt. His 
interventions in European policy were restricted to complaints about the 
inferiority of the European Defence Community in comparison with a coalition 
of national armies. From April 1953, however, the securing of an ’easement’ in
i
relations with the Soviet Union became his overriding priority. In order to 
secure this rapprochement he was prepared to offer the Soviets the prize of 
German neutralisation. This was completely at odds with current British policy 
and provoked a violent reaction from the Foreign Office. Though the extent of the
1. John W. Young, ‘Cold War and Detente With Moscow’ in John W. Young (ed.), The Foreign 
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reversal being contemplated by the Prime Minister was kept secret, both 
Eisenhower and Adenauer had justifiable concerns about what sort of deal 
Churchill was contemplating. Adenauer, in particular, regarded Churchill as 
completely unreliable. Though the strength of the opposition within the 
government to Churchill’s ideas forced him to abandon the notion of overturning 
German policy in order to appease the Soviets, the episode was only one 
indication of a general and widespread concern in Britain about developments on 
the continent. The continued state of paralysis in France and the alarmingly rapid 
recovery of the Federal Republic combined to create a sense of unease in the 
United Kingdom and even among some American officials.
In the context of the changed emphasis in western strategy which 
developed during 1953, it would have been legitimate to ask whether a German 
defence contribution of the size agreed in the aftermath of the Korean War was 
still essential. In fact this question was never put, and no attempt was made to 
examine what sort of contribution Germany should make if the planned build-up 
in conventional forces was to be overturned in favour of a strategy based on 
smaller conventional forces and the use of atomic weapons as the British Chiefs 
advocated. Both the British and American military continued to insist that a 
German contribution was a necessity without making any effort to re-define its 
function now that the Lisbon force goals were redundant. The Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Sir John Harding, was particularly persistent in his calls 
for a German contribution. At a time when the Chiefs were unable to meet the 
targets set by NATO and were under severe Treasury pressure to restrict defence 
expenditure still further, it was convenient for them to advocate the assumption 
by Germany of a greater responsibility for continental defence. Indeed, they 
displayed an increasing tendency to subordinate military to economic 
considerations in their discussions of NATO strategy. They opposed the setting of 
long term force goals in order to allow NATO’s defence forces to stabilise at a 
level which could be sustained by the European economies. The role of 
conventional forces was to be downgraded, but no effort was made to calculate 
the force levels required for this new approach and the planned reinforcement of 
NATO by German units was regarded as a good thing in itself. It provided either 
the only means of increasing conventional capabilities or, if the continental
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countries reduced their defence effort, a means of compensating for future 
reductions in NATO forces.
Churchill, though he was acutely conscious of the revolutionary nature of 
the hydrogen bomb, did not link the case for German neutralisation to any new 
strategic analysis. His motivation was purely diplomatic. The Russians would have 
to be offered something if a deal was to be struck and a change in German policy 
was the most obvious, and to Churchill the most appealing, concession. Following 
Churchill’s stroke, the hawkish figure of Robert Cecil, 5th Marquis of Salisbury, 
was able to reassert the conventional Foreign Office line as, in the absence of 
Eden, he took up responsibility for the government’s foreign policy. As the Labour 
Party pointed out, this policy precluded any deal with the Soviets as it required 
the incorporation of the whole of Germany into the western system as the price 
the Soviets must pay for an agreement on reunification. The exchange of notes 
with Moscow which followed the Washington conference, or ’Little Bermuda’, was 
largely an exercise in propaganda on both sides, as the Prime Minister himself 
pointed out. Churchill’s stroke was a significant moment in the history of Britain’s 
attitude towards a German defence contribution because from that moment the 
EDC sceptics within the government lost the initiative they had gained following 
Churchill’s May speech. During his convalescence Churchill became persuaded 
that, as there would clearly be a long delay before he could attend a summit, it 
was best to support the early ratification of EDC in order to facilitate the 
subsequent holding of a high level meeting.
Until Churchill’s dramatic speech to the House of Commons on 11 May, 
the NATO powers had responded cautiously to the new Soviet leadership’s ’peace 
offensive’. Though Eisenhower’s speech of 16 April received a rapturous press 
response, the pre-conditions he outlined for an improvement in relations with the 
Soviets were quite unrealistic. This was a relief to Dulles who had opposed the 
idea from the outset. He told the Paris North Atlantic Council meeting in April 
that as long as a Soviet threat existed "we must match Soviet unity imposed by 
force with equal unity". Ratification of EDC was "now within our grasp. We must 
act rapidly since it is the principal missing ingredient to real strength and
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security." Though the Council approved a shift towards qualitative improvement 
and away from quantitative expansion, this was the result of a greater stress on 
economic feasibility which had been developing for a year before Stalin’s death.
The response of the British government was more ambiguous. In 
correspondence with Churchill, Eisenhower must have gained the impression that 
the British Prime Minister saw the Far East, rather than Germany, as the most 
likely region in which there was a possibility of a reduction in tensions. On 5 April 
Churchill wrote: "We think....that we ought to leave no chance of finding out how 
far the Malenkov regime are prepared to go in easing things up all round. There 
seems certainly to be great possibilities in Korea and we are glad of the steps you 
have taken to resume truce negotiations." Later that month Selwyn Lloyd told 
Dulles "that Mr. Churchill felt strongly that this was not appropriate time to give 
any indication of easing up on part of western powers as result of Soviet 
tactics." However, with his attention now focused on the problem of East-West 
relations, Churchill was quick to detect what he regarded as a softening of 
Moscow’s attitude.^ In another letter to Eisenhower on 12 April he spoke of "the 
Soviet change of attitude and policy", and asked "Would it not be well to combine 
the reassertions of your and our inflexible resolve with some balancing expression 
of hope that we have entered upon a new era? A new hope has, I feel, been 
created in the unhappy, bewildered world." Ten days later, Churchill was arguing 
that the Soviets would never accept a unified Korea and that the three heads of 
government ought to resume the negotiations which had ended in 1945.^ On 28 
April he told a sceptical Cabinet that he wanted to call a summit at which the 
three leaders could "take up the discussion at the point at which it had been left 
at the end of the Potsdam Conference."^ The reference to Potsdam is significant
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because at that conference it was agreed to maintain Four Power control of a 
united Germany and to exchange industrial for agricultural goods across the zonal 
boundaries. A return to Potsdam would be a huge step backwards. Despite the 
tepid reaction of the Cabinet, Churchill wrote again to Eisenhower announcing his 
intention to send a message to Malenkov offering to meet him in Moscow. The 
President expressed "astonishment" at this suggestion and Churchill agreed to 
delay sending his missive. However, it was clear that he was not willing to 
abandon the idea of talks with the new Soviet leader and he added mischievously 
that if Eisenhower went with him to a conference they would have "the best
n
chance of a good result".
Eden had initially seen Stalin’s death as an opportunity for him to meet 
Molotov, but his chance to engage in personal diplomacy was frustrated when he
o
was hospitalised as a result of a botched operation. In the Foreign Secretary’s 
absence, Strang adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Churchill’s demands for 
a summit, suggesting only that such a meeting would have to be "approached with 
all circumspection" and that any discussion of Germany might jeopardise EDC 
ratification.^ In general, however, the Foreign Office were strongly opposed to a 
summit and believed that if the Soviets did take a more accommodating line over 
Germany, Britain’s long term objectives would be jeopardised. Dennis Allen both 
doubted that the Soviets were pursuing a softer policy and feared the 
consequences of new proposals for German reunification. He warned that it might 
suit Moscow to resurrect this issue, "in a last attempt to delay still further French 
ratification of the EDC Treaty." Roberts was also convinced that Soviet 
concessions could endanger the EDC. He minuted, "The Russians could put us 
in a very awkward position in this way but fortunately they are not gamblers by 
nature and rarely behave as skilfully as we think they should in their own 
interests." A hostile Russia was more useful to the Foreign Office than a 
conciliatory one; at least until EDC was ratified.^
The problem for the Foreign Office was that the absence of Eden meant
7. Boyle (ed.), op.cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 4 May 1953, p.48, Eisenhower to Churchill, 5 May 
1953, p.49-50 and Churchill to Eisenhower, 7 May 1953, p.50-1.
8. Avon Papers, AP20/16/10, Strang draft telegrams to Moscow, 28 and 29 March 1953.
9. FO 800/759, Strang to Churchill, 20 April 1953.
10. FO 371/103659, C1016/10A, Allen minute, 31 March 1953 and C1016/16, Roberts minute, 21 
April 1953.
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that there was no-one of sufficient standing to present their case effectively. In a
note prepared for the foreign affairs debate on 11 May, they stated that there had
been "little sign" of a change in the Soviets’ policy towards Germany, adding that
they had not replied to the last western note of 23 November 1952 and concluded
"We see no reason to take the initiative in the m ean tim e."In stead  of pressing
this view, Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister of State, actually helped draft the Prime
Minister’s 11 May speech which was so at variance with the advice given in the
12Foreign Office note. Despite the laudatory reception given to Churchill’s
speech it was marred by a contradiction between his insistence that there would
be no compromise over the European Defence Community or Germany and the
offer to the Soviets of a private meeting at which a wide range of issues could be
13discussed without any fixed agenda or the presence of over zealous experts.
In terms of practical diplomacy, it was quite evident that if the participants at a 
high level conference were to discuss anything but platitudes, the EDC and the 
German question would be two of the first items for discussion. Furthermore, if 
an agreement was to be reached, compromise on both sides would be necessary. 
Officially, Churchill’s suggested inducement to the Soviets was an offer to 
conclude some sort of new Locarno agreement guaranteeing frontiers. Apart from 
the fact that no peace treaty defining Germany’s post war borders had yet been 
agreed, this was clearly too insubstantial an idea to be attractive to Moscow. It 
seems that Churchill himself was aware of this problem and hoped to offer the 
Soviets something more tempting at the prospective meeting of the leaders. In his 
11 May speech he promised that when Adenauer visited London in a few days 
time he would re-assure the Chancellor "that West Germany will in no way be 
sacrificed or-1 pick these words with special care- cease to be master of its own 
fortunes within the agreements we and the other NATO countries have made with 
them ."^  However, after his two days of talks in London, Adenauer left the 
country thoroughly alarmed. According to the official records of their meetings, 
Adenauer told Churchill on 15 May that he "did not think there were any 
important differences between the recent speeches of the Prime Minister and of
11. FO 371/103664, C1071/9, Foreign Office note for Foreign Affairs debate, 7 May 1953.
12. D.R.Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (Jonathan Cape, London 1989), p.171.
13. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.515, cols.889-898.
14. Ibid., col.890.
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the President....it seemed generally agreed that progress could only be made with
Russia on the basis of continued vigilance, fidelity and unity in the west.” The
"misgivings" of the EDC states about Churchill’s speech were put down to
inadequate reporting. The next day Roberts congratulated Strang on the fact that
Adenauer and his foreign affairs adviser, Herbert Blankenhom, were "very
satisfied with the conversation and with the visit generally." However, Churchill
had actually told the Chancellor that a meeting with the Soviets was essential, that
his own promises to West Germany could not exclude "secret diplomacy" and that
the Americans, who once could not be persuaded of the existence of a Soviet
threat, had now gone "to the other extreme."^ Over the next few weeks
Adenauer had separate discussions with the American writer, Drew Middleton,
the German journalist, Ernst Friedlander, and the Dutch statesman, Dirk Stikker,
and told each of them of his concern about Churchill’s a ttitude .^  The fullest
account of the Chancellor’s perspective on his conversations with Churchill was
provided by Blankenhorn who conveyed his views to the British diplomat Con
O’Neill. This revealed that Adenauer’s worries about Churchill’s initiative had only
been exacerbated by their meeting. He regarded the ageing Prime Minister as
dangerously unstable and seems actually to have developed feelings of contempt
for him. According to Blankenhom, Adenauer was "scared stiff" by Churchill’s
views and had been so infuriated by his approach to German problems that he
had very nearly walked out of the meeting. The Chancellor did not know whether
Churchill "was now standing on his head or his heels", but was convinced that "he
could not trust him to conduct conversations with the Russians on German or 
17other subjects."
Had Adenauer known of the private discussions Churchill was having with 
Foreign Office officials, he would have discovered that his fears were justified. On 
16 May the Prime Minister told Pierson Dixon that "he had not closed his mind 
to the possibility of a unified and neutralised Germany." Dixon recorded that this 
remark was made "in the context of a possible high level discussion with the
15. FO 371/103705, C1074/14, record of German Chancellor’s visit, conversation of 15 May 1953, 
C1074/15, Roberts to Strang, 16 May 1953, C1074/16, record of conversation between Churchill 
and Adenauer at lunch on 15 May 1953.
16. FO 371/103664, C1071/32, Roberts to Strang, 4 June 1953 and C1071/34, Roberts to Strang, 
10 June 1953; FO 371/103666, C1071/64, Johnston to Hancock, 18 June 1953.
17. FO 371/103665, C1071/60, Roberts to Strang, 17 June 1953.
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Russians, and his meaning, I think, was that it might be desirable to agree to such 
a solution for Germany as part of a settlement with the Russians." Churchill also 
told Lloyd and Strang that "he would be willing to consider the unification and 
neutralisation of Germany if the Germans wished, but only if they wished for 
this.”18
It was Frank Roberts who, as Under-Secretary responsible for German 
affairs, organised the Foreign Office campaign to frustrate Churchill’s plans. He 
warned that "a ’neutralised’ Germany would mean a fundamental change in allied 
policy pursued since 1947." His principle argument against German neutralisation 
was the same one that the Foreign Office had been using for years. If Germany 
was not firmly tied to the West she could not be trusted to resist Soviet 
blandishments. Roberts stated "A reunited Germany with a national army would 
sooner or later be tempted to use its economic and military power as a bargaining 
factor between East and West. As the Russians would have Germany’s former 
Eastern territories to offer and the West would have nothing, except perhaps the 
Saar, such a Germany would inevitably become associated with the Soviet bloc. 
We should thus have created by our own action the most deadly danger to our 
own security and that of the world. A disarmed Germany would be so weak that, 
American troops having departed, she would be at the mercy of the most
powerful, ruthless and determined power in Europe ie. the Soviet Union....
Throughout history Germany has never shown any particular vocation for 
neutrality". Churchill’s initiative, if successful, would result in the collapse of 
European institutions, "and sooner or later a return to German nationalism and 
the revival of the German quarrel with France and Western Europe." Dixon 
agreed and added, "The rearmament of the Federal Republic, her integration into 
Western Europe, the collective defence effort are component parts of a whole. If 
we reverse our German policy, we bring the whole structure tumbling about our 
ears & advance the frontiers of the Soviet bloc to the Rhine." He wanted a "re­
armed & anti-Russian" Germany and asked, "can anyone suppose that the 
outbreak of an American-Soviet conflict could be long deferred from the day that 
Germany became a Soviet satellite or partner in an unholy alliance?" Strang 
transmitted these views to the Prime Minister in a formal memorandum on 30
18. FO 371/103660, C1016/32, Dixon and Strang minutes, 19 May 1953.
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May. The reply from 10 Downing Street was enigmatic. Churchill insisted that he 
was fully aware of the "awful consequences" of a change in policy but added "It 
is certain that on present lines we are moving steadily towards war and that the 
French have managed with their EDC for nearly four years to prevent a German 
army being created." Though declaring he had no "final inhibitions", he also 
promised not to let Adenauer down and expressed concern that a united Germany 
might suffer the same fate as Czechoslovakia. Having thus apparently accepted 
the dangers of neutralisation, he finally confounded expectations with the cryptic 
comment that "Larger combinations might alter the proportion", and the 
statement that the crucial American atomic advantage "would not be affected by 
the great issues which we both have in our minds and with which your paper 
deals." ^
The Foreign Office sought to play on the Czech analogy in order to 
frighten Churchill into dropping the whole idea of a deal with the Soviets on 
neutralisation. They failed. On 13 June Churchill wrote to Strang and Lloyd, "I do 
not think a free and united Germany would join the Soviets in any foreseeable 
period, if so they would only form part of a wider no-man’s land, communications 
across which could be dealt with by the Atomic Bomb." Then on 23 June, the day 
of his stroke, Churchill wrote to Lloyd with the bizarre but revealing statement 
"We are still firmly behind the Bonn Treaty and EDC Agreements unless they lag
2fi
or fail, or unless something better comes up." Anthony Nutting, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, reported to a stricken Eden 
that he and Lloyd had discussed these matters with Churchill but "could not get 
it out of his head that a divided Germany was a greater risk than a neutral and 
united Germany." In his revealing account covering events since Eden’s 
hospitalisation, Nutting suggested that Churchill’s speech had set back the 
ratification of the EDC in France but that "The worst anxiety, however, has been 
felt in Germany where the speech has given rise to all sorts of fears, not least in 
Adenauer’s breast, that we are out to do a deal with the Russians at Germany’s
19. Frank Roberts, ’Dealing with Dictators’ (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p. 166; FO 
371/103660, C1016/32, Roberts memo, 19 May 1953 and Dixon minute, 19 May 1953, Strang to 
Churchill, 30 May 1953, C1016/34, Churchill to Strang, 31 May 1953.
20. FO 371/103660, C1016/34, Dixon minute, 1 June 1953; PREM 11/449, Churchill to Strang and 
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expense. The Chancellor’s meeting with the Prime Minister did not I am afraid
do much to remove this anxiety". Nutting did offer some reassurance to Eden
when he suggested that Churchill would continue to support the EDC in public
21"until October or November at least".
From this fragmentary evidence it is possible to piece together Churchill’s 
thinking about the relationship between a high level conference with the Soviets 
and German policy. His personality was a curious mixture of eirenism and 
bellicosity and by the early 1950s he had become fearful that without a reduction 
in tension the Cold War could turn hot. He believed that with the recent 
development of the hydrogen bomb this would be the ultimate disaster and that 
a meeting with the new Kremlin leadership was the best means of averting this 
catastrophe. It would be necessary, however, to offer some sort of tangible 
reassurance to the Soviets if the meeting was to be a success. Publicly he raised 
the idea of a new Locarno, while in private he discussed the prospect of German 
neutralisation. This latter notion was attractive to him because it was precisely the 
sort of concession which would be welcomed by the Soviets, it would scupper the 
hated EDC, and it would not, in his view, impair the military superiority which the 
West possessed by virtue of their lead in atomic weapons technology. In his own 
thinking the only factor militating against German neutralisation was his loyalty
to Adenauer who he described to Eisenhower as, "The best German we have
22found for a long time." However, Churchill remained somewhat distrustful of 
the German people in general and in this, if nothing else, he was fairly 
representative of both public and governmental opinion.
At this stage in his life Churchill had little respect for the opinions of the 
career diplomats in the Foreign Office. He remained committed to the special 
relationship with the United States, however, and winning over the Eisenhower 
administration was one of the main obstacles to be overcome before a high level 
conference could take place. Eisenhower had consistently tried to dampen the 
Prime Minister’s enthusiasm for such a meeting and Dulles had been thoroughly
21 The Avon Papers, AP 20/16/127, Nutting to Eden, 25 June 1953.
22. Boyle (ed), op.cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 12 April 1953, p.44.
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irritated by the 11 May speech. On 20 May Churchill and Eisenhower spoke 
on the phone and agreed to accept the French proposal for a meeting of western 
heads of government.^
However, the Bermuda conference was delayed by the governmental crisis 
in France and then cancelled following Churchill’s stoke on 23 June. In the days 
after the attack it seemed unlikely that Churchill would ever resume his duties as 
Prime Minister. His absence allowed the Foreign Office to re-impose the 
prevailing orthodoxy on German policy. Though he retained his desire for a 
conference with Eisenhower and Malenkov, after his stroke Churchill realised that 
he had lost any opportunity there might have been of persuading the Americans 
to accept his ideas on German neutralisation. He was persuaded that the 
American administration would only agree to a three power heads of government 
meeting after a final decision had been reached on EDC. On 1 July he sent a 
message to Eisenhower in which he disingenuously announced: "I have never 
thought of a Four Power meeting taking place till after EDC was either ratified 
or discarded by the French." He cautioned that the Soviets could at any time 
march to the Rhine while throwing Asia into chaos and explained: "It is this 
feeling that makes me so anxious that before we reject all hope of a Soviet change 
of heart we should convince our peoples that we have done our best." The 
President replied with an emphatic endorsement of EDC and a veiled warning 
that should it fail the US might return to a policy of isolationism. In his Cabinet 
paper Churchill now set out a schedule involving French ratification of EDC 
before the end of October. If the French government continued to prevaricate he 
proposed that Germany should be rearmed within the NATO structure. Once this 
matter was resolved the West "should be in a far better position to talk to Russia 
than if the present indefinite delay continued." He was still concerned that 
German rearmament was "a profound and legitimate anxiety in Russia", but, with 
his plans for neutralisation now abandoned, he could only suggest that its 
implementation "should be coupled with a declaration of willingness for a four
23. Townshend Hoopes, op cit., p. 174; Thomas Alan Schwartz, 'America’s Germany*, (Harvard 
University Press, London 1991), p.282; M. Steven Fish, ‘After Stalin’s Death: The Anglo-American 
Debate Over a New Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 10, 1986, p.338.
24. CAB 128/26, CC(53)33rd mtg., minute 2, 21 May 1953.
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25Power conference before the end of the year. J
In the absence of both Churchill and Eden, the Marquis of Salisbury took
responsibility for foreign affairs. He had informed Churchill on 11 June that he
was "frankly sceptical" about the likelihood of a change of heart in Moscow and
he evidently shared the opinions of the most suspicious of Foreign Office officials
in this matter. Frank Roberts had recommended that the three powers should
make clear at Bermuda that western policy remained "firmly based upon the Bonn
and Paris Treaties of May 1952 and upon the allied note of September 23,1952."
The Foreign Office brief for Bermuda stressed that the government’s "immediate
aim... is to integrate Western Germany into Western Europe and to enable her
to take part in its defence." The threat of an unholy alliance between Russia and
Germany was at the forefront of their thinking. The paper urged that the object
of the Bermuda meeting ought to be "to strengthen and unite the West, to bring
the German Federal Republic solidly within the western family... and so to prevent
German flirtations with Moscow at our expense on the Rapallo model. Germany,
even reunited, cannot any longer alone play the role of a major World Power, but
in alliance with the Soviet Union she would shift the balance of power against the
West. There are many powerful arguments from German history encouraging the
Germans to such an alignment which would follow the advice bequeathed to them
by Frederick the Great and Bismark." Though the brief paid lip-service to German
reunification, it contained the qualification that "it will be much safer for us and
for Europe if the Federal Republic can be solidly anchored with the West before
26we move on to German reunification." On 6 July Salisbury presented a paper 
to the Cabinet in which he listed his priorities for the Washington Foreign 
Ministers meeting which had been called as a substitute for the Bermuda meeting. 
The first three were the reaffirmation of German policy, supporting Adenauer in 
his election year and pressing France to ratify EDC. Persuading the Americans to 
keep the door open for high level talks was listed sixth and last. Salisbury 
promised to present the case for such a conference but "without pressing the
25. Boyle (ed), op.cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 1 July 1953, p.82-3, Eisenhower to Churchill, 6 
July 1953, p.85-6; CAB 129/61, C(53)194, 7 July 1953; PREM 11/449, Churchill to Strang, 6 July 
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26. FO 371/103666, C1071/65, Roberts to Strang, 8 June 1953 and C1071/67, FO Brief on ‘The 
Problem of Germany* for Bermuda, June 1953; PREM 11/428, Salisbury to Churchill, 11 June 
1953.
163
Americans too hard" on the issue. The Cabinet accepted Salisbury’s argument that
he should seek to persuade the French to ratify EDC prior to any four power 
77conference.
At Washington, Salisbury warned that "immediate 4-power talks would 
provoke uncertainty in Germany which might impair Adenauer’s chances... Great 
Britain was firmly attached to such talks after the German elections." However, 
he subsequently added the further qualification that "it was important to obtain 
German military integration with the West before discussing the German problem 
with the Soviets, since otherwise the Soviets would have a chance to wreck the 
meeting and gain their objectives." Following Churchill’s enthusiastic advocacy of 
a meeting with the Soviets, this argument surprised the other delegates. Bidault 
wished to demonstrate the "impossibility" of a deal with Moscow in order to 
facilitate French ratification, while Dulles accepted Adenauer’s own argument that 
a meeting would actually improve his electoral prospects. °  Salisbury contacted 
the Cabinet to say that he was convinced, "Bidault simply cannot commit himself 
to securing early ratification of EDC before the possibility of a Four-Power 
meeting on Germany has been fully explored." With Bidault, Dulles and 
Adenauer all supporting the holding of talks prior to ratification, he urged the 
Cabinet to modify their position. They accepted this advice but were keen that the 
talks should not be restricted to Germany and hoped it would "be possible to give 
the impression in any public communique that if progress were made the talks 
would proceed to wider issues." In line with Churchill’s 11 May speech Salisbury
on
was instructed that the agenda should "be kept as open as possible". 7
Throughout the meeting, Salisbury urged the French to ratify EDC
27. CAB 128/26, CC(53)39th mtg., minute 3, 6 July 1953; CAB 129/61, C(53)187, 3 July 1953.
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speedily. On the first day he explained that the Community was essential because 
there "remained an important gap in our defences and that no alternative thereto 
had been found." Three days later, having conceded that a meeting with the 
Soviets could precede ratification, he stated "there should be no question of 
deciding that there was no need for EDC.... firm reaffirmation of the attached 
three governments to the EDC was absolutely necessary". He criticised a draft 
tripartite statement on European unity because, "There was little reference to the 
EDC as an immediate objective and there was no sense of urgency expressed.
“2ft
Failure to recognise this urgency would be disastrous."
Salisbury was much less active in pressing for a high level meeting and
despite his own claims to the contrary did not support the idea at all strongly. On
10 July he suggested a conference of the three western leaders should be held in
about three months time to discuss the possibility of a four power high level
conference in order to "prevent a feeling of frustration in Europe, and retain the
initiative for the Western Powers." However, by 13 July Salisbury had to report
that any meeting would only be at Foreign Minister’s level. He expressed regret
that he had not achieved agreement on a higher level meeting and explained that,
though he had "pressed strongly", Dulles had made it clear that the President had
categorically refused to attend the initial stages of a meeting. According to the
American minutes, however, Salisbury had restricted his advocacy of a high level
meeting to some mild criticisms of the wording of the draft communique. They
state that he "noted that the communique referred to a four power meeting of
’Foreign Ministers’, commenting that the original conception had been for a
meeting on a higher level. While he had no doubt that any resulting meeting
would in fact be a meeting of Foreign Ministers he said that he would much
prefer that the communique read ’representatives of the French, United Kingdom,
United States and the Soviet Union’." After Dulles intervened to explain
Eisenhower’s opposition to a high level meeting Salisbury immediately accepted 
31the initial wording.
30. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, McBride minutes of 1st Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 July 
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On 14 July, at the end of the conference, the three powers issued a note
to the Soviet Union offering to meet at the end of September to discuss the
organisation of free elections throughout Germany and conditions for the creation
of an all German government. In the official communique the three reasserted
their support for EDC as part of the movement towards European unity and
announced their desire for talks with the Soviet Union "to discuss directly the first
steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem, namely,
the organization of free elections and the establishment of a free all-German 
32government."
Butler told the House of Commons that the Foreign Ministers talks "are
intended not as a substitute for, but as a prelude to further discussions if..... real
progress can be made the present proposals in no way exclude or excluded a
widening of the present talks in terms either of personalities or of topics." 
However, he was insistent that the Soviets must accept that free elections should 
be the first priority in any German settlement and warned that the Soviet 
proposals "would mean a Germany left in dangerous and irresponsible isolation 
at the heart of Europe." Salisbury and Butler were vigorously criticised by the 
Labour opposition for having, as Ian Mikardo memorably put it, "muted down the 
reverberating chord which the Prime Minister had struck to the plaintive peep- 
peep of a penny tin whistle." However, the debate was notable mainly for the 
concerns expressed about the growing power and influence of Germany. F.J. 
Bellenger argued for the demilitarisation of Central Europe and was supported 
by Bob Boothby who noted "the Russians... have had the Germans at their throats 
during the last decade, and one thing they would surely ask for is some safeguard 
against a repetition of that unpleasing experience." G.A. Pargiter declared "I am 
one of those - one of many millions in the country - who have a greater fear of
the possibility at some future time of German aggression than of Russian
• ..34aggression.
During the summer of 1953 the imminence of elections in West Germany,
32. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, notes from the governments of the US, UK and France to the Soviet 
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the riots against communist rule in East Germany and the apparent strengthening 
of Germany’s economic and diplomatic position created uneasiness in the British 
Government. Adenauer’s election victory provided some reassurance but doubts 
about Germany’s future remained a powerful factor and re-emerged strongly in 
1954. Roberts noted on 4 June 1953 that there was "a great danger, at worst of 
the German ship getting out of control with all Dr. Adenaeur’s election pressures, 
or, at best, of an American-German line-up developing in Europe against us and 
the French." The revolts in Berlin and other East German cities in mid-June 
elicited little sympathy. Kirkpatrick warned "we must not close our eyes to the 
dangers inherent in the riots. The Germans were a hysterical people, rioting was 
contagious and if we deliberately inflamed passions for propaganda purposes we 
might one day find the Germans using violence to express disapproval of our 
policy." In his Cabinet memorandum Churchill had stated "We must face the 
fact that there will always be ’a German problem’ and a ’Prussian danger’." Like 
Roberts, he was concerned that the Americans, frustrated by continued paralysis 
in France, might ally themselves with the Germans and remove all measure of 
control which the West had over the Federal Republic. He complained to his 
physician that the Americans "will not listen now when I warn them about 
Germany. At Potsdam I wanted Prussia isolated and Germany divided horizontally 
and not vertically." During his convalescence he lambasted the Americans as 
"fools" and outlined his new thinking: "If we’d got EDC, then we could have 
spoken to Russia from strength, because German rearmament is the only thing 
they are afraid of. I want to use Germany and EDC to keep Russia in the mood 
to be reasonable - to make her play. And I would use Russia to prevent Germany 
getting out of hand." Though most Foreign Office officials had been shocked 
by Churchill’s 11 May speech and appalled by his subsequent consideration of a 
disarmed Germany, Strang regarded the speech as "well balanced", and noted on 
25 June that the Prime Minister was "still open to argument" over his
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neutralisation idea. He bristled at Adenauer’s criticisms of Churchill, declaring "I 
think these Germans are getting above themselves.' Salisbury’s own 
memorandum on the Washington conference stated the Soviet and western 
powers were both "afraid of the re-emergence of a strong Germany allied to, or 
likely to fall under the influence of, the other party. There is also the fear.... of the 
re-emergence of a strong and independent reunified Germany."
The EDC was now regarded officially as the best means of containing any 
potential German threat within the confines of a more united Europe. Though the 
government remained opposed to the idea of British membership, they had 
persuaded their NATO allies that they would co-operate closely with EDC. In 
May the French had finally accepted Britain’s proposals to send representatives 
to the Council of Ministers and Board of Commissioners, on condition that they 
be embodied in a formal agreement rather than a unilateral declaration. On 19
3 Q
May the Cabinet assented to this procedure. When these plans were 
presented to the EDC’s Interim Commission they were given a unanimous 
welcome and negotiations began on the nature of future co-operation between the 
British and European armed forces.^ Experts in the American State 
Department described the British offer as "sufficiently far reaching to have a 
favourable impact on French ratification".^
However, EDC was still regarded as a means to an end rather than, as the 
Americans tended to treat it, as a goal in itself. The main aim of British policy­
makers was to safely integrate Germany into the western system, and by the 
summer of 1953 some were beginning to question whether EDC was a feasible 
means of achieving this. As early as April Hood had written to the Chiefs of Staff 
suggesting that if the EDC treaty was not ratified by mid-summer the government 
should consider an alternative scheme based on German membership of 
N A T O .^ In June Nutting suggested that with France in a continuous state of 
political turmoil it might be advantageous to examine the possibility of bringing
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the contract into force before the EDC. In response Jack Ward, admitted that 
"the Bonn Conventions represented the goal of our policies regardless of a 
German defence contribution." He concluded, however, that it would be 
injudicious to re-open negotiations on the EDC-contract treaty complex. 
Kirkpatrick explained that the two were linked because "we are not prepared to 
take the risk of giving the Germans sovereignty until they were fully committed 
to integration with the West... Secondly if concessions as regards sovereignty were 
to be made to the Germans we wanted to be sure that, in return, they would meet 
their share of the cost of Western Defence."^ Nutting accepted these 
arguments and dropped the subject, but in Cabinet Macmillan continued to make 
clear his own doubts about the EDC. On 6 July, while agreeing to support EDC 
for the present, he stated that "The incorporation of a reunified Germany in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) might well prove to be a more 
satisfactory solution in the long term". At a Cabinet meeting on 21 July the 
contrary view was advanced that "If Germany was to be united, it would be best 
that she should be unified within EDC: for this would go some way to ensure that 
she did not again emerge as a strong and aggressive independent Power. The 
alternatives were to admit a unified Germany to NATO which would leave her 
free to build up her independent strength and to leave NATO when she desired, 
or to neutralise the whole of Germany - which was a solution unacceptable to the 
Western Allies."^ Thus despite the doubts of many about the European Army 
it clearly still had many supporters in the British government.
The British Chiefs had been among the most enthusiastic advocates of 
EDC and German rearmament, regarding them as essential to the forward 
strategy which they advocated. By early 1953 they had dropped the idea of a 
massive conventional force build up in favour of greater dependence on atomic 
weapons, and it was difficult to present the case in the same terms. They now 
began to argue that the EDC and a German defence contribution were necessary 
in order to compensate for deficiencies in the contributions of other countries, 
including the United Kingdom. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper had estimated
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that the forces available at the end of 1952, if supplemented by the planned
German contribution, would be sufficient to implement a strategy based on the
large scale use of nuclear weapons.^ By December 1952 the allies had 22
divisions and 3,103 aircraft at NATO standards of readiness available to fight at
M-day. This was a shortfall of 31% for land forces and 24% for air forces on the
Lisbon goals.^  It was clear that, with France and Britain determined to
economise on defence expenditure, the forces available were unlikely to expand,
and might actually contract. The French, who would provide the bulk of NATO’s
land forces prior to a German contribution, decided in November 1952 that they
could not produce the additional three divisions required of them by NATO
planners during the course of 1953.^ In Britain, Butler had insisted in
December 1952 that a Radical Review of defence expenditure should be
undertaken in an effort to secure long term reductions. During early 1953 the
Joint Planning Staff produced a series of papers examining the possibilities of
reducing British commitments to Hong Kong, Malaya, Korea, the Middle East and
NATO. In this latter paper it was argued that Britain was already planning to
default on its contribution to the NATO air force by 40% and that any other
48reductions would have an adverse effect on the alliance.
The studies undertaken by the JPS for the 1952 Annual Review, which had 
been postponed to April 1953, revealed the extent of the short-fall in the British 
army’s contribution to continental defence. Though they could provide 4 divisions 
at M-day as required, the 2 divisions supposed to be available by M +30 would 
arrive later than planned, while the further 2 1/3 divisions needed by M +90 could 
not be deployed at all due to equipment shortages which would not be made good 
until 1960. Discussing the issue of a German contribution, they commented "We 
agree that the importance of this can hardly be over stressed."^ On 26 March 
Alexander presented these figures to the Defence Committee and outlined the 
new approach recommended by his military advisers. He explained that the
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current force goals "took no account of Soviet intentions, as against Soviet 
capabilities, nor of the economic factors. In consequence the gap between what 
nations could contribute and what the Supreme Commanders said they required 
was growing wider, and there was a danger that this would encourage pessimism 
and defeatism in NATO." He suggested a new political approach to force goals 
"which would be based upon the forces needed to conduct the Cold War, to deter 
the outbreak of a major war and to impose an initial delay upon the enemy if a 
war should start." It was agreed that Alexander should present the case for this 
new approach to the Americans at the forthcoming NATO meeting in P a r is h  
The problem for the British was that the NATO Supreme Commander, 
Matthew Bunker Ridgway, was actually planning increased force goals to 
implement his forward strategy. In order to launch his putative air counter­
offensive, he recommended an increase of 55% or 3,000 aircraft on the central 
front. Though the American Chiefs were cautious about endorsing such an 
ambitious programme of expansion, they too were committed to the military 
rather than the political approach to force planning. In February 1953 they stated 
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the political implications of any substantial 
increase in NATO force requirements. If force goals are adopted which do not 
show any progress towards meeting these requirements the risk to the security of 
the NATO appears to be increased. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider 
it essential that responsible military authorities determine their force requirements 
for a reasonable chance of success in war by considering military factors."^* 
Within NATO the main support for the British government’s point of view came 
from Montgomery. In March 1953 he told the American Chiefs that what was 
required was a force which could be maintained over a long haul of 20 to 30 
years. He warned that Ridgway’s "continuous bleating for more and more forces 
without any idea how they were to be maintained over an indefinite period was 
doing immense harm." In June he advised Ridgway’s successor, Gruenther, that 
NATO had reached its limit in terms of conventional land forces and would have
CO
to rely increasingly on superior sea and air power. However, when SHAPE 
produced a paper on the effect of new weapons upon force requirements it
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showed that an increase of 10 divisions and 3,000 aircraft was needed on current 
estimates of D-day forces, though this was partially compensated by a reduction 
of 15 divisions at D + 3 0 .^  The American Chiefs commented that "the 
availability of large scale quantities of atomic munitions in 1956 will neither open 
the way for an entirely new and different strategy for the defence of Europe, nor 
permit a reduction in force requirements in support of currently approved NATO 
defense concepts. Instead a large scale use of atomic weapons by the Allies would 
compensate, but only in part, for the gap between estimated force requirements 
and attainable force goals."^
The British Chiefs believed that such an attitude would only have a 
demoralising effect on the NATO powers. During the remainder of 1953 a lengthy 
battle was conducted over whether force goals should be produced at all. On 7 
July Elliot warned that gaining American agreement to a ’long haul’ strategy 
"would be a lengthy process since the American political climate was not at 
present so favourable towards us."^ In fact the British military were conducting 
a battle on two fronts; with the Americans who would not accept the 
abandonment of large-scale force goals, and with the Treasury who continued to 
press for economies in the defence budget. On 18 June a meeting was held under 
Churchill’s chairmanship which recommended a cut of £308 million on defence 
expenditure for the 1955 Financial Year, despite the expected reduction in 
American military assistance. The Chiefs were instructed to concentrate on 
acquiring the most modem military technology at the expense of manpower and 
maintenance. The reduction in the size of the armed forces would necessarily 
mean the acceptance of increased risks in the discharge of overseas obligations 
and might "also mean that we shall have to consider some reduction in the 
commitments which we have undertaken to our partners in NATO." When the 
Chiefs questioned this threat to Britain’s Alliance commitments they were
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instructed "that the planned United Kingdom contribution to NATO forces could
not be considered sacrosanct but that the priorities laid down in the directive
should be applied equally to it." Significantly, the Chiefs also wanted to know, for
the proposes of planning, when they could assume that the first German units
would be available. They were given the optimistic reply that the first formations
should be ready by the end of 1955. The Chiefs had already decided by this stage
that the "German contribution to the defence of NATO might in the long run lead
to some reduction of United Kingdom forces in Germany."^ The Ministry of
Defence informed the Foreign Office that they might "have to reconsider our own
military commitments on the Continent and the raising of German forces is the
57major factor in such an examination".
Clearly the importance of the planned German forces was now seen to lie 
in their role as a substitute for the contributions which other NATO countries, 
including Britain, had hoped to make. The British military were abandoning the 
practice of setting precise force goals in order to implement a defined strategy. 
The confusion which this could cause was evident from Sir John Harding’s 
contribution to a discussion of future strategy, which the Chiefs conducted with 
Lord Hood, on 21 July. Hood argued that the death of Stalin and the subsequent 
reduction in international tension meant "there was a strong argument for basing 
NATO policy on the maintenance of present NATO defence expenditure as a 
continuing deterrent to Soviet aggression, and for planning for the continuance of 
this defence effort over a prolonged period: rather than the current policy which 
envisaged a period of maximum danger occurring in the near future and possibly 
an even greater build up of NATO forces in subsequent years." McGrigor then 
pointed out "that there might be difficulties in maintaining the argument that 
within NATO there should be no reduction in the present tempo of defence 
effort, whereas we ourselves were at this present moment being hard-pressed to 
make drastic economies within our own Services." He accepted, however, that 
Hood’s ideas reflected those of the Global Strategy Paper. Harding then declared 
that "In view of the uncertainty of any future NATO policy, he felt that it was not 
only a waste of time, but positively dangerous to set 1956 force requirements and
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to publicise these hypothetical forces." However, having admitted that force 
requirements could not be met, he went on to criticise Montgomery’s support for 
the abandonment of the forward strategy because "without a forward strategy, a 
German contribution - and this was essential to NATO defence - was not 
attainable. Any rearmament of Germany must go hand in hand with a forward 
strategy."^ Unfortunately for Harding, SHAPE assessments had also shown 
that a forward strategy went hand in hand with large scale conventional forces, 
which he and the other Chiefs regarded as no longer feasible for economic 
reasons. In correspondence with Montgomery, Harding concentrated on the 
diplomatic, rather than the flawed military rationale, for German rearmament. He 
wrote that "the greatest danger to the West would come from a united and 
independent Germany allied to Russia, and that we should therefore do 
everything in our power to prevent that ever becoming possible. On the other 
hand the best solution for us would be a united Germany firmly anchored to the 
West and unable to lead the West by the nose". He continued by stating that 
"once she has achieved unity Germany will insist on rearming herself and that no 
one will be brave enough to prevent her. That makes it all the more important to 
ensure that western Germany now, and the whole of Germany later should be 
firmly anchored to the W est".^
At a second meeting to discuss the Foreign Office’s new directive for 
NATO, Harding criticised the stress laid on the role of political factors in 
formulating the new strategy, "whereas, in fact, economic factors were clearly 
more powerful." Powell of the Ministry of Defence warned "that should there be 
any appreciable reduction of NATO forces, then the effective deterrent would 
begin to disappear, with a consequent greater risk of war." Like Harding, he 
favoured the continuance of the forward strategy. The Committee agreed that 
without a German defence contribution Denmark would be rapidly overrun and 
urged the Foreign Office to stress "the great importance of an effective German 
defence contribution" in their paper.**® The brief supplied by the Ministry of 
Defence on 20 November for the rescheduled Bermuda conference confirmed that
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the gap between the forces available and those required was likely to grow, but
still insisted that the forward strategy must be implemented, because to abandon
it would "put in jeopardy a German contribution to the NATO defence forces
which it is essential to secure as soon as possible". However, at a meeting of
officials three days later a feeling of ambivalence about Britain’s commitment to
the continent was evident. Sir Harold Parker, representing the Defence Ministry,
explained that though the French wanted a further commitment of forces from
Britain to European defence, "For us, the worst drain on our resources was the
retention of forces in Europe". Speaking for the Foreign Office, Dixon commented
that, in the context of EDC ratification, it was necessary to "do everything to
reassure the French that it was our policy and that of the United States to
maintain our forces at substantially the same level over the next few years". Sir
Norman Brook gave the Cabinet view that NATO planning should be based on
the assumption that "roughly the present level of forces in aggregate, plus German
forces, would be available over the next few years". He suggested that the best
solution to French anxieties might be some kind of Anglo-American guarantee to
maintain approximately the current level of forces on the continent.^
The British position was, not surprisingly, causing some confusion in the
United States. The American deputy on the NATO Standing Group urged that
his government must sponsor the case for the production of 1956 force goals,
"Since there has been a continuing pressure from certain NATO nations to delay
and discredit the necessity for the development of realistic force requirements,
apparently because of domestic political considerations." He warned that the
production of the 1956 figures was "essential" and complained about "the
continuing tendency among NATO nations to assume that the use of new weapons
would materially reduce existing force requirements, which SHAPE/704/53...
fOclearly indicate to be improbable."0^ However, Eisenhower had insisted on cuts 
in American defence expenditure and by the second half of 1953 his 
administration was beginning to consider revising Alliance strategy to take account 
of the inability of NATO to meet its force goals. By September the State 
Department was expressing "general agreement on the UK formulation of the
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problem", while voicing reservations that the British were willing to gloss over 
many of the problems. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 
argued that to fill the gap between contributions and requirements, "further build­
up will be required over and above the German contribution", and that current 
American atomic superiority could only provide a breathing space. He suggested 
putting the case to the Allies that "Given the present NATO forces, the Alliance 
can safely count only on holding critical areas in Europe. If our allies would prefer 
to defend the whole area that means carrying out the forward strategy. This in 
turn means a German contribution... and additional effective forces." When 
Dulles discussed the matter with administration officials it was agreed that some 
new conception of NATO strategy was needed and that the "British were groping 
for such a concept but had not yet hit upon right formulation." In November the 
American ambassador to Britain accurately identified the main flaw in British 
military planning as the "absence satisfactory rationalisation of present magnitude 
forces, qualitatively improved, plus German contingents, in fact constituting 
adequate future deterrent."
There was also some confusion over the purpose of a meeting with the 
Soviets. Dulles saw a conference as a means of proving that the Soviets were 
intractable in order to encourage EDC ratification while Churchill hoped that 
genuine progress could be made. In fact, this was a contentious issue even within 
the British government. On 4 August the Soviets replied to the note sent to them 
by the three Foreign Ministers at Washington. They called for the inclusion of 
China at the conference and the discussion of measures to reduce international 
tension. The British ambassador to Moscow, Gascoigne, expressed his belief that 
the Soviets "will not play on the German or Austrian questions", while in London 
Roberts stated that "the Soviet note... is designed primarily to confuse public 
opinion in Western Europe and to postpone indefinitely any four power meeting." 
However, Churchill complained to Salisbury "we are in no position to accuse the 
Soviets of *bad faith’ when we know that our triple Note proposing the 4-power 
conference of Foreign Ministers on Germany and Austria was very likely to lead
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to a breakdown and thus afford Bidault after a long delay greater possibility of 
carrying EDC through the French parliament. The Soviets are replying to one 
manoeuvre by another. I fear we are moving into a course of propaganda 
manoeuvring on both sides likely to end in failure.” This infuriated Roberts who 
complained that Churchill had wanted them to pursue three contradictory 
objectives: talks with Russia, EDC ratification and victory for Adenauer in the 
German elections. He bridled at the suggestion that Soviet and Western policies 
towards Germany were "on all fours''.^
Churchill found an ally in Macmillan who wrote an extraordinary 
memorandum arguing against shutting the door to a meeting with the Russians. 
He claimed that the differences in the British and Soviet approach to talks were 
due to philosophical traditions. He wrote "We, in this country, have followed 
(since Bacon and Newton) the ’a postiori’ or inductive method of reasoning... the 
Russians (like the French and sometimes the Americans) argue ’a priori’ and 
deductively". As a result Macmillan claimed that the Soviets attached importance 
to solving the great issues first, while the British gave priority to smaller matters. 
He added of the Soviets, "Though their purpose is largely to cause trouble, this 
may also reflect a genuine and natural approach to the problem. It is the normal 
way anyone (except an Englishman) would think." In the second half of his paper 
Macmillan concentrated on the need to bind Germany into the western system. 
He explained "At present the French are alarmed at the prospect of an EDC 
which... may merely do peacefully what Hitler almost did by force - that is, lead 
to the domination of Western Europe by Germany... they must be made to realise 
that a neutralised Germany is far more dangerous... if the French are not 
prepared to go on with EDC they must agree to the Germans being in NATO and 
NATO must be made to include them and bind them. A free Germany means, or 
may mean, another Stalin-Ribbentrop pact in 5 or 10 years."^ These 
sentiments were echoed by Churchill in his criticisms of the initial drafts of a 
western reply to the Soviets. He urged the removal of a passage calling for "a free 
all-German Government enjoying freedom of action in internal and external
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affairs". He believed this would "entitle the Germans to have unlimited armaments 
and to make an alliance with Russia and then on this basis to discuss a Peace 
Treaty ending the war in which they surrendered unconditionally. If Germany is 
united and free to act as she pleases in internal and external affairs what else does 
she need in a Peace Treaty except a settlement of frontiers. This she might think 
would be better settled after some years exercise of the freedoms mentioned." 
Salisbury agreed to support the removal of the offensive phrase and, after further 
discussions with the French and Americans, it was excised.^
The Soviets followed their note of 4 August with another on 15 August
which concentrated on the subordination of the Federal Republic to the Western
powers. The main disagreement over the drafting of the reply to these two notes
was over the amount of detail to include, with the Americans favouring a
comprehensive rebuttal of the Soviet charges and the British supporting a shorter
text emphasising their willingness to attend a conference. This latter approach had
f nbeen suggested by Macmillan and was embraced by Salisbury. ' However, the 
acting Foreign Secretary did not share the hopes of Macmillan and Churchill for 
a successful meeting with the Soviets. With Churchill still absent, he told the 
Cabinet on 10 August "that Stalin’s death had not led to any fundamental change 
in Soviet Foreign policy." By 23 August he was declaring himself "not altogether 
happy" about the idea of continuing to press for a broader agenda than the 
German problem. When it was suggested in Cabinet two days later that the 
current draft reply deviated too far from the Prime Minister’s initiative of 11 May, 
Salisbury used the same argument that he had employed at Washington; that the
r o
Americans and the French would not accept a discussion of wider issues.
There remains the question of what Macmillan and Churchill hoped could 
be achieved at a meeting with the Soviets, given the intransigence of both Moscow
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and Washington. Certainly the possible threat to the European peace of a
renascent Germany appears to have been on both their minds. In his memoirs
Macmillan recalls a meeting with the Prime Minister on 1 September at which
Churchill explained that the Soviets had a genuine fear of a rearmed Germany.
When Macmillan then presented his view that this was "the only card we have to
play", Churchill assented. The following day Moran recorded Churchill’s concern
that the world was "in a terrible state. Germany is rapidly regaining strength and
will soon be reunited, while Russia, America and Britain outbid each other for her
favour".^ On the other hand, Churchill seemed after his stroke to have
accepted that the Americans were going to insist that EDC was ratified, thus
ruling out a deal with the Soviets over German rearmament. In correspondence
with his old friend Beaverbrook, who strongly opposed the idea of a German
defence contribution, he advised "there is certainly going to be a German army
and I hope it will be on our side and not against us. This need in no way prevent,
70but may on the contrary help, friendly relations with the bear." The truth is 
that Churchill’s mental health was poor throughout his second administration and, 
though he was still capable of visionary leaps of the imagination, he was often 
confused and contradictory when dealing with practical matters of policy. It seems 
likely that had Churchill been able to attend a conference with the Soviets prior 
to his stroke he would have tried to engage in secret diplomacy; offering 
concessions on Germany in an effort to achieve success in his role as world 
peacemaker. After his stroke, though still concerned about Germany’s revival and 
the state of East-West relations, he appears to have acknowledged that there was 
no real alternative to EDC.
In their reply of 2 September the western powers suggested that the 4- 
Power conference should be held in Lugano, and during the next few weeks the 
Foreign Office began to make preparations for the prospective meeting. The 
problem was how to make German reunification acceptable to Moscow, when the 
West’s terms were non-negotiable. This was the quandary which had apparently 
led Churchill to consider neutralisation. The Foreign Office’s solution was to offer
69. Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 (Macmillan, London, 1969), p.525; Lord 
Moran, op.cit., 2 September 1953, p.465.
70. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair, vol.8, (Heinemann, London 1988), p.890- 
1; Kenneth Young, Churchill and Beaverbrook (Eyre and Spottiswood, London 1966), p.302.
179
some form of security guarantee to the Soviet Union. On 16 September Salisbury
presented the Cabinet with various options which could be put to the Soviets,
ranging from non-aggression pacts to treaties of mutual assistance. A ministerial
sub-committee was established which adopted the idea of a non-aggression pact
between the EDC and the Soviet Union, backed by American and British
71guarantees, as the most practical solution.
Not surprisingly with so little to offer, the Foreign Office was not optimistic
about a deal with the Soviet Union at Lugano. From Moscow Paul Grey warned,
in a dispatch which was given an enthusiastic welcome, that if the Soviets did go
to Lugano it would only be with the intention of continuing the struggle against
the EDC by other means. Geoffrey Harrison, the new Under-Secretary
responsible for the Western Department, produced both old and new arguments
against accepting the Soviet terms for German reunification. He claimed that
under the Soviet scheme "there would be no effective limit on her power to
rearm. The danger of this to Western Europe and to the United Kingdom is self-
evident. We should be back in the position where Germany could play off East
against the West, increasing her own strength all the while by exacting alternate
concessions from either side." He added the new concern that even if "a reunited
and re-armed Germany succeeded in avoiding becoming a Soviet satellite the
danger of a future German/Polish conflict (leading almost inevitably to a further
world war) would be grave." Pat Hancock, the new head of the Central
Department, informed Salisbury bluntly "a united Germany must be a member of
77the EDC, itself an element in the Western alliance/ The arrival of a
particularly hostile Soviet note on 28 September seemed to confirm the gloomy
prognosis of those who believed a deal with Moscow was impossible, while casting
73new doubt on whether the Soviets wished even to meet. ' J
The Americans remained singularly unenthusiastic about the prospect of
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a conference and regarded British efforts to formulate a security guarantee as a 
rather tiresome distraction. When Dulles discussed the idea of such a guarantee 
with his advisers on 26 September, he stated that "he would never place much 
dependability on an arrangement based on neutralization or limitation", while any 
other arrangement would require "a system for proof against evasions and 
violations". The arrival of the third Soviet note of the year prompted him to ask 
"Do we really want a meeting?" and to reflect that though the note was "evasive 
and dilatory", the administration's task was "to determine whether this view is 
reflected in French and German public opinion or if we still have to go through 
another exchange of notes to pin down Soviet unwillingness to m eet."^  
Following Eden's recovery Dulles came to London to discuss the international 
situation. On 14 October he told Eisenhower and that he intended "strongly to 
oppose" any suggestion from Churchill for a high level conference. The President 
supported his Secretary on this point and Dulles went on to add that "he was 
doubtful about the wisdom of tendering any non-aggression pacts or similar 
guarantees to the Soviets at least until EDC had been ratified." Thus, when Eden 
raised this subject at the London meeting and outlined three different 
formulations, Dulles said he doubted "that USSR, in view of its own record, rates 
non-aggression pacts very high." On his return Dulles declared that "we ought not 
seriously to seek discussions with the Soviets until decisions have been taken on 
EDC. If they occurred before then they would arrest progress towards EDC 
ratification and provide Moscow with opportunity to try and disrupt western 
unity."^
It must have been somewhat disheartening for Eden to find that after his 
long absence the EDC remained the seminal issue confronting the western 
alliance. In June after a month-long crisis, Laniel had become Prime Minister of 
France with the support of the anti-EDC RPF who succeeded in further delaying
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ratification. However, progress continued to be made in discussions 
concerning Britain’s military association with the community. The Military 
Committee of the EDC Interim Commission still sought closer links with British 
forces on the continent and the British military were flexible in meeting their 
suggestions. It was agreed that the RAF would second officers to the European 
Air Force, provide training for the Community’s airmen, including German 
recruits, and accept European air squadrons and wings into their organisation 
when this was practicable. Though the Army’s programme of co-operation was 
less extensive, they were prepared to give substantial assistance with training and 
to exchange personnel. The only proposals emanating from the Military 
Committee which the Chiefs refused to countenance were for common 
operational control of EDC and UK air forces and the incorporation of divisions 
from the European into the British army and vice versa. In November the British 
military representative on the EDC Interim Commission reported that though the 
Military Delegates Committee had reiterated their proposal for joint operational 
control of the two air forces, they accepted that the British draft statement of 
policy was "an objective endeavour to define a workable association between our 
forces and those of the future ED C."^
The question that was increasingly being asked in late 1953, in the face of 
apparently interminable French delaying tactics, was whether there was any 
alternative to EDC. In August Eisenhower’s Special Assistant, C.D. Jackson, asked 
"Does it have to be EDC, unification, free elections or else?", and suggested as a 
possible solution arming the Federal Republic’s police force while phasing in 
E D C .^  That same month the Joint Chiefs of Staff complained that "the 
attitude of France continues in effect to obstruct ratification of the EDC Treaty... 
thereby denying to NATO the German contribution in military forces and in 
industrial back up which are essential to an adequate European defence position". 
They suggested: "In the absence... of clear indications portending the early 
realization of EDC action to obtain a German contribution of military forces and
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79armaments by other means should be initiated.' In Britain the erstwhile 
international secretary of the Labour Party and recently elected MP, Denis 
Healey, warned that it was "preposterous” to expect the other continental powers 
to accept a united Germany into EDC and suggested an ’Austrian* solution to the
on
German problem. Meanwhile French politicians continued to insist that the 
Community in its current form was unacceptable without closer British
01
involvement.
The two figures whose disgruntlement with EDC was of greatest 
significance were Adenauer and Churchill. In March 1953 Adenauer had made a 
secret approach to the new American administration suggesting that German 
cadres should begin training according to EDC stipulations immediately after the 
Federal Republic had ratified the T reaty .^ During the following summer 
Adenauer intervened to ensure the phraseology of the various western notes to 
the Soviet Union did not prejudice his position. Then in September the Chancellor 
produced his own plan for reunification based on the establishment of a 
demilitarised zone in central Europe and the garrisoning of Germany west of the 
Elbe solely by EDC forces. When the Foreign Office heard rumours of this plan 
they made clear their hostility to the idea of British and American troop 
withdrawals but asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of 
demilitarising the Eastern zone of Germany or establishing a narrow demilitarised 
belt of 10 km along the German frontier. The Chiefs dismissed the possibility of 
the Soviet Union accepting the demilitarisation of East Germany, unless some 
part of the Federal Republic was treated similarly, and when they examined this 
prospect concluded "on purely military grounds the UK cannot accept a plan 
which involves the partial evacuation.... of any territory in the Western zone of 
Germany." They found that a small demilitarised zone would cause only minor
O -i
strategic difficulties and were willing to accept it if it was politically expedient.
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Adenauer’s initiative had come at a time when the British military were re­
emphasising the need for a full scale German contribution to western defence in 
order to compensate for shortcoming in Alliance force levels. The Chiefs were 
reluctant to "haul down our flag over much of the world" in face of the cuts 
demanded by the radical review. Nor were they willing to abandon their 
commitment to continental defence. However, they were quite convinced that 
NATO would have to accept a scaling down of its ambitions to account for the 
economic factors which were causing member states, including Britain, to default 
on their force goals. The Chiefs were beginning to consider the possibility of 
withdrawing divisions from the continent once the German defence contribution 
became effective, while the RAF was already planning to make a smaller 
contribution to NATO on the assumption that German air units would act as 
substitutes. In conducting the 1953 Annual Review, Baker, the Vice Chief of the 
Air Staff, noted "the RAF could no longer avoid showing its hand to NATO" 
about the deficiencies in their contribution. What they did not intend to reveal, 
however, was their plan to reduce their contribution still further. The Air Staff 
concluded that due to defence cuts they could not "support 500 aircraft in 2nd 
TAF. It seems reasonable to assume that as German forces build up they should 
take over a part of the responsibilities which we now hold, thus our own forces 
should begin to taper off in step with the German build-up." The Chiefs agreed 
that the maximum contribution which could be made in the long term was 372 
aircraft. The army meanwhile were unable to provide the 4 divisions required by 
NATO at D+90. The best that could be done was to supply one division by 
D -1-105 and a second by D+120. The Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
Sir Harold Redman, suggested being "quite frank" with NATO that Britain "could 
not put our forces at the priority required by NATO Commanders because of
national priorities which were unlikely to change... Our inability stemmed from
85shortage of manpower and of money." By September Harding was willing to 
acknowledge that a forward strategy was not feasible "because the forces 
necessary for such a policy would clearly not be available in time." When the 
Chiefs examined Montgomery’s latest strategic analysis, which stressed the need
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for air and naval units at the expense of conventional land forces, they were 
generally sympathetic. McGrigor suggested that the British army might be 
neglecting its role as a global power due to its commitment to Europe. He was 
supported by Dickson, the Chief of the Air Staff, in this analysis. Though he 
acknowledged current commitments to Europe could not be reduced in the long 
term, Dickson suggested that it should 'be clearly understood that the United 
Kingdom contribution to Germany must diminish inversely as the German 
contribution increased." The Chief Staff Officer, Sir Neville Brownjohn, looked 
forward to the time when it would be possible to build up Britain’s strategic
or
reserve by withdrawing forces from Germany.00 The British military had been
stressing the importance of a German military contribution since 1950 and
87continued to do so during discussions of the 1953 NATO Annual Review0 ' but 
it is clear that by the end of 1953 the reasons why it was regarded as essential 
were very different from those put forward previously. Under pressure from the 
Treasury, the Chiefs had cut back on their commitments to the continent and the 
German contribution was increasingly seen as a substitute for the forces which 
Britain and the other NATO countries could not supply, rather than as part of a 
wider force build-up.
By contrast the Foreign Office was a model of consistency. They had always 
regarded German rearmament as part of the process by which Germany would 
be integrated into the West. At the start of the decade it had been perceived as 
a distant last step in the process, but under American pressure it had become 
irrevocably tied up with the political integration of the Federal Republic with the 
West. Convinced that they were involved in a zero-sum game with the Soviets for 
control of Germany, securing the western half of the country had become a top 
priority for the diplomatic corps. By the end of 1953 it appeared that the political 
balance within western Europe was becoming unstable due to French inaction and 
German assertiveness. There was an increasing sense of an opportunity being lost. 
Thus Frederick Warner of the Foreign Office’s Central department wrote of "a 
vicious circle: the more openly impatient with France the Germans became, the
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more Frenchmen will point to the dangerous recurrence of German nationalist 
feelings etc. The worry is that the same Frenchmen will use the alleged danger as 
an argument against ratifying EDC whereas it is an argument for ratification." In 
response to a letter from the High Commissioner warning of the increasing 
attraction of a German national army in the Federal Republic, Hancock wrote, 
"In fact the Germans do not at present trust themselves to have a national army... 
we should leave no time in taking advantage of this extraordinarily favourable
oo
situation to bring the EDC into being".
Churchill shared the general sense of frustration about EDC and his 
attitude continued to annoy the Americans. Their ambassador in Paris had 
suggested that a positive statement from Churchill about EDC would be useful in 
securing ratification and Dulles decided to take up this suggestion. When Dulles 
visited London in October he found the Prime Minister as unenthusiastic as ever 
about a European Army. Churchill "made uncomplimentary references EDC with 
grudging acquiescence in important early decision one way or another." He 
promised Bidault "he would put British troops in line with American and French 
again if Germany should become aggressor" in an effort to persuade him that 
Germany should be allowed to join NATO. Churchill’s main preoccupation was 
still the holding of a high level conference and it was obvious to the American 
delegation that on this issue he was at odds with Eden and Salisbury. On returning 
to Washington Dulles described the idea of such a conference as "a sleeping pill" 
which "would have a potentially disastrous effect on both NATO and the EDC, 
and would enable the Russians to pull ahead while the western democracies 
doze."^
Even a new Soviet note delivered on 3 November and described by the 
Moscow embassy as being "in the best tradition of Soviet obtrusiveness and 
obstinacy" did not dim Churchill’s enthusiasm for a meeting with Malenkov. In a 
note to Eden on 5 November his veiled criticisms of the idea of a Foreign
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Ministers conference can be read as a coded justification of his own preference 
for a higher level meeting. He wrote: "I never thought anything would come of the 
plan made at Washington for a formal conference of Foreign Ministers to settle 
the German problem....I am not at all surprised, nor I gather were you, that the 
project collapsed....My only hope was for more friendly contacts bringing about a 
gradual easement while of course we all maintained our unity and strength." 
Alerted by the reference to "more friendly contacts", Eden replied "I feel there are 
serious dangers in having discussions with the bear unless we have some idea what 
we are to talk about and what we expect to achieve."^ Churchill still hoped he 
could at least meet Eisenhower and, after the President had turned down the 
suggestion of a meeting in the Azores in October, the Prime Minister tried again 
in November with a suggestion for a conference at Bermuda. Eisenhower 
accepted largely because he wished to discuss the situation which resulted from 
"the negative character of the Soviet reply." On 26 November the Cabinet, 
guided by Eden, "agreed that, at the Bermuda conference every effort should be 
made to persuade the French to ratify the EDC Treaty without further 
delay....The essential need was that an early start should be made with the re­
creation of the German army....if Germany’s military strength were re-created 
within the framework of the EDC, this would give a greater assurance that it 
would not be used for an aggressive purpose; and from that point of view it was
preferable that Germany’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe should
Q7be made within EDC rather than through Germany’s accession to NATO."
The Bermuda conference was predicated on the belief that the Soviets had 
abandoned any hope of reuniting Germany on their terms. Roberts wrote on 7 
November that "the Soviet notes and more particularly the last note suggest that 
the Russians, while continuing to put spokes in wheels, must now be reconciled 
to the probability that the Federal Republic will be integrated within the Western 
alliance, and are comforting themselves with the thought that they still at least
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retain control of eastern Germany". This reassuring analysis was complicated by 
the arrival on 26 November of a more conciliatory Soviet note suggesting a four 
power Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin. The Allies had been calling for such 
a meeting since the Washington conference and could not now refuse, whatever 
the complications it might cause. As one Foreign Office minute put it, "Although 
the Note makes it clear that the chances of agreement are almost non-existent, 
we cannot now refuse a meeting now that the Russians have expressed their
Q-i
willingness to go into one without prior conditions." One of the reasons that 
the chances of an agreement were so slim was that the Allies now had absolutely 
no concessions to offer the Soviets. The Foreign Office had taken their idea of a 
non-aggression pact or some other security guarantee into the preparatory 
tripartite discussions for the abortive Lugano conference which took place in 
Paris, but the Americans emasculated the idea. Five sub-committees were set up 
to examine various aspects of the negotiations with the Soviets. The most 
controversial work was done by the sub-committee dealing with security 
guarantees. The British argued for a non-aggression pact to reassure the Soviet 
Union, while the French and Americans insisted they would go no further than a 
declaration of intent. Roberts, as head of the British delegation, initially opposed 
the declaration of intent idea but eventually acquiesced. While the British and 
French were willing to give this declaration some substance, offering for example 
"to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal 
Republic and other states", the Americans would not go beyond a restatement of 
their responsibilities under the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
sub-committee on security guarantees was the only one which failed to produce 
a unanimous rep o rt.^  There was a further disagreement over the American 
desire to produce a declaration of intent, outlining future policy towards Germany. 
On this matter it was the British delegation’s turn to eviscerate the planned 
declarations, transforming a detailed programme of reforms into a general
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expression of good will towards the Federal Republic.^ The British and 
American initiatives cancelled one another out, leaving the Allies with little to 
offer either the Soviets or the Germans. The Foreign Office brief for Bermuda 
agreed that it would be "premature" to bring any part of the Bonn conventions 
into force prior to EDC ratification and suggested American pressure for a 
declaration of intent ought to be resisted on this basis. It noted that Eden had 
agreed to delay any further discussions of a declaration on European security and 
expressed the hope that British restraint on this subject would encourage the
Q (L
Americans to reciprocate on the subject of the declaration of intent. 
However, it proved impossible to prevent the Prime Minister from raising the 
issue of guarantees, or ’Locarnoisms’ as he called them, at Bermuda.
The Bermuda meeting was one of the most bad-tempered international
conferences since Bevin and Molotov had traded insults in the immediate post-
1945 conferences of Foreign Ministers. With no fresh initiative possible on Soviet
or German policy, the allies took to squabbling amongst themselves. At the first
plenary session held by the Heads of Government on 4 December Churchill
suggested that the firm opposition of the United States combined with their
economic problems "may well have brought about a definite change in Russian
policy and outlook which may govern their actions for many years to come." This
elicited a furious response from Eisenhower, who declared that though the Soviets
might be presenting their policies differently, they still occupied the position of
international prostitutes or, as the American minutes more demurely put it, "that
despite both, perfume or lace, it was still the same old girl". He then abruptly
97adjourned the meeting. The Prime Minister blamed Dulles for tummg 
Eisenhower against a meeting with Malenkov and told his doctor a few days later 
"even now I have not been defeated by this bastard. I have been humiliated by my
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go
own decay.' He wished to ensure that the three powers offered some 
conciliatory gesture to the Soviets. On 7 December he wrote to Eden that the 
draft communique did not "show the slightest desire for the success of the [Berlin] 
Conference or for an easement in relations with Russia. We are going to gang up 
on them without any reference to the Locarno idea.... Many people would think 
that we are deliberately riding for a fall. Perhaps we are." At the fifth plenary 
meeting that day, during a discussion of the prospects for Berlin, Churchill said 
"It would be very difficult to make any arrangement if we could not do anything 
of interest to them.... He had read many thing in the communique on one side 
and few on what he called Locamoisms or reassurances."^
The other source of disagreement among the three western leaders was the 
EDC. Despite his disagreements with the Americans on the issue of guarantees 
for the Soviets, Churchill reserved most of his venom for the French, and on the 
issue of the EDC allied himself with Eisenhower in demanding action from Paris. 
The second plenary session was hardly an improvement on the first. Laniel, the 
French Prime Minister, had retired to his bed where he remained for the rest of 
the conference, so that Bidault was left to deal with Anglo-American demands for 
action. Eisenhower was relatively tactful in dealing with the French Foreign 
Minister but Churchill launched "an emotional attack" in which he complained 
that three years had been wasted in discussing the EDC. He warned that if the 
treaties were not ratified by France, then the Germans would have to be rearmed 
under NATO auspices. ^  During the remainder of the conference both the 
British and American delegations became increasingly frustrated by Bidault’s 
failure to give a firm commitment to putting the EDC treaty before the National 
A ssem bly .^  The final plenary session, at which the communique was 
discussed, was particularly chaotic. Bidault wanted the communique to state that 
the fulfilment of EDC was dependent "on the solutions of problems with which 
France has long been faced". Churchill was furious at what he regarded as
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quibbling over the terms of EDC, which he damned as "a French invention". Eden 
was by this stage as annoyed as his chief by Bidault’s attempts to place the onus 
for ratification of the EDC on to the British. The session actually broke up during 
an argument over what reference to make to the European Army in the 
communique. The dispute was only resolved when Eden made a visit to Laniel’s 
sickbed and got final French agreement to a revised text. Churchill 
regarded EDC ratification as necessary in order to clear the way for a summit, the 
Foreign Office wanted it as a means of binding the Federal Republic to the West 
before the forces of German nationalism re-emerged and the Americans had 
made it a cornerstone of their European policy, but at Bermuda it was clear that 
the French were not prepared to bring the issue to its final resolution. Another 
eight months would pass before the treaty was finally put to the French Assembly.
The period between the death of Stalin and the Bermuda conference was 
one of seemingly endless frustration for the Allies, which manifested itself in a 
series of bad-tempered rows. Churchill fought with Adenauer, Eisenhower and 
most of his own government in an effort to achieve his ambition of a high level 
conference. The British and American Chiefs disputed the issue of force levels 
and a new strategy for NATO. Conant stirred up a controversy with his suggestion 
that Adenauer might be planning to raise a German national army and discord 
reigned in France’s relations with her allies as the latter sought ever more urgently 
a resolution to the EDC saga. The fractious Bermuda meeting was only the 
culmination of a frustrating year. The two disputes with which the British were 
most actively involved were Churchill’s plan for a meeting with the Soviet leaders 
and the British military’s attempt to revise NATO strategy both of which were 
linked to the German rearmament issue. In the first case Churchill, who retained 
a mistrust of certain elements of the German nation, contemplated sacrificing a 
German defence contribution in order to achieve a reduction in international 
tension. Whereas in the winter of 1950-1 it had been the fear of Soviet aggression 
which had undermined British support for the concept of a German contribution 
to western defence, under Churchill it was the hope that some kind of
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rapprochement could be achieved which threatened to destroy the consensus. In 
the second case the Chiefs argued for a major revision in Allied strategy which 
gave a new role to the planned German army. The Federal Republic was now 
expected to provide substitute divisions for those which the NATO nations were 
unable to provide. The Prime Minister failed where the Chiefs succeeded and the 
result was the reinforcement of the status quo, for the new military analysis 
complemented the diplomatic case for German rearmament. The only thing which 
had changed was the military rationale for German rearmament and this was 
barely acknowledged.
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CHAPTER 5 
REVISITING RAPALLO?
The first eight months of 1954 were a period of ever increasing tension in 
the western alliance as policy-makers awaited the outcome of the European Army 
project. The pressure could not be released until the French parliament voted on 
the ratification of the EDC treaty. In Washington and London much of the 
uneasiness was due to the belief that the status quo in Germany was becoming 
untenable. The British and Americans feared that the demands within the Federal 
Republic for an end to the occupation and the creation of German armed forces 
were becoming so insistent that not even Adenauer would be able to prevent dire 
consequences should they be frustrated. They developed a dual policy of trying to 
bring the EDC drama to a final successful resolution, while seeking to relieve 
pressure on the German Chancellor by offering to implement at least some of the 
constitutional freedoms contained in the Bonn Conventions. Though they co­
operated in pursuit of these goals, there was a latent tension between London and 
Washington on German policy. The American administration genuinely believed 
that there was no feasible alternative to EDC, while many British officials, 
including the Prime Minister, believed a NATO solution was preferable. 
Furthermore, the British government was less concerned with an immediate 
solution to the problem of German rearmament than with the implementation of 
the contract which they believed was the real key to European security. They were 
torn between their suspicion of the Germans, with its concomitant desire to 
maintain a measure of control over German rearmament, and the demands 
emanating from Washington for an early solution to the contractual and defence 
problems which would finally grant the Federal Republic its freedom. The 
Americans were much more anxious to begin the process of German rearmament 
and sought to impose a deadline for its implementation.
The British perspective partly reflected a new attitude towards the German 
defence contribution which was increasingly seen as a means of overcoming some 
of the long term problems caused by the need to economise on the defence 
budget, rather than as a solution to the problem of continental defence. Since the 
1952 Global Strategy Paper the British Chiefs of Staff had been of the view that 
the solution to European defence lay in new technology rather than vast
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conventional forces. The Americans only came to accept this position towards the 
end of 1953, and with the crucial qualification that the Europeans, including the 
British and Germans, ought to take responsibility for providing the conventional 
forces which would act as the ’shield’ without which the Alliance’s nuclear ’sword’ 
would be ineffective. In fact both the American and British military establishments 
hoped that the implementation of EDC would allow them to make reductions in 
their commitments to the European continent, though neither was willing to 
inform their allies of these plans. The promises they made to the French on 
maintaining current force levels were hedged around with qualifications. Though 
the financial arguments for and against German rearmament were of little 
importance, the discussion of the technicalities which occurred during the first half 
of 1954 revealed that the burdens imposed by the continental commitment on the 
Exchequer were likely to increase substantially in the post-contractual period.
The American equivalent of the British Global Strategy Paper was NSC 
162/2 which was approved by Eisenhower in October 1953. This stated that, in 
terms of their employment in a future war, nuclear weapons would be regarded 
as just as legitimate as conventional forces. It was intended that this new emphasis 
on nuclear weapons would allow for a reduction in American commitments 
overseas and hence provide a more cost effective means of meeting America’s 
global commitments. Eisenhower stated "that the real issue was not the pros and 
cons of redeployment, but rather how fast such a redeployment could be carried 
out."* It was clear to him that the process could not begin immediately and he 
reacted angrily when Defence Secretary Wilson suggested at a National Security 
Council meeting held in preparation for the December North Atlantic Council in 
Paris, that there was a desire in America "to bring our forces home." Eisenhower 
responded "that our great objective at the moment was to secure the ratification 
of EDC. Accordingly... we could not afford to take any steps towards 
redeployment, or even to talk about redeployment, until these objectives had been 
reached." Paris did, however, provide an opportunity to inform the Allies of what
1. Klaus A. Maier, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany as a Battlefield in American Nuclear 
Strategy*, p.396-7 and Bruno Thoss, ‘American Troops in Germany and German-American 
Relations 1949-1956’, p.420-1 in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Herman Josef Rupieper 
(eds.), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
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Dulles described as the "added capabilities for defence conferred by new 
weapons", and to bring further pressure to bear on the French to ratify the EDC 
treaty. On 14 December Dulles informed the Allies that if EDC should fail "there 
would indeed be great doubt as to whether continental Europe could be made a 
place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of United States 
policy... Unless unity is achieved soon, different and divisive forces may take 
command."'*'
Not surprisingly in view of the long campaign which the British Chiefs had 
waged in favour of a strategy placing greater reliance on new weapons in 
conjunction with a reduction in conventional force goals, the British supported the 
American ’New Look’. There was some disappointment that SACEUR had not 
yet produced the lower force goals which the British military deemed appropriate 
for the new nuclear dependent strategy. However, the Military Committee of 
NATO had accepted British views on the urgency of German rearmament within 
the EDC and on the need for a new policy directive. Powell of the Ministry of 
Defence informed the Chiefs on 2 December that the Americans were now finally 
"sold on the ’long haul’ concept." As far as the British were concerned, one of 
the most important aspects of the new strategy was the scope it provided for 
economies in the defence budget. Alexander’s presentation to the North Atlantic 
Council stressed the "need for German force contribution and need to go on 
increasing NATO forces and raising their efficiency within politico-economic 
capabilities." He said that the aim of NATO now should be "to press on with task 
of reviewing and reassessing pattern of our defense efforts against background of 
political and economic assumptions which they have been given and taking into 
account as realistically as possible effect of new weapons."^ Though Paris marked 
an advance for the British strategy of the ’long haul’ it did not see any progress 
made towards the other major goal of the Chiefs of Staff; the implementation of 
EDC. Following Bidault’s obstreperous performance at Bermuda and the minatory
2. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, vol.5,(pt.l) Memorandum of 174th NSC 
meeting, 10 December 1953, p.450-1, Statement by Secretary of State to North Atlantic Council, 
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3. DEFE 4/67, COS(53) 137th mtg., minute 1, 2 December 1953, COS(53)139th mtg., minute 1, 
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tone employed by Dulles at Paris, it was evident that the European Army idea 
was likely to remain a source of dangerous conflict for months to come. On 22 
December Harding suggested to the other Chiefs "that it would be prudent 
therefore to give increased attention to possible alternative methods of raising 
German armed forces."^ This proposal was endorsed by his colleagues but the 
process of reassessment was to demonstrate just how difficult it was to find an 
effective means of integrating the Federal Republic into western defence without 
reviving fears of German militarism.
On 5 February the Foreign Office sent a long paper to the Chiefs 
outlining what they regarded as the two main alternatives to a European Army. 
The favoured option, should EDC fail, was the admission of Germany to NATO. 
This had the advantages of including the United States and Canada, of being 
relatively simple to implement and of providing an effective means of containing 
Germany. The Foreign Office noted that "NATO is the organisation best suited, 
failing EDC, to contain the Germans. The British counterweight by itself might 
not suffice to restrain Germany". In order to prevent German domination of the 
Alliance the Foreign Office produced a list of safeguards. There would have to be 
restrictions on German arms production, both to prevent the Soviets from gaining 
access to important assets during any offensive in central Europe and to ensure 
that the Germans themselves did not "misuse" their military potential. The size of 
German armed forces would be controlled by an agreement between the NATO 
partners that no member state would be allowed to maintain any forces 
independent of SACEUR’s control except for a gendarmerie, a bodyguard for the 
head of state, forces required by other NATO commanders or forces required for 
defence responsibilities outside the NATO area. This last qualification was an 
effective means of discriminating against Germany which had no out of area 
commitments. The Foreign Office were confident that the creation of more 
integrated NATO structures, which would control the armed forces, production 
and infrastructure programmes of the member states, would prove effective 
against any new German threat. Though recognising the difficulties of gaining 
American, French and German acceptance of the restructuring of NATO, they 
still believed this was the best and most practical alternative. The other option
5. DEFE 4/67, COS(53)144th mtg., minute 1,22 December 1953.
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considered was German membership of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and the 
revival of the military structures of the Western Union. The principal objections 
to this were that it would weaken the Atlantic link and force the United Kingdom 
to take up the leadership of Europe, with all the responsibilities in the form of 
continental commitments that this would entail. Even with Britain taking a 
vigorous lead and the Americans giving the project their support, "there will be 
a danger that the Germans and not ourselves will become the dominant element." 
The Foreign Office were, however, attracted by the fact that this scheme would 
exclude Italy. This would remove the danger of "a Rome-Bonn axis" as well as 
dividing "a rather unhealthy grouping of the Catholic powers". Nevertheless, they 
concluded that this policy would involve "for the United Kingdom a new departure 
in European leadership with its attendant risks and continental commitments. 
Even if we were ready to accept these, there would be immense political 
difficulties to overcome."**
The military, who had been among the first to point out the merits of the 
European Army scheme, were very unhappy with the alternatives presented to 
them by the Foreign Office. The report produced by the Joint Planners on 3 
March was critical of the Brussels Treaty option. Like the Foreign Office they 
emphasised that this solution would be much more complex and time-consuming 
than German membership of NATO. Their main concern, however, was that the 
resurrection of the Brussels Treaty would weaken the Atlantic link. The fear was 
that if the Americans became divorced from European defence planning they 
might have "an opportunity... to reduce their active participation in European 
defence, a possibility which would of itself make the plan unacceptable." 
Commenting on the Joint Planners work, the Chiefs declared that the European 
option was "definitely unacceptable". The JPS report gave a cautious endorsement 
to the Foreign Office plan for German entry into NATO, while pointing out the 
many practical difficulties of integration. However, this aspect of the JPS paper 
and of the Foreign Office proposals was much less acceptable to the Chiefs. They 
doubted the practicality of the measures designed to integrate Germany’s defence 
effort into the Western alliance and were particularly critical of the idea of a 
European arms pool. On the subject of force restrictions the Chiefs insisted the
6. DEFE 5/51, COS(54)41, 5 February 1954.
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Joint Planners redraft their paper "to indicate that it would be extremely difficult 
to devise a formula that would prevent the Germans from ’cheating’ in relation 
to the strength of their armed and hidden national forces." They were "sceptical" 
about the formula devised by the Foreign Office to prevent any forces being 
formed outside the auspices of NATO. The paper which the Chiefs finally 
approved stressed the importance of finding a formula which would limit German 
forces "while, at the same time, safeguarding the national position of UK Fighter 
and Bomber Commands." After reiterating the practical problems with the NATO 
solution, the Chiefs concluded that "The greatest difficulties and dangers brought 
out by the report indicated the importance of achieving ratification of the EDC 
Treaty."^
Hood was unimpressed by the Chiefs’ negative approach to the NATO 
option. The JPS had recommended that the Germans should not be allowed 
possession of strategic bombers and the Chiefs had sought an additional 
moratorium on German submarines. Hood told them that these measures 
"conflicted with the whole concept of the Foreign Office suggestions which were 
based on the assumption that the Germans would not agree to any arrangements 
which would involve discrimination against them... the best safeguard against the 
resurgence of German militarism was to bring Germany into NATO... It would 
have to be accepted that there was no absolute guarantee that Germany would 
play fair and it was inevitable that considerable reliance would have to be placed 
on her good will." The Chiefs responded bluntly that they "would be failing in their 
duty if, at this stage, they did not make clear that in their considered opinion 
there was considerable danger in making no reservations in relation to the 
production by Germany of submarines, strategic aircraft and fissile material." 
Their report, published the next day, stated "We consider it essential that 
Germany shall re-arm but we would point out that certain aspects of her re­
armament might involve a grave potential threat to the security of the United 
Kingdom. We would view with very serious misgivings any resurrection by her of 
strategic air or submarine forces, and consider that these should not be permitted 
to her. We consider further that she should not be allowed to possess fissile
7. DEFE 4/69, COS(54)27th mtg., minute 4,11 March 1954; DEFE 5/52, COS(54)94, 26 March 
1954; DEFE 6/25, JP(54)20 (Final), 3 March 1954.
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material."**
In May 1953 Churchill had suggested making the EDC treaty made 
palatable to the Soviets by a security guarantee similar to Locarno, or offering a 
unified, demilitarised Germany, but his proposals were not treated seriously by the 
allies. On 16 December the representatives of the occupying powers met in Paris 
to resume their discussion of Germany’s future. Their task now was to consider 
the tactics which the foreign ministers should adopt during the forthcoming 
meeting with the Soviets in Berlin. Since the Prime Minister’s Commons speech 
of 11 May, the British had been attempting to devise some form of security 
guarantee which would reassure the Soviets that EDC had no offensive purpose. 
By the end of the year, however, the Foreign Office were no longer prepared to 
press the matter. Against their advice Churchill had raised the issue of 
"Locamoisms" at Bermuda and had been rebuffed. From Moscow the new 
ambassador, Hayter, declared "I am inclined to agree with a remark Chip Bohlen 
made to me... that the only security guarantee in which the Russians would be 
interested would be a guarantee that we would not rearm Germany." At Paris 
Roberts abandoned the Locarno proposals. The officials of the three powers 
agreed that neither a mutual assistance treaty nor a non-aggression pact was 
acceptable. All they were prepared to offer Moscow was a non-contractual 
declaration of intent intended to reassure Moscow of their pacific intentions. 
Agreement was also reached that any Soviet proposal for a demilitarised zone in 
Germany would be treated with the "greatest reserve". The experts reported to 
their governments that "any demilitarised zone would form a vacuum in Europe 
and which might well become the scene of frequent incidents and would afford 
very questionable security."^
The Foreign Office were convinced that the Soviets had no intention of 
deviating from their standard proposals for unification based on the merger of the
8. DEFE 4/69, COS(54)33rd mtg., minute 4,24 March 1954; DEFE 5/52, COS(54)94, 26 March
1954.
9. FO 371/103695, C1071/798, Hayter to Roberts, 10 November 1953; FO 371/103700, C1071/951, 
report on the Tripartite Talks in Paris, Document 4 on the Problem of Security in Europe, 21 
December 1953; FO 371/103701, C1071/977, report from Paris on Tripartite Talks on the Problem 
of Security in Europe, 19 December 1953. The British position going into the tripartite talks had 
been that a non-aggression pact would be the best means of securing Soviet acceptance of German 
unification within EDC. After the meeting of officials in Paris this concept was abandoned. 
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governments of West and East Germany. At the same time they insisted that the 
western powers should make no concessions to the Soviets during the conference. 
Stalemate was the expected outcome. Hayter wrote that "it seems difficult to 
imagine that in the absence of fresh developments the Kremlin expect the 
conference to reach agreement even of a limited scope. They show no signs of 
having modified any of their fundamental requirements and not many of hoping 
that we can be convinced to modify ours." This analysis received a string of 
endorsements in the Foreign Office. From Germany Johnston suggested that "a 
fairly early breakdown" must be expected over whether an all-German government 
or all-German elections should come first. He tried to introduce some flexibility 
into the British position, which gave priority to free elections, by suggesting that 
separate polls should take place in East and West Germany under international 
supervision prior to the formation of an all-German government. Roberts 
rejected this "very ingenious" suggestion, citing as one of the reasons for his 
opposition that it might give the communists some say in the negotiation of a 
peace trea ty .^
The main purpose of the Berlin conference as far as the diplomatic corps 
were concerned was to facilitate ratification of the EDC treaty in France. In order 
to impress European public opinion it was necessary to present a realistic 
programme for German reunification. The two main difficulties in formulating 
such a plan were the status of the East and West German governments during the 
transition from free elections to the signature of a peace treaty and whether the 
government of a united Germany should be allowed the freedom to join 
whichever international groupings it chose. The Foreign Office were prepared to 
allow the Germans to formulate their own solution to the former problem but the 
second was of greater concern as it obviously had crucial implications for EDC. 
Discussing tactics at Berlin, Anthony Nutting commented that the Soviets were 
"nothing like ready to make any settlement. Therefore we should treat Berlin as 
a cold war exercise... French ratification of EDC very largely hangs on its 
outcome". He suggested that the West should emphasise the point, already 
conceded to the Federal Republic in the Bonn Conventions, that a reunited
10. FO 371/103696, C1071/836 Hayter to FO, 1 December 1953 with Pallister minute, 9 December 
1953, Hancock minute 10 December 1953, Hohler minute, 11 December 1953; FO 371/109269, 
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Germany should be free to decide its own international relations, including 
whether or not to join EDC. Roberts wrote in support of this line that "By 
concentration upon... free elections leading to the formation of a free all-German 
government which must decide its own international relationships, we should also 
get over the main public relations difficulties... i.e. suggestion that we are asking 
the Russians not only to make concessions over German reunification but also to 
accept German membership of the EDC." Eden told the Cabinet that he intended 
to stress at Berlin that under the British plan Germany would be free to decide 
its own international alignments but that this concession was made without any 
expectation that it would be accepted. As Kirkpatrick commented on Nutting’s 
original memorandum, the risk of a German refusal to join was "not real, for the 
Russians will not accept the proposal but will insist that Germany should be 
compulsorily neutralised, an alternative which is much more dangerous for us." 
Eden responded: "I like all this".**
Thus the Foreign Office expected Berlin to be a propaganda battle and 
intended to be victorious in the war of words. The discussion of German policy 
itself had now become sterile as officials repeated old dogmas, but what is 
interesting is the extent to which they believed they had reached a modus vivendi 
with the Soviets on the subject of German rearmament. Roberts recorded a 
conversation between Russian and French officials during which the Soviet 
diplomat, Rodionov, stated "The Soviet Union could not make concessions over 
free elections... At the same time the Russians realised there was no reason for 
the Western Powers to abandon their thesis about free elections etc." Rodionov 
also apparently conceded that "the most unacceptable form of German 
rearmament for the Soviet Union would be full and independent German 
membership of NATO. The least unacceptable form... was German membership 
of the EDC." Kirkpatrick minuted "I believe that the Russians have come to the 
same conclusion as we have, namely that a rearmed Germany on her own 
presents no great threat but that a rearmed Germany is a dangerous accession of
11. FO 371/109271, C1071/89, Nutting to Secretary of State, 30 December 1953 with Kirkpatrick 
minute, 30 December 1953, Eden minute, 31 December 1953; FO 371/109275, C1071/218, Roberts 
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strength to any potentially hostile consortium... it is probably true that the 
Russians have really reconciled themselves to EDC."1*6 This opinion was 
apparently confirmed by a conversation Eden had with Molotov at Berlin on 27 
January. Eden wrote to London that his discussion with Molotov "confirmed my 
impression that if we proceed firmly but unprovocatively with the EDC the Soviet 
Union will as so often in the past acquiesce in this as a fait accompli despite all 
their efforts to destroy it. But we shall never succeed in persuading them to accept 
it as corresponding to the general including the Soviet interest." It is clear 
from both these versions that the British now regarded EDC as the form of 
German rearmament which was least likely to provoke a reaction from Moscow. 
This development was of particular significance because both the Attlee and 
Churchill governments had been fearful of the likely Soviet reaction to the 
rearmament of Germany by the West.
The atmosphere at Berlin was cordial but, as had been expected, no 
progress was made towards an agreement on German reunification. From the 
outset the western allies aimed for a break with the Soviets over Germany which 
would facilitate ratification of EDC in France after the conference. There was 
some discussion in the Foreign Office of the need to boost German morale by 
reaching some minor agreements with the Soviets on issues such as interzonal 
trade but Roberts placed this in context with his statement that "we and the 
Russians are really both shadow-boxing in that neither of us really wants to unite 
Germany soon. They will use the conference to delay the EDC and, if possible, 
confuse the whole western alliance. We, on the other hand, want to be able, 
immediately after the conference, to complete our plans for EDC e tc" .^  In 
Washington Dulles told the National Security Council "that the forthcoming Berlin 
meeting would be more important in its negative than in its positive aspects... this 
meeting might represent the last major Soviet effort to disrupt the Western 
Alliance and to destroy the security of Western Europe. If this effort failed, our
12. FO 371/109271, C1071/75, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 8 January 1954, Kirkpatrick minute, 8 
January 1954.
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own programme would succeed."^ The highlight of the meeting for the western 
powers was the presentation of the Eden Plan on German reunification. It 
proposed a five stage process towards unification involving free elections, the 
convocation of a national assembly, the drafting of a constitution, the formation 
of an all-German government and finally the negotiation of a peace treaty. As 
agreed by the allies in the preparations for the meeting, it stated that "The all- 
German government shall have authority to assume or reject the international 
rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany 
and to conclude such other international agreements as it may w ish."^ The 
plan, of course, proved unacceptable to the Russians.
The Berlin conference did not produce the desired effect of hastening
French ratification of EDC but it did finally persuade the Labour opposition in
Britain to support government policy on German rearmament. In office the
Labour Party had accepted the principle of a German defence contribution, while
seeking to delay its implementation in practise. In opposition they had continued
to argue for postponement of German rearmament until in February 1954 Attlee
finally decided to settle the issue by a vote of the Parliamentary Labour Party.
This only served to reveal the bitter divisions among Labour MPs. A motion by
Wilson opposing German rearmament was defeated by the precarious margin of 
17111 votes to 109. During the first day of the Commons debate on the Berlin 
conference, Morrison praised Eden for the "genuine attempt" he had made to 
reach a German settlement and Nutting was able to declare that during the 
debate there had "been a remarkable amount of agreement and a remarkable lack 
of division". The next day Attlee opined that Eden had "showed a great deal of 
patience", but the Labour dissenters, with the aid of the rebel Conservative 
Viscount Hinchingbrooke, launched a sustained assault on government policy
15. FRUS 1952/4, vol.7, memo of 181st NSC Meeting, 21 January 1954, p.781. See also James B. 
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which demonstrated that the Commons remained split on the issue.
Within the government the debate continued over how to encourage the 
French to ratify EDC and what alternative to adopt should they refuse to do so. 
One complication was removed by Churchill’s decision to give his full support to 
the policy of rearming Germany. He wrote to Eden in Berlin that "we must stand 
by the principle of a German contingent either to EDC or an amended NATO. 
This alone gives the West the chance of obtaining the necessary strength by 
creating a European or internationalized German army but not a National one". 
He now evinced the arguments against a neutralised Germany that he had 
rejected before his stroke, namely that "we should in no circumstances agree to 
Germany being reduced to a neutralised, defenceless hiatus (sic) which would only 
be the preliminary to another Czechoslovakia process."^ The Prime Minister’s 
hopes of attending a summit now rested on the successful conclusion of 
negotiations on Indochina and Korea.
There was no great disagreement on the need to offer yet more 
concessions to the French in order to facilitate EDC ratification. On returning 
from Berlin Eden told the Cabinet of his concern for the future of Germany. He 
had gained the "impression from many Germans... that Western Germany was 
becoming impatient of the policy of the Western Powers. The Germans were once 
again growing prosperous and with their prosperity had come a strain of 
arrogance." Over the next few months this concern was to be transformed into 
alarm at the prospect of a German break with the West. In February 1954, 
however, Eden still hoped EDC could be ratified reasonably quickly if Britain 
agreed to further concessions. His initial suggestion was that a brigade group of 
the BAOR might be integrated into the European A rm y.^ The British military 
were reluctantly prepared to go even further than this and incorporate a whole 
British division into the EDC force. The previous month the Foreign Office had 
warned the Chiefs of the "very serious crisis" which would occur if EDC was not 
ratified. As usual the military treated the request to give further support to the 
EDC sympathetically. They were not prepared to accept common operational
18. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.524, cols. 425, 519, 575, 594-6, 645-52.
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control of the British and European air forces, nor to give any promises to
maintain indefinitely the current level of forces on the continent. The former was
impractical while the latter would obviously jeopardise the Army’s plans to reduce
its commitment to Europe once German forces were created. However, the Chiefs
were prepared to consider some sort of promise to maintain current "fighting
capacity", with the proviso that this would only be for a short period and would
be subject to change if the international situation altered. In addition they were
willing to accept EDC divisions into the BAOR on a temporary basis and vice
21versa whenever this proved practicable. When Hood returned to the Chiefs
to explain that "if we were to influence the French... it would have to be made
clear that a British formation would be available permanently to the EDC" he
found them reluctant to agree, but ultimately willing to accept that the proposal
might be necessary. Among the many faults they found with the idea was that
"Against the background of reduced defence expenditure it would be very difficult
to obtain sanction for any really long term commitment for British forces." Despite
this Redman made it clear that Harding was willing to commit a division to EDC
as the most practical option and the Army’s opinion seems to have been 
22decisive. On 10 March Eden presented the military’s proposals to the Cabinet
where it was noted that the concessions would be "worthwhile" if they achieved
23the desired goal of EDC ratification.
This British concession, combined with a restatement of the American 
government’s attitude towards EDC, did result in some progress during the spring 
of 1954. On 15 March Eden wrote to the British representative at the EDC 
conference in Paris, Steel, instructing him to present the new British proposals 
while making clear that Britain would retain the "right to remove forces from 
Europe to meet an emergency outside the NATO area and that the introduction 
of new weapons or a change in the international situation might make possible a 
general reduction in the level of NATO forces." He was to emphasise that there
21. DEFE 4/68, COS(54)2nd mtg., minute 1A, 7 January 1954, COS(54)4th mtg., minute 4, 19 
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would be a serious problem once the full £80 million cost of British forces in
Germany fell on the British Exchequer.^ Despite these reservations Laniel told
the American ambassador on 23 March "that British and United States assurances
were satisfactory and that United Kingdom in particular would change the view
of a considerable number of deputies." On 13 April the EDC Interim
Commission finally approved the statement on military association between British
7f%and American forces and the agreement was signed. Following a discussion
with Dulles on 14 April, during which both men praised Britain’s new policy
towards EDC, Laniel promised to set a date for the submission of the treaty to
71the National Assembly. '
Though the British government made its offer to the French in good faith, 
in retrospect it is possible to question whether they were not being somewhat 
injudicious in making a commitment which, for financial reasons, they might have 
great difficulty in keeping. The current arrangements for a German financial 
contribution to defence were hugely advantageous and this would make the 
adaptation to the changed post-contractual situation even more difficult. The 
British forces in Germany actually found it impossible to spend their full share of 
the DM600 million paid monthly to the allies by the Germans. This was partly 
because the British High Commission had been wary of beginning long term 
capital projects which might extend into the post-contractual period. It was agreed 
in February that execution of capital works projects should be accelerated in an 
effort to spend the excess funds.^ The British underspend also seemed likely 
to prejudice their position in discussions of the post-contractual German defence 
contribution. In the second half of 1953 a consensus emerged in favour of 
extending the April 1953 agreement to the end of 1954. Though this would involve 
an immediate reduction in the German contribution to the upkeep of Allied forces
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from DM600 to DM400 million a month as soon as the EDC and the contract
came into force, the Foreign Office could not envisage the Germans accepting any
increase in the Allied share and the Treasury accepted this argument. This
brought the British into conflict with the Americans who wanted to replace the
current "arbitrary" figures with a new NATO assessment of the scale of the
expected total German financial contribution to defence. However, with delays to
EDC ratification continuing, they agreed to support the extension of the April
3f)1953 agreement to the end of the year. The next difficulty was getting the 
Germans to accept this. When Schaeffer, the German Minister of Finance, met 
Allied representatives in May he claimed that he could no longer agree to the 
figure of DM950 million a month for Allied and German forces in the post­
occupation period and cited the vast underspend resulting from the current 
DM600 million agreement as evidence that the Allied share of the total should be 
reduced. This was obviously unwelcome to the Foreign Office and British woes 
increased when the following month the Americans suggested scaling down the 
current DM600 million allocation to DM500 million. In July the Allied High 
Commission pressurised Schaeffer into accepting the extension of the post- 
contractual agreement until the end of the year but the Federal government now 
made clear its determination to abrogate the current DM600 million agreement
at the end of September. The issue was still unresolved when the French
31Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty at the end of August.
The British military now regarded German rearmament as part of the 
solution to the long term problem of an affordable defence for Western Europe 
rather than as an urgent military requirement. In February the Chiefs had 
received a request from Gruenther for information on what forces the British 
would make available to him during the first six months of war. This provided an 
opportunity to inform him of the shift away from a continental strategy which had
29. T225/409, Crawford to France, 6 July 1953, Allen minute, 8 October 1953, Treasury memo, 
12 November 1953, FO to UK Permanent Delegation (Paris), 25 November 1953.
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been under way since 1952. In 1953 the Chiefs had agreed that they could only
earmark two reserve divisions as reinforcements for NATO. Conscious of their
own limited resources and the potential problem of moving troops to the
continent under war-time conditions, the Army was convinced that it would be
impossible to provide SACEUR with two extra divisions until M +90 at the
earliest. Their efforts were now increasingly concentrated on creating a strategic
reserve in Britain. The Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Harold
Redman, suggested "it would have to be made clear that any forces built up in the
United Kingdom during the period up to M+180 would not necessarily be
committed to NATO." This policy was supported by Dickson. The Air Staff were
conscious of the fact that their own contribution to continental defence would
become a "wasting asset" after M+30. On 14 April the Defence Committee
accepted the impracticality of providing reserve units before M +90 and agreed
that SACEUR should be informed of the decision to concentrate on the build-up
of a strategic reserve. However, the British did not reveal their thoughts about the
future of British forces on the continent. On 20 April the Joint Planning Staff
requested an opinion from the Chiefs on whether the H-bomb would allow for a
reduction in NATO forces or obviate the need for a German defence
contribution. The answer to both questions was negative. Nevertheless, when it
came to the issue of Britain’s contribution to continental defence, the Chiefs felt
compelled to consider the financial restraints imposed upon them. During May
they discussed the possibility of "a phased reduction in our contributions to
NATO". They agreed that the British government "should not give the impression
that any reduction in our present contributions was unthinkable. When a German
contribution had become effective it might be strategically possible to effect some
reduction." Though they described this as a political decision their willingness to
contemplate it demonstrates that the new military rationale behind German 
32rearmament.
However, the diplomatic need for some resolution of the EDC-contract, 
saga was becoming still more urgent. During early 1954 doubts were increasing in
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both Britain and the United States about whether France would ever ratify EDC. 
Eisenhower was becoming impatient with the constant delays resulting from the 
French preconditions for ratification. At a meeting of the NSC in March he asked 
"Must we go on forever coddling the French?" However, when the Deputy 
Secretary of Defence, Keys, suggested threatening the French that if they did not 
ratify EDC the US would withdraw its troops from Europe, Eisenhower made
' j ' y
clear his opposition to this alternative. In Washington, with the President 
vetoing any discussion of a peripheral defence, there seemed to be no alternative 
but to press ahead single-mindedly with the EDC project.
With the long-standing policy of support for EDC being constantly 
undermined by French delaying tactics, the Foreign Office began to reconsider its 
policy towards Germany during the spring and summer of 1954. The sense that 
the European balance was being undermined by French vacillation in the face of 
growing German assertiveness produced a crisis atmosphere in which the Foreign 
Office reconsidered the fundamentals of its policy towards continental Europe and 
reasserted the importance of the political integration of West Germany, even if 
this required a delay in a German defence contribution. What was in fact 
occurring was a return to the principles which had governed policy in the 1950-51 
period. On both occasions the ingrained British distrust of the German character 
created a fear that they might once again destabilise the delicate post-war 
European balance. Though Strang’s belief that the Germans would always be a 
menace to European peace was no longer so prominent, Foreign Office officials 
remained convinced that if the Federal Republic was given complete liberty to 
pursue an independent foreign policy she would eventually opt for an alliance with 
the Soviet Union. The solution to this problem, agreed upon following long 
negotiations with the Americans and French, was the creation of a political and 
military framework inside which the Germans could be safely integrated into the 
West. This took concrete form in the EDC treaty and the Bonn Conventions. 
Though willing to support German rearmament within the EDC as part of the 
overall settlement, the Foreign Office had always regarded the new political 
relationship as their priority. By summer 1954, however, the deterioration in the 
German political situation, which they had always predicted would occur unless
33. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of 187th NSC mtg., 4 March 1954, p.886-90.
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progress was made with the task of integrating the Federal Republic into the 
West, appeared to have begun. Urgent remedial action in the form of the 
implementation of the contract was required, whatever the fate of EDC might be.
In Germany the American High Commissioner, Conant, was concerned 
about the threat to the Federal Republic’s stability resulting from the sense of 
German frustration at the current prevarication in Paris over EDC and the 
restoration of sovereignty. At the start of the year Adenauer decided to take 
advantage of his majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat to seek an 
amendment to the constitution, or Basic Law, which would ensure the legality of 
German rearmament. By March, however, Adenauer’s actions had created a crisis. 
Though the Americans and British were unperturbed by the constitutional change, 
the French refused to authorise them unless Adenauer agreed to sign the 
protocols to the EDC Treaty, which had been agreed in February 1953, on behalf 
of the Head of State, President Heuss. This extremely complex dispute, which 
raised issues concerning the status of the EDC protocols as interpretative texts, 
the nature of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law and the role of the High 
Commission in Germany, aroused bitter feelings in the Federal Republic. Conant 
wrote to the State Department that the French position was "having serious 
influence on domestic politics here and threatens to divide coalition parties and 
even split Chancellor’s own party. State of excitement has been aroused which 
given nature of German temperament may well explode in undesirable ways with 
increasing bitterness."^
Following a strong warning from Dulles to Bidault, the French finally 
agreed to sign the amendment to the Basic Law on 25 March. Two days later 
Conant suggested to a meeting of lawyers in Frankfurt that it might now be 
necessary to separate the contract from the EDC in order to bring the occupation 
to an end. E.R. Warner, the deputy head of the Foreign Office’s German 
Department, supported this idea declaring "we shall on the one hand be under 
very great pressure from the Federal Government and German public opinion,
34. FO 371/109715, CW1641/5, Ward to Eden, 1 February 1954; FO 371/109717, CW1641/50, 
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while on the other hand we shall meet endless further delays and hesitations from 
the French about the alternative nature of a defence contribution. If we are not 
to have a first-class German crisis on our hands as well as a French crisis, we shall 
have to be prepared to terminate the occupation without waiting for final 
agreement on a defence contribution." Though other officials were sceptical of this 
solution, Roberts acknowledged that the link between the contract and the EDC
' i f i
could not be maintained beyond the autumn.
By early May Conant was recommending that the occupation be 
terminated, citing as evidence of the deterioration of the Chancellor’s position, his 
"unprecedented difficulty" in obtaining coalition support for his Saar policy and
07
the promotion in German newspapers of the idea of a German national army. ' 
The Laniel government was by this stage embroiled in the catastrophic 
consequences of the failure of their Dien Bien Phu operation in Indochina and 
was unable to put EDC before the National Assembly on the specified date. On 
28 May, three weeks after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Roberts met Crouy-Chanel 
of the French Embassy who warned that EDC would never be acceptable in 
France and that it was time to consider the alternatives. Roberts stressed the need 
for a quick solution "if we were not to find ourselves in an embarrassing and 
dangerous position in Germany." Kirkpatrick, who had now replaced Strang as 
Permanent Under-Secretary, minuted acerbically, "I have always believed that the 
real ’German danger’ lies in the Germans’ traditional inclination to do a deal with 
the East. But whatever Crouy may say, the French conception of the German 
danger is a lot of repugnant men in picklehaube invading France and routing a 
lesser number of valiant Frenchmen wearing red trousers and blue coats. Unless 
we are careful my bad dream will come true. The Russians could offer the 
Germans enormous inducements. We have only one little inducement to offer; 
membership of the Smarter Club." A few weeks later Kirkpatrick told Churchill’s 
private secretary, Jock Colville, that there were "dangerous movements" in
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Germany which were "tending towards a new Rapallo". So concerned were 
the Foreign Office with the deteriorating situation in Germany that they began to 
consider the idea of rearming Germany through a gendarmerie, which was the 
solution which they had rejected during 1950, and twice raised this matter with the 
Americans. However, their main energies were devoted to finding a means 
of ending the occupation without the need to reach an agreed solution to the 
problem of the German defence contribution. Serious consideration of this idea 
preceded Churchill’s visit to Washington at the end of June 1954.
By this time the entire cause of western defence seemed to be jeopardised 
by events in Indochina. The already poisonous political atmosphere of the Fourth 
Republic had become still more noxious since the French humiliation in 
Indochina, and on 12 June the Laniel government collapsed. In an attempt to 
create some order in French politics the National Assembly chose the enigmatic 
Pierre Mendes-France as Prime Minister. He insisted that a solution to the 
Indochina war must have priority over all other issues and committed himself to 
achieving a settlement within a month. Meanwhile the situation in Germany 
appeared certain to deteriorate. These events led to further disagreements among 
the Anglo-American partners. Eisenhower and Churchill continued to argue about 
the viability of a reformed NATO as an alternative to EDC, while the officials in 
their respective foreign ministries began a new dispute on the subject of how long 
a German defence contribution could be delayed once an agreement on a new 
political relationship had been reached.
In Britain there was scepticism about the prospect of EDC being ratified 
in Paris following the fall of Laniel. The new British ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn 
Jebb, was convinced that the treaty would never succeed in the National Assembly 
and urged his government to search for an alternative. When the Commons 
debated foreign affairs on 23 June the general presumption was that the plan to
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create a European Army had failed. Woodrow Wyatt, a consistent supporter of 
the treaty, declared, "The falling fortresses of Vietnam are the background to the 
funeral of the European Defence Community." Julian Amery suggested that the 
government should "persuade our American friends to stop nagging the French 
Government into signing an agreement which they are determined not to sign." 
Both men argued that the best alternative was a European organisation in which 
Britain could fully participate. This new grouping within NATO would be less 
supra-national than EDC but would feature more integration than the Atlantic 
alliance.^®
Immediately following Mendes-France’s appointment as Prime Minister and 
just prior to the Washington meeting, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower concerning 
Germany, "If EDC fails we ought to get her into NATO or a revised form of 
NATO under the best terms possible."^ Contemporaneously Eden instructed 
his officials to prepare a paper examining the possibility of British membership of 
a modified, less federal EDC, along the lines of the proposals made by Wyatt and 
Ameiy. In a draft Cabinet paper prepared for his return from Washington, the 
Foreign Office considered what alternatives might be available should France be 
unwilling to accept the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO. They admitted 
that the revival of the EDC in a less supra-national form was "not unattractive. It 
is as much in our interest as in the French to keep German rearmament within 
limits and the security of the UK now requires us to share, indeed lead, in the 
defence of the Continent". Mindful of the current plans to reduce Britain’s 
defence commitments, the Foreign Office noted the economic obstacles to this 
solution, stating that "The fixed level of British forces could hardly be less than 
what we now maintain on the Continent and we should then be faced with a long­
term commitment for their support costs". In their view the current British land 
and air commitment was in any case insufficient to contain a twelve division 
German force. Thus the primary objection was that Britain could not carry the 
burden of European security without American assistance. Nevertheless, such was 
the current concern over Germany’s future that the paper concluded that if both
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the NATO and EDC solutions failed, "we might then have to consider urgently a 
modified EDC to include the UK if only to avoid the certain loss of Germany in 
one form or another to the Soviet camp". This document set out clearly the twin 
British fears of a rupture in the Atlantic Alliance should Britain be drawn into a 
federalist European defence organisation and of a new threat from Germany if 
the project to tie the Federal Republic to the West should fail. On his return from 
Washington, Eden decided to shelve the paper, at least until Mendes had put the 
EDC treaty before the National Assembly in A ugust.^
The Americans, though unaware of the extent of British planning, were 
concerned about the canvassing by British diplomats, and in particular Jebb’s Paris 
Embassy, of alternatives to EDC and by Churchill’s own inconsistent attitude 
towards the Community. Eisenhower told Dulles that "Churchill is not supporting 
EDC but he won’t say so, so both you and I, Foster, had to be very cagey on this. 
We are not interested in anything but EDC and we have got to be tough about 
it" .^  On 15 June the American ambassador to France informed the State 
Department that the British were discussing alternatives to EDC with opponents 
of the treaty. Dulles instructed the ambassador in London to raise the matter and 
urge the British not to encourage opposition to EDC. He was anxious to "discuss 
with the British as soon as possible problems of general strategy for immediate 
period."44
Though not yet ready to discuss alternatives to EDC, the Americans were 
willing to be flexible about the timing of German rearmament. They were 
prepared to see the contract, or some other form of political arrangement 
between the Allies and the Federal Republic, introduced prior to a final solution 
of the EDC issue. On 15 June the British ambassador in Washington, Roger 
Makins, reported the concern of the American administration that nothing should 
be done to "rock the EDC boat". Though committed to the European Army as the 
ultimate solution to European defence, he explained that "the Americans are out
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for very quick action in the political side in Germany."^ Two days later 
Leishman of the Washington Embassy was informed by the State Department that 
they aimed "to make sufficient progress on political side to hold situation for 
Adenauer, while gaining few more months to work on solution rearmament 
problem." Leishman explained to the Americans that the "British approach had 
been directed first to question alternatives in event EDC not ratified and then of 
interim political action in Germany to save Chancellor’s position while military 
problem being solved." He agreed that "solution military question may take time, 
while political situation in Germany requires early action."^
The Foreign Office had now decided that political reform in the Federal 
Republic must have priority. Roberts suggested the simplest solution would be 
"the conclusion of a short Protocol, signed by the four parties to the Bonn 
Conventions, which would bring the Convention into force, while reserving Allied 
powers in the fields of disarmament, demilitarisation and industrial production and 
research, thus preventing independent German rearmament." By 22 June the 
Foreign Office had completed a draft statement of principles for the Washington 
meeting of Churchill and Eisenhower. The first principle was that "The situation 
in Germany is slipping fast." The paper went on to discuss the remedial action 
which should be taken if EDC was not ratified within two months. The main 
proposals were for a short treaty to bring the Bonn Conventions into effect or, 
should the French refuse to sanction this, joint action by the American and British 
High Commissioners to end the most objectionable aspects of the occupation in 
their zones.^
Eisenhower, Dulles, Churchill and Eden discussed Germany’s future on 27 
June and agreed that if the French Assembly went into recess during the summer 
having failed to ratify EDC, action would have to be taken to bring the 
contractual arrangements into force without prejudicing a final solution to the 
German rearmament problem. Eden declared "that if something were not done 
to restore sovereignty to Germany by October, (in the absence of French 
ratification of EDC) the Soviets would be able to pull the Germans across the
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line." Eisenhower and Churchill signed an agreement that if the French Assembly 
did not ratify the treaty before going into recess, they would take action to restore 
German sovereignty while getting an assurance from Adenauer "that Germany will 
defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to 
rearmament." British and American experts were to meet in London to discuss 
methods by which the contract could be implemented separately from the EDC 
trea ty .^
The Anglo-American Working Group met for the first time on 5 July and 
over the next seven days they discussed what action could be taken to grant 
sovereignty to West Germany should EDC not be ratified before the French 
Assembly went into its summer recess. They examined three different scenarios 
which envisaged firstly, full French co-operation in implementing the Bonn 
Conventions, secondly, limited French co-operation in ameliorating the occupation 
regime and finally French opposition to political concessions. Even if this last 
scenario proved to be the most realistic, the group were confident that a number 
of reforms could be introduced by a majority vote of the Allied High Commission. 
The principal area of disagreement was over the length of time which the French 
should be allowed, following the introduction of political reforms, before further 
action was taken to implement German rearmament. In the case of continued 
French failure to ratify the Americans wished to make provision for the calling of 
a meeting of EDC countries ninety days after the implementation of the contract. 
The restrictions on German rearmament imposed as part of the political 
settlement would then lapse after another 60 days. Roberts explained that on this 
basis "Germany would resume complete liberty of action to rearm how she saw 
fit one-hundred-and-fifty days after the signature of the protocols. She could then 
decide to build up her own national army before considering what, if any, 
collective security system she would join. However unlikely this eventuality we 
cannot, and there is no need to, run such a risk." The British delegation suggested 
that if a conference of EDC powers was to be called after 90 days it should be to 
consider West Germany’s "immediate contribution to the defence of the free
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world as part of a system of mutual collective security.” They would not accept any 
time limit on the period during which restrictions on German rearmament were 
to remain in force. The British and American positions proved irreconcilable and 
the final report of the working party included a number of different versions of 
the controversial article.^  The British delegation also produced a paper 
covering the possible military restrictions which could be imposed upon the 
Federal Republic if she were to join NATO. The Americans agreed to include the 
document in the official record of the meeting but were not prepared to enter into 
discussions upon the tex t.^
There followed a hiatus in discussion of Germany’s future as Eden and 
Dulles became preoccupied with the negotiation of an Indochina settlement at the 
reconvened Geneva conference. However, Eden made his own view of the 
Working Party’s proposed solution to the rearmament dilemma very clear to 
Roberts. The Foreign Secretary "was very strongly against" the American 
proposals and "not very enthusiastic" about the British counter-proposals. In late 
July the Americans put forward a new draft which omitted any mention of a time 
limit after which restrictions on German rearmament would end. Instead, 
provision was made for a meeting of the EDC powers 90 days from the 
introduction of the contract with the Federal Republic in order to agree 
"comparable arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the 
maintenance of international peace and security." This was acceptable to the 
British. Unfortunately, the Americans also introduced a new clause which referred 
to the Federal Republic’s decision to "defer for the time being the unilateral 
exercise of the right to rearmament." Despite the fact that the Eisenhower- 
Churchill memorandum of 27 June had used exactly the same phrase, the Foreign 
Office argued that its inclusion in a formal treaty would allow the Federal 
Republic to rearm shortly after the conference of EDC powers was called. They 
were not prepared to accept that Germany had a right to rearm. Roberts wrote 
that "What we cannot do (and I think this was the very strong opinion of the
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Secretary of State) is to commit ourselves now to (a) any specific date by which 
the Germans will rearm with or without restrictions, or (b) any particular kind of
Cl
German rearmament to replace the EDC solution. 1 Churchill was reluctant 
to defer German rearmament yet again and had to be persuaded to make a 
statement to the House of Commons on 14 July that the discussion of the 
introduction of the contract "would entail the deferment of German rearmament 
for the time being". The announcement of a further delay in rearming the 
Germans clearly infuriated him and after announcing it he growled "which should 
please you people" to the Bevanites on Labour’s backbenches. For once the 
British won their argument with Washington and an article redrafted by Roberts 
which avoided any mention of the Federal Republic’s right to rearm was finally 
accepted by the Eisenhower administration.
British scrupulousness over the drafting of those sections of the Anglo- 
American document which dealt with German rearmament was a product of 
persistent doubts about German reliability. The Foreign Office was convinced that 
the situation in the Federal Republic was deteriorating and that until the country 
was firmly linked to the West it could not be relied upon as an ally. Officials in 
London were sceptical of reports from West Germany that the situation was less 
volatile than they believed. On 21 June Kirkpatrick’s replacement as High 
Commissioner, Hoyer-Millar, informed his colleagues in London that there was 
"no doubt that the Chancellor’s position has weakened in recent months", but that 
he was confident Adenauer could maintain control over the situation until the end 
of the year and probably longer. The Foreign Office simply refused to believe 
these reassurances. Kirkpatrick, Roberts and Hancock all expressed their disbelief. 
The former wrote "This err’s (sic) on the optimistic side. In Germany the position
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can melt away with bewildering rapidity." Roberts claimed Hoyer-Millar had 
"deliberately painted the picture in less sombre colours because he thought that 
we were going to the other extreme." These men were much more susceptible to 
the alarming reports being provided by Adenauer’s own advisers.^ The nature 
of their concerns about the Germans was illustrated by their response to a 
valedictory report from the British consul in Stuttgart, Andrew Gilchrist. In 1950 
Gilchrist had been an opponent of early German rearmament but after his term 
in the Federal Republic he was much more sanguine about that country’s future. 
On 15 July he wrote of his belief that "German society is morally and spiritually 
healthy", and that, though they now desired an army, it was not so as they could 
attack others "but to prove that they are a force and equal Power in Europe". He 
suggested that the resurgence of virulent German nationalism was unlikely and 
that German antipathy to the Soviets made a German-Soviet alliance highly 
improbable. Even Hoyer-Millar thought this "too optimistic" and the general view 
in London was that Gilchrist was "over enthusiastic and naive". Wright commented 
on the subject of Germany’s spiritual health that "the Germans were quite capable 
of performing the mental gymnastics necessary to create a regime very similar to 
that of the Nazis, and at the same time to disassociate this historically from the 
Hitler regime." Warner added that "the Germans are excitable and changeable 
people who will adopt one view in a given set of circumstances and a quite 
different view in another."^
With Eden’s assistance and Dulles’s grudging acquiescence, Mendes-France 
was able to achieve a settlement of the Indochina question by 21 July. Attention 
now shifted to the EDC question and three days later the Soviets proposed a 
conference to discuss European security. This served to complicate still further the 
process of EDC ratification. Hancock had been expecting this Soviet move and 
had no doubt it would "greatly impair the chances of any early decision by the 
French Assembly". He made clear that "any such Soviet initiative must be 
resisted." On 12 August Mendes-France met British and French representatives
54. FO 371/109576, CW1072/37, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 21 June 1954, with Kirkpatrick minute 
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and informed them that the pressure in France for a further meeting with the
Soviets was very great. Reilly of the British Embassy was blunt. He informed the
French Prime Minister that the British government "would much prefer not to
negotiate with the Russians until the ratification process had been fully
com pleted."^ However, it was the Americans who took the lead in quashing
this new French demarche. Dulles declared himself "deeply shocked and
disheartened" by Mendes-France’s attitude and Dillon was instructed to make
clear American displeasure. By 13 August the French Prime Minister was
57declaring that "he was not proposing another meeting with the Russians."
Mendes-France was more tenacious in pursuing revisions to the EDC treaty 
in order to make it more palatable to the National Assembly. He was dependent 
on Socialist support and they had long been critical of the nature of British and 
American guarantees and of those supra-national elements of the EDC which 
implied a loss of democratic accountability. The group of experts appointed by 
Mendes to draft an additional protocol to the treaty completed their deliberations 
in early August. Between 11 and 13 August there was a battle in the Cabinet over 
the nature of the Working Group proposals which resulted in the resignation of 
three Gaullist ministers, who regarded the modifications as insufficiently extensive. 
When the proposals were made public, pro-EDC figures were bitterly critical of
C O
the extent of the changes/0 Their principal effect would be to delay or modify 
many of the supra-national elements of the treaty. Thus the introduction of 
common European regulations concerning military doctrine, recruitment, discipline 
and other measures would be delayed for up to five years. In addition for eight 
years each member would have a veto over decisions by the EDC’s commissariat. 
Other important proposals provided members with the opportunity to withdraw 
should Anglo-American guarantees be retracted, or German reunification occur,
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59and limited the integration of European Army units to forward areas.
The British and American reactions to the French initiative were very
different. On 6 August the French ambassador in London, Massigli, had raised the
prospect of removing the supra-national elements of the treaty in a conversation
with Kirkpatrick. The Permanent Under-Secretary reacted calmly, declaring that
presentation would be crucial and that "the postponement of the application of
certain provisions of the Treaty would be more acceptable than their removal."
After examining the French amendments, Kirkpatrick informed Churchill that they
were "not unacceptable on the points of direct interest to us and the Americans."
His main concern, as always, was the likely effects in Germany where "Dr.
Adenauer in his present weakened position, could not accept an unfavourable or
discriminatory arrangement."^ In contrast, the Americans regarded French
proposals as disastrous. Dillon described them as "unacceptable beyond our worst
expectations", while Bedell Smith, the Acting Secretary of State, was thoroughly
depressed by them. His policy was to encourage the other EDC countries "to
stand firm against unrealistic concessions or destructive compromises". The
American government was firmly opposed to any measures which would require
a reconsideration of the treaty by the other European parliaments, which would
dilute the supra-national element, which would discriminate against Germany or
61which would raise the issue of relations with NATO. In short they were 
opposed to the entire French programme.
The Anglo-Saxon powers were, however, prepared to let France’s EDC 
partners take the lead in dealing with Mendes-France’s plans for the revision of 
the EDC treaty. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, had proposed 
that the six signatories should meet in June, but at that time Mendes-France was 
devoting his energies to Indochina. With the French now seeking major revisions 
to the treaty, a conference became essential and representatives of the six met at
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Brussels on 19 August for four days of discussions. Spaak presented a compromise 
deal based on the gradual introduction of the supra-national provisions of the 
treaty. However, the other EDC countries would not consent to the idea of a veto. 
Mendes was in no mood to compromise and the conference descended into 
acrimony. The antipathy between Spaak and Mendes-France manifested itself in 
a series of virulent exchanges and the controversy between the two continued long 
after the collapse of the E D C .^  Towards the end of the conference, Mendes 
told an American official that the conference had failed and that "continued 
discussion seemed pointless". He "insisted over and over again that fault was not 
his, listing examples in an effort to show that other Ministers had not given him 
’one single’ concession." The French Prime Minister wished to meet with 
Eisenhower and Churchill to "map new plans for European policy and limit 
damage for failure of ED C."^
Immediately after the Brussels conference Mendes-France flew to England 
where he met Eden and Churchill at the Prime Minister’s own home, Chartwell. 
Despite American urging to confine discussions to the subject of EDC ratification, 
the Churchill government had continued to discuss the various possible 
alternatives while the delays in Paris continued. The Prime Minister had twice 
written to Dulles offering his view that German rearmament within NATO was 
the best solution to the current dilemmas of European security policy. Spaak was 
also consulted about this solution but he, like Dulles, opposed the idea. In Paris, 
Jebb campaigned for a European solution which could include Great Britain in 
a less federal European defence organisation.^ It was not surprising therefore 
that Churchill, Eden and Mendes seem to have discussed a broad range of 
alternative policies at Chartwell. Mendes-France asserted that EDC would be 
rejected by the National Assembly. The favoured British alternative of German 
membership of NATO was mentioned along with the possibility of some form of 
European organisation within the Atlantic alliance in which Britain would
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participate. Mendes-France suggested that this latter alternative might merely 
involve a common armaments pool but Eden was wary of this suggestion as being 
only the first step towards greater integration. The Foreign Secretary concluded 
from his talks with Mendes-France that German membership of NATO with 
limitations on her rearmament was still the best option. The main difficulty would 
be in trying to gain agreement on safeguards, for Eden could not envisage 
Adenauer accepting extensive restrictions. Nevertheless, he concluded that "as 
many as possible of these must be secured."^ Churchill’s main function at the 
talks seems to have been to chastise the French for their slow progress. His 
frustration with them had grown to anger and he "pointed out that we should not 
agree to be governed by the impotence of the French Chamber." In their 
correspondence with the Americans, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
emphasised their efforts to persuade Mendes-France to give his full support to 
EDC rather than the discussion of alternatives which had taken p la c e d
As the EDC debate in the French National Assembly approached, 
American officials in Europe made a last bid to save the treaty but found their 
initiative blocked by the Foreign Office which wished to see the matter finally 
resolved. David Bruce had been a staunch supporter of EDC and an influential 
figure in making it the centrepiece of America’s policy in Europe. On 26 August 
he proposed to the State Department a further conference of the EDC powers, 
this time with British and American representatives present. He hoped that if they 
displayed a united front it might be possible to influence French opinion. 
Meanwhile, pro-EDC politicians in France sought support for a motion to adjourn 
the EDC debate while a European conference was convened. However, the 
Foreign Office was not convinced that a conference was worthwhile if there were 
no new proposals on offer. They argued that "The overriding consideration must 
surely be to give the French no further excuse for delay and to avoid driving the 
Germans to exasperation." In France, Mendes outmanoeuvred the supporters of
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EDC by initially appearing to support the reconvening of a conference and then
dropping the idea once the debate in the National Assembly began. Having failed
to get the changes he wanted at Brussels, he refused to support the treaty and
hinted broadly that if it failed the Allies would be ready to discuss alternative
solutions. On 30 August the Assembly passed a motion putting the preliminary
question, known as a dry guillotine, which had the effect of ending discussion of
the treaty without a vote on its substance and thus killing it. The anti-EDC faction
f dwon with a comfortable majority of 319 votes to 264.
Mendes-France’s decision to put EDC to the vote in the National Assembly 
has had the effect of distorting perceptions of American and especially British 
policy during the summer of 1954. The Anglo-Saxon powers were preparing 
themselves for yet more procrastination on the part of the French government 
and by the end of August 1954 had finally reached agreement on a document 
which would grant sovereignty to Germany, while retaining restrictions on her 
ability to rearm. As will be discussed in the next chapter this policy may well have 
brought the Allies into conflict with Adenauer. However, the rejection of EDC 
and the astonishing speed with which a substitute was found have left the 
impression that little consideration was given to separating the issues of 
sovereignty and rearmament. In fact the Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, 
were much more anxious to bring an end to the occupation in order to relieve the 
mounting pressure on Adenauer, than they were to achieve an early German 
defence contribution. Since May 1952 British support for the European Army 
solution had been predicated on the notion that EDC was essential if the 
occupation was to be ended. The British military had been inclined to give more 
emphasis to the merits of EDC as a useful solution to the problems of western 
European defence and in early 1954 they were willing to make substantial 
concessions in order to accommodate the French. However, they were no longer 
so vigorous in pressing the case for German rearmament, which was increasingly 
seen as a means of reducing Britain’s continental commitment in the long term.
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The absence of any urgent military need for German reinforcements contributed 
to the relatively sanguine British attitude to the prospect of further delays in 
German rearmament. It was the integration of West Germany into the political 
system of western Europe which really mattered.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE UNRESOLVED GERMAN PROBLEM 
The signing of the Paris Agreements in the autumn of 1954 and the 
subsequent induction of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO in May 
1955 are generally taken to mark the end of the great debate over Germany’s 
future which the wartime allies had conducted since 1945. In the years after 1955 
West Germany came to be regarded as a trusted member of the western alliance. 
To British policy-makers at the time, however, the creation of West German 
armed forces was not regarded as marking the beginning of a period in which they 
could relax their vigilance. Though in 1949-50 German rearmament had been 
regarded by many as a possible last step in the process of integrating Germany 
into the western community, force of circumstances, in the shape of American 
pressure, had ensured that this came about sooner than had been envisaged. It 
may appear bizarre, having catalogued the long saga of procrastination which 
preceded the collapse of EDC, to describe the Paris Agreements as premature, 
but it should be remembered that only a decade earlier Britain, the United States, 
France and the Soviet Union had been engaged in a bitter war with Germany. 
Though, unlike France and the Soviet Union, Britain had not endured German 
occupation, British policy-makers, like their colleagues in Paris and Moscow, were 
still not sure that the Germans could be trusted. The issue of German unification 
briefly assumed great importance in the Foreign Office in 1955, firstly because 
they believed the West was now in the strongest position to negotiate with 
Moscow and secondly because a really determined effort to reunite the country 
was regarded as essential to persuade the Germans that the western alliance 
would be beneficial to them. The idea of imposing restraints on a reunited 
Germany’s military capacity therefore appealed as a means of convincing both the 
Soviets and the Germans that the West was serious. The Foreign Office used the 
interval between the ratification of the Paris Agreements and the recruitment of 
German troops to reconsider the role of these forces in a possible diplomatic 
settlement. The Chiefs of Staff, however, were not convinced that the West could 
afford to make military concessions in order to achieve a united Germany. Indeed, 
according to British military planners, a united Germany ought to make a larger 
defence contribution than that assigned to the Federal Republic. These
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contradictions were never resolved and the Foreign Office chose to sponsor a 
German plan based on the neutralisation of East Germany rather than embark 
on an initiative which would require an overhaul of western defence plans. Even 
this more cautious scheme floundered on Franco-American opposition. Any 
serious attempt to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union was lost with the 
increased sense of complacency which accompanied the emergence of the self- 
congratulatory spirit of Geneva. In this period we see once again the fear of a 
rearmed Germany exerting its powerful influence on Britain’s diplomatic strategy.
Though the Foreign Office had anticipated the defeat of the EDC treaty 
and had prepared contingency plans as early as December 1952, there was still a 
sense of shock when it actually occurred. The problems of implementing the 
NATO solution which had been held in reserve for nearly two years appeared 
formidable. The threat of a reappraisal of American policy was a card which 
Dulles was not averse to playing. In addition, Adenauer’s outright refusal to 
accept the implementation of the contractual agreement worked out by the British 
and Americans and the lingering suspicion that Mendes-France was determined 
to kill any plan which involved sanctioning any form of German rearmament, 
combined to create a bleak outlook at the start of September 1954. Yet the 
American decision to await a European solution to the crisis allowed the British 
to retake the initiative which they had lost in New York four years previously, 
while Adenauer actually shared the British conviction that unless a solution was 
found to the German rearmament problem which linked the Federal Republic to 
western defence organisations, then Germany could once more be a menace to 
European stability. Mistrust of Mendes-France lingered throughout the remainder 
of 1954 but at the very end of the year he placed all his authority behind the Paris 
Agreements and succeeded in obtaining the approval of the National Assembly.
In December 1952 the British Cabinet had been presented with 
contingency plans to be used in the event of the French either failing to ratify 
EDC or attaching unacceptable conditions to ratification. The basis of the plans 
was German membership of NATO combined with a reform of the organisation’s 
structure to give the Supreme Commander greater authority. The possibility of 
utilising the machinery of the Brussels Treaty was even mentioned as a means of 
substituting for the European element provided by the EDC structure. By
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February 1954 the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff, had 
drafted detailed plans for the incorporation of Germany into NATO which 
included controls over German arms production and the integration of her armed 
forces into the Alliance. As an alternative it was suggested that the Federal 
Republic might accept membership of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in place 
of full NATO membership. The drawback of this solution was that it would 
probably involve Britain in new commitments on the continent. In this revised 
scheme the Brussels Treaty solution had ceased to be seen as complementary to 
the NATO solution.*
In July 1954 the British had presented their ideas on the inclusion of West 
Germany in NATO to the Americans in the Anglo-American Study Group. It was 
indicative of American reservations that they refused to endorse the British 
proposals even in the form of a draft contingency plan. Despite persistent 
American coolness Eden again outlined the case for German membership of 
NATO in a Cabinet paper written in anticipation of the defeat of EDC. He 
warned that a European solution would drag Britain into dubious continental 
projects such as a common arms programme, while vitiating the prized Atlantic 
partnership. Furthermore, a European grouping "would be much less powerful to
-5
contain Germany than NATO with America and Canada present." Yet there 
remained concern that, in the context of continuing French reservations about any 
form of German rearmament, the admittance of Germany to NATO might prove 
as impracticable as the EDC project. In the immediate aftermath of the negative 
vote of the French National Assembly, Kirkpatrick’s prognosis was gloomy. He 
believed that the French would never accept German entry into NATO without 
restrictions, while the Germans would not agree to any discrimination against 
them. Consequently, the dilemma facing British policy-makers was what to do 
when France vetoed German entry into the Atlantic Alliance. He suggested that 
in the circumstances all the European countries might have to adopt the same 
restrictions as those proposed for Germany. If the French rejected this alternative
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the choice was between the apparently desperate options of coming to a deal with 
the Russians on Germany "whilst we still have a little bargaining capacity" or an 
attempt to maintain the status quo which would "allow Germany to drift slowly 
and irrevocably into the Russian camp."^
This analysis proved overly sombre. Though the initial British attempts to 
resolve the dilemma posed by the defeat of EDC were frustrated it was Eden who 
eventually secured an agreement on a formula which both allowed German 
membership of NATO and revived the European pillar of NATO through the 
creation of a Western European Union (WEU). However a number of military 
and economic objections were brushed aside in the rush to achieve a settlement. 
Initially the British regarded the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic 
as their most important objective. Despite arguments over the link between the 
restoration of sovereignty and the rearmament of Germany, by the end of August 
the British and Americans had agreed upon a scheme to end the occupation. A 
new difficulty then arose as reports from Bonn indicated that Adenauer was 
opposed to severing the link between the return of sovereignty and the creation 
of German armed forces. Hancock believed Adenauer’s reservations were due to 
his fear of a long delay in German rearmament following the establishment of 
contractual relations. In what turned out to be a pessimistic assessment he 
suggested the German rearmament negotiations were unlikely to be completed 
before the end of the year.^
The Allied High Commission was instructed to press Adenauer to accept 
the revised Bonn Conventions on the grounds "that discussions about the form of 
German rearmament would inevitably occupy some little time." The British plan 
was that the American and British High Commissioners would present the Study 
Group paper on the implementation of the Bonn Conventions to Adenauer, while 
in Paris the Ambassadors pressed Mendes-France to accept this scheme. It was 
the American High Commissioner, Conant, who first raised the matter with 
Adenauer in a disastrous meeting on 2 September. The Chancellor described the 
Anglo-American document as "worse than blow which he had suffered after vote 
of French Assembly" and insisted he could not possibly present it to the
4. FO 371/109294, C1071/792, Kirkpatrick minute, 31 August 1954.
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Bundestag. At this stage Adenauer still seemed to want to try and salvage the 
EDC. Later that day Hoyer-Miller explained to Adenauer that from the British 
point of view "the important thing in the interest of the German Government 
itself was to give back to Germany as much as possible of its sovereignty at once 
without waiting for the negotiations on the military question." Adenauer again 
demurred. As a result of these conversations it was decided in London and 
Washington to abandon the Study Group paper and not to raise the subject with 
Mendes-France. Nevertheless there was a residue of bitterness. Conant 
recommended to the State Department that "we proceed to disengage completely 
from the British in our approach German problem...British insistence that French 
must be kept on equal basis nearly caused major blow-up in delicate situation."^
It was from this moment that responsibility for a solution devolved on to 
the British government. Following an exchange of letters with Churchill and a 
more cordial conversation with Hoyer-Millar on 3 September, Adenauer agreed 
that the eventual solution to the German problem should be based on the long 
standing British contingency plan for German membership of NATO with
n
limitations on the extent of German rearmament/ On 8 September Eden 
suggested to the Cabinet the outlines of the eventual solution. His plan involved 
West German admittance to NATO and the revival of the Brussels Treaty to 
include Germany and Italy. Eden warned that to secure agreement it might be 
necessary to offer a permanent commitment of three British divisions to Europe, 
which was an increase on the promised commitment of one division to the EDC. 
It was Churchill who proved averse to this idea, and while the Brussels Treaty 
option was welcomed by ministers, they refused to endorse any additional
o
continental commitment as yet.
Eden’s dilemma was how to placate both Churchill, who saw no reason to
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pander to French susceptibilities, and Mendes-France, who was working on a rival 
scheme for German membership of a new Brussels Treaty organisation. In 
response to a report from the Washington Embassy that the Pentagon wished to 
reduce its commitment to France, Churchill expressed the hope that the threat of 
a peripheral defence would bring the French to their senses. He contemplated the 
possibility of "a triple alliance between Britain, the United States and Germany 
to protect France against itself." On 9 September he wrote to Eden expressing 
reservations about the planned commitment of three British divisions to the 
continent which would be "unsustained by the United States", and asking with 
reference to the French, "Ought they not in the first instance...to be confronted 
with and to feel the peril of the kind of ideas of re-appraisal now being considered 
by the Pentagon?" However, when Eden discussed German rearmament with the 
French ambassador, Massigli, on 10 September he refrained from using the threat 
of an ’agonizing reappraisal* of America’s role in Europe. Massigli made clear that 
the French were not prepared to wait passively for an Anglo-American plan to 
emerge. He told Eden "that the admission of Germany into NATO with nothing 
but some conditions Germany might offer would have no chance in the French 
Chamber." Instead the Quai d’Orsay were proposing that the Brussels Treaty 
"might be reshaped to include Germany and Italy and some military arrangement 
might be made under it which could conceivably include a European Commander- 
in-Chief." Eden "pulled a long face" when Massigli said German membership of 
NATO with voluntary safeguards would be rejected and told the Ambassador "I 
was firmly convinced that the admission of Germany into NATO was the right way
Q
to handle the military aspect."
It was during his tour of European capitals that Eden was able to secure 
sufficient support for the NATO option to leave France isolated. After gaining an 
enthusiastic reception for his ideas in Brussels, Bonn and Rome that Mendes- 
France had prepared detailed counter-proposals based on continued German 
exclusion from NATO. He explained to the French Prime Minister that he had 
gained widespread support for German admission to NATO but that he 
recognised "safeguards were the crux of the matter". He suggested "that they
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should be organised through a strengthening of the NATO machinery with 
additional powers and duties allocated to SACEUR." Mendes-France responded 
that any safeguards should be included in the new military clauses which the 
French wished to add to the Brussels Treaty as a means of facilitating German 
accession. When Eden pressed him on German membership of NATO, Mendes 
said "this could only be contemplated later, after the safeguards had been set up, 
or at least it would have to be considered separately". Eden was evidently 
depressed by his conversation and it was left to Roberts to hear the details of the 
French plans. However, before Eden departed for London the following day 
Mendes declared himself "resigned" to German admission to NATO, but he 
insisted that safeguards must be the responsibility of the Brussels Treaty 
powers.*®
On 17 September Eden gained a further success when he persuaded Dulles
to attend a nine power conference and to accept the concept of an expanded
Brussels Treaty.** On the same day as his meeting with Dulles, Eden briefed
the Cabinet on his European tour and made it clear that the French were still the
main obstacle to a settlement. In return for Mendes-France’s acceptance of
German membership of NATO he was willing to give substantial powers to the
new Brussels Treaty Organisation. He agreed that "it might be preferable that
agreement limiting the size of contingents should be concluded under the aegis of
the Brussels Treaty rather than through the machinery of Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers, Europe, whose interest was naturally to secure the largest possible
NATO force". Eden reported that he had not been questioned about troop
commitments and that they might not be called upon to give a permanent
12guarantee covering British force levels on the Continent. However, during the 
next few days Mendes-France made public statements suggesting that the 
restructuring of the Brussels Treaty might involve "a certain dose of
10. Lord Avon, Full Circle (Cassels, London, 1960), p. 154-61; Frank Roberts, Dealing with 
Dictators (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p. 170-1; PREM 11/843, two telegrams from 
Paris (Jebb) to FO (Eden to Churchill), 16 September 1954, FO to Paris, 17 September 1954; 
FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to Office of US High Commissioner in 
Germany, 16 September 1954, p. 1198-9 and Ambassador in France to US High Commissioner 
(Gruenther to Conant and Dulles), p.1200-1.
11. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, report on Dulles’s conversation with Adenauer and Eden, 16-17 
September 1954, p. 1213-21, Dulles to the President, 18 September 1954, p.1227-8.
12. CAB 128/27, CC(54)60th mtg., minute 1, 17 September 1954.
232
13supranationality", while failing to endorse German membership of NATO. 
Erring on the side of caution, the Foreign Office sought Cabinet approval for an 
offer to maintain current force levels on the continent. Their paper explained that 
the French would "have to accept German sovereignty and German membership 
of NATO and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If they are 
to do this they must be given some striking quid pro quo. The assurance most 
likely to strike French opinion is the continued presence of British troops in 
Europe." The London conference opened on 28 September before Eden had an 
opportunity to gain ministerial approval for his proposed concessions. Churchill 
had been discussing with Dulles his "grave concern at possibility of having British 
troops committed to continent after US forces might have been withdrawn", while 
Mendes-France only seemed interested in discussing the new functions to be given 
to the Brussels Treaty Organisation. Relations between Eden and Churchill had 
been scarred by the issue of the succession and at a meeting of ministers that 
night the Foreign Secretary found Churchill "very difficult" to deal with. Eden 
explained that both Adenauer and the Canadian, Pearson, had appealed to him 
to make the offer of a permanent troop commitment. In response Churchill 
expressed his anxiety that the Americans would not be entering into a parallel 
commitment. Eventually the Prime Minister yielded, but only after he had noted 
that if "the French still refused to adopt a reasonable attitude it would 
subsequently be easier to impose the solution of ’the empty chair’." ^  The only 
other possible source of opposition was the Treasury, but they too seemed to be 
swayed by the prevalent mood of crisis. Crombie wrote that "the whole Western 
Defence structure is in jeopardy and we can hardly avoid taking some risks in its 
support". Nevertheless Treasury officials were somewhat alarmed by the speed 
with which the decision in favour of a commitment was taken. Faced with a fait 
accompli by Eden their task was to minimise the financial burden which would
13. CAB 128/27, CC(54)61st mtg., minute 1,21 September 1994; Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendes- 
France (UK edition, translated by George Holoch, Holmes and Meier, London 1984), p.280.
14. CAB 129/70, C(54)298, 27 September 1954; CAB 129/71, C(54)302, 30 September 1954; 
PREM 11/843, record of meeting on 28 September 1954; FO 800/779, Churchill to Eden, 27 
September 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Dulles to the President, 28 September 1954, p.1293; Robert 
Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1986), p.388, Young in Young 
(ed.), op.cit., p.98-9.
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result from the loss of occupation costs. ^
Eden made his statement on Britain’s contribution to continental defence 
at the fourth plenary session of the conference on 29 September. He pledged that 
Britain would maintain four divisions and the 2nd Tactical Air Force or their 
"equivalent fighting capacity" on the continent and that reductions would only be 
made with the consent of all the Brussels Treaty powers. However in the event 
of the commitment producing too great a strain on Britain’s finances Eden 
reserved the right to have the North Atlantic Council review the level of Britain’s 
contribution, while Britain also retained the right to withdraw from Europe, in the 
event of "an acute overseas emergency". Eden’s initiative was welcomed by the 
other powers at the conference and Dulles informed the President that it made 
"it almost impossible for France to reject a reasonable settlement of the conditions 
which would make possible the admission of Germany to NATO." In Spaak’s view 
the British offer "ensured the success of the conference". ^
Nevertheless, Mendes clung obdurately to French proposals for strict 
controls over German rearmament, including the idea of a European arms pool. 
The British Chiefs of Staff had examined these proposals in their draft form and 
concluded that they were "unduly cumbersome and difficult to implement." They 
were concerned as to whether the Germans could be trusted to act honestly, but 
concluded that the presence of Allied troops in the Federal Republic would 
ensure compliance. When the issue of restrictions on the German contribution was 
discussed, it was the Admiralty, who had always been the least enthusiastic of the 
three services about German rearmament, who were most concerned to impose 
restrictions. They insisted that Germany should not be allowed to manufacture 
warships above 2,500 tons, submarines or influence mines. At the London 
conference these issues were passed on to a working group, which reported back 
on 1 October. Their proposals largely concerned the strengthening of SACEUR’s 
powers and Mendes-France complained that the French proposal for limiting 
German arms manufacture through the use of the EDC concept of strategically
15. T225/414, Strath minute, 11 September 1954, Crombie minute, 10 September 1954, Crombie 
minute, 30 September 1954.
16. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, draft protocol to Brussels Treaty, Annex IIB, Statement by UK Secretary 
of State at Fourth Plenary Meeting of London conference, 29 September, p. 1361-2, Dulles to 
President, 29 September 1954, p.1366-7; Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle (translated by 
Henry Fox, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971), p.184-5.
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exposed areas and a common arms pool had been ignored. A settlement was
finally reached on 2 October based on Adenauer’s offer to voluntarily renounce
the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and not to
manufacture weapons on an agreed list unless authorised to do so by a two-thirds
majority of the Brussels Council. The list included long-range and guided missiles,
influence mines, warships larger than 3,000 tons, submarines of above 350 tons or
strategic bombers. The subject of the arms pool was referred to the Brussels
Treaty Council for further discussion. The Admiralty were disappointed that the
limits they had set for the German navy were to be exceeded, but with both Eden
and Churchill supporting the arms agreement there was little they could do to
17prevent its incorporation into the Final Act of the London conference/ At the 
Paris conference, during which the terms for German membership of NATO were 
finally confirmed, it was agreed that the revised Brussels Treaty Organisation, now 
renamed the Western European Union (WEU), would set a ceiling for the 
defence contributions of its members, that any proposed increase in these force 
levels would require unanimous approval by WEU, that until the occupation was 
officially terminated the occupying powers would retain their rights in the field of 
demilitarisation and that the French proposals for an arms pool would be studied
i o
by a special working group rather than the Brussels Council/ 0
Before the Allies could terminate the occupation it was necessary to reach 
agreement on the future status of their forces stationed in the Federal Republic 
and on the financial support which the Germans would offer them. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, during the summer of 1954 the Americans had suggested, 
and the Germans had demanded, a reduction in the current DM 600 million a 
month payment to the Allies. The British government and especially the Treasury 
were staunchly opposed to any such change, but feared that the French refusal to
17. DEFE 4/72, COS(54)102nd mtg., minute 1, 27 September 1954; DEFE 5/54 COS(54)311, 24 
September 1954; PREM 11/843, Rumbold to the Prime Minister, 2 October 1954; FRUS 1952-4, 
vol.5, Telegraphic Summary of 8th Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power conference, 2 October 
1954, p. 1321-3, Telegraphic Summary of 9th Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power conference, 3 
October 1954, p.1324-5, memo prepared by the French Delegation, p.1333-4, report by Working 
Party on a German Defence Contribution, 1 October 1954, p.1338-9, Final Act of the Nine-Power 
conference, p.1345-52.
18. FRUS 1952-4,vol.5, Telegraphic Summary of 2nd Plenary Meeting of the Nine Power 
conference, 21 October 1954, p. 1415-7, Draft Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Final 
Act of the London conference, 19 October 1954, p.1432, Protocol on the Termination of 
Occupation Regime, 21 October 1954, p.1434, Protocol to the Brussels Treaty, p.1441-57.
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accept EDC had placed Germany in a strong bargaining position. Their proposals 
for the London conference were that the Germans should continue to pay the DM 
600 million up to the date of German entry into NATO and should then pay on 
the previously agreed EDC scale which stipulated contributions of DM 400 million 
for six months, DM 300 million for the next two months and DM 200 million for 
the ninth month. However, the Germans were determined to revise these terms. 
They proposed that the DM 600 million a month arrangements should continue 
to the end of the year on condition that there was no increase in the reserves of 
unspent funds or carry-over, but that, in the expected interim period between the 
signing of the contract and German induction into NATO, DM 100 million should 
be deducted from the monthly payment and put into a fund which could be used 
for jointly agreed defence projects. Once West Germany entered NATO, and 
assuming that the other measures for a German defence contribution and the 
restoration of sovereignty were in force by 30 June 1955, the Federal Republic 
promised to make monthly payments of DM400 million for two months, DM300 
million for the four months after that and DM200 million for another six months. 
The German figures were supported by the Americans and accepted by the British 
on the grounds that if they had rejected them "finance would have been the only 
substantial matter disagreed in the London conference". Once again the financial 
argument yielded to the diplomatic. Nevertheless, Treasury officials estimated that 
British costs would be met in full up to the end of the 1954-5 financial year and 
that in the following year the extra costs would only be around £15-20 million. 
Macmillan told a somewhat sceptical House of Commons that the Paris 
Agreements would not entail any large increase in the costs of maintaining British 
forces on the continent of Europe in the foreseeable fu tu re.^
When at the end of the year it became necessary to seek yet another 
extension of the current agreement, the British adopted their customary tactic of 
arguing in favour of an extension of the existing agreement on the grounds that 
any changes were only likely to favour the Germans. However, the Foreign Office
19. CAB 134/1047, MAC(G)(54)10th mtg., 24 September 1954; T225/412, Turnbull memo to 
Crombie, 20 September 1954, undated Turnbull memo on Occupation Costs; T225/414, Crombie 
memo, 28 September 1954; FO 371/109772, CW1072/4, Jackling to UK High Commission, 23 
September 1954, CW 1072/10, Bonn (Hoyer-Millar) to FO, 11 October 1954, CW 10712/14, Bonn 
(Hoyer-Millar) to FO, 14 October 1954; The Parliamentaiy Debates, 5th series, vol.531, cols. 1929- 
35.
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decided that if it proved impossible to secure a continuation of the status quo,
they would accept the creation of a DM 100 million a month fund from the total
DM 600 million contribution for jointly agreed defence projects. The High
Commission eventually adopted a proposal which involved little change in the
financial deal struck in London. However, the DM 100 million fund would now
cover the interim period between the ratification of the Paris Agreements by the
Federal Republic and their implementation. The result of the long series of
financial negotiations was that the British got the full cost of their forces in
20Germany covered well into 1956. This outcome, which was far better than the 
most optimistic analysis made at the outset, was the result of two factors; the long 
delay in implementing German rearmament and the constant extension of the 
favourable 1952 agreement guaranteeing the Allies DM 600 million a month. The 
various Treasury projections of future additional costs had little impact on the 
debate over German rearmament. Initially it had seemed that the financial 
burdens involved might undermine Britain’s support for the policy but Butler 
never raised this issue. In later years, with the economy recovering and the date 
of German rearmament being constantly postponed, the financial factor had even 
less effect.
After the formality of having the Paris Agreements endorsed by the North 
Atlantic Council, the final task was to achieve ratification. As a result of 
Adenauer’s refusal to contemplate the restoration of the Federal Republic’s 
sovereignty without the conclusion of an agreement sanctioning German 
rearmament, the two issues had once again been fused together. Inside the 
Foreign Office, even at this very late stage, some officials were still unhappy about 
having to rearm Germany at all. R.A. Chaput de Saintonge, of the Foreign 
Office’s German Information Department, was convinced that the German 
generals would set themselves up as the true leaders of the German nation and 
that those forces "likely to oppose the renascent militarism", such as the Trade 
Unions, must be strengthened. Still more alarming was the fact that Adenauer
20. CAB 134/1047, MAC(G)(54)13th mtg., 2 December 1954; T 225/415, FO to Bonn, 4 December
1954, Hoyer-Millar(Bonn) to FO, 8 December 1954; T225/416, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 5 
January 1955. For the twelve months after May 1955 the British were to receive DM843 million, 
while the projected cost of their forces was DM902 million. See T225/416, Jackling memo, 4 May
1955, Allen (Bonn) to FO, May 1955.
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seemed to share these concerns. In mid-October the Foreign Office learned of a
conversation between the Chancellor, Spaak and Beck at Claridges during the
opening phase of the London conference. Adenauer told the Benelux ministers
"that he feared the resurgence of German nationalism and militarism and
wondered what would happen after he had disappeared from the scene if
European Union had not in the meantime been brought about." In Paris, Jebb,
who had always been sceptical about German rearmament and gave a particularly
alarming account of this conversation, seized on this admission. He wrote "there
is no doubt to my mind that an armed Germany will speak a very different
language. If indeed the Germans should then use their twelve divisions in an effort
to come to terms with the Soviet Union we should not, I suppose, be able to say
21that we were not warned." Despite this, the diplomatic consequences of re­
examining German rearmament were too great even to consider a change of 
policy. Eden told the House of Commons, "Much has been said and written in the 
last months of the importance of a German military contribution to the West, and 
I should be the last to under-estimate this. But for my part, if our hopes in these 
agreements can finally be realised, my greatest satisfaction will lie in the fact that
Germany can find her place in joint membership with countries she has in the
22past invaded. In no other way can we hope to rebuild our shattered Europe." ^ 
German rearmament continued to be unpopular in the Labour Party. At 
the Scarborough party conference in September 1954 the Bevanites submitted an 
amendment opposing German rearmament. Attlee declared "I am not in the least 
likely to underrate the danger of a resurgent military, nationalist Germany", and 
after much effort the NEC won the crucial vote by 3,270,000 votes to 3,022,000.
21. FO 371/109312, Cl 193/15, Chaput de Saintonge minute, 4 October 1954; FO 371/109638, CW 
1194/37, Allchin (Luxemburg) to Roberts, 19 October 1954, Jebb (Paris) to Harrison (FO), 10 
November 1954, In response to Jebb’s letters Hoyer-Millar restated the familiar concerns about 
a possible German-Soviet alignment and argued that there was no alternative to the current 
course. In London Warner was optimistic that the situation in Germany had improved since 1950 
but feared what would happen when Adenauer died. See FO 371/109639, CW 1194/54, Hoyer- 
Millar to Harrison, 25 November 1954, Warner minute, 6 December 1994.
22. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.531, cols. 1041-2. In a television broadcast in 
November Eden reiterated this view, declaring: "it never seemed to me that the German military 
contribution in defence, though it is important, is what really matters in the new arrangements. 
What really matters is the chance of Germany working with the West and our ending... this age­
long Franco-German feud which has cost us all so much. That’s what counts to me, the other is 
secondary". See Avon Papers, AP 14/3/259B, Transcript of a Press conference broadcast by the 
BBC, 19 November 1954.
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In November six Labour backbenchers defied party orders and voted against the
'y i
Paris Agreements. The whip was removed from the dissenters. As had been 
the case with EDC, however, the divisions which German rearmament caused in 
French society were more accurately reflected in the French National Assembly 
than equivalent concerns were in the British Parliament. In contrast to his 
indifference over EDC, Mendes-France gave the Paris Agreements his full 
backing, but this was insufficient to prevent the National Assembly defeating a 
motion for the creation of the WEU by 280 votes to 259 on Christmas Eve, 1954. 
At this stage even Jebb recommended that the French be given "a sharp knock 
on the head" which Eden duly delivered with a threat that unless this decision was 
reversed the other powers would go ahead and rearm Germany without any 
regard to French opinion. Eden had requested a joint Anglo-American statement 
but Dulles and Eisenhower refused. Both governments recognised the need for 
urgent action if, as Eden put it, "we are to hold the position not only in Germany 
but in other Western European countries". There was, however, no need to 
implement contingency plans calling for the "empty chair" for France in NATO 
because, on the night of 30 December, the French National Assembly reversed 
their position by 287 votes to 260 .^
There were to be further false alarms over the fate of the Paris 
Agreements, particularly when Faure replaced Mendes-France as Prime Minister 
in February 1955, but the British government began the new year confident of 
foreign policy success. For once there was actually almost complete unity within 
the government over policy towards Moscow. The consensus view was that once 
the Paris Agreements were brought into force the West would have its best 
opportunity yet to make a deal with the Soviet Union. These hopes were to some 
extent justified, as the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was to demonstrate, 
but on the crucial issue of Germany they were to prove misguided. Now that the
23. Philip M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A  Political Biography (Jonathan Cape, London 1979), 
p.331-4; Kenneth Harris, Attlee, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.522-5; The six who 
had the whip removed were Craddock, Stephens, Davies, Fernyhough, Yates, Emrys Hughes and 
Silverman. James Carmichael, Monslow, Crossman and Bevan all spoke out against the agreement 
in the Commons.
24. PREM 11/891, Jebb to FO, 24 December 1954; PREM 11/843, FO to Washington (Eden to 
Dulles), 27 December 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Diary entry by President’s Press Secretary, 24 
December 1954, p. 1522, memo of conversation by the Director of the Office of German Affairs 
(Lyon), 29 December 1954, p. 1532-3; Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Polity for West German Re­
armament (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 149; Lacouture, op.cit., p.321-5.
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West appeared to be in such a position of strength, the Foreign Office believed 
that it would be appropriate to offer some further concessions to the Soviet Union 
on the subject of unification. This idea was given some urgency by the belief that 
if progress towards German reunification was not made a process of political 
entropy would begin. Kirkpatrick and his officials believed that, whatever the 
successes of their policy so far, the situation in Germany was still volatile. 
Adenauer was an old man and it was feared that if he left the scene while 
Germany was still divided the possibility of doing a deal with Moscow might prove 
too tempting for his successors to resist. During 1955 the Foreign Office came up 
with a range of inducements in an effort to persuade the Soviets to accept 
unification on western terms but few of them were put on the negotiating table 
due to the opposition of Britain’s allies.
Eden had told the Commons during the debate on the Paris Agreements, 
"if we proceed calmly and steadily with these proposals we shall have better 
opportunities for negotiations than we have had for a very long time". 
Mendes-France could not, however, afford to adopt quite such a relaxed approach 
to the prospect of negotiations with Moscow. Even though he had forced the 
Paris Agreements through the National Assembly they still had to be approved by 
the Senate. On 5 January Mendes wrote to Eisenhower and Churchill to argue 
that a fresh approach to Moscow should be made in order to persuade French 
public opinion that ratification would not hinder efforts to reduce international 
tensions. He suggested a conference could be held in May. Though Jebb was not 
unsympathetic to this approach, Churchill and Eden were furious. The Foreign 
Secretary’s initial reaction was that any prospect of talks with the Soviets would 
delay ratification in France and Germany, but when Mendes accepted that a 
meeting could only occur after ratification he became still more angry. He warned 
that if Mendes went ahead with his proposals he would "wreck the alliance" and 
insisted "Jebb must stand up to the French on this."^ Meanwhile, Churchill 
drafted his own reply to Mendes in which he returned to his idea about an
25. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.533, col.414.
26. FO 371/118195, WG 1071/1, Jebb to FO, 3 January 1955, WG 1071/3, FO to Paris, 5 January 
1955, WG 1071/7, Jebb to FO, 6 January 1955, WG 1071/8, Mendes-France to Churchill, 5 
January 1955, WG 1071/16, Jebb to FO, 8 January 1955 with Eden minute; FO 371/118196, WG 
1071/29, Jebb to FO, 11 January 1955 with Eden minute, WG 1071/33, Aide-Memoire to Quai 
d’Orsay, 9 January 1955.
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alliance between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Germany. He threatened the 
French with the "Empty Chair" and went on to explain his view "that the United 
States with their immense superiority of nuclear weapons and acting in association 
with Great Britain, the British Commonwealth and the German Federal Republic 
will be strong enough, at any rate during the next few years, to afford to the 
Benelux countries and our other Allies... a definite and substantial security based 
on physical and moral deterrent power." However, that Churchill himself had not 
abandoned the hope of a meeting with the Soviets was clear from his statement, 
which the Foreign Office tried but failed to amend, that "The sooner we can get 
our united ratification the sooner the Top-Level Four-Power Conference may 
com e".^ With the Americans threatening that any French demarche on this 
subject would have "a very adverse influence on the future of the Western alliance 
and the role of France within it", Mendes gave up his hopes of an early 
summit.
The precariousness of Mendes-France’s position was conclusively proven
on 6 February when he was toppled from the premiership. In the British Foreign
Office this event caused dismay at the thought of yet more delays before
ratification could be completed. Warner suggested putting the contingency plans
which had been worked out with the Americans into final form and perhaps even
ending the occupation in the British and American zones independently of the
French. However, Harrison, who had taken over Roberts’s responsibilities for
German affairs, regarded Anglo-American plans to institute the ’Empty Chair’
proposal as "a counsel virtually of despair" and warned Jebb to be cautious in his 
29use of this threat. It was still an end to the occupation which was seen as the 
essential requirement if progress was to be made in solving the German problem. 
Two dispatches from Hoyer-Millar that same month highlighted the opposition 
within Germany to rearmament. He reported that many Germans "feel that the 
creation of armed forces would inevitably crystallise, for as long as can be 
foreseen, the partition of Germany and will by regularising the status of the
27. FO 371/118197, WG 1071/66, Churchill to Mendes-France (draft), January 1955, FO to Prime 
Minister, 11 January 1995, Churchill to Eden, 12 January 1955.
28. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, State Department to Embassy in France, 8 January 1955, p. 121.
29. FO 371/118200, WG 1071/166, Hancock minute, 7 February 1955, Harrison minute, 7 February 
1955; FO 371/118258, WG 1074/12, Harrison minute, 10 February 1955, WG 1074/10, Warner 
minute, 5 February 1955.
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Federal Republic as an American satellite, render impossible any deal with the 
Russians." Wright noted that it was "quite clear that the reunification issue had 
now assumed an overwhelming importance in German public opinion." Harrison 
complained that the emphasis given to Germany’s future defence role had been 
too great. He minuted "It has always struck me over the past 4 or 5 years that it 
has been a major blunder of SACEUR and of US policy to put all the emphasis 
on the need of their miserable twelve divisions for the effective defence of 
Europe. The right line today surely is that full and equal partnership in the
in
Western community involves for Germany obligations as well as rights."
Indifference about the "miserable twelve divisions" and concern about the 
state of German public opinion led the Foreign Office to begin considering a new 
approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Deputy High Commissioner 
in Bonn, Roger Allen, expressed "serious doubts" about whether it would be 
possible to achieve unification after the Paris Agreements, while warning that 
German sensitivities on this point would have to be taken into account "if we want 
to avoid having a disgruntled Germany as well as a dicky France in the team." 
Warner in London concurred with this analysis suggesting it might be "several 
decades" before reunification would be feasible. From Paris Jebb argued that 
given Germany’s past record it might be better not to make the attempt to reunify 
Germany. This elicited yet another reprimand for the unconventional ambassador. 
Revealingly, Jebb was told "German forces are, of course, required to defend the 
existing status quo but our policy and purpose is more dynamic...It is based on the 
premise that it is only when Western unity and strength has been consolidated 
that we shall be able to get down to serious negotiations with the Russians, 
looking eventually towards the reunification of Germany and the genuine
01
appeasement of Europe." 1 The Germans were keen to exploit British fears 
about the future. Despite a distinct lack of evidence von Braun, the Germany 
charge in London, told Turton, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, that there was not the same level of enthusiasm for WEU in
30. FO 371/118161, WG 10112/3, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 4 February 1955; FO 371/118258, 
WG 1074/15, Hoyer-Millar to Eden, 14 February 1955, Wright minute, 17 February 1955, Harrison 
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January 1955; WG 1071/113, Jebb to Kirkpatrick, 25 January 1955, Kirkpatrick minute, 25 January 
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Germany as there had been for EDC.
In March the Foreign Office produced a paper on the subject of East-West 
talks which confirmed that new thinking was taking place on the subject of 
unification and rearmament. It stated "We are this year as close to being able to 
talk on terms of equality with the Soviet leaders as we are likely to be in the 
foreseeable future...once ’saturation’ in thermo-nuclear weapons is reached, our 
relative military strength declines. Moreover the cohesion of the West may well 
be at a high point in the period immediately after the ratification of the Paris 
agreements." The paper also outlined the dangers of not talking with the Russians. 
The Foreign Office believed "Unless we make a demonstrably serious effort to 
reunify Germany, the Germans cannot be relied on to resist Russian 
blandishments." They argued for negotiations with the Soviets "as soon as seems 
practicable after ratification." In discussing a four-power conference they 
acknowledged "We cannot expect any concessions from the Russians unless we 
advance on our opinion at Berlin...the only possible advance would be to 
undertake that the Federal Government would suspend their plans for the raising 
of 12 divisions etc., contemplated in the Paris agreements pending the decision of 
an all-German Constituent Assembly."^ Though there were differences over 
the prospects of making a deal on Germany with the Soviets, there was unanimity 
that the effort should be made. Warner, who was generally sceptical about the 
prospect of a deal, wrote to Hoyer-Millar that "The recent Soviet initiative over 
Austria suggested that the Russians might be willing to seek some reasonable kind 
of compromise." Neither Allen nor Hoyer-Millar believed agreement with the 
Soviets was possible, but the latter was insistent that the West must adopt a more 
flexible attitude in order "to smoke the Russians out about reunification" and 
pacify German opinion.*^
The Foreign Office was determined that the next meeting would not be a 
repetition of Berlin and in late March and early April discussed a range of new
32. Opinion polls showed that the WEU solution was actually more popular in Germany than the 
EDC. See Deutsch and Edinger (eds.), Germany Rejoins the Powers (Octagon Books, New York, 
1973 edition), p.166; FO 371/118200, WG 1071/163, Turton minute, 4 February 1955.
33. FO 371/118204, WG 1071/278, FO to Washington, 26 March 1955 (two telegrams), WG 
1071/291, draft FO paper including proposals for a Four-Power conference at appendix, 24 March 
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proposals, including the withdrawal of troops from the whole or a part of the 
Federal Republic, the staging of the West German rearmament programme and 
the setting of a ceiling on German rearmament at the same level as the East 
German Volkspolizei. Initially, Kirkpatrick did not want the "possible ’bun’ to the 
Russians ventilated or discussed outside the office", but on 22 April he presented 
some of these ideas to the Chiefs of Staff. He stated bluntly that "we might be 
faced shortly with the difficult task of negotiating a German treaty with the 
Russians...If Russia suggested that Germany should be neutralised, and Germany 
estimated that this was the quickest way to unification, we would have to be very 
careful that we in no way appeared to be dragging our feet because such action 
might result in the Germans making a deal with Russia." He added that it had 
always been expected that a peace treaty would make "provision for some 
German Armed Forces, but they did not appear to be in a position either 
materially or psychologically to support a large force." The Chiefs were asked to 
consider various formulae for troop withdrawals from a united Germany, including 
neutralisation. The Joint Planning Staff reported that neutralisation of an armed 
Germany "would be fraught with the greatest military dangers", while the Soviets 
were unlikely to accept a reunited Germany which was free to invite NATO forces 
to advance to the Polish border. Surprisingly, however, the planners did not regard 
either the withdrawal of NATO forces to the Rhine or to the French frontier as 
militarily unsafe provided Soviet forces were withdrawn from East Germany. 
Though Kirkpatrick did not raise the subject of future arms limitations on a 
reunified Germany, Harding took it up. He suggested that Germany’s "forces 
should be of sufficient size not to tempt Russia to attack her, but at the same time 
there must be some safeguard against them becoming so strong that they could 
menace the stability of Western Europe." At this point discussion turned to the 
possibility of a reunified, non-aligned Germany acting as a bulwark against Soviet 
aggression and it was agreed the shape and size of the forces required by 
Germany to fulfil this role should be considered. Thus, because of Kirkpatrick’s 
failure to raise the issue of a force ceiling or a delay in West German rearmament 
openly, the military concentrated their attention on the possibility of NATO troop 
withdrawals as an inducement to the Soviets to agree to reunification. This in turn 
led to a study of the force levels which the Germans would require if they were
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35to confront the Soviets on the Polish border unsupported by NATO forces.
There was little doubt that the government of the Federal Republic would 
co-operate with the Foreign Office should they propose a phasing in of German 
rearmament. The Bundestag had voted in favour of the WEU agreement on 27 
February by a large majority of 314 votes to 157. Hoyer-Miller was, however, 
concerned that the strength of opposition to German rearmament in the Federal 
Republic would cause difficulties in the long term. Like so many other British 
diplomats he still did not really trust the Germans. In a dispatch addressed to the 
new Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, he stated "I cannot help having a 
sneaking feeling of relief that the Germans are so far failing to show, in their 
rearmament plans, the same skill and determination which they demonstrated to 
our great disadvantage in the years between the wars.” However, Hoyer-Millar was 
concerned that the anti-rearmament campaign might be symptomatic of a wider 
tendency towards neutralism. On 21 April he warned that "The coming end of the 
occupation has given encouragement to the ’national-neutralists’." He continued 
by stating that it was inevitable, following the thermo-nuclear revolution in 
warfare, that "the Germans should ask themselves whether their contribution of 
twelve divisions of conventional type will weigh at all in the strategic balance when 
many of them feel that it risks depriving Germany irrevocably of political benefits 
which she might otherwise one day hope to enjoy from Russia." He noted that one 
of Adenauer’s aides, von Herwarth, had suggested a contribution of 6 rather than 
12 divisions.^ Earlier he had speculated that the Chancellor himself might 
favour a delay in rearmament, writing that Adenauer "has always maintained that 
he is ready for Four-Power talks before the re-establishment of German armed 
forces is fully effective, the implications being that a favourable outcome of the 
talks might make possible a modification of rearmament plans." On 28 April 
Kirkpatrick met Blankenhom, who presented proposals for a force ceiling in a 
reunited Germany and the neutralisation of the Russian zone. Kirkpatrick was 
delighted and presented his own two favoured options of an agreement "that
35. FO 371/118206, WG 1071/379, Hancock minute, 1 April 1955, Harrison minute, 1 April 1955; 
DEFE 4/76, COS(55)28th mtg., minute 1,22 April 1955 including JP(55)30 (Final), 20 April 1955; 
DEFE 5/57, COS(55)74, 7 April 1955.
36. FO 371/118208, WG 1071/429, UK High Commissioner (Hoyer-Millar) to Macmillan, 21 April 
1955; FO 371/118321, WG 1192/61, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Macmillan, 12 April 1955.
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pending unification, the rearmament of Western Germany should be phased or 
should not exceed the strength of the volkspolizie", or acceptance by the West that 
they should "move out Anglo-American troops in return for the move of Russian 
troops".*^
Following Churchiirs resignation, Eden and Macmillan proved quite as 
eager as Churchill himself had been for a meeting with the Soviets. On 19 April 
Macmillan presented the Cabinet with a version of the Foreign Office paper on 
talks with the Soviet Union which had been written the previous month, including 
the suggestion of offering to delay German rearmament as part of a deal on 
unification. He explained that he was trying to secure a meeting of officials to 
discuss these ideas before the end of the month. ° The working party began its 
discussions in London on 27 April and completed its report on 5 May, the day on 
which the occupation of Germany ended and the Paris Agreements came into 
force. The British representative, Geoffrey Harrison, did not press for 
consideration of NATO troop withdrawals or the phasing in of German 
rearmament and instead the discussion of possible concessions to the Russians 
centred on a proposal by the German representative, Blankenhom, to offer them 
some kind of European security system. The final report did not indicate much 
of a change from the western position at Berlin. It stated that acceptance of the 
Eden Plan was "the essential first step" towards unification and, while mentioning 
the possibility of mutual assistance pacts and guarantees of frontiers, it stressed
on
their practical difficulties. 7 Harrison’s main efforts during the discussions were 
directed towards gaining agreement to a heads of government rather than a 
Foreign Ministers meeting. With Churchill removed from power Eden was now 
anxious for a summit, and on 26 April Macmillan informed the Cabinet of this 
shift in policy. During the course of the working party discussions the British
37. FO 371/118209, WG 1071/477, Kirkpatrick minute, 28 April 1955; FO 371/118324, WG 
1193/18, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 31 March 1955; FO 1008/347, Hancock to Hoyer-Millar, 2 
May 1955. Blankenhom seems to have been considerably less forthcoming on the subject of new 
concessions to the Soviets when he discussed the unification issue with the Americans. See FRUS 
1955-7, vol.5, Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 28 April 1955, p. 153-4, and 
Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 29 April 1955, p. 157-8.
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246
delegation were "disarmingly frank in acknowledging their proposals, particularly 
for meeting at summit, aimed at local electorate."^® On 6 May Eden wrote to 
Eisenhower urging him to accept the idea of a summit and explaining "much in 
our country depends upon it; this is not a party question here, but responds to a 
deep desire of our people." Eisenhower doubted such a meeting could be a 
success without some rough agenda which would have to be discussed by the 
western Foreign Ministers.^* Nevertheless, four days later the western powers 
invited the Soviet leaders to a summit meeting.
The British had given very little indication to the allies of the possible 
inducements which were under consideration. This reflected continuing uncertainty 
about the diplomatic and strategic implications of German reunification. On 11 
May the Joint Planning Staff completed their report on this subject. They 
concluded that a neutral Germany would have serious disadvantages for the 
western alliance. They argued that a neutral Germany might be lured towards the 
Soviet camp by an offer from Moscow to restore her pre-war borders in eastern 
Europe and that to keep Germany in the western orbit it would be necessary to 
extend NATO guarantees and give economic and political support. Strategically, 
a neutral Germany would necessitate a redeployment of NATO forces, the loss 
of the Baltic exits and of forward radar stations and airfields. Similar difficulties 
would arise if a united Germany was allowed to remain a member of NATO on 
condition that all foreign troops were withdrawn. In either case Germany would 
form the front line in any defence against a Soviet advance westwards. In an 
attempt to balance the need for a strong German force to counter a Soviet 
invasion against the threat a massive German army could pose to the West, the 
JPS suggested a united Germany free of all foreign troops ought to be allowed a 
force of 18 divisions and 1,200 aircraft. When the Chiefs of Staff discussed this 
report with Kirkpatrick, Dean and Hancock of the Foreign Office, it was 
acknowledged that the neutralisation of Germany would be "a major cold war 
defeat" and the Chiefs agreed that the unification of Germany combined with the
40. CAB 128/29, CM(55)6th mtg., minute 5, 26 April 1955: FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Delegation to 
London (Beam) to State Department, 27 April 1955, p. 151-2, Delegation to London (Beam) to 
State Department, 30 April 1955, p.160-161.
41. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Eden to Eisenhower, 6 May 1955, p. 164-5, Dulles to British Ambassador 
(Makins), 6 May 1955, p. 165-6, State Department to Dulles, 9 May 1955, p. 178-9.
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withdrawal of all foreign forces "comprised the minimum conditions that could be 
considered but the practical implications...should be considered."^ Thus instead 
of considering the phasing in of West German rearmament or the setting of a 
ceiling on German force levels, the military were concentrating their attention on 
the possibility of NATO force withdrawals. Before the opening of the summit for 
which Eden and Macmillan had worked so assiduously, all these options would be 
discounted in favour of the establishment of a demilitarised zone in the eastern 
half of a united Germany. Though less dangerous for the western allies, this 
proposal was bound to be unacceptable to the Soviets and so ensured that the 
plans made for German rearmament in 1951 would be implemented in 1956 with 
very little variation despite the five year hiatus.
At the beginning of June the British Embassy in Washington consulted the 
Americans on a new western plan for presentation to the Soviets at the planned 
summit. The brief supplied by the Foreign Office for ambassador Makins 
reiterated the theme that they had been emphasising since the start of the year; 
that the period between the ratification of the Paris agreements and the erosion 
of American nuclear superiority represented the optimum moment for 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. It stated that it was also "important that the 
Western negotiators should take account both of the political advantage of 
unifying Germany and of the need to impress the German people with the resolve 
of the West to achieve German unification." However, any solution must be 
based on the cardinal principles of free elections and Germany’s right to choose 
an alliance with the West. Within this framework a number of concessions were 
contemplated including the removal of all foreign troops from the east zone, from 
Germany east of the Rhine or from the entire country. Another option was the 
complete demilitarization of the east zone to include German as well as foreign 
troops. The draft went on to state "Additional variations could be made by 
providing for the liquidation of the East German forces (volkspolizei) or by 
offering to phase West German rearmament up to a stage equivalent to the 
Volkspolizei." Finally it was suggested that if a general disarmament plan could 
be agreed with the Russians, this could include a ceiling of perhaps 300,000 men
42. DEFE 4/76, COS(55)33rd mtg., 13 May 1955, minute 1, including JP(55)36 (Final), 11 May 
1955.
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on German forces. Even without a disarmament agreement the paper suggested 
a ceiling could be imposed on German forces either at the WEU figure of 12 
divisions or at some other level.^ The ill-defined nature of these proposals, 
which reflected the uncertainty in current British planning for Germany, seemed 
designed to create confusion and they had just that effect.
Makins outlined British ideas to the State Department over two days on 
2 and 3 June and, though he reported that the American officials V ere  clearly 
impressed by the comprehensive nature of our studies", in fact his presentation 
left numerous questions unanswered. The Americans warned that the plan for the 
westward move of NATO forces "might lead the Soviets to suggest withdrawal of 
American forces to the US in return for the withdrawal of their forces to the 
USSR" and also "questioned how inviting the British proposals might be to the 
Soviets". On the subject of the rearmament of West Germany up to the level of 
the Volkspolizei, Leishman of the British Embassy reported "Neither we nor the 
Americans when we mentioned this to them were quite clear what you had in 
mind. Would these be possible variations only in the case that Germany remained 
divided? If Germany were reunited, would not the all-German government take 
care of the Volkspolizei? Are you contemplating the possibility that the German 
build-up in the West could be modified in return for the disbandment of the 
Volkspolizei?" The vagueness of the Foreign Office reply only illuminated their 
own uncertainty about this subject. Hancock claimed the idea was Kirkpatrick’s 
and continued "I should not wish to be too explicit about its exact implications...as 
I understand...the idea would relate not necessarily to a divided Germany or to a 
reunited Germany but rather to the interim period between free elections and the 
transfer of powers to a civil Government. It might even apply during an earlier 
period when German reunification was the subject of Four-Power discussions. The 
idea of ’phasing’ is one which we have not examined closely and I should myself 
imagine that, if we got the military to advise on it they would see every kind of 
difficulty...The idea of West German rearmament up to a strength equivalent to 
that of the Volkspolizei is perhaps, one which would represent fewer practical 
difficulties." Hancock concluded, without any apparent use of irony: "I think you 
would be well advised not to make the attempt of explaining to the Americans
43. FO 371/118215, WG 1071/628, Harrison (FO) to Makins (Washington), 28 May 1955.
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what we mean.” In response to the Embassy’s queries about the strategic 
implications of the plans for mutual withdrawals the Foreign Office would only 
reply that the military were studying the problem .^
On 10 June the Chiefs considered two papers from the JPS which analysed 
the implications of the withdrawal of foreign troops from a united Germany and 
the preconditions which the Soviets were likely to set for any settlement. The JPS 
considered that the seminal point about the withdrawal of NATO forces to 
Germany’s western border was that it would require a complete revision of 
current strategy. As a result SACEUR "might regard it as impractical to defend 
the Eastern frontier on (sic) a reunified Germany unless Germany were allowed 
to raise much larger conventional forces than those at present assumed, and 
unless sufficient traditional air forces, with a nuclear capability, were retained on 
the continent to support them." The new estimate of the German forces required 
was 26 divisions. This was not likely to be acceptable to the Russians but if a 
ceiling on force levels was set at a lower level in order to propitiate Moscow "not 
only would Germany be unable to provide the replacement for the NATO forces 
which would be withdrawn from her territory, but she would be unable to defend 
herself." The Chiefs took up this issue stating "Our defence in Western Europe 
could only be effective if our withdrawal from Germany were so timed that our 
forces could be replaced by German forces. This would, however, mean that 
Germany might raise larger forces than at present envisaged, which might not be 
possible of fulfilment." They were convinced that the problems of large scale 
redeployment were almost insurmountable and revised the section of the JPS 
paper covering Soviet preconditions to state 'The defence of Western Europe 
cannot be assured except by the use of German territory and the use of 
infrastructure that has been built there." Dickson was particularly vehement that 
the West now had the advantage in the Cold War and should not lose it at the 
negotiating table. He suggested that redeployment could only be considered in the
44. FO 371/118215, WG 1071/632, Makins (Washington) to FO, 3 June 1955, WG 1071/636, 
memo by Makins, 2 June 1955, Warner minute, 7 June 1955; FO 371/118216, WG 1071/653, 
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context of an effective disarmament treaty.^
The reluctance of the Foreign Office to pursue Kirkpatrick’s ideas about 
phasing German rearmament or setting a limit on it, combined with the rejection 
by the Chiefs of a policy of mutual withdrawals, marked a watershed in British 
policy towards future negotiations with the Soviet Union. The former notions 
would perhaps have involved a reduced German defence contribution, while the 
latter implied an increase in the size of German forces. The Foreign Office 
seemed to believe that with the Paris Agreements now ratified, the scale and rate 
of German military build-up were of little consequence in comparison with the 
advantages of a possible deal with the Soviets on unification or, at least, a 
propaganda victory at the forthcoming summit meeting. The military, not 
surprisingly, were more concerned with creating an effective defence system in 
Western Europe. Any of the concessions suggested by the Foreign Office would 
require changes in NATO strategy. The Chiefs were not consulted on the issue of 
force ceilings and concluded that a NATO withdrawal from Germany would be 
too damaging to the alliance. As a result attention now shifted to the prospect of 
a one sided withdrawal involving a Soviet evacuation of the eastern zone of 
Germany. This had fewer implications for German rearmament and was never 
likely to be acceptable to the Soviets and can, therefore, be dealt with more 
briefly.
On 7 June the Foreign Office received reports that the Germans supported 
the linking of unification to disarmament and that they were considering a 
proposal to create a demilitarised zone in the eastern half of Germany which 
could also incorporate parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland. When the Foreign 
Ministers met with Adenauer in New York later that month, Macmillan found that 
Adenauer’s ideas on unification were very similar to his own. The Chancellor 
stressed that he was quite willing to accept a ceiling of 12 divisions on the forces 
of a united Germany, while his military adviser, Heusinger, outlined plans for a 
demilitarised zone along the Stettin-Prague-Vienna axis. The German plan also 
incorporated the idea of additional zones to the east and west of the demilitarised 
zone in which there would be a ceiling on force levels. Macmillan told Adenauer
45. DEFE 4/77, COS(55)41st mtg., minute 2, 10 June 1955; DEFE 5/58, COS(55)132, 10 June 
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"our minds were working on lines not dissimilar to those which he had outlined". 
He instructed the Foreign Office and the Chiefs to consider the Heusinger Plan 
and their initial reaction was favourable.^ By 23 June the Joint Planners had 
produced a variant of the Heusinger Plan based on a trizonal division of 
continental Europe. The central zone, consisting of the Soviet area of Germany 
and western areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be completely 
demilitarized to the extent of the removal of all arms industries; a second zone, 
consisting of eastern Poland and Western Germany, would have limits on 
conventional force sizes and prohibitions on rocket and missile sites; while an 
outer zone covering Europe from the Pyrenees to Riga in the Soviet Union would 
have forces of equal strength. The Chiefs stressed that disengagement in central 
Europe would not necessarily entail a reduction in the strength of the forces 
required for western defence and that the forces allowed in western Germany 
should be sufficiently large to contain the British, American and Canadian units 
currently stationed there. They also wanted the forces in the outer zone to be set 
as close to current NATO force levels as possible "as any higher level would be
A  *7
to our disadvantage." A week later the Chiefs considered a much simpler plan
for the creation of a narrow demilitarised strip in Central Europe. Once again
they wished to ensure that any deal with the Russians involved as little disruption
to NATO as possible. Their report stated that the Wismer-Elbe-Saale line was the
best defensive position for NATO and that it was "essential therefore that the line
48of the Elbe-Saale is not included in the demilitarised strip."
By the beginning of July the Foreign Office had prepared a formula for
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German unification for presentation to the Americans. It suggested that the West 
should inform the Soviet Union that they were "prepared in principle to agree to 
a completely demilitarised area between East and West, accompanied by a 
Security Pact and, if the Russians desire it, an agreement as to the total and 
stationing of Russian and satellite forces on the one hand and the forces of 
NATO countries on the other in Germany and the countries of Europe 
neighbouring Germany." When Makins presented the British zonal plan and the 
demilitarised strip plan to State Department officials on 1 July the Americans 
were quick to point out that these ideas were unlikely to be regarded with much 
favour in Moscow. The British Ambassador had no effective response except to 
say "the demilitarised strip might be less unpalatable than the other proposal." 
When he reported the results of the meeting to the Foreign Office they quickly 
agreed to drop the zonal plan but refused to accede to Makins’s request for more 
details on the demilitarised strip id ea .^  On 8 July Makins raised the issue with 
Dulles who made clear that there were numerous military objections to a 
demilitarised strip in central Europe. While he might be willing to accept the idea 
as the basis of a long-term solution, he did not want it raised at the Geneva 
summit.^® At the preliminary meeting of western Foreign Ministers Macmillan 
pressed for the inclusion of the British proposal in western presentations at the 
Geneva summit but both Dulles and Pinay opposed this. The matter was remitted 
to the Heads of Government when, as so often in the past, Eden acceded to 
American wishes and agreed "that anything which might be said about a 
demilitarised zone must be tentative and vague."^
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The Geneva Heads of Government conference was marked by cordiality
and a complete failure to reach agreement on any of the current outstanding
issues. The Soviets presented proposals for a disarmament treaty and a European
security system, while the West advocated unification of Germany through free
elections and a five power mutual security pact. At the third plenary session on
20 July Eden mentioned that some force limitations on Germany and
neighbouring countries could be agreed as part of a deal on unification. He had
already raised the matter bilaterally with the Soviets, but during the four power
meetings Eisenhower seemed anxious to end the fruitless debate on the terms for
unification and the British proposals were not formally tabled. Instead the
remainder of the Geneva conference was taken up with jejune discussions of
whether European security or Germany should have priority on the agenda for the
52future Foreign Ministers conference. The second Geneva conference of the 
year, at which the Foreign Ministers met to reconsider the issues the Heads of 
Government had examined previously, opened on 27 October and proved as 
fruitless as its predecessor. The British government prepared yet another variant 
of their demilitarisation scheme and combined it with the offer of an East-West 
reciprocal guarantee against attack but once again found that Dulles was 
determined to emasculate any new initiative. The Soviets showed little interest in 
the idea of unification and seemed more concerned about consolidating their hold 
in East Germany. Macmillan informed his colleagues a week before the 
conference opened that he believed "that the Russians were not prepared to leave 
Germany."^
Thus the ill-co-ordinated British attempt to revise the settlement reached 
at Paris in October 1954 ended in failure. However, the fact that it was
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undertaken at all is revealing. It was the result of a belief that the Russians might 
be amenable to a deal on German unification now that the West had 
demonstrated its solidarity, and fear that the situation in Germany remained 
dangerously unstable. Though the former thesis was falsified, British diplomats still 
clung to the latter conviction, as an analysis of their reactions to the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union 
reveals. Adenauer paid his first visit to Moscow in September 1955. Both before 
and during his trip he issued a stream of reassurances to the western allies that 
he had no intention of making any concessions to the Soviets. Thus when it was 
revealed that he had agreed to the granting of full diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union in return for the release of 10,000 German prisoners who had been 
held in Russia since the end of the war, western diplomats reacted with outrage. 
The American Ambassador to Moscow, Charles Bohlen, declared that the "Soviets 
have achieved probably their greatest diplomatic victory in the post-war period." 
His British colleague, Sir William Hayter, commented "the German Chancellor has 
thrown away his most treasured card and gained nothing at all in return ."^
Ironically, the reaction in London was far more composed. Foreign Office 
cynicism about German motives insulated officials against any sense of shock. 
They were expecting the Germans to try and come to some kind of agreement 
with the Soviets and were delighted that Adenauer’s encounters had been so 
bruising. Having received the verdict from the British embassy in Bonn that the 
Germans "have been taken for a ride by the Russians...the Germans may be wary 
how they come within reach of the bears hug again", Harrison concluded: "the visit 
will at least have had the salutary effect of destroying certain incipient German 
illusions, specifically, (a) that the Germans if given the chance, could deal with the 
Russians and (b) that reunification was perhaps not necessarily so far off." Though 
there was not quite the same level of virulent anti-Germanism as to be found in 
France, ten years after the end of the war British officials remained bitterly 
distrustful of the Germans, with the exception of the reliable Adenauer. On 4 
October Hoyer-Millar sent a report to London describing the views of the
54. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to State Department, 14 
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departing French Ambassador, Francois-Poncet. The erstwhile French High 
Commissioner had a gloomy view of the future and suggested that "the re­
establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow would only make things worse." 
In response Kirkpatrick criticised Francois-Poncet for his partisanship but 
conceded "that we must look to the future of Germany with some misgivings. The 
Germans are so stupid politically that one cannot rely on them to see on which 
side their bread is buttered, and they have a sneaking longing to commit suicide. 
The consequence is that their conduct of affairs is unstable, hysterical and 
unpredictable...The most urgent and real German danger we have to face is the 
deeply implanted German longing to do a deal with Russia. I agree...that the 
opening of direct Russo-German diplomatic relations is unfortunate. But, of 
course, this need not be fatal and will not in my opinion be even seriously 
damaging so long as Adenauer is at the helm."^
Another cause for alarm was that in planning Germany’s contribution to 
western defence the nascent German defence ministry, or Blank Office, adopted 
a latitudinarian approach to the guidelines provided by the Allies. As early as 
February 1955, with the Paris Agreements still unratified, it was clear that they 
intended to have six armoured and six infantry divisions instead of four armoured 
and eight infantry divisions, and that they were planning to reduce the manpower 
committed to these formations to enable them to create specialised brigades. By 
August Hoyer-Millar was reporting that the Germans were intending to increase 
the number of their all-weather fighters and reconnaissance planes at the expense 
of fighter-bombers.^ However, when the Chiefs of Staff were asked to consider 
the German plans in November, it was clear to them that the main changes 
related to Germany’s naval forces. The Germans intended to operate 18 
destroyers, 6 ocean going minesweepers and 12 submarines despite the fact that 
none of these types of craft had been allowed to them under the EDC. In addition 
the manpower allotted to the German navy had been increased from 20,500 to 
35,000. Though the War Office and Air Ministry accepted that the changes made
55 FO 371/118248, WG 1071/1258, Hoyer-Millar to Johnston with memo, 4 October 1955, Warner 
to Hoyer-Millar, 14 October 1955.
56. FO 371/118323, WG 1193/12, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Eden, 23 February 1955; FO 
371/118325, WG 1193/42, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Eden, 29 June 1955; FO 371/118327, WG 
1193/56, Allen (Bonn) to Macmillan, 16 August 1955.
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by the Germans in their spheres of competence did not go beyond the "equivalent
fighting capacity" of the EDC figures, at a meeting of the Chiefs on 29 November
Mountbatten made clear the Admiralty’s concerns. He said that the German plans
"would provide a force entirely different in concept from that originally proposed
under the EDC Treaty. The force now planned was offensive in character...the
German navy now planned was a much more effective force than that originally
envisaged and provided that Germany remained in NATO and allied to the West,
it would be greatly to our advantage and that of NATO. We should note,
however, that if at some future date the German desire for reunification
outweighed their leaning towards an alliance with the West, then this new and
large offensive Navy would be a dangerous factor in the situation." It was agreed
by the Committee "That if ever there was a revival of Germany’s political position
then the German navy, as now proposed, might constitute a serious danger. This
57fact ought to be brought to the attention of the Foreign Secretary."
On 2 January 1956 at separate ceremonies in Andemach, Wilhelmshaven 
and Norvinick the first recruits of the new German armed forces were inducted 
into the three services. In 1945 the creation of a new German military machine 
was regarded as anathema by practically all responsible statesmen. By the end of
1949 the western powers were beginning to contemplate rearmament in their 
zones and the Soviets had already begun the process in the east. In December
1950 and again in May 1952 West German rearmament appeared imminent, but 
on both occasions the French effectively sabotaged the project. From the British 
perspective what is remarkable is how little influence the Attlee and Churchill 
governments had over either bringing forward or postponing the date of German 
rearmament. Immediately after the war, with the possible exception of Churchill, 
British statesmen and officials shared in the consensus that Germany must be 
permanently disarmed. Following the public discussion of rearmament at the end 
of 1949, in the spring of 1950 the British government formulated a cautious 
compromise plan which was shattered by the conflict of American and French 
policies. In 1951 the Attlee government was the principal opponent of the 
European Army, only to find it adopted by the American government. From 1952
57. FO 1008/368, Beagley (UK Permanent Delegation to NATO) to Ward, 5 December 1955; 
DEFE 4/81, COS(55)98th mtg., minute 1, 29 November 1955; DEFE 5/63, COS(55)320, 29 
November 1955; DEFE 6/31, JP(55)150 (Final), 28 November 1955.
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the British were unable to overcome French opposition to the compromise deal 
agreed in May of that year.
The argument of this thesis has been that the continuing antipathy towards 
the Germans felt in Westminster and Whitehall is crucial to an understanding of 
Britain’s policy towards German rearmament. At the simplest level it explains the 
backlash against German rearmament which occurred in the year following the 
New York conference of September 1950. In a more complex way it explains the 
subsequent advocacy of German rearmament after it was tied to the contract in 
the May 1952 treaty complex. It was believed by British policy-makers that unless 
Germany was granted its sovereignty, which now included its military sovereignty, 
the politically "stupid" Germans would seek a deal with the Soviet Union which 
would be the greatest disaster imaginable for British diplomacy. Once agreement 
on the implementation of the contract was reached with the ratification of the 
Paris Agreements, the Foreign Office became interested in the possibility of 
bargaining away some of the military advantages of a German defence 
contribution for Russian concessions on German unification. However, these ideas 
were never fully developed and the negative results of the Geneva conference 
restored the status quo.
The British military’s view of German rearmament had always been distinct 
from that of the Foreign Office. The Army and the Air Force initially regarded 
a German defence contribution as essential to the expansion of NATO’s resources 
on the central front, which was the basic requirement of an effective defence. As 
East-West tension reduced, arsenals expanded and economies became strained, 
a new Alliance strategy emerged which concentrated on increasing capability 
through the deployment of nuclear weapons, and the Chiefs of Staff increasingly 
regarded German rearmament as a method of compensating for the failure of the 
Allies, including Britain, to provide adequate conventional forces, even for the 
revised nuclear strategy. The Navy was always the most sceptical about the need 
for a large German contribution and this pattern continued up to the end of 1955.
The period from September 1954 was significant because for a brief period 
after this date British diplomacy operated free from the restraints imposed by fear 
of the Soviet Union and overbearing American pressure. Though the WEU 
compromise fashioned by Eden was designed to allow German rearmament in a
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European context, it should be stressed that the primary aim of British diplomacy 
was to implement the contract. A solution to the rearmament problem only 
became urgent when Adenauer refused to separate it from the grant of 
sovereignty to the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the Paris Agreements were a 
major achievement, not least because they seemed to offer the prospect of a new 
flexibility in Britain’s attitude towards negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is 
why the events of 1955 form a fascinating coda to the controversy over German 
rearmament. Bruno Thoss has argued that during this period the British 
considered a smaller German defence contribution because they recognised that 
some concessions would be necessary in response to the more conciliatory Soviet 
policy, and that their aim was to forestall any American offer of troop reductions
C O
which might involve an American withdrawal from Europe. Actually the 
British were still concerned about Germany’s future and it was to forestall any 
drift in the Federal Republic towards an alliance with the Soviets that they 
considered a variety of schemes to allow them greater flexibility in any future 
negotiations with the new Soviet leaders. In considering the possible role of 
German armed forces in a united country they paid very little attention to military 
factors but when they did consult the Chiefs, the Foreign Office discovered that 
the 12 German divisions remained an integral part of Alliance strategy and that 
under some circumstances an even larger force might be required. However, it 
was the interest of the two superpowers in maintaining their respective positions 
in a divided Germany, rather than any internal dissension within the government, 
which ensured that the plans devised for Germany’s future by British policy­
makers were, like many earlier British initiatives, rendered redundant.
58 Bruno Thoss, ’American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956’ in 
Diefendorf, Frohn and Rupieper (eds.), ’American Policy and the Reconstruction of West 
Germany, 1949-1955’ (Cambridge University Press, 1993) p.426.
CONCLUSION
The current consensus concerning the development of Britain’s policy 
towards the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany needs revision. In 
narrative terms the story is generally perceived as having begun in June 1950 with 
the Korean War and ended in September 1954 with the agreement on the WEU 
at the London Conference. Yet the British government had actually decided on 
a long term plan for German rearmament in May 1950 and the genesis of this 
decision can be traced back to November 1949. Furthermore, the ratification of 
the Paris agreements in May 1955 sparked off renewed debate in the Foreign 
Office about the scale and nature of German rearmament. There is also a need 
to revise current orthodoxies relating to British policy between 1950 and 1954. The 
extent of the backlash against German rearmament precipitated by the Korean 
War and the Labour government’s enthusiasm for a deal with the Soviets on 
Germany have both been underestimated; the Anglo-American disputes over the 
nature of German arms production are seldom discussed; the widespread support 
for the EDC rather than the NATO solution, particularly in the military, is rarely 
recognised; while the willingness of the British government to delay German 
rearmament in order to implement the contract in the summer of 1954 has not 
been properly acknowledged.
In more general terms there is a need to reconsider the motivation behind 
British policy. Though it is evident that the British eventually accepted German 
rearmament for diplomatic reasons, it remains unclear whether this was part of 
a more general Cold War strategy aimed at strengthening western solidarity or the 
result of a fear which predated the Cold War: that German instability was a 
potent threat to European peace and that finding a means of controlling the 
nascent West German state was an urgent priority. A detailed analysis of British 
views proves that the latter consideration was of greater importance. In addition, 
though the pervasive influence of American pressure on British policy has, quite 
rightly, been acknowledged, with the exception of Churchill’s May 1953 speech, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the constant British interest in possible 
Soviet reactions.
It is also necessary to examine the military and economic implications of 
German rearmament before one can discount them as a factor in the British
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debate. Indeed, such an examination shows that on at least one occasion the 
military rationale for German rearmament overrode diplomatic objections. This 
occurred at the outset of the debate when Bevin approved the Chiefs’ 
gendarmerie scheme. Though Bevin was somewhat tentative in revealing to the 
Allies that the arming of a West German gendarmerie was seen as a long term 
solution to the problem of a German defence contribution, it is quite clear that 
in May 1950 the Attlee administration was more prepared than the other western 
powers to contemplate this somewhat unpalatable option.-^ The British military 
were convinced that an effective defence for western Europe required a measure 
of German rearmament and the formation of a gendarmerie appeared to be the 
least dangerous method of achieving it. Bevin accepted the scheme even though 
the Foreign Office were reluctant to press ahead with any measure of German 
rearmament. French and American hostility to the plan, combined with the 
outbreak of the Korean War, caused its abandonment. It had never been put to 
the full Cabinet and only a small circle of ministers and officials knew of it. The 
widening of the debate in late 1950 which resulted from the presentation of the 
American ’package* proposal produced a powerful coalition of Germanophobic 
government officials and Labour politicians who were determined to block 
German rearmament. Instead of being confronted by the long-term, cautious 
proposals accepted by Bevin in May, they were presented with an American plan 
calling for the creation of a large German army at an early date. Thus western 
policy towards German rearmament developed on an entirely different basis from 
that which Bevin had envisaged.
However, the main factor which persuaded the government to oppose the 
idea of early German rearmament was the Korean War. Though most writers 
have suggested that the Korean War galvanised the western powers into accepting 
a German military build-up, it actually had the contrary effect in Britain. It
1. The most accurate accounts of this situation come from two German historians but they only 
deal with the matter in cursory fashion. See Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German 
Politician in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, vol.l, (British Edition, Berghahn 
Books, Oxford, 1995), p.524-9 and Matthias Peter, ‘Britain, the Cold War and the Economics of 
German Rearmament’ in Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Macmillan, London,
1990), p.277-8.
2. Christian Greiner, ‘The Defence of Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany’ in Riste 
(ed.), Western European Security and Atlantic Defence, 1947-1953 (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1985), p.172; Klaus Larres, ‘Reunification or Integration with the West?: Britain and 
the Federal Republic of Germany in the Early 1950s’ in Aldrich and Hopkins (eds.) Intelligence,
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convinced the Foreign Office that an armed gendarmerie was essential for dealing
with intra-German conflict on the Korean model, and could not therefore be the
basis for a German army. Chinese intervention produced an even stronger
backlash against the policy because it increased concerns about possible Soviet
retaliation. Finally, the massive western build-up now planned by NATO appeared
to render any plans for the incorporation of German units impractical on the
grounds of cost and equipment shortages. In the first months of 1951 a number
of senior Foreign Office officials, the majority of the Cabinet and even the Chief
of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, were convinced that German rearmament should
be delayed. However, the idea that it should be traded in return for Soviet
concessions at a Foreign Ministers conference was less widely accepted. This
policy was advocated by a group of Labour ministers led by Attlee and, like the
gendarmerie scheme before it, foundered on allied opposition. At the preliminary
meetings in Paris it became clear that the Americans were not prepared to
compromise with Moscow even on the subject of an agenda. As on so many
occasions the shelving of a British scheme has resulted in a neglect of it in the 
•2
secondary literature.
There is a similar gap in discussions of the initial EDC negotiations. A 
great deal has been written on the controversy surrounding Eden’s Rome press 
conference and the refusal of the British government to join the community,^ but 
the Anglo-American controversies over German production of heavy military 
equipment, short range missiles and civil aircraft have been neglected. 
Consequently, the fact that Eden and the Foreign Office continued to have
Defence and Diplomacy: British Foreign Policy in the Post-War World (Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994), 
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York, 1988), p.12.
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Nicolson, London, 1973), p.483.
4. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament (Cambridge University Press,
1991), ch.5; Maj-Gen Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History 
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concerns about the extent of German rearmament has been ignored. Though 
Eden’s return had coincided with a shift in opinion at the Foreign Office in favour 
of arming the Germans, the British government remained intensely suspicious of 
the Germans and were convinced of the need for extensive safeguards to 
accompany it.
There was a clear division between those who regarded EDC as the best 
vehicle for containing the German threat and those who favoured a NATO 
solution. The commonly held view that the British always viewed NATO as the 
best solution^ is erroneous. Sir William Strang, though unenthusiastic about 
German rearmament in general, was willing to accept EDC as the most effective 
means of controlling it. The Chiefs of Staff were constant in their advocacy of 
EDC as the best solution to the German problem. Thus, it was not merely to 
avoid American censure that Eden made a whole series of concessions designed 
to secure French ratification. His policy reflected a genuine commitment to the 
treaty as a means of resolving the Franco-German antagonism and the dilemma 
of German rearmament without unduly provoking the Soviets.**
Within the government it was Churchill who was the principal opponent 
of EDC and his constant opposition to it is another of the reasons why the British 
have been castigated for their lack of support for EDC. His attempt to overturn 
the treaty in May 1953 is the most well-documented episode in the history of his
*7
second premiership. However, his plans met with strong opposition from both 
within and outside the government and his failure left the status quo on the 
subject of German rearmament untouched. By contrast, in the summer of 1954
5. James, op. cit., p.347; Carlton op. cit., p.361; Witness Seminar, British Attitudes Towards 
German Rearmament and Reunification in the 1950s, Contemporary Record 5, 1991, p.292-3; 
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263
the government adopted a policy of delaying the creation of a German army in 
order to save the contract, which involved the revision of current orthodoxies and 
left Churchill once again isolated, but this time in defence of the policy of early 
German rearmament. Despite his objections the British and Americans developed 
a scheme designed to restore the sovereignty of Germany, without a resolution of 
the rearmament question. The significant difference between their approaches was 
that whereas the Americans wished to acknowledge that the Federal Republic had 
the right to rearm and impose a deadline for ending the policy of demilitarisation 
the British, and especially Eden, would not agree to any formula which committed 
them on the timing or nature of German rearmament after a contractual 
settlement. Once again it was clear that the political rather than the military
o
rationale was paramount.
This was only confirmed by the events which followed the ratification of the 
Paris Agreements in 1955. In preparing for the Geneva conference that year 
Kirkpatrick and his officials adumbrated a range of diplomatic formulae on 
Germany, while displaying a supreme disregard for the importance of the 12 
divisions which the Federal Republic was supposed to contribute to western 
defence. These various initiatives were the culmination of long-standing British 
concerns about Germany’s future. It was not that the Foreign Office saw a larger 
German defence contribution as a significantly greater military threat, but that 
they believed that support for the western alliance in Germany was fragile and 
that Adenauer’s death or retirement could shatter it. They wished to take 
advantage of the favourable circumstances prevailing in 1955 to make a further 
attempt at demonstrating to the Germans where their interests lay. Britain’s 
diplomatic strategy during the Geneva conferences is a subject worthy of further
Qexamination.
Ten years after the end of the Second World War the British government 
remained suspicious of German intentions. This unease can be traced back at least 
as far as British distaste for the autocratic domineering Germany over which
8. Brief reference is made to this episode in Dockrill (1991), op. cit., p. 140-1, Bork and Gress op. 
cit., p.329 and Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy mid the United States of Europe (St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1993), p.58.
9. For a recent study see Rolf Steininger, ’Zwischen Paiser Vertragen und Genfer 
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Bismarck presided. Though the British have occasionally been portrayed as 
enthusiastic advocates of a German defence contribution,-^ the policy was 
actually only accepted with great reluctance. Some writers have argued that the 
primary impulse behind British policy was the belief that it was imperative to 
integrate the nascent West German polity into the evolving western 
community.^ This is an accurate description of the consensus which had 
developed by May 1952 and which governed British policy for the next two years. 
However, it does not give sufficient emphasis to the visceral antipathy to the 
Germans which underlay this policy and consequently does not explain the strong 
opposition to German rearmament in the 1950-51 period. Furthermore, it lays 
insufficient stress on the fact that this policy was to a large degree forced on the 
British by the linking of the EDC and the contract. When the prospect of 
decoupling these emerged, the British embraced the idea with enthusiasm. 
Nevertheless, the general point that the predominant rationale for German 
rearmament was a diplomatic one and the linking of the issue to western 
integration is a significant advance in the historiography of post-war British 
attitudes to the Federal Republic.
Those writers who have stressed the reluctance of Britain to rearm and the 
role of "relentless American pressure",^ also have a good case but their 
arguments require perhaps more substantial revision than those who stress the 
integrationist rationale. The importance of the series of independent foreign policy 
forays undertaken by the British government has been obscured by the study of 
the methods by which the Americans stifled British initiative in this field. The fact 
that London was marginally more willing to accept a NATO solution than 
Washington does not seem as important as the fact that in the spring of 1950 they 
developed their own plans for the creation of German armed forces or that in 
1955 they considered modifying the WEU compromise.
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It is only when one takes account of the Anglo-Soviet relationship that the 
whole picture becomes clear. Britain’s policy for German rearmament was 
predicated on the existence of a long term, rather than an immediate, Soviet 
threat. The gendarmerie scheme was designed as a solution to the problem of the 
Soviet Union’s vast military superiority. When the threat of an early war increased, 
a strong reaction against the whole idea of German rearmament set in. It was not 
merely American pressure, but also the apparently quiescent attitude of the Soviet 
Union which persuaded the British government to take the EDC option in late 
1951. As Eden noted at Berlin, the European Army project appeared to be the 
least provocative form of German rearmament and this was one reason why it had 
many supporters within the British government. Furthermore, one must 
acknowledge that by this stage the British were increasingly interested in the idea 
of detente with the Soviet Union. ^  In 1951, 1953 and 1955 the possibility of 
concessions to the Soviets on the subject of German rearmament was discussed 
as a means of achieving a rapprochement with Moscow.
The corollary of the integrationist thesis is that military and economic 
motives were subordinate to diplomatic considerations in the debate over the 
Federal Republic’s defence contribution. This is substantially correct but the 
details of the development of British thinking about these aspects of policy are 
enlightening and have not been fully considered. The arguments presented by the 
Chiefs of Staff, and particularly Slessor, were based not on a more favourable 
assessment of German reliability, but on a belief that a strategic revolution had 
occurred which removed the long-standing German threat. They believed that 
Germany was so vulnerable to the threat of strategic bombardment, including 
nuclear attack, that she could never again undertake a policy of aggression. 
However, the Labour government was much more concerned by the military’s 
confession that the danger of Soviet aggression would increase in the period 
immediately prior to the creation of German armed forces, and from the spring 
of 1950 the Chiefs’ arguments were increasingly marginalised. Indeed at the start 
of 1951 Slessor himself began to have doubts about the policy. The 1952 Global 
Strategy Paper amounted to a recognition that once NATO had increased its
13. Young, 1995 op. cit.; Brian White, Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations 
(Routledge, London, 1972), ch.4; F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, Britain and Soviet 
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nuclear capability a German defence contribution was not essential to western 
defence. This was a controversial thesis and the Chiefs did not press the point 
during the next three years. Instead, under pressure from the Treasury to accept 
a ceiling on defence expenditure, they increasingly regarded German armed forces 
as a substitute for their own continental commitment. This fact helps put the 
subsequent decision to reduce the size of the BAOR into context.
There has only been one serious attempt to consider the role of economic 
factors in Britain’s decision to accept German rearmament. ^  This is surprising 
in light of the potentially serious repercussions which the policy of German 
rearmament had for Britain’s financial position. However, it does reflect the low 
priority given to the Treasury’s arguments during discussions of this subject. In late 
1950 the Labour government became aware that once the Federal Republic began 
to create its own armed forces they would demand a reduction in occupation 
costs. It was hot until a year later that the Conservatives fully examined the 
implications of this and Butler concluded that the benefits of German 
rearmament, in terms of reducing the Federal Republic’s competitiveness in world 
trade, outweighed the disadvantages. Though the Treasury continued to make 
occasional protests against the burden likely to result from the loss of occupation 
costs, this factor played little role in the wider policy debate. In the crisis 
atmosphere of September 1954 the commitment to maintain current force levels 
on the continent was made so quickly that no serious consideration was given to 
its long-term consequences. It should be noted, however, that, had the Allies not 
secured a very favourable financial settlement for the pre-ratification period in 
1952, the government might have been forced to consider these problems much 
earlier.
This examination of the German rearmament debate has demonstrated 
how substantially different London’s Cold War agenda was from Washington’s. 
The Attlee and Churchill governments were regularly forced to defer to the senior 
partner in the Atlantic Alliance, but if we are to understand the distinctive role 
played by the British it is necessary to examine closely those failed attempts to 
divert the American Cold War juggernaut. Though tied to Washington by the 
demands of expediency, the British repeatedly clashed with the Americans during
14 Peter in Deighton (ed.) op. cit.
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discussions of German rearmament. The disagreement over the gendarmerie 
scheme was the first and the most unusual of these disputes but there were a 
series of further clashes over the package proposal, the Spofford Plan, arms 
controls in Germany, the replies to the 1952 Stalin notes, Churchill’s summit 
proposals, the decoupling of German rearmament from the contract, and the 
strategy to be adopted at the 1955 Geneva summit. With the possible exception 
of the battle of the notes, all these incidents were at least partially the result of 
genuine disagreements about the nature and importance of German rearmament. 
The British found it much more difficult to accept this policy than the Americans 
and only really acquiesced on the basis that it was essential in order to integrate 
the Federal Republic into the West.
For British policy-makers in the early 1950s the threat posed by Germany 
appeared to be as dangerous as the long term Soviet menace. In order to 
understand their attitude it is essential to erase memories of subsequent Cold War 
history as far as possible. Germany has now been a reliable member of the 
western alliance for forty years, while the collapse of the Soviet Union is too 
recent to bury memories of the long hostility between Russia and the West. 
Memories of the Berlin Wall, Cuba, the Prague Spring and Afghanistan remain 
vivid, but for the policy-makers of the early 1950s the resonant recollections were 
of Sarajevo, Rapallo, Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. These carried a 
different message about Germany from the one which has been conveyed by forty 
years of division. Of these incidents it was the least known today, the Soviet- 
German Rapallo Pact which was seminal in British discussion of German 
rearmament in the early 1950s. It seemed to give a double lesson for it did not 
merely illustrate the allegedly natural German proclivity to seek alliances with 
eastern autocrats but it also demonstrated that this tendency would only be 
encouraged by a punitive peace. British policy-makers were not convinced that a 
policy of magnanimity would succeed but they believed it was the only feasible 
option in the light of recent history and current dilemmas. If there is one thing 
which the study of German rearmament demonstrates it is the heavy burden which 
the supposed lessons of the past impose on those planning for the future.
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APPENDIX 
FOREIGN OFFICE POLICY MAKERS
DENIS ALLEN (1910-87) Schooled in New Zealand and a graduate of 
Cambridge, Allen headed the German Political department between 1950 and
1952 and the Central department from 1952 to 1953. He was subsequently 
ambassador to Turkey and promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary.
ROGER ALLEN (1909-72) Educated at Repton and Corpus Christi, Roger 
Allen initially pursued a legal career before joining the FO in 1940. He was in 
Moscow between 1946 and 1948 and British Deputy High Commander from 1954 
to> the end of the occupation. Later he was ambassador to Greece and Iraq.
DEREK ASHE (b. 1919) Educated at Bradfield and Trinity, Oxford, 
between 1947 and 1949 Ashe was second secretary to Berlin and then Frankfurt. 
Ini 1950 he became Kirkpatrick’s Private Secretary. He was ambassador to 
Romania and Argentina in the 1970s.
RODERICK BARCLAY (1909-96) an Old Harrovian and graduate of 
Trinity, Cambridge, Barclay was posted to Brussels, Paris and Washington prior 
to> World War II. He was Principal Private Secretary to Bevin in the last two years 
o f his Foreign Secretaryship. He reached the rank of Deputy Under-Secretary in
1953 and was ambassador to Denmark and Belgium.
STEWART CRAWFORD (b.1913) Crawford was educated at Greshams 
and Oriel, Oxford. He worked at the Air Ministry in the 1930s and in 1946 joined 
thie German section of the FO. From 1948 to 1951 he headed the German 
Finance department and the Mutual Aid Committee from 1952 to 1954. He led 
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